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The concluding chapter stresses the influence of conservatism and romanticism on Disraeli's understanding of the Eastern Question. The experiences of the Greek Revolution are highlighted, as well as the personal experiences from Disraeli's Grand Tour. The changes in his view of the Eastern Question are highlighted, as well as his declining enthusiasm for the Ottoman Empire. Equally, the roles which Metternich and Palmerston played in shaping Disraeli's perception of the Eastern Question are analysed, as well as the crucial experience of the Crimean War in forming Disraeli's reliance on a strategy based on deterrence. The decisive role which Disraeli would play in Britain's policy during the Eastern Crisis is stressed. Finally, it is demonstrated how, during the Eastern Crisis, Disraeli put into practice the key principles on which his foreign policy was based: the ‘instinct of power’, ‘love of fame’, quest for prestige, and preservation of the balance of power.

The Crimean War played a decisive role in consolidating Disraeli's perceptions of the Eastern Question. Guided by Aberdeen's example and following Palmerston's tactics, he claimed that Russia had to be sent decisive and clear messages, which had to be accompanied with some sabre‐rattling as well. Only in this way could Russia be prevented from reaching out for the Sultan's possessions and disturbing the existing balance of power. In his policies towards the Balkan states, Disraeli nevertheless found himself closer to Metternich than Palmerston — the status quo had to be defended at all costs. The chapter highlights that in Disraeli's understanding of the Eastern Question, and foreign policy as a whole, the concepts of ‘the instinct of power’ and ‘the love of fame’ were crucial, as well as that his understandings were close to the Realist school in international relations.

This chapter describes how Reuter built up a strong reputation and could quickly extend his company's service to the entire British press. Reuter's continuing successes brought him to the attention of the highest levels of government. In 1861, Reuter was presented at the Court of Queen Victoria by Prime Minister Lord Palmerston. The spread of undersea cables helped Reuter extend his service to other continents. Reuters was the first news agency to bring the news of President Abraham Lincoln's assassination in the United States to the European public. By the mid-1860s Julius Reuter's name and reputation were well established. The name of ‘the great Reuter’ was as familiar as the name of Dickens — the great Victorian novelist, who was also a journalist by training.

This chapter discusses the political activities of Lord Derby from 1855 to 1858. In February 1855, Derby was confronted with the problems of how to oppose the British Prime Minister, Viscount of Palmerston, how to handle William Gladstone, and how to bolster his ally Benjamin Disraeli. Derby's relationship with Palmerston is complex. Disraeli remained deeply mistrusted by many of the conservatives, and Gladstone refused to join Derby in his Conservative Party. However, despite all these challenges, Derby was able to regain power as prime minister in February 1858.

This chapter discusses the political activities of Lord Derby after his second term as prime minister of Great Britain ended in June 1859. Derby resumed opposition to Viscount Palmerston's government with a keen sense of expectation. Benjamin Disraeli suggested that Palmerston's new ministry would be merely a refacimento of the old Palmerston clique. In a gala dinner on July 16, Derby assured the Conservative Members of Parliament and peers that the Conservative Party would soon gain the majority in the House of Commons.

This chapter discusses the sustained opposition of Palmerston's coalition and how the Conservatives preferred to support the war but criticised its conduct. It reveals two points of significance: about the perceptions of France and about the centrality of Derby. Derby had two clear targets: Palmerston's interventionism and the increased expenditure it entailed. This chapter illustrates the particular difficulties involved in opposing Palmerston's handling of international relations. Palmerstonian policy was also deplored for its potential economic consequences that gave the Conservatives' their best chance to criticise Palmerston for appeasing France, rather than the radicals providing grounds for the Conservatives and Conservative supporters of Palmerston to unite. Thus, the chapter concludes by saying that the Conservative role in Palmerston's defeat was entirely opportunistic.

This chapter focuses on the European crisis and the events that preceded the Austro-French war of 1859. It clearly points out that international efforts were made to resolve matters without a war. This chapter assesses the framework of ideas and preconceptions within which Conservative foreign policy was determined during the crisis i.e. the Derbyite ‘mental map’. The new policy pursued in 1859 was consistent with the policy of late 1840s. This chapter emphasizes on how Conservatives used the opportunity to preserve British interests while avoiding the kind of interference for which they had so often condemned Palmerston. It provides some evidence of the fact that at the time of Italian crisis, Cabinet members were also engaged in discussions as to how to strengthen British defensive weaknesses. It elaborates that the only new thing that happened in 1859 was French determination to encourage Italian nationalism.

This chapter covers the historical components and emergence of liberal internationalism as a political ideology, discussing the Victorian liberalism and the visions of international politics that grew out of and were important for the ascendancy of internationalism. The popularity of Cobdenite ideas is closely related to their compatibility not only with dissent, but also with philosophical radicalism, traditional Whig views about war and peace, and the evangelically inspired, economic arguments in favour of free trade. William Ewart Gladstone argued against Lord Palmerston's meddling foreign policy, his conception of the English as ‘universal schoolmasters’, his ‘insular temper’ and his ‘self-glorifying tendency’. Lord Salisbury provides a helpful contrast to liberal internationalism. Internationalist ideology was underwritten by expectations of intellectual, moral and/or political progress, which would issue in a public morality and the reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism, ensuring the entrenchment of order and justice in international politics.

This chapter provides an analysis of Foreign policy in the mid-Victorian era, as it becomes easier to perceive the dimensions of nineteenth-century politics if debate about foreign policy is integrated into domestic political history. Foreign policy played a significant part in the Conservatives' calculations; but for Conservatives, Whig-Peelite domestic changes were tangled up with Palmerston's disruptive foreign policy, offering a possible basis for party reunion. Even the events overseas offered domestic advantages for the Conservatives in two ways: Palmerston's controversial policies provoked debate and they united disparate factions against him. It explains how the Conservatives actively sought to maintain European stability, but avoided over-commitment throughout the mid-Victorian period.

This chapter discusses the different aspects of the Queensberry inheritance. In January 1855, Lord Aberdeen resigned, and in the following month, Lord Palmerston was asked to form a government. Palmerston was a long-serving, dedicated statesman, a Whig, an old opponent of Peel, and an advocate of religious tolerance. On December 28, 1855, the six children of Archibald and Caroline were christened at Cummertrees, Caroline presenting the church with a silver christening bowl. Her interest in the welfare of her servants and tenants included their religious observance. Archibald's charm had long worn thin, and he must also have suffered under the disapproving gaze of Prince Albert, who expected high moral standards from men in public life.

This chapter examines how Great Britain responded to Egypt's bid for mastery of the Middle East during the period 1831–1841. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the emerging rivalry between Great Britain and Russia centered on one particular issue: the future of the Ottoman Empire. The so-called Eastern Question was how to manage the decline of Turkey. Before discussing Great Britain's decision to support the Ottoman Empire and oppose the rise of Egypt, this chapter considers the emergence of Anglo-Russian antagonism and the decline of Ottoman power, along with the causes and consequences of the first Syrian war. It then explores British foreign secretary Viscount Palmerston's views on the Eastern Question as well as his assessment of the risks of containment failure and access denial with regards to Egypt as a rising power. It also analyzes the second Syrian war and the agreement signed by Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia that would govern the use of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits.

This chapter by Howard Jones offers a step-by-step account of British decision-making during the recognition crisis of late 1862, when Britain, France, and Russia considered trying to mediate an end to the war. Jones explains that had this attempt been made, it might have culminated in British recognition of the Confederacy and an Anglo-Union war. Jones argues that the Union victory at Antietam and Lincoln's Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in many ways heightened, rather than dampened, European interest in intervention.

This chapter argues that British policy after the death of Palmerston was not driven by imperial dogma or careless adventurism; it was driven by a careful consideration of the balance of power. The first section establishes that British policymakers realized they were declining. The second section demonstrates that policymakers tailored their domestic policies to fit the drop in relative power. The third section details how decision-makers slightly reconfigured their international policies to meet changing global conditions. The fourth section highlights the limits of retrenchment, and how shifting structural conditions affected policymakers responses.

This chapter explores how Stephen Duck used his increasing proficiency in classical learning to position himself in relation to male patrons and friends, including Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston, and Joseph Spence. The various models offered by Horace were particularly useful to Duck in this process. Initially, by imitating Horace’s odes Duck crafted non-threatening reflections on his achievements which were couched in a language of contentment and moderation. Later, with more daring, Duck adopted the Horatian satirical mode in order to reflect on his place in literary culture. The example of Horace enabled Duck to develop a confident poetic voice. By the early 1740s, his earlier, earnest sincerity was displaced by a witty willingness to make fun of his labouring-class origins.

This chapter analyzes the bases and evolution of Lincoln and Seward’s personal friendship and professional partnership during the first year of the war. As Lincoln solidified his one-war policy and Seward implemented his purposeful bluster warning against European intervention in the American conflict, the two leaders responded to British and French recognition of the South’s status as a belligerent and instituted the North’s blockade of the Confederacy. Lincoln initiated his brilliant representation of the war’s international significance and assumed an increasingly active role as commander in chief, and Seward took the lead in the North’s decision to compromise and accept British demands in the dangerous Trent affair. All of this is set against British and French responses to the American war.