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Conclusion

Daniel H. Levine

in The Morality of Peacekeeping

This chapter attempts to give a broad overview of the argument of the book and reinforce its central themes of communal reconciliation, care, reciprocity, and the dangers of violence.

Promoting Security

Jonathan S. Addleton

in Mongolia and the United States: A Diplomatic History

This chapter explores interaction between the United States and Mongolia on security issues, including support for Mongolia's increasing presence on UN and other peacekeeping missions around the ... More

This chapter explores interaction between the United States and Mongolia on security issues, including support for Mongolia's increasing presence on UN and other peacekeeping missions around the world. Most notably, Mongolia joined international efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mongolian soldiers have also served under the UN flag in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chad, Darfur and South Sudan, among other places. The United States supported these efforts in a number of ways, including through a partnership established between the Mongolian Armed Forces and the Alaska National Guard and periodic exercises such as Khaan Quest and Gobi Wolf. Joining with other countries, the United States also helped Mongolia in its efforts to establish an international peacekeeping training centre at Five Hills, west of Ulaanbaatar.Less

Saving Darfur: Unamid (2007–)

Marina E. Henke

in Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in ... More

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).Less

PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE 1990S

David Fitzgerald

in Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq

The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. ... More

The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. Nonetheless the Army did adapt itself to this ‘new world order’ in two ways. Firstly, reticence towards intervention was elevated almost to the level of formal doctrine within the Army. Secondly the Army began to formulate a new peacekeeping doctrine for the 1990s. The tensions between these two approaches, both derived from different sets of lessons from Vietnam, never really affected the broader institutional identity of the Army, but they did create a paradox: that of an anti-interventionist military that nonetheless acquiesced in peacekeeping interventions. This paradox speaks not only to the particular difficulties the US faced when undertaking peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, but the way in which the ghosts of Vietnam continued to haunt the Army.Less

Introduction: Bureaucracy, Power, and Tragedy in Rwanda

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This introduction outlines the rationale, arguments, sources, focus, and architecture of the book. It also explains the author’s involvement with the Goulding Archive and reviews the promises and ... More

This introduction outlines the rationale, arguments, sources, focus, and architecture of the book. It also explains the author’s involvement with the Goulding Archive and reviews the promises and perils that such a primary source offers, including in terms of potential bias (both internal and external). The introduction also identifies three explanations for the Secretariat’s fragmentation in the early 1990s—bureaucratic, power-political, and conceptual—and argues that these pathologies still affect the UN organization today. Through a ‘micro-history’ of the Rwandan crisis as seen from New York, the introduction further explains why and how the events of 1994 provide the contours of a ‘macro-history’ of the UN Secretariat as a whole.Less

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of ... More

This chapter reviews the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before and during the Rwandan genocide. After introducing the peculiar context of the early 1990s and the promises of the so-called ‘New World Order’ which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the chapter outlines the role of DPKO during the early reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and reviews several decisions taken by the peacekeeping department. These include the size of the mission and its troop levels, the so-called ‘genocide cable’ sent by Dallaire about forthcoming ethnic massacres, and the mandate and rules of engagement of the Rwandan operation. The chapter also introduces the phenomenon of the ‘anticipatory veto’, or a tendency on the part of Secretariat officials to recommend to the Security Council only what the latter is likely to endorse.Less

Department of Political Affairs

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by ... More

This chapter assesses the role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the Rwanda genocide. It situates DPA within the Secretariat of the early 1990s, explains the importance given to it by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and analyses the department’s reaction to the crisis. The DPA’s role in monitoring the Arusha Peace Agreements and in providing the ‘political’ analysis of the Rwandan context is also reviewed, as is Boutros-Ghali’s desire for a powerful ‘political’ department to be juxtaposed to member states’ preference for peacekeeping and DPKO. The chapter also considers the leadership change of March 1994 when, a month before the genocide, Marrack Goulding took over the whole of DPA.Less

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter considers the role played and the problems faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the tragic events of 1994. It reviews a number of shortcomings that ... More

This chapter considers the role played and the problems faced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the tragic events of 1994. It reviews a number of shortcomings that defined this operation, including its late deployment, scarce resources, and poor logistics. The chapter also analyses UNAMIR’s mandate and highlights the different interpretations of it offered by UNAMIR and by DPKO. The reasons behind the personal frictions within the mission’s leadership are also assessed, including the faulty separation between peacebuilding and peacekeeping—and between the roles of DPA and DPKO—in both Kigali and New York.Less

Bureaucracy

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter explores the origins of the bureaucratic confrontation between DPA and DPKO in the early 1990s. It argues that while both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali wanted to strengthen their ... More

This chapter explores the origins of the bureaucratic confrontation between DPA and DPKO in the early 1990s. It argues that while both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali wanted to strengthen their role as Secretary-General, they used different bureaucratic tools to achieve it. Pérez de Cuéllar kept peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the tight control of his Executive Office, whereas Boutros-Ghali created DPA and DPKO. In October 1993, Boutros-Ghali also abruptly redefined the roles of these two departments, so that DPA was charged with substantive decision-making responsibility, whereas DPKO was to be downgraded to ‘operational’ tasks. Fresh documents also suggest that the DPA–DPKO competition was partly the result of the Secretary-General’s attempt to disenfranchise himself from the UN membership through what Boutros-Ghali saw as a powerful ‘political’ office to be opposed to the ‘operational’—and, in his view, US-dominated—DPKO.Less

Intelligence

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter considers the ways in which the UN Secretariat handled the four critical stages of the ‘intelligence sequence’ in Rwanda, namely, the planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of ... More

This chapter considers the ways in which the UN Secretariat handled the four critical stages of the ‘intelligence sequence’ in Rwanda, namely, the planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the run-up to the genocide. It argues that it is precisely in the domain of intelligence that the ambiguous roles of DPA and DPKO were most visible and problematic. Fresh evidence further suggests that, on the eve of UNAMIR, a new system of data-collection and analysis was established by Boutros-Ghali that was supposed to rely heavily on both DPA and DPKO as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the SG. The chapter comes to the conclusion that part of the reason behind the DPA–DPKO feud in New York can be linked to their competing intelligence roles in the early 1990s.Less

Peacebuilding

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This chapter brings the story of DPA–DPKO relations up to the present. It argues that neither the bureaucratic nor the conceptual problems faced by UNAMIR—especially the difficulty of separating ... More

This chapter brings the story of DPA–DPKO relations up to the present. It argues that neither the bureaucratic nor the conceptual problems faced by UNAMIR—especially the difficulty of separating peacekeeping from peacebuilding—have been fully addressed, let alone solved. The chapter picks up the DPA–DPKO confrontation at the time of Kofi Annan’s elevation to SG and considers the changes that he (from 1997) and Ban Ki-moon (from 2007) introduced to tackle the difficult relations between DPA and DPKO. Annan’s response to this rivalry was the ‘Lead Department’ concept, whereas Ban—following a trend in post-9/11 international relations—prioritized peacebuilding and DPA over peacekeeping and DPKO. Since one of the key reasons behind their bureaucratic friction lies with the porous borders between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that the partial strengthening of DPA in 2008–09—well intentioned though it was—failed to solve the problem.Less

Conclusion: The UN Secretariat, Yesterday and Today

Herman T. Salton

in Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda

This conclusion argues that the historic friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is far more than a pernicious case of ... More

This conclusion argues that the historic friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is far more than a pernicious case of bureaucratic pathology. It suggests that the roles of these two departments remain elusive both at the UN Headquarters and in peace operations around the world partly due to the all-encompassing reference to ‘political’ affairs in the DPA’s title, and partly as a result of the problematic distinction between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ functions in New York. Since few—if any—activities at UN Headquarters can be regarded as ‘technical’ or ‘non-political’ in nature, it is no wonder that the role and scope of DPA remain as unclear today as they were in Rwanda in 1994 and when the department was set up in 1992.Less

Introduction

Daniel H. Levine

in The Morality of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is defined, and distinguished from related operations including peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. The broad definition is taken from the United Nations’ “capstone doctrine,” as a ... More

Peacekeeping is defined, and distinguished from related operations including peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. The broad definition is taken from the United Nations’ “capstone doctrine,” as a “technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile… achieved by the peacemakers,” and is elaborated in terms of Urquhart's contention that peacekeepers have no enemies. This distinguishes it from peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, even when peacekeepers use force. The importance of peacekeeping is emphasized, as a tool useful for building peace in the contemporary world, where violence is often the result of a collapse in social order, calling for repair and reconciliation rather than military defeat – but in a violent context where unarmed peacebuilders are insecure.Less

A Normative Framework for Peacekeeping

Daniel H. Levine

in The Morality of Peacekeeping

This chapter develops a broad normative framework for peacekeeping, based on the idea that peacekeepers aim at restoring functional social relationships between all parties rather than the more ... More

This chapter develops a broad normative framework for peacekeeping, based on the idea that peacekeepers aim at restoring functional social relationships between all parties rather than the more traditional war aim of identifying and defeating an enemy. The idea that peacekeepers have no enemies is further elaborated, delving into the concept of enmity (and critiquing the way spoiler groups are often conceived) and some of the historical changes in how peacekeeping has been conceived, particularly in the wake of massacres of civilians in the Balkans and Rwanda during peacekeeping missions. Drawing on Korsgaard's work on respect, the key problem is identified as creating or restoring social practices of shared value disrupted by conflict. For individual peacekeepers, this translates into a focus on caring virtues of attentiveness, restraint, and creativity.Less

Consent

Daniel H. Levine

in The Morality of Peacekeeping

The concept of consent, part of the traditional “holy trinity” is analysed. This chapter argues that consent is best understood not as a one-time agreement, but as an ongoing process (in line with ... More

The concept of consent, part of the traditional “holy trinity” is analysed. This chapter argues that consent is best understood not as a one-time agreement, but as an ongoing process (in line with much contemporary thought). Approaches to consent that focus on an agreement by the host nation government are morally dangerous, as peacekeepers operate where institutions are not in place to allow any formal government to embody the desires or interests of the political community as a whole.Less

Impartiality

Daniel H. Levine

in The Morality of Peacekeeping

Contemporary understandings of impartiality make a sharp break with earlier notions of neutrality. Impartiality is now most often understood as even-handed enforcement of the peacekeepers’ mandate ... More

Contemporary understandings of impartiality make a sharp break with earlier notions of neutrality. Impartiality is now most often understood as even-handed enforcement of the peacekeepers’ mandate (and/or international human rights norms). This chapter first canvasses a variety of possible understandings of “impartiality,” and argues that impartiality should be understood in terms of focusing on the peace process. Second, it argues that we must attend not only to the standards for impartial action but to the processes by which some actions are deemed partial or impartial – peacekeepers may in good faith believe themselves to be acting impartially, but if they are the sole interpreters and authorities, they may find that other actors do not agree. Impartiality requires a more inclusive process for resolution of disagreements, such as that pursued early in the 1993 peacekeeping operation in SomaliaLess