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In important recent work in religious epistemology, Paul Moser develops a multifaceted reply to a prominent attack on belief in God—the so called Hiddenness Argument. This chapter raises a number of worries about Moser’s novel treatment of the Hiddenness Argument. After laying out the version of that argument Moser most explicitly engages, the chapter explains the four main elements of Moser’s reply and argues that his reply stands or falls with two pieces in particular—the Purposively Available Evidence Argument and the Cognitive Idolatry Argument. It is shown that the Cognitive Idolatry Argument fails, leaving the Purposively Available Evidence Argument as Moser’s only potentially viable objection to the Hiddenness Argument. The chapter concludes that Moser’s treatment of the Hiddenness Argument depends crucially on controversial epistemological claims about certain of our moral beliefs, and is thus considerably more vulnerable than many have recognized.

This chapter explicates the concept of a natural sign. The original Reidian concept of a natural sign is either a sensation or a perception that is causally linked “upstream” to what the sign signifies and “downstream” to the generation of a characteristic judgment. The author extends Reid's work to consider the idea of a “theistic natural sign.” A theistic natural sign ought to be something that is connected both to God and to a human disposition to believe in God. He argues that both widespread belief in God and current cognitive science are consistent with the claim that theistic signs exist. Finally, he argues that theistic natural signs might be understood as either (a) non‐propositional grounds on which belief in God is warranted, or (b) non‐propositional (or, perhaps, even propositional) evidence for the fact of God's existence. He remains neutral between these competing views.

In this chapter, William Hasker responds to the challenges to Christian philosophy offered by the other chapters in this section. Graham Oppy argues that the widely acclaimed surge in Christian philosophy is more a myth than a reality. Paul Moser thinks that, insofar as there has been something of a surge, the philosophy produced falls short of being properly Christian. John Schellenberg’s view is even more ominous: the result of the surge is something that is not really philosophy at all. Aaron Simmons accepts that a surge has occurred: he worries that it may lead to both exclusivism and triumphalism among the philosophers involved in it. It is argued here that, while the criticisms have some merit, the project of Christian philosophy can be vindicated against them and remains a viable and promising enterprise.