Dean J. White
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719095238
- eISBN:
- 9781781708828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719095238.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The book uses a case study of the British response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 to understand what factors motivate the decision to intervene in humanitarian crises overseas; it is primarily a ...
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The book uses a case study of the British response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 to understand what factors motivate the decision to intervene in humanitarian crises overseas; it is primarily a study of British politics, especially under Conservative Governments, rather than a study of the genocide itself. The book begins with a review of the general literature on humanitarian intervention and a brief description of the background to the genocide. It then moves on to focus on the British response; the research uses interviews with ministers and senior civil servants and documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to explore and explain the Government’s response. It also explores in some depth the response of the British media, public, NGOs and Parliament and considers how these various actors influence government policy making. The research demonstrates that intervention only becomes likely when three factors are present: first there must be a realisation that a humanitarian crisis exists; secondly, to overcome bureaucratic inertia there must be support for intervention at the most senior levels of government; and there must be a belief that intervention will be successful. In the final chapter, the book then tests this conclusion by reviewing the British response to the contemporary crises in Libya and Syria.Less
The book uses a case study of the British response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 to understand what factors motivate the decision to intervene in humanitarian crises overseas; it is primarily a study of British politics, especially under Conservative Governments, rather than a study of the genocide itself. The book begins with a review of the general literature on humanitarian intervention and a brief description of the background to the genocide. It then moves on to focus on the British response; the research uses interviews with ministers and senior civil servants and documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to explore and explain the Government’s response. It also explores in some depth the response of the British media, public, NGOs and Parliament and considers how these various actors influence government policy making. The research demonstrates that intervention only becomes likely when three factors are present: first there must be a realisation that a humanitarian crisis exists; secondly, to overcome bureaucratic inertia there must be support for intervention at the most senior levels of government; and there must be a belief that intervention will be successful. In the final chapter, the book then tests this conclusion by reviewing the British response to the contemporary crises in Libya and Syria.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book assesses the role of the UN Secretariat in the Rwandan genocide. With the help of new sources, including the personal diaries and private papers of the late Sir Marrack Goulding, it ...
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This book assesses the role of the UN Secretariat in the Rwandan genocide. With the help of new sources, including the personal diaries and private papers of the late Sir Marrack Goulding, it situates the Rwanda operation within the context of bureaucratic friction existing at Headquarters in the early 1990s between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The book argues that these units clashed not only over resources (a classic symptom of bureaucratic pathology) but also over the scope of peacekeeping and the role of the Secretary-General (SG) within it. This rivalry also reflected a split between a strong-willed SG determined to leave his mark on international affairs and to use his ‘political’ department independently of states, and Washington and the politico-military apparatus of the Pentagon, which in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti found itself increasingly at odds with Boutros-Ghali. Although the book looks at how this bureaucratic and power-political confrontation impacted on the Rwanda mission, it identifies the conceptual reasons for the DPA–DPKO split in the grey area that separates peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The difficulty of distinguishing these two key UN functions, coupled with the creative tension between SGs and states, explains why six decades after the birth of the UN, it has still not been possible to demarcate the exact roles of DPA and DPKO. Far from being dull and irrelevant, the book concludes that the UN bureaucracy is an intriguing barometer of the role of the Secretary-General in world politics.Less
This book assesses the role of the UN Secretariat in the Rwandan genocide. With the help of new sources, including the personal diaries and private papers of the late Sir Marrack Goulding, it situates the Rwanda operation within the context of bureaucratic friction existing at Headquarters in the early 1990s between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The book argues that these units clashed not only over resources (a classic symptom of bureaucratic pathology) but also over the scope of peacekeeping and the role of the Secretary-General (SG) within it. This rivalry also reflected a split between a strong-willed SG determined to leave his mark on international affairs and to use his ‘political’ department independently of states, and Washington and the politico-military apparatus of the Pentagon, which in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti found itself increasingly at odds with Boutros-Ghali. Although the book looks at how this bureaucratic and power-political confrontation impacted on the Rwanda mission, it identifies the conceptual reasons for the DPA–DPKO split in the grey area that separates peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The difficulty of distinguishing these two key UN functions, coupled with the creative tension between SGs and states, explains why six decades after the birth of the UN, it has still not been possible to demarcate the exact roles of DPA and DPKO. Far from being dull and irrelevant, the book concludes that the UN bureaucracy is an intriguing barometer of the role of the Secretary-General in world politics.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter attempts to give a broad overview of the argument of the book and reinforce its central themes of communal reconciliation, care, reciprocity, and the dangers of violence.
This chapter attempts to give a broad overview of the argument of the book and reinforce its central themes of communal reconciliation, care, reciprocity, and the dangers of violence.
Jonathan S. Addleton
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9789888139941
- eISBN:
- 9789888180868
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789888139941.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter explores interaction between the United States and Mongolia on security issues, including support for Mongolia's increasing presence on UN and other peacekeeping missions around the ...
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This chapter explores interaction between the United States and Mongolia on security issues, including support for Mongolia's increasing presence on UN and other peacekeeping missions around the world. Most notably, Mongolia joined international efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mongolian soldiers have also served under the UN flag in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chad, Darfur and South Sudan, among other places. The United States supported these efforts in a number of ways, including through a partnership established between the Mongolian Armed Forces and the Alaska National Guard and periodic exercises such as Khaan Quest and Gobi Wolf. Joining with other countries, the United States also helped Mongolia in its efforts to establish an international peacekeeping training centre at Five Hills, west of Ulaanbaatar.Less
This chapter explores interaction between the United States and Mongolia on security issues, including support for Mongolia's increasing presence on UN and other peacekeeping missions around the world. Most notably, Mongolia joined international efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mongolian soldiers have also served under the UN flag in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chad, Darfur and South Sudan, among other places. The United States supported these efforts in a number of ways, including through a partnership established between the Mongolian Armed Forces and the Alaska National Guard and periodic exercises such as Khaan Quest and Gobi Wolf. Joining with other countries, the United States also helped Mongolia in its efforts to establish an international peacekeeping training centre at Five Hills, west of Ulaanbaatar.
Richard Caplan
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198810360
- eISBN:
- 9780191847356
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
How can we know if the peace that has been established following a civil war is a stable peace? More than half of all countries that experienced civil war since World War II have suffered a relapse ...
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How can we know if the peace that has been established following a civil war is a stable peace? More than half of all countries that experienced civil war since World War II have suffered a relapse into violent conflict—in some cases more than once. Meanwhile the international community expends billions of dollars and deploys tens of thousands of personnel each year in support of efforts to build peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. This book argues that efforts to build peace are hampered by the lack of effective means of assessing progress towards the achievement of a consolidated peace. Rarely, if ever, do peacebuilding organizations and governments seek to ascertain the quality of the peace that they are helping to build and the contribution that their engagement is making (or not) to the consolidation of peace. More rigorous assessments of the robustness of peace are needed. These assessments require clarity about the characteristics of, and the requirements for, a stable peace. This in turn requires knowledge of the local culture, local history, and the specific conflict dynamics at work in a given conflict situation. Better assessment can inform peacebuilding actors in the reconfiguration and reprioritization of their operations in cases where conditions on the ground have deteriorated or improved. To build a stable peace, it is argued here, it is important to take the measure of peace.Less
How can we know if the peace that has been established following a civil war is a stable peace? More than half of all countries that experienced civil war since World War II have suffered a relapse into violent conflict—in some cases more than once. Meanwhile the international community expends billions of dollars and deploys tens of thousands of personnel each year in support of efforts to build peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. This book argues that efforts to build peace are hampered by the lack of effective means of assessing progress towards the achievement of a consolidated peace. Rarely, if ever, do peacebuilding organizations and governments seek to ascertain the quality of the peace that they are helping to build and the contribution that their engagement is making (or not) to the consolidation of peace. More rigorous assessments of the robustness of peace are needed. These assessments require clarity about the characteristics of, and the requirements for, a stable peace. This in turn requires knowledge of the local culture, local history, and the specific conflict dynamics at work in a given conflict situation. Better assessment can inform peacebuilding actors in the reconfiguration and reprioritization of their operations in cases where conditions on the ground have deteriorated or improved. To build a stable peace, it is argued here, it is important to take the measure of peace.
Marina E. Henke
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739699
- eISBN:
- 9781501739705
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739699.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in ...
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This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).Less
This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).
David Fitzgerald
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804785815
- eISBN:
- 9780804786423
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785815.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. ...
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The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. Nonetheless the Army did adapt itself to this ‘new world order’ in two ways. Firstly, reticence towards intervention was elevated almost to the level of formal doctrine within the Army. Secondly the Army began to formulate a new peacekeeping doctrine for the 1990s. The tensions between these two approaches, both derived from different sets of lessons from Vietnam, never really affected the broader institutional identity of the Army, but they did create a paradox: that of an anti-interventionist military that nonetheless acquiesced in peacekeeping interventions. This paradox speaks not only to the particular difficulties the US faced when undertaking peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, but the way in which the ghosts of Vietnam continued to haunt the Army.Less
The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. Nonetheless the Army did adapt itself to this ‘new world order’ in two ways. Firstly, reticence towards intervention was elevated almost to the level of formal doctrine within the Army. Secondly the Army began to formulate a new peacekeeping doctrine for the 1990s. The tensions between these two approaches, both derived from different sets of lessons from Vietnam, never really affected the broader institutional identity of the Army, but they did create a paradox: that of an anti-interventionist military that nonetheless acquiesced in peacekeeping interventions. This paradox speaks not only to the particular difficulties the US faced when undertaking peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, but the way in which the ghosts of Vietnam continued to haunt the Army.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This introduction outlines the rationale, arguments, sources, focus, and architecture of the book. It also explains the author’s involvement with the Goulding Archive and reviews the promises and ...
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This introduction outlines the rationale, arguments, sources, focus, and architecture of the book. It also explains the author’s involvement with the Goulding Archive and reviews the promises and perils that such a primary source offers, including in terms of potential bias (both internal and external). The introduction also identifies three explanations for the Secretariat’s fragmentation in the early 1990s—bureaucratic, power-political, and conceptual—and argues that these pathologies still affect the UN organization today. Through a ‘micro-history’ of the Rwandan crisis as seen from New York, the introduction further explains why and how the events of 1994 provide the contours of a ‘macro-history’ of the UN Secretariat as a whole.Less
This introduction outlines the rationale, arguments, sources, focus, and architecture of the book. It also explains the author’s involvement with the Goulding Archive and reviews the promises and perils that such a primary source offers, including in terms of potential bias (both internal and external). The introduction also identifies three explanations for the Secretariat’s fragmentation in the early 1990s—bureaucratic, power-political, and conceptual—and argues that these pathologies still affect the UN organization today. Through a ‘micro-history’ of the Rwandan crisis as seen from New York, the introduction further explains why and how the events of 1994 provide the contours of a ‘macro-history’ of the UN Secretariat as a whole.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of ...
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This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of the so-called ‘New World Order’ which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the chapter outlines the role of DPKO during the early reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and reviews several decisions taken by the peacekeeping department. These include the size of the mission and its troop levels, the so-called ‘genocide cable’ sent by Dallaire about forthcoming ethnic massacres, and the mandate and rules of engagement of the Rwandan operation. The chapter also introduces the phenomenon of the ‘anticipatory veto’, or a tendency on the part of Secretariat officials to recommend to the Security Council only what the latter is likely to endorse.Less
This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of the so-called ‘New World Order’ which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the chapter outlines the role of DPKO during the early reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and reviews several decisions taken by the peacekeeping department. These include the size of the mission and its troop levels, the so-called ‘genocide cable’ sent by Dallaire about forthcoming ethnic massacres, and the mandate and rules of engagement of the Rwandan operation. The chapter also introduces the phenomenon of the ‘anticipatory veto’, or a tendency on the part of Secretariat officials to recommend to the Security Council only what the latter is likely to endorse.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by ...
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This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and analyses the department’s reaction to the crisis. The DPA’s role in monitoring the Arusha Peace Agreements and in providing the ‘political’ analysis of the Rwandan context is also reviewed, as is Boutros-Ghali’s desire for a powerful ‘political’ department to be juxtaposed to member states’ preference for peacekeeping and DPKO. The chapter also considers the leadership change of March 1994 when, a month before the genocide, Marrack Goulding took over the whole of DPA.Less
This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and analyses the department’s reaction to the crisis. The DPA’s role in monitoring the Arusha Peace Agreements and in providing the ‘political’ analysis of the Rwandan context is also reviewed, as is Boutros-Ghali’s desire for a powerful ‘political’ department to be juxtaposed to member states’ preference for peacekeeping and DPKO. The chapter also considers the leadership change of March 1994 when, a month before the genocide, Marrack Goulding took over the whole of DPA.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter considers the role played and the problems faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the tragic events of 1994. It reviews a number of shortcomings that ...
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This chapter considers the role played and the problems faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the tragic events of 1994. It reviews a number of shortcomings that defined this operation, including its late deployment, scarce resources, and poor logistics. The chapter also analyses UNAMIR’s mandate and highlights the different interpretations of it offered by UNAMIR and by DPKO. The reasons behind the personal frictions within the mission’s leadership are also assessed, including the faulty separation between peacebuilding and peacekeeping—and between the roles of DPA and DPKO—in both Kigali and New York.Less
This chapter considers the role played and the problems faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the tragic events of 1994. It reviews a number of shortcomings that defined this operation, including its late deployment, scarce resources, and poor logistics. The chapter also analyses UNAMIR’s mandate and highlights the different interpretations of it offered by UNAMIR and by DPKO. The reasons behind the personal frictions within the mission’s leadership are also assessed, including the faulty separation between peacebuilding and peacekeeping—and between the roles of DPA and DPKO—in both Kigali and New York.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explores the origins of the bureaucratic confrontation between DPA and DPKO in the early 1990s. It argues that while both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali wanted to strengthen their ...
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This chapter explores the origins of the bureaucratic confrontation between DPA and DPKO in the early 1990s. It argues that while both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali wanted to strengthen their role as Secretary-General, they used different bureaucratic tools to achieve it. Pérez de Cuéllar kept peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the tight control of his Executive Office, whereas Boutros-Ghali created DPA and DPKO. In October 1993, Boutros-Ghali also abruptly redefined the roles of these two departments, so that DPA was charged with substantive decision-making responsibility, whereas DPKO was to be downgraded to ‘operational’ tasks. Fresh documents also suggest that the DPA–DPKO competition was partly the result of the Secretary-General’s attempt to disenfranchise himself from the UN membership through what Boutros-Ghali saw as a powerful ‘political’ office to be opposed to the ‘operational’—and, in his view, US-dominated—DPKO.Less
This chapter explores the origins of the bureaucratic confrontation between DPA and DPKO in the early 1990s. It argues that while both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali wanted to strengthen their role as Secretary-General, they used different bureaucratic tools to achieve it. Pérez de Cuéllar kept peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the tight control of his Executive Office, whereas Boutros-Ghali created DPA and DPKO. In October 1993, Boutros-Ghali also abruptly redefined the roles of these two departments, so that DPA was charged with substantive decision-making responsibility, whereas DPKO was to be downgraded to ‘operational’ tasks. Fresh documents also suggest that the DPA–DPKO competition was partly the result of the Secretary-General’s attempt to disenfranchise himself from the UN membership through what Boutros-Ghali saw as a powerful ‘political’ office to be opposed to the ‘operational’—and, in his view, US-dominated—DPKO.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter considers the ways in which the UN Secretariat handled the four critical stages of the ‘intelligence sequence’ in Rwanda, namely, the planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of ...
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This chapter considers the ways in which the UN Secretariat handled the four critical stages of the ‘intelligence sequence’ in Rwanda, namely, the planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the run-up to the genocide. It argues that it is precisely in the domain of intelligence that the ambiguous roles of DPA and DPKO were most visible and problematic. Fresh evidence further suggests that, on the eve of UNAMIR, a new system of data-collection and analysis was established by Boutros-Ghali that was supposed to rely heavily on both DPA and DPKO as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the SG. The chapter comes to the conclusion that part of the reason behind the DPA–DPKO feud in New York can be linked to their competing intelligence roles in the early 1990s.Less
This chapter considers the ways in which the UN Secretariat handled the four critical stages of the ‘intelligence sequence’ in Rwanda, namely, the planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the run-up to the genocide. It argues that it is precisely in the domain of intelligence that the ambiguous roles of DPA and DPKO were most visible and problematic. Fresh evidence further suggests that, on the eve of UNAMIR, a new system of data-collection and analysis was established by Boutros-Ghali that was supposed to rely heavily on both DPA and DPKO as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the SG. The chapter comes to the conclusion that part of the reason behind the DPA–DPKO feud in New York can be linked to their competing intelligence roles in the early 1990s.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter brings the story of DPA–DPKO relations up to the present. It argues that neither the bureaucratic nor the conceptual problems faced by UNAMIR—especially the difficulty of separating ...
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This chapter brings the story of DPA–DPKO relations up to the present. It argues that neither the bureaucratic nor the conceptual problems faced by UNAMIR—especially the difficulty of separating peacekeeping from peacebuilding—have been fully addressed, let alone solved. The chapter picks up the DPA–DPKO confrontation at the time of Kofi Annan’s elevation to SG and considers the changes that he (from 1997) and Ban Ki-moon (from 2007) introduced to tackle the difficult relations between DPA and DPKO. Annan’s response to this rivalry was the ‘Lead Department’ concept, whereas Ban—following a trend in post-9/11 international relations—prioritized peacebuilding and DPA over peacekeeping and DPKO. Since one of the key reasons behind their bureaucratic friction lies with the porous borders between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that the partial strengthening of DPA in 2008–09—well intentioned though it was—failed to solve the problem.Less
This chapter brings the story of DPA–DPKO relations up to the present. It argues that neither the bureaucratic nor the conceptual problems faced by UNAMIR—especially the difficulty of separating peacekeeping from peacebuilding—have been fully addressed, let alone solved. The chapter picks up the DPA–DPKO confrontation at the time of Kofi Annan’s elevation to SG and considers the changes that he (from 1997) and Ban Ki-moon (from 2007) introduced to tackle the difficult relations between DPA and DPKO. Annan’s response to this rivalry was the ‘Lead Department’ concept, whereas Ban—following a trend in post-9/11 international relations—prioritized peacebuilding and DPA over peacekeeping and DPKO. Since one of the key reasons behind their bureaucratic friction lies with the porous borders between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that the partial strengthening of DPA in 2008–09—well intentioned though it was—failed to solve the problem.
Herman T. Salton
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198733591
- eISBN:
- 9780191797972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733591.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This conclusion argues that the historic friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is far more than a pernicious case of ...
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This conclusion argues that the historic friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is far more than a pernicious case of bureaucratic pathology. It suggests that the roles of these two departments remain elusive both at the UN Headquarters and in peace operations around the world partly due to the all-encompassing reference to ‘political’ affairs in the DPA’s title, and partly as a result of the problematic distinction between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ functions in New York. Since few—if any—activities at UN Headquarters can be regarded as ‘technical’ or ‘non-political’ in nature, it is no wonder that the role and scope of DPA remain as unclear today as they were in Rwanda in 1994 and when the department was set up in 1992.Less
This conclusion argues that the historic friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is far more than a pernicious case of bureaucratic pathology. It suggests that the roles of these two departments remain elusive both at the UN Headquarters and in peace operations around the world partly due to the all-encompassing reference to ‘political’ affairs in the DPA’s title, and partly as a result of the problematic distinction between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ functions in New York. Since few—if any—activities at UN Headquarters can be regarded as ‘technical’ or ‘non-political’ in nature, it is no wonder that the role and scope of DPA remain as unclear today as they were in Rwanda in 1994 and when the department was set up in 1992.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
International peacekeeping is one of the primary ways that global and regional institutions, such as the United Nations and the African Union, respond to conflict, violence, instability, and human ...
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International peacekeeping is one of the primary ways that global and regional institutions, such as the United Nations and the African Union, respond to conflict, violence, instability, and human rights abuses. While a major component of many peacekeeping operations is military, peacekeeping is different enough from other military options that trying to analyse its proper conduct using the traditional just war principles of jus in bello is inadequate. A moral analysis of peacekeeping must take full account of the fact that peacekeepers should not relate even to hostile forces as enemies; and, that peacekeeping is an endeavour that shares many characteristics with war, policing, and governance, but is distinct from all three. This book outlines a moral structure for peacekeeping centered on the idea that peacekeepers are there to manage violence (both that of parties to the conflict and their own) in such a way to permit a damaged political community to heal itself. It argues for a new understanding of the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, based on dozens of field interviews with peacekeepers, and drawing on philosophical work in the ethics of care, deliberative democracy, and theories of respect, as well as research on the psychology of violence and concrete discussions of the conflicts and interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia. It also discusses the relationship between peacekeeping and the responsibility to protect civilians, and the distinction from related operations, such as peace enforcement and counterinsurgency.Less
International peacekeeping is one of the primary ways that global and regional institutions, such as the United Nations and the African Union, respond to conflict, violence, instability, and human rights abuses. While a major component of many peacekeeping operations is military, peacekeeping is different enough from other military options that trying to analyse its proper conduct using the traditional just war principles of jus in bello is inadequate. A moral analysis of peacekeeping must take full account of the fact that peacekeepers should not relate even to hostile forces as enemies; and, that peacekeeping is an endeavour that shares many characteristics with war, policing, and governance, but is distinct from all three. This book outlines a moral structure for peacekeeping centered on the idea that peacekeepers are there to manage violence (both that of parties to the conflict and their own) in such a way to permit a damaged political community to heal itself. It argues for a new understanding of the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, based on dozens of field interviews with peacekeepers, and drawing on philosophical work in the ethics of care, deliberative democracy, and theories of respect, as well as research on the psychology of violence and concrete discussions of the conflicts and interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia. It also discusses the relationship between peacekeeping and the responsibility to protect civilians, and the distinction from related operations, such as peace enforcement and counterinsurgency.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Peacekeeping is defined, and distinguished from related operations including peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. The broad definition is taken from the United Nations’ “capstone doctrine,” as a ...
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Peacekeeping is defined, and distinguished from related operations including peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. The broad definition is taken from the United Nations’ “capstone doctrine,” as a “technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile… achieved by the peacemakers,” and is elaborated in terms of Urquhart's contention that peacekeepers have no enemies. This distinguishes it from peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, even when peacekeepers use force. The importance of peacekeeping is emphasized, as a tool useful for building peace in the contemporary world, where violence is often the result of a collapse in social order, calling for repair and reconciliation rather than military defeat – but in a violent context where unarmed peacebuilders are insecure.Less
Peacekeeping is defined, and distinguished from related operations including peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. The broad definition is taken from the United Nations’ “capstone doctrine,” as a “technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile… achieved by the peacemakers,” and is elaborated in terms of Urquhart's contention that peacekeepers have no enemies. This distinguishes it from peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, even when peacekeepers use force. The importance of peacekeeping is emphasized, as a tool useful for building peace in the contemporary world, where violence is often the result of a collapse in social order, calling for repair and reconciliation rather than military defeat – but in a violent context where unarmed peacebuilders are insecure.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops a broad normative framework for peacekeeping, based on the idea that peacekeepers aim at restoring functional social relationships between all parties rather than the more ...
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This chapter develops a broad normative framework for peacekeeping, based on the idea that peacekeepers aim at restoring functional social relationships between all parties rather than the more traditional war aim of identifying and defeating an enemy. The idea that peacekeepers have no enemies is further elaborated, delving into the concept of enmity (and critiquing the way spoiler groups are often conceived) and some of the historical changes in how peacekeeping has been conceived, particularly in the wake of massacres of civilians in the Balkans and Rwanda during peacekeeping missions. Drawing on Korsgaard's work on respect, the key problem is identified as creating or restoring social practices of shared value disrupted by conflict. For individual peacekeepers, this translates into a focus on caring virtues of attentiveness, restraint, and creativity.Less
This chapter develops a broad normative framework for peacekeeping, based on the idea that peacekeepers aim at restoring functional social relationships between all parties rather than the more traditional war aim of identifying and defeating an enemy. The idea that peacekeepers have no enemies is further elaborated, delving into the concept of enmity (and critiquing the way spoiler groups are often conceived) and some of the historical changes in how peacekeeping has been conceived, particularly in the wake of massacres of civilians in the Balkans and Rwanda during peacekeeping missions. Drawing on Korsgaard's work on respect, the key problem is identified as creating or restoring social practices of shared value disrupted by conflict. For individual peacekeepers, this translates into a focus on caring virtues of attentiveness, restraint, and creativity.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The concept of consent, part of the traditional “holy trinity” is analysed. This chapter argues that consent is best understood not as a one-time agreement, but as an ongoing process (in line with ...
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The concept of consent, part of the traditional “holy trinity” is analysed. This chapter argues that consent is best understood not as a one-time agreement, but as an ongoing process (in line with much contemporary thought). Approaches to consent that focus on an agreement by the host nation government are morally dangerous, as peacekeepers operate where institutions are not in place to allow any formal government to embody the desires or interests of the political community as a whole.Less
The concept of consent, part of the traditional “holy trinity” is analysed. This chapter argues that consent is best understood not as a one-time agreement, but as an ongoing process (in line with much contemporary thought). Approaches to consent that focus on an agreement by the host nation government are morally dangerous, as peacekeepers operate where institutions are not in place to allow any formal government to embody the desires or interests of the political community as a whole.
Daniel H. Levine
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748675890
- eISBN:
- 9780748697199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748675890.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Contemporary understandings of impartiality make a sharp break with earlier notions of neutrality. Impartiality is now most often understood as even-handed enforcement of the peacekeepers’ mandate ...
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Contemporary understandings of impartiality make a sharp break with earlier notions of neutrality. Impartiality is now most often understood as even-handed enforcement of the peacekeepers’ mandate (and/or international human rights norms). This chapter first canvasses a variety of possible understandings of “impartiality,” and argues that impartiality should be understood in terms of focusing on the peace process. Second, it argues that we must attend not only to the standards for impartial action but to the processes by which some actions are deemed partial or impartial – peacekeepers may in good faith believe themselves to be acting impartially, but if they are the sole interpreters and authorities, they may find that other actors do not agree. Impartiality requires a more inclusive process for resolution of disagreements, such as that pursued early in the 1993 peacekeeping operation in SomaliaLess
Contemporary understandings of impartiality make a sharp break with earlier notions of neutrality. Impartiality is now most often understood as even-handed enforcement of the peacekeepers’ mandate (and/or international human rights norms). This chapter first canvasses a variety of possible understandings of “impartiality,” and argues that impartiality should be understood in terms of focusing on the peace process. Second, it argues that we must attend not only to the standards for impartial action but to the processes by which some actions are deemed partial or impartial – peacekeepers may in good faith believe themselves to be acting impartially, but if they are the sole interpreters and authorities, they may find that other actors do not agree. Impartiality requires a more inclusive process for resolution of disagreements, such as that pursued early in the 1993 peacekeeping operation in Somalia