Jay David Atlas
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195133004
- eISBN:
- 9780199850181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133004.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Richard Rorty wrote The Linguistic Turn, a collection of essays that discusses the philosophical methods employed by both various empiricists during the war and the philosophers of “ordinary ...
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Richard Rorty wrote The Linguistic Turn, a collection of essays that discusses the philosophical methods employed by both various empiricists during the war and the philosophers of “ordinary language” in pre- and post-war Oxford. A third linguistic turn is experienced in philosophy which originated from the thoughts of philosophers such as W. V. O. Quine and Noam Chomsky. This turn had a lighter impact than the first two turns, and it is perceived as having more sophistication and tentativeness, and being more responsive to the requirements of theory construction. P. H. Nowell-Smith's notion of “contextual implication” coincided with Paul Grice's idea of a “conversational implication”, and from this emerged the Gricean aspect of this said linguistic turn. This chapter attempts to discuss how Grice came up with such an idea and how this was incorporated into a philosophical language theory.Less
Richard Rorty wrote The Linguistic Turn, a collection of essays that discusses the philosophical methods employed by both various empiricists during the war and the philosophers of “ordinary language” in pre- and post-war Oxford. A third linguistic turn is experienced in philosophy which originated from the thoughts of philosophers such as W. V. O. Quine and Noam Chomsky. This turn had a lighter impact than the first two turns, and it is perceived as having more sophistication and tentativeness, and being more responsive to the requirements of theory construction. P. H. Nowell-Smith's notion of “contextual implication” coincided with Paul Grice's idea of a “conversational implication”, and from this emerged the Gricean aspect of this said linguistic turn. This chapter attempts to discuss how Grice came up with such an idea and how this was incorporated into a philosophical language theory.
Paul Grice and Judith Baker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed ...
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The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).Less
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).
Paul Grice
Richard Warner (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198242529
- eISBN:
- 9780191597534
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198242522.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical ...
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This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.Less
This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.
Judith Baker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter describes the three works of Paul Grice collected in this volume, selected in order to present his metaphysical defence of value. It clarifies some of the basic elements of ...
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This introductory chapter describes the three works of Paul Grice collected in this volume, selected in order to present his metaphysical defence of value. It clarifies some of the basic elements of Grice's constructivist theory and the relationship between the third Carus lecture and the ‘Reply to Richards’.Less
This introductory chapter describes the three works of Paul Grice collected in this volume, selected in order to present his metaphysical defence of value. It clarifies some of the basic elements of Grice's constructivist theory and the relationship between the third Carus lecture and the ‘Reply to Richards’.
Jay David Atlas
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195133004
- eISBN:
- 9780199850181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133004.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This look at the philosophy of language focuses on the interface between a theory of literal meaning and pragmatics — a philosophical examination of the relationship between meaning and language use ...
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This look at the philosophy of language focuses on the interface between a theory of literal meaning and pragmatics — a philosophical examination of the relationship between meaning and language use and its contexts. Here, the author develops the contrast between verbal ambiguity and verbal generality, works out a detailed theory of conversational inference using the work of Paul Grice on Implicature as a starting point, and gives an account of their interface as an example of the relationship between Chomsky's Internalist Semantics and Language Performance. He then discusses consequences of his theory of the Interface for the distinction between metaphorical and literal language, for Grice's account of meaning, for the Analytic/Synthetic distinction, for Meaning Holism, and for Formal Semantics of Natural Language.Less
This look at the philosophy of language focuses on the interface between a theory of literal meaning and pragmatics — a philosophical examination of the relationship between meaning and language use and its contexts. Here, the author develops the contrast between verbal ambiguity and verbal generality, works out a detailed theory of conversational inference using the work of Paul Grice on Implicature as a starting point, and gives an account of their interface as an example of the relationship between Chomsky's Internalist Semantics and Language Performance. He then discusses consequences of his theory of the Interface for the distinction between metaphorical and literal language, for Grice's account of meaning, for the Analytic/Synthetic distinction, for Meaning Holism, and for Formal Semantics of Natural Language.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199739998
- eISBN:
- 9780199895045
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739998.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their ...
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Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their attraction. Building on the ideas of Paul Grice and Amos Tversky, this work shows how figurative language derives its power from its insistence that the reader participate in the text, looking beyond the literal meaning of the figurative language to the meanings that are implied. With examples ranging from Shakespeare, John Donne, and Jane Austen to e.e. cummings, Bessie Smith, and Monty Python, this work shows that the intellectual and aesthetic force of figurative language is not derived from inherent magical power, but instead from the opportunity it provides for unlimited elaboration in the hands of those gifted in its use. A distinctive feature of this work is that it presents a modern restatement of the view, first put forward by Aristotle, that metaphors are to be treated as elliptical similes. In a generalized form, this restatement of the Aristotelian view treats both metaphors and similes (and a number of other tropes) as figurative comparisons. The book then offers a detailed defense of this “comparativist” view of metaphors in response to the almost universal rejection of it by eminent philosophers. This new edition has extended the notion of figurative comparisons to cover synecdoche. It also ventures into new territory by considering two genres, fables and satires.Less
Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their attraction. Building on the ideas of Paul Grice and Amos Tversky, this work shows how figurative language derives its power from its insistence that the reader participate in the text, looking beyond the literal meaning of the figurative language to the meanings that are implied. With examples ranging from Shakespeare, John Donne, and Jane Austen to e.e. cummings, Bessie Smith, and Monty Python, this work shows that the intellectual and aesthetic force of figurative language is not derived from inherent magical power, but instead from the opportunity it provides for unlimited elaboration in the hands of those gifted in its use. A distinctive feature of this work is that it presents a modern restatement of the view, first put forward by Aristotle, that metaphors are to be treated as elliptical similes. In a generalized form, this restatement of the Aristotelian view treats both metaphors and similes (and a number of other tropes) as figurative comparisons. The book then offers a detailed defense of this “comparativist” view of metaphors in response to the almost universal rejection of it by eminent philosophers. This new edition has extended the notion of figurative comparisons to cover synecdoche. It also ventures into new territory by considering two genres, fables and satires.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587292
- eISBN:
- 9780191728747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter reviews the book, Studies in the Way of Words, by Paul Grice. It highlights aspects of his work which constitute a substantial and enduring contribution to philosophical and linguistic ...
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This chapter reviews the book, Studies in the Way of Words, by Paul Grice. It highlights aspects of his work which constitute a substantial and enduring contribution to philosophical and linguistic theory. Most prominent among these are two contributions which are highlighted. First, there is the attempt to give a reductive analysis of the concept of linguistic meaning in psychological terms — a project originally and brilliantly sketched in the 1957 article ‘Meaning’ (reproduced as Chapter 14 in this book), and subsequently elaborated in a series of lectures and articles (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 18). Second, there is the development of the theory of conversational implicature, which has rightly won a secure place in linguistic theory, on both of its necessarily connected semantic and pragmatic sides (Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, and 17).Less
This chapter reviews the book, Studies in the Way of Words, by Paul Grice. It highlights aspects of his work which constitute a substantial and enduring contribution to philosophical and linguistic theory. Most prominent among these are two contributions which are highlighted. First, there is the attempt to give a reductive analysis of the concept of linguistic meaning in psychological terms — a project originally and brilliantly sketched in the 1957 article ‘Meaning’ (reproduced as Chapter 14 in this book), and subsequently elaborated in a series of lectures and articles (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 18). Second, there is the development of the theory of conversational implicature, which has rightly won a secure place in linguistic theory, on both of its necessarily connected semantic and pragmatic sides (Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, and 17).
Paul Grice
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents the final section of Paul Grice's ‘Reply to Richards’, which takes up, or takes off from, a few of the things that they have to say about important issues belonging to the chain ...
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This chapter presents the final section of Paul Grice's ‘Reply to Richards’, which takes up, or takes off from, a few of the things that they have to say about important issues belonging to the chain of disciplines listed in the title of the section - metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and value.Less
This chapter presents the final section of Paul Grice's ‘Reply to Richards’, which takes up, or takes off from, a few of the things that they have to say about important issues belonging to the chain of disciplines listed in the title of the section - metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and value.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In “Free Agency,” Gary Watson argued that an account of free agency needs to distinguish what a person wants or desires—what a person is to some extent moved to do—from what a person values. Even ...
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In “Free Agency,” Gary Watson argued that an account of free agency needs to distinguish what a person wants or desires—what a person is to some extent moved to do—from what a person values. Even when one values what one desires, the motivational strength of the desire may not correspond to the extent to which one values what the desire is for. This chapter describes a model of valuing as a higher-order policy of weights in practical reasoning. It makes a proposal that ties an important kind of reflective valuing to the will of an agent whose agency is temporally extended. Intentions, plans, and policies were initially introduced on top of prior structures of considered desires. The chapter proceeds by way of a project of Paul Grice's “creature construction”: such policies about weights are a further development of planning structures, planning structures introduced earlier in the “construction” to support cross-temporal and social organization. The chapter also discusses desires, considered desires, and deliberation as well as planning agents and hierarchy.Less
In “Free Agency,” Gary Watson argued that an account of free agency needs to distinguish what a person wants or desires—what a person is to some extent moved to do—from what a person values. Even when one values what one desires, the motivational strength of the desire may not correspond to the extent to which one values what the desire is for. This chapter describes a model of valuing as a higher-order policy of weights in practical reasoning. It makes a proposal that ties an important kind of reflective valuing to the will of an agent whose agency is temporally extended. Intentions, plans, and policies were initially introduced on top of prior structures of considered desires. The chapter proceeds by way of a project of Paul Grice's “creature construction”: such policies about weights are a further development of planning structures, planning structures introduced earlier in the “construction” to support cross-temporal and social organization. The chapter also discusses desires, considered desires, and deliberation as well as planning agents and hierarchy.
Lindsay Judson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264577
- eISBN:
- 9780191734267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264577.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Historiography
John Lloyd Ackrill (1921–2007), a Fellow of the British Academy, had a powerful and far-reaching influence on the way ancient philosophy is done in the English-speaking world and beyond. In his first ...
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John Lloyd Ackrill (1921–2007), a Fellow of the British Academy, had a powerful and far-reaching influence on the way ancient philosophy is done in the English-speaking world and beyond. In his first article, he interpreted Plato's claim at Sophist 259e, in the process confronting what would have been at the time the authoritative interpretation, that of W. D. Ross. Ackrill was born in Reading to Frederick William Ackrill and Jessie Anne Ackrill. He was educated at Reading School and at St John's College in the University of Oxford; his philosophy tutors at St John's were Paul Grice and John Mabbott. Ackrill's first book was Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. He also published a pair of seminal articles on Plato's Sophist. Perhaps the most important aspect of Ackrill's enduring influence was his editorship of the Clarendon Aristotle Series.Less
John Lloyd Ackrill (1921–2007), a Fellow of the British Academy, had a powerful and far-reaching influence on the way ancient philosophy is done in the English-speaking world and beyond. In his first article, he interpreted Plato's claim at Sophist 259e, in the process confronting what would have been at the time the authoritative interpretation, that of W. D. Ross. Ackrill was born in Reading to Frederick William Ackrill and Jessie Anne Ackrill. He was educated at Reading School and at St John's College in the University of Oxford; his philosophy tutors at St John's were Paul Grice and John Mabbott. Ackrill's first book was Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. He also published a pair of seminal articles on Plato's Sophist. Perhaps the most important aspect of Ackrill's enduring influence was his editorship of the Clarendon Aristotle Series.
Stanley Rosen
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300091977
- eISBN:
- 9780300129526
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300091977.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of ...
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This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of G. E. Moore, John Austin, and Paul Grice. The topics of ordinary language and common sense are closely related in one way and quite different in another. A language, by definition, is a set of procedures for constructing intelligible units of communication. Common sense, on the other hand, is a faculty of judgment. The terms “ordinary” and “common,” however, suggest a deeper connection. It is a simple step to the inference that ordinary language is that which is spoken normally or usually within some specified linguistic community, as defined by some particular natural language or languages. An analogous step allows one to infer that common sense belongs to the majority of a designated population, and perhaps to all of its members.Less
This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of G. E. Moore, John Austin, and Paul Grice. The topics of ordinary language and common sense are closely related in one way and quite different in another. A language, by definition, is a set of procedures for constructing intelligible units of communication. Common sense, on the other hand, is a faculty of judgment. The terms “ordinary” and “common,” however, suggest a deeper connection. It is a simple step to the inference that ordinary language is that which is spoken normally or usually within some specified linguistic community, as defined by some particular natural language or languages. An analogous step allows one to infer that common sense belongs to the majority of a designated population, and perhaps to all of its members.
Paul Grice
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents some ideas about how to approach philosophical psychology. It begins by formulating four problems that adequate philosophical psychology must be able to test. It discusses some ...
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This chapter presents some ideas about how to approach philosophical psychology. It begins by formulating four problems that adequate philosophical psychology must be able to test. It discusses some general aspects of the relation between psychological theory and psychological concepts, and two formal features that may be desirable to attribute to some of the laws of the theory to be used to explicate psychological concepts. The chapter then goes on to a semi-realistic procedure for introducing some psychological concepts, content-internalization, and higher-order psychological states.Less
This chapter presents some ideas about how to approach philosophical psychology. It begins by formulating four problems that adequate philosophical psychology must be able to test. It discusses some general aspects of the relation between psychological theory and psychological concepts, and two formal features that may be desirable to attribute to some of the laws of the theory to be used to explicate psychological concepts. The chapter then goes on to a semi-realistic procedure for introducing some psychological concepts, content-internalization, and higher-order psychological states.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587292
- eISBN:
- 9780191728747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter discusses some lessons learned from philosophy in the 20th century. One of these is that the fundamental bearers of the properties of truth or falsity, the fundamental subjects of the ...
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This chapter discusses some lessons learned from philosophy in the 20th century. One of these is that the fundamental bearers of the properties of truth or falsity, the fundamental subjects of the predicates ‘true’ or ‘false’, are not linguistic items, neither sentences nor utterances of sentences. It is not, when we speak or write, the words we then use, but what we then use them to say, that is in question. It is whatever may be believed, doubted, hypothesized, suspected, supposed, affirmed, denied, declared, alleged, and so forth, that is, or may be, true. The views of Paul Grice are also considered: his emphasis on the value of consulting our great dead predecessors; the doctrine of the unity of philosophy across apparent departmental divisions; and his opposition to ‘Minimalism’ in philosophy, a heading under which he ranged a number of other ‘isms’, including ‘physicalism’ and ‘extensionalism’.Less
This chapter discusses some lessons learned from philosophy in the 20th century. One of these is that the fundamental bearers of the properties of truth or falsity, the fundamental subjects of the predicates ‘true’ or ‘false’, are not linguistic items, neither sentences nor utterances of sentences. It is not, when we speak or write, the words we then use, but what we then use them to say, that is in question. It is whatever may be believed, doubted, hypothesized, suspected, supposed, affirmed, denied, declared, alleged, and so forth, that is, or may be, true. The views of Paul Grice are also considered: his emphasis on the value of consulting our great dead predecessors; the doctrine of the unity of philosophy across apparent departmental divisions; and his opposition to ‘Minimalism’ in philosophy, a heading under which he ranged a number of other ‘isms’, including ‘physicalism’ and ‘extensionalism’.
Christopher Hutton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748633500
- eISBN:
- 9780748671489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748633500.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Applied Linguistics and Pedagogy
This chapter reviews approaches taken by political philosophers concerned with the nature of law, with language seen as one of the key elements in the formation of political collectivities ruled by ...
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This chapter reviews approaches taken by political philosophers concerned with the nature of law, with language seen as one of the key elements in the formation of political collectivities ruled by law. However language as law's medium has also been seen as a potential source of instability and uncertainty, and legal theorists and political philosophers have differed widely in their assessment of the importance and role of language in law. If law is a kind of market of exchange or reflects a social contract between citizens and the sovereign, and language is the medium for the recording of law and for its explication, then the terms of that contract, and language in general, become the primary medium through which social order is created and maintained. Questions about definition, rules, and coherence are central to anxieties about legal language. This chapter reviews the positions of legal theorists and philosophers, notably Bentham, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Grice, showing how that the linguistic turn in philosophy used law as a way of understanding everyday language.Less
This chapter reviews approaches taken by political philosophers concerned with the nature of law, with language seen as one of the key elements in the formation of political collectivities ruled by law. However language as law's medium has also been seen as a potential source of instability and uncertainty, and legal theorists and political philosophers have differed widely in their assessment of the importance and role of language in law. If law is a kind of market of exchange or reflects a social contract between citizens and the sovereign, and language is the medium for the recording of law and for its explication, then the terms of that contract, and language in general, become the primary medium through which social order is created and maintained. Questions about definition, rules, and coherence are central to anxieties about legal language. This chapter reviews the positions of legal theorists and philosophers, notably Bentham, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Grice, showing how that the linguistic turn in philosophy used law as a way of understanding everyday language.
Margot Norris
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813034027
- eISBN:
- 9780813038162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813034027.003.0015
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
Fritz Senn, one of the most incisive readers ever to tackle Ulysses, calls “Calypso” “probably the easiest chapter in the novel.” This is certainly true for veteran readers of the novel, who can ...
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Fritz Senn, one of the most incisive readers ever to tackle Ulysses, calls “Calypso” “probably the easiest chapter in the novel.” This is certainly true for veteran readers of the novel, who can bring the knowledge of the whole work to bear on figuring out nearly everything that goes on in this episode. But how would “Calypso” strike a first-time or virgin reader, as we might call such a hypothetical figure? This chapter advocates a return to first principles in its endeavor to track the heuristic dilemmas faced by a “virgin” reader of “Calypso.” Adopting Paul Grice's notion of implicature, the role of the unspoken and the implied in discourse, this chapter charts the path the reader must steer through the false leads, explanatory gaps, perplexing conjunctions, semiotic lapses, and insinuated points of view of this episode. It shows that all interpretations of Ulysses must necessarily be incomplete and imperfect and that, moreover, James Joyce forces us to collude in the guilty secrets at which the text playfully gestures only often to reveal as figments.Less
Fritz Senn, one of the most incisive readers ever to tackle Ulysses, calls “Calypso” “probably the easiest chapter in the novel.” This is certainly true for veteran readers of the novel, who can bring the knowledge of the whole work to bear on figuring out nearly everything that goes on in this episode. But how would “Calypso” strike a first-time or virgin reader, as we might call such a hypothetical figure? This chapter advocates a return to first principles in its endeavor to track the heuristic dilemmas faced by a “virgin” reader of “Calypso.” Adopting Paul Grice's notion of implicature, the role of the unspoken and the implied in discourse, this chapter charts the path the reader must steer through the false leads, explanatory gaps, perplexing conjunctions, semiotic lapses, and insinuated points of view of this episode. It shows that all interpretations of Ulysses must necessarily be incomplete and imperfect and that, moreover, James Joyce forces us to collude in the guilty secrets at which the text playfully gestures only often to reveal as figments.
George Bealer
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244288
- eISBN:
- 9780191680762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244288.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Predicates and open-sentences express properties and relations, and sentences express propositions. But which type of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are these, which type of PRP is ...
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Predicates and open-sentences express properties and relations, and sentences express propositions. But which type of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are these, which type of PRP is relevant to the theory of meaning? Do they conform to the first traditional conception or the second? Given Paul Grice's intentionalist analysis of meaning, it is easy to establish that the second traditional conception of PRPs is the one relevant to the theory of meaning, for it is this conception that is suited to intentional matters to begin with. But how, then, does the first traditional conception fit in? This chapter addresses this.Less
Predicates and open-sentences express properties and relations, and sentences express propositions. But which type of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are these, which type of PRP is relevant to the theory of meaning? Do they conform to the first traditional conception or the second? Given Paul Grice's intentionalist analysis of meaning, it is easy to establish that the second traditional conception of PRPs is the one relevant to the theory of meaning, for it is this conception that is suited to intentional matters to begin with. But how, then, does the first traditional conception fit in? This chapter addresses this.
Geoffrey Leech
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780195341386
- eISBN:
- 9780190225933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341386.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter presents a goal-oriented approach to communication, in which both the speaker and the hearer engage in problem solving to arrive at pragmatic meaning. Especially in explaining ...
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This chapter presents a goal-oriented approach to communication, in which both the speaker and the hearer engage in problem solving to arrive at pragmatic meaning. Especially in explaining indirectness and negative politeness, it returns to the foundations of modern Anglo-American pragmatics in the thinking of (in particular) Paul Grice and John Searle, bringing these two philosophical accounts together in a “Searlo-Gricean” account of the pragmatics of politeness. It further draws on more recent neo-Gricean thinking, especially in emphasizing the role of default interpretation as an essential component of pragmatic inference. Also explained is the role of pragmaticization (or “routinization”) as a process leading to conventional implicature. The pragmatic background of this chapter is further explained, especially for newcomers to the field, in the Appendix at the end of the book.Less
This chapter presents a goal-oriented approach to communication, in which both the speaker and the hearer engage in problem solving to arrive at pragmatic meaning. Especially in explaining indirectness and negative politeness, it returns to the foundations of modern Anglo-American pragmatics in the thinking of (in particular) Paul Grice and John Searle, bringing these two philosophical accounts together in a “Searlo-Gricean” account of the pragmatics of politeness. It further draws on more recent neo-Gricean thinking, especially in emphasizing the role of default interpretation as an essential component of pragmatic inference. Also explained is the role of pragmaticization (or “routinization”) as a process leading to conventional implicature. The pragmatic background of this chapter is further explained, especially for newcomers to the field, in the Appendix at the end of the book.
Nicholas Allott and Benjamin Shaer
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive ...
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In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive properties that follow from the institutional nature and goals of the legal domain. The authors first sketch a general picture of verbal communication as essentially inferential, drawing on recent work in linguistic pragmatics that takes its inspiration from the work of Paul Grice. The authors then focus on the complex activity of adjudication. The authors analyse adjudication in speech act terms as a “verdictive”, explaining how this act encompasses a number of sub-activities. In doing so, the authors pay particular attention to Endicott’s (2012) claims about the “interpretative” and “non-interpretative” aspects of judging. Significantly, the authors reject some specific claims of his regarding the “non-interpretative” nature of certain components of adjudication. The authors argue (i) that the general picture of verbal communication implies that understanding the speech act content of the law is an interpretative, inferential activity; and (ii) that a court creatively determining extensions of vague terms is also performing interpretation, if it is attempting to respect certain intentions of the legislature in doing so.Less
In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive properties that follow from the institutional nature and goals of the legal domain. The authors first sketch a general picture of verbal communication as essentially inferential, drawing on recent work in linguistic pragmatics that takes its inspiration from the work of Paul Grice. The authors then focus on the complex activity of adjudication. The authors analyse adjudication in speech act terms as a “verdictive”, explaining how this act encompasses a number of sub-activities. In doing so, the authors pay particular attention to Endicott’s (2012) claims about the “interpretative” and “non-interpretative” aspects of judging. Significantly, the authors reject some specific claims of his regarding the “non-interpretative” nature of certain components of adjudication. The authors argue (i) that the general picture of verbal communication implies that understanding the speech act content of the law is an interpretative, inferential activity; and (ii) that a court creatively determining extensions of vague terms is also performing interpretation, if it is attempting to respect certain intentions of the legislature in doing so.
Sylvia Berryman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198835004
- eISBN:
- 9780191876561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198835004.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
On the model of Grice’s account of the creation of a new kind of value at the same time as the introduction of practical agents, this chapter continues the argument that Aristotle attempted to ...
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On the model of Grice’s account of the creation of a new kind of value at the same time as the introduction of practical agents, this chapter continues the argument that Aristotle attempted to ‘bootstrap’ a commitment to normativity from the existence of practical reason. Reinterpreting Socrates’ paradoxical claim that everyone aims at the good, Aristotle turned a tautological analysis of action—that it necessarily aims at some good—into the normative thesis that we are, as rational agents, implicitly committed to seeking the true good. Central to his vision is the belief that we can antecedently identify some agents as more practically wise than others, averting the possibility of radical collective error.Less
On the model of Grice’s account of the creation of a new kind of value at the same time as the introduction of practical agents, this chapter continues the argument that Aristotle attempted to ‘bootstrap’ a commitment to normativity from the existence of practical reason. Reinterpreting Socrates’ paradoxical claim that everyone aims at the good, Aristotle turned a tautological analysis of action—that it necessarily aims at some good—into the normative thesis that we are, as rational agents, implicitly committed to seeking the true good. Central to his vision is the belief that we can antecedently identify some agents as more practically wise than others, averting the possibility of radical collective error.
D. H. Mellor
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199645084
- eISBN:
- 9780191743351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645084.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends the view that sentences get their meanings from the contents of the beliefs they express, not the other way round. It shows first how the contents of contingent beliefs are given ...
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This chapter defends the view that sentences get their meanings from the contents of the beliefs they express, not the other way round. It shows first how the contents of contingent beliefs are given by the success conditions of the actions they make desires cause, i.e. the conditions in which the actions fulfil those desires. It then meets objections to this thesis and uses it to derive the meanings of sentences. It does this by showing how uttering a sentence to tell others what we believe is an action that will succeed if our beliefs about how it does so are true. The chapter ends by showing how this theory simplifies Paul Grice’s theory of meaning.Less
This chapter defends the view that sentences get their meanings from the contents of the beliefs they express, not the other way round. It shows first how the contents of contingent beliefs are given by the success conditions of the actions they make desires cause, i.e. the conditions in which the actions fulfil those desires. It then meets objections to this thesis and uses it to derive the meanings of sentences. It does this by showing how uttering a sentence to tell others what we believe is an action that will succeed if our beliefs about how it does so are true. The chapter ends by showing how this theory simplifies Paul Grice’s theory of meaning.