Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their ...
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Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.Less
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.
Michael Spivey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195170788
- eISBN:
- 9780199786831
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.003.0006
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter identifies weaknesses in formal logical approaches to categorization by discussing Russell's Paradox with set theory and the Sorites Paradox, and by tracking the continuous temporal ...
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This chapter identifies weaknesses in formal logical approaches to categorization by discussing Russell's Paradox with set theory and the Sorites Paradox, and by tracking the continuous temporal dynamics of the categorization process. On the way toward selecting a discrete response in a categorization task, a participant's simultaneous partial consideration of multiple categories is revealed by continuous real-time measures, such as eye-tracking. Experimental results and simulations (with the normalized recurrence localist attractor network) are shown for animal categorization tasks, visual object categorization, and categorical speech perception. It is argued that constraints on action, rather than some internal “cognitive bottleneck”, are responsible for producing category-like effects.Less
This chapter identifies weaknesses in formal logical approaches to categorization by discussing Russell's Paradox with set theory and the Sorites Paradox, and by tracking the continuous temporal dynamics of the categorization process. On the way toward selecting a discrete response in a categorization task, a participant's simultaneous partial consideration of multiple categories is revealed by continuous real-time measures, such as eye-tracking. Experimental results and simulations (with the normalized recurrence localist attractor network) are shown for animal categorization tasks, visual object categorization, and categorical speech perception. It is argued that constraints on action, rather than some internal “cognitive bottleneck”, are responsible for producing category-like effects.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the ...
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It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the Lottery and Preface paradoxes and from naturalized epistemology are answered. It is further argued that, under normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction simply is to believe each of its conjuncts.Less
It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the Lottery and Preface paradoxes and from naturalized epistemology are answered. It is further argued that, under normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction simply is to believe each of its conjuncts.
Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of Buridan’s conception of logical validity in a semantically closed token-based system, as he conceives of natural languages. The chapter argues first ...
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This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of Buridan’s conception of logical validity in a semantically closed token-based system, as he conceives of natural languages. The chapter argues first that Buridan has very good logical, as well as merely metaphysical, reasons to conceive of natural languages as compositional systems of significative token-symbols. Next, the chapter discusses the peculiar Buridanian conception truth and validity, according to which validity must not be based on truth, and truth need not always follow upon correspondence. These results are presented as the consequences of Buridan’s pursuit of a consistently nominalist semantics for natural languages, able to handle the Liar Paradox and its kin involving reflective uses of language without the Tarskian distinction between object-language and meta-language, rejected for systematic reasons in the seventh chapter.Less
This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of Buridan’s conception of logical validity in a semantically closed token-based system, as he conceives of natural languages. The chapter argues first that Buridan has very good logical, as well as merely metaphysical, reasons to conceive of natural languages as compositional systems of significative token-symbols. Next, the chapter discusses the peculiar Buridanian conception truth and validity, according to which validity must not be based on truth, and truth need not always follow upon correspondence. These results are presented as the consequences of Buridan’s pursuit of a consistently nominalist semantics for natural languages, able to handle the Liar Paradox and its kin involving reflective uses of language without the Tarskian distinction between object-language and meta-language, rejected for systematic reasons in the seventh chapter.
Graeme Forbes
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ ...
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This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ Barnato won the Le Mans 24 hour race in 1929 and (debatably) 1930. Attempts in 1990 to sell a certain car, also referred to as Old Number One, were resisted by some on the grounds that too many upgrades, modifications, and repairs had taken place for the 1929 car to be considered the same car as the 1990 car. The chapter argues for the coherence of a ‘no fact of the matter’ verdict about such puzzles, and develops apparatus that involves a novel conception of degrees of truth in terms of higher-order levels of vagueness, thereby avoiding the need for talk of ‘degrees of identity’.Less
This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ Barnato won the Le Mans 24 hour race in 1929 and (debatably) 1930. Attempts in 1990 to sell a certain car, also referred to as Old Number One, were resisted by some on the grounds that too many upgrades, modifications, and repairs had taken place for the 1929 car to be considered the same car as the 1990 car. The chapter argues for the coherence of a ‘no fact of the matter’ verdict about such puzzles, and develops apparatus that involves a novel conception of degrees of truth in terms of higher-order levels of vagueness, thereby avoiding the need for talk of ‘degrees of identity’.
Shoutir Kishore Chatterjee
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198525318
- eISBN:
- 9780191711657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198525318.003.0006
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
After James Bernoulli, the main contributors to probability theory and its applications in the 18th century worked either to solve more intricate problems of games of chance (De Moivre), or to build ...
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After James Bernoulli, the main contributors to probability theory and its applications in the 18th century worked either to solve more intricate problems of games of chance (De Moivre), or to build new probability models (De Moivre, Daniel Bernoulli). Further, some of them used probabilistic arguments to test hypotheses about or to estimate parameters involved in probability models for real life phenomena in the fields of demography, astronomy, and theory of errors. The concept of continuous variables, the tool of generating functions, the normal model approximation to the binomial, and ‘the rational expectation principle’ (in the context of the St. Petersburg Paradox) emerged out of these studies.Less
After James Bernoulli, the main contributors to probability theory and its applications in the 18th century worked either to solve more intricate problems of games of chance (De Moivre), or to build new probability models (De Moivre, Daniel Bernoulli). Further, some of them used probabilistic arguments to test hypotheses about or to estimate parameters involved in probability models for real life phenomena in the fields of demography, astronomy, and theory of errors. The concept of continuous variables, the tool of generating functions, the normal model approximation to the binomial, and ‘the rational expectation principle’ (in the context of the St. Petersburg Paradox) emerged out of these studies.
David B. Audretsch
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183504
- eISBN:
- 9780199783885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183504.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Knowledge has emerged as the critical factor to generate economic growth, jobs, and competitiveness in a globalized economy. However, science, research, and human capital do not do the taxpayers much ...
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Knowledge has emerged as the critical factor to generate economic growth, jobs, and competitiveness in a globalized economy. However, science, research, and human capital do not do the taxpayers much good if these investments in new knowledge are not translated into jobs and growth. There is no shortage of educated, scientific, and engineering, as well as creative and dedicated people. But the product of all of this is that their new ideas and insights are not always picked up by the great large companies. The reason is what scholars have only recently termed as, The Knowledge Filter. It is the knowledge filter that stands between investment in research and science, but also more generally knowledge and ideas on the one hand, and their commercialization through innovation, leading ultimately to economic growth, on the other. It is the knowledge filter that impedes the spillover of knowledge and ideas from actually becoming commercialized into innovations that become the basis for economic growth.Less
Knowledge has emerged as the critical factor to generate economic growth, jobs, and competitiveness in a globalized economy. However, science, research, and human capital do not do the taxpayers much good if these investments in new knowledge are not translated into jobs and growth. There is no shortage of educated, scientific, and engineering, as well as creative and dedicated people. But the product of all of this is that their new ideas and insights are not always picked up by the great large companies. The reason is what scholars have only recently termed as, The Knowledge Filter. It is the knowledge filter that stands between investment in research and science, but also more generally knowledge and ideas on the one hand, and their commercialization through innovation, leading ultimately to economic growth, on the other. It is the knowledge filter that impedes the spillover of knowledge and ideas from actually becoming commercialized into innovations that become the basis for economic growth.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263301
- eISBN:
- 9780191718823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses and replies to a number of the more important objections that have been made to dialetheism since the publication of the first edition of the book. The topics covered include ...
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This chapter discusses and replies to a number of the more important objections that have been made to dialetheism since the publication of the first edition of the book. The topics covered include dialetheic logic, the Extended Liar Paradox, expressability, and motion.Less
This chapter discusses and replies to a number of the more important objections that have been made to dialetheism since the publication of the first edition of the book. The topics covered include dialetheic logic, the Extended Liar Paradox, expressability, and motion.
Carol Graham, Soumya Chattopadhyay, and Mario Picon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199732739
- eISBN:
- 9780199776887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732739.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Research on the economics of happiness has raised a new debate on the relationship between happiness and income. Easterlin’s original work highlighted an apparent paradox: as countries grew ...
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Research on the economics of happiness has raised a new debate on the relationship between happiness and income. Easterlin’s original work highlighted an apparent paradox: as countries grew materially wealthier — and healthier — over time, average happiness levels did not increase. A number of studies since then confirmed the general direction of his findings. Yet some recent papers, based on new data, find a stronger relationship between average per capita income and happiness levels, and question whether the paradox exists at all. This chapter shows how the steepness of the slope in the income-happiness relationship depends to a large extent on the particular question that is used; on the sample of countries and time frame selected; on the specification of the income variable; and on the rate of economic growth in addition to income levels. This chapter also highlights three related phenomena: the paradox of unhappy growth; happy peasants and frustrated achievers; and the paradox of low aspirations.Less
Research on the economics of happiness has raised a new debate on the relationship between happiness and income. Easterlin’s original work highlighted an apparent paradox: as countries grew materially wealthier — and healthier — over time, average happiness levels did not increase. A number of studies since then confirmed the general direction of his findings. Yet some recent papers, based on new data, find a stronger relationship between average per capita income and happiness levels, and question whether the paradox exists at all. This chapter shows how the steepness of the slope in the income-happiness relationship depends to a large extent on the particular question that is used; on the sample of countries and time frame selected; on the specification of the income variable; and on the rate of economic growth in addition to income levels. This chapter also highlights three related phenomena: the paradox of unhappy growth; happy peasants and frustrated achievers; and the paradox of low aspirations.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a ...
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Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.Less
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.
David Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199263257
- eISBN:
- 9780191602603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263256.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Develops an extended version of the Preface Paradox to show how the counter-intuitive binary beliefs mandated by deductive consistency and deductive closure can cascade into massive irrationality. ...
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Develops an extended version of the Preface Paradox to show how the counter-intuitive binary beliefs mandated by deductive consistency and deductive closure can cascade into massive irrationality. This highlights the Preface Paradox's severity and illuminates what is absurd about the beliefs required by deductive cogency Then shows that situations with Preface Paradox structure occur commonly in ordinary life. Finally, examines and rejects attempts to defend deductive constraints by explaining away our troublesome intuitions in Preface cases and in related cases involving the Lottery Paradox.Less
Develops an extended version of the Preface Paradox to show how the counter-intuitive binary beliefs mandated by deductive consistency and deductive closure can cascade into massive irrationality. This highlights the Preface Paradox's severity and illuminates what is absurd about the beliefs required by deductive cogency Then shows that situations with Preface Paradox structure occur commonly in ordinary life. Finally, examines and rejects attempts to defend deductive constraints by explaining away our troublesome intuitions in Preface cases and in related cases involving the Lottery Paradox.
Nicholas Silins
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter investigates the way in which our conscious judgments can be a guide to our beliefs, a topic discussed by Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, Christopher Peacocke, and Alex Byrne, among others. ...
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The chapter investigates the way in which our conscious judgments can be a guide to our beliefs, a topic discussed by Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, Christopher Peacocke, and Alex Byrne, among others. The chapter argues that our conscious judgments can give us a kind of justification to self-ascribe beliefs which is (i) distinctively first-personal, (ii) non-inferential, and (iii) fallible. The chapter then defends my view from a challenge from ‘constitutivist’ views in the epistemology of introspection, defended by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker, according to which only our beliefs themselves give us justification to self-ascribe beliefs.Less
The chapter investigates the way in which our conscious judgments can be a guide to our beliefs, a topic discussed by Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, Christopher Peacocke, and Alex Byrne, among others. The chapter argues that our conscious judgments can give us a kind of justification to self-ascribe beliefs which is (i) distinctively first-personal, (ii) non-inferential, and (iii) fallible. The chapter then defends my view from a challenge from ‘constitutivist’ views in the epistemology of introspection, defended by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker, according to which only our beliefs themselves give us justification to self-ascribe beliefs.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially ...
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A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially Comparative View correct, or is, perhaps, some other view correct? This chapter distinguishes between the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View, and illustrates some of the implications of adopting one or the other. In doing this, it begins by exploring an important example that illuminates the appeal of the Essentially Comparative View, Derek Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Analyzing the Mere Addition Paradox, its implications, and various possible responses to it provides a much better understanding of a number of important views that stand or fall together. One of these views, called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle, is also, along with the transitivity of “better than,” widely regarded as a fundamental principle of practical rationality.Less
A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially Comparative View correct, or is, perhaps, some other view correct? This chapter distinguishes between the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View, and illustrates some of the implications of adopting one or the other. In doing this, it begins by exploring an important example that illuminates the appeal of the Essentially Comparative View, Derek Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Analyzing the Mere Addition Paradox, its implications, and various possible responses to it provides a much better understanding of a number of important views that stand or fall together. One of these views, called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle, is also, along with the transitivity of “better than,” widely regarded as a fundamental principle of practical rationality.
Martin Fransman
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198290964
- eISBN:
- 9780191596162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290969.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This paper has the following purposes. The first is to demonstrate that many of the best‐known approaches to the firm in economics have in common a starting‐point that sees the firm as a response to ...
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This paper has the following purposes. The first is to demonstrate that many of the best‐known approaches to the firm in economics have in common a starting‐point that sees the firm as a response to information‐related problems. The second purpose is to review critically some of these approaches on the basis of the internal structure of their arguments, and the third is to analyse some of the limitations of the ‘information‐related paradigm’ in the light of the distinction that, it is argued, must be drawn between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. The last purpose is to propose some additional approaches to the firm that merit further exploration. The seven sections of the essay are: Purposes; Introduction; The Firm as Response to Information‐Related Problems; The Firm as a Repository of Knowledge; The IBM Paradox—an examination of the downfall of IBM; Implications for the Theory of the Firm; and Conclusion.Less
This paper has the following purposes. The first is to demonstrate that many of the best‐known approaches to the firm in economics have in common a starting‐point that sees the firm as a response to information‐related problems. The second purpose is to review critically some of these approaches on the basis of the internal structure of their arguments, and the third is to analyse some of the limitations of the ‘information‐related paradigm’ in the light of the distinction that, it is argued, must be drawn between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. The last purpose is to propose some additional approaches to the firm that merit further exploration. The seven sections of the essay are: Purposes; Introduction; The Firm as Response to Information‐Related Problems; The Firm as a Repository of Knowledge; The IBM Paradox—an examination of the downfall of IBM; Implications for the Theory of the Firm; and Conclusion.
S. N. Afriat
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198284611
- eISBN:
- 9780191595844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198284616.003.0019
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This is the second of six chapters on the logic of price, and reviews the characteristics of Leontief's input–output method. The six sections of the chapter are: Quesnay's tableau économique; the ...
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This is the second of six chapters on the logic of price, and reviews the characteristics of Leontief's input–output method. The six sections of the chapter are: Quesnay's tableau économique; the Leontief matrix; production planning; Leontief and Zeno (Zeno's Paradox); productive systems; and a computer demonstration (of Leontief's input–output model).Less
This is the second of six chapters on the logic of price, and reviews the characteristics of Leontief's input–output method. The six sections of the chapter are: Quesnay's tableau économique; the Leontief matrix; production planning; Leontief and Zeno (Zeno's Paradox); productive systems; and a computer demonstration (of Leontief's input–output model).
W. Kip Viscusi
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293637
- eISBN:
- 9780191596995
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293631.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Risk beliefs often reflect systematic biases, such as the overestimation of small risks and underestimation of large risks. The prospective reference theory model explains these and other anomalies ...
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Risk beliefs often reflect systematic biases, such as the overestimation of small risks and underestimation of large risks. The prospective reference theory model explains these and other anomalies and in many instances predicts these patterns of behaviour. Precautionary behaviour is subject to a paradox since people will tend to undervalue marginal decreases in risk but will overvalue improvements that completely eliminate the risk. Risk ambiguity aversion, as reflected in the Ellsberg Paradox, affects public responses to dimly understood risks such as Mad Cow disease and many carcinogens. Many other biases in risk beliefs are evident, such as overreaction to risk increases, overestimation of risk decreases that eliminate the risk, and overestimation of highly publicized risks.Less
Risk beliefs often reflect systematic biases, such as the overestimation of small risks and underestimation of large risks. The prospective reference theory model explains these and other anomalies and in many instances predicts these patterns of behaviour. Precautionary behaviour is subject to a paradox since people will tend to undervalue marginal decreases in risk but will overvalue improvements that completely eliminate the risk. Risk ambiguity aversion, as reflected in the Ellsberg Paradox, affects public responses to dimly understood risks such as Mad Cow disease and many carcinogens. Many other biases in risk beliefs are evident, such as overreaction to risk increases, overestimation of risk decreases that eliminate the risk, and overestimation of highly publicized risks.
Colin Howson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263419
- eISBN:
- 9780191734175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263419.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses Bayesianism in statistics. The first section of the chapter is devoted to the First Bayesian Theory, which is immediately followed by a discussion of significance tests and the ...
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This chapter discusses Bayesianism in statistics. The first section of the chapter is devoted to the First Bayesian Theory, which is immediately followed by a discussion of significance tests and the Second Bayesian Theory. Lindley's Paradox and the Neyman-Pearson Theory are examined in detail, along with the concept of priors and likelihood. The final portion of the chapter focuses on the Second Bayesian theory as logic.Less
This chapter discusses Bayesianism in statistics. The first section of the chapter is devoted to the First Bayesian Theory, which is immediately followed by a discussion of significance tests and the Second Bayesian Theory. Lindley's Paradox and the Neyman-Pearson Theory are examined in detail, along with the concept of priors and likelihood. The final portion of the chapter focuses on the Second Bayesian theory as logic.
Paolo Crivelli
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199564453
- eISBN:
- 9780191721618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably ...
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Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably Chrysippus) placed it in the methodological subsection of the logical part, others in ethics, yet others in the subsection of dialectic relating to voice. The first of these locations focuses on the epistemological side of the theory of definitions. In particular, it is connected with two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure that makes them suitable for instruction. The Stoics do not think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. As for the link with the Stoic theory of language and meaning, definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a special kind (distinct from statables).Less
Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably Chrysippus) placed it in the methodological subsection of the logical part, others in ethics, yet others in the subsection of dialectic relating to voice. The first of these locations focuses on the epistemological side of the theory of definitions. In particular, it is connected with two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure that makes them suitable for instruction. The Stoics do not think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. As for the link with the Stoic theory of language and meaning, definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a special kind (distinct from statables).
Jaegwon Kim
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585878
- eISBN:
- 9780191595349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics” argues that if Carl Hempel had been willing to make use of some of the metaphysical concepts that are now regarded as uncontroversial, such as the concept of an ...
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“Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics” argues that if Carl Hempel had been willing to make use of some of the metaphysical concepts that are now regarded as uncontroversial, such as the concept of an event, the concept of causation, and others, he could have formulated and defended his theory of explanation more simply and effectively. This claim is illustrated with various purported counterexamples that dogged Hempel's DN model of explanation. However, Hempel's positivist commitments stood in the way. This essay includes a short argument defending Hempel's view that explanations are logical derivations or arguments.Less
“Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics” argues that if Carl Hempel had been willing to make use of some of the metaphysical concepts that are now regarded as uncontroversial, such as the concept of an event, the concept of causation, and others, he could have formulated and defended his theory of explanation more simply and effectively. This claim is illustrated with various purported counterexamples that dogged Hempel's DN model of explanation. However, Hempel's positivist commitments stood in the way. This essay includes a short argument defending Hempel's view that explanations are logical derivations or arguments.
Gustaf Arrhenius
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
What is the role of equality in the evaluation of populations of different sizes in respect to their goodness? The field of population ethics has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show ...
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What is the role of equality in the evaluation of populations of different sizes in respect to their goodness? The field of population ethics has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Parfit's well-known Mere Addition Paradox is a case in point. These paradoxes challenge at a fundamental level the existence of a satisfactory theory of our duties to future generations and intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses whether egalitarian concerns can help us solve these paradoxes. It is claimed that whereas egalitarian considerations are applicable in different number cases and can help us solve the Mere Addition Paradox, such considerations are not of much help in another paradox. The implications of the Priority View in different number cases are also examined.Less
What is the role of equality in the evaluation of populations of different sizes in respect to their goodness? The field of population ethics has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Parfit's well-known Mere Addition Paradox is a case in point. These paradoxes challenge at a fundamental level the existence of a satisfactory theory of our duties to future generations and intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses whether egalitarian concerns can help us solve these paradoxes. It is claimed that whereas egalitarian considerations are applicable in different number cases and can help us solve the Mere Addition Paradox, such considerations are not of much help in another paradox. The implications of the Priority View in different number cases are also examined.
