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This chapter explores the extent to which a covert perfectionism, or theory of the good life, may be at work, along with more traditional antidiscrimination values, in contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence. The chapter argues that it is difficult to fully understand or make sense of courts’ reactions to sex-based hiring in cases that involve personal privacy or sexual titillation without recognizing an unspoken judicial prioritization of intellectual development and a distrust of commodified sexuality.

In this chapter, I discuss what perfectionism for children entails. In this context, perfectionism refers to the view that the state is empowered to promote people’s welfare by taking actions premised on a contested view of ethics. Whereas previous discussions have been focussed on individual achievements in fields like the arts or sport, I argue this rests on an implausibly narrow view of personal flourishing. In addition, I argue against the view that perfectionism should aim only, or mostly, at the promotion of autonomy. While critical thinking and self-reflection are often central to a good life, they are far from sufficient. Instead, promoting the welfare of children requires them to come to hold ethical beliefs conducive to their flourishing; they must hold a positive and plausible conception of the good.

This chapter explores Emersonian Moral Perfectionism (EMP). It examines Cavell's interpretation of EMP and discusses Dewey's text in which he echoes the Emersonian voice. It shows that the preoccupations that run through Cavell's discussion of EMP are, in fact, very close to Dewey's central concerns with democracy, education, and growth. The chapter concludes that EMP can constitute an alternative framework to reevaluate Dewey beyond Hegel and Darwin.

This chapter explores the extent to which a covert perfectionism, or theory of the good life, may be at work, along with more traditional antidiscrimination values, in contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence. The chapter argues that it is difficult to fully understand or make sense of courts’ reactions to sex-based hiring in cases that involve personal privacy or sexual titillation without recognizing an unspoken judicial prioritization of intellectual development and a distrust of commodified sexuality.

Chapter 10 moves from considering relationships between agents conceived simply as individuals toward considering agents conceived as members of bounded groups. It addresses the question: what part ought values and conceptions of the good life play in a supranational polity containing a diversity of ways of life? Should the EU be perfectionist, or adhere instead to liberal neutrality? The chapter articulates four guiding principles which together define ‘impartial perfectionism’, in which the EU framework even-handedly assures and affirms diversity of morally acceptable ways of life. Impartial perfectionism is a public philosophy that all in a pluralistic EU can subscribe to, it is argued, because it actively promotes public mutual recognition of each as culturally situated holders of universal human rights and differing ethical attachments. Moreover, impartial perfectionism at EU level, because it guarantees citizens a context of choice, requires a wide degree of latitude be left to member states to decide matters of value and ethos. It is claimed that this is the nature of the good supranational polity.

Chapter 10 begins the search for the best version of objective naturalism, the view that purely physical ways of living can be meaningful, and not merely because they are the object of propositional attitudes. This chapter criticizes two of the three major forms of objectivism in the literature, starting with the currently dominant view, namely, Susan Wolf’s theory that meaningfulness is being attracted to what merits attraction. The chapter then takes up consequentialism, especially the utilitarian view, suggested by Peter Singer, that meaning comes from making those in the world better off. Utilitarianism is rejected not only because meaning need not involve promoting well-being, but also because of its consequentialist or teleological structure. There are respects in which promoting well-being, or even excellence ò la Thomas Hurka’s perfectionism, insufficiently captures meaningful conditions. That is, certain ‘agent-relative’ ways of responding to final goodness are shown to be essential for an adequate theory.