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The Idea of Experience

Alan Millar

in Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262026550
eISBN:
9780262255219
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter discusses the disjunctive conception of experience and pays particular attention to those philosophers who are attracted by it. Originally suggested by J. M. Hinton, the disjunctive ... More


Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity

Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon (eds)

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199608751
eISBN:
9780191823305
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Animalism is the view that we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and ... More


Persons, Animals, and Human Beings

Harold Noonan

in Time and Identity

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014090
eISBN:
9780262265799
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.003.0147
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter discusses the suggestion that a psychological approach must be mistaken, because, in fact, the correct account of personal identity is given by the biological approach, according to ... More


Remnant Persons: Animalism’s Undoing

Mark Johnston

in Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199608751
eISBN:
9780191823305
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter raises three objections to animalism. First, if it isn’t an account of what we essentially are then the “too many persons” argument is ineffectual, since “animal” could be a phase ... More


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