Search Results

The Watershed

Yezid Sayigh

in Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993

The growth of the appeal of Organizations such as the ANM and Fateh in the early 1960s revealed certain patterns. The proliferation of small ‘liberation groups’ reflected disappointment with Arab ... More

The growth of the appeal of Organizations such as the ANM and Fateh in the early 1960s revealed certain patterns. The proliferation of small ‘liberation groups’ reflected disappointment with Arab political structures and leaders, but a majority of Palestinians remained outside any formal affiliation. The Palestine-first sentiment of Fateh was widely shared, but still lacked embodiment in an institutional framework. That active steps were taken to set one up was due to the determination, in which ambition also played a role, of Shuqayri. Furthermore, the Jerusalem assembly decreed the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization and reconstituted itself as the Palestine National Council. The ANM, by giving rise to an autonomous Palestinian organization, had taken its first steps towards the conduct of an armed struggle. Indeed, the extent of its membership, organizational experience, ideological articulation, and military preparation placed it on a par with its main competitors, the PLO and Fateh.Less

The Black Panthers and the PLO: The Politics of Intercommunalism

Alex Lubin

in Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary

This chapter focuses on the formation of Black Panther intercommunalism as an anti-imperialist, trans-community politics that united the U.S. Black Panther Party, the Palestine Liberation ... More

This chapter focuses on the formation of Black Panther intercommunalism as an anti-imperialist, trans-community politics that united the U.S. Black Panther Party, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and a group of Arab Jews in Israel who called themselves the Israeli Black Panthers. It considers how anticolonialism emerged as a post-1967 response to the ascendancy of the Israeli colonial state as an occupying army. The chapter looks at the ways in which the PLO and the U.S. Black Panthers drew comparisons between racial capitalism in the United States and in Israel, as well as between U.S. imperialism globally, in which Israeli politics in the West Bank and Gaza were implicated. It demonstrates how the Panthers’ political imaginary reverberated within Israel, where some Mizrahi Jews began to see themselves as members of a different sort of political imaginary, one that was shaped by the Afro-Arab politics of the Panthers.Less

The Rise of the PLO and the Birth of International Terrorism (1956–1970s)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter focuses on Israel's counterterrorism efforts between 1956 and the 1970s, with particular reference to the birth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that gave rise to ... More

This chapter focuses on Israel's counterterrorism efforts between 1956 and the 1970s, with particular reference to the birth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that gave rise to international terrorism. It begins by looking at the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the role it played in the Palestinian struggle against Israel before discussing the creation of the PLO by Egypt in collaboration with other Arab states. It then turns to the emergence of Yasir Arafat as the leader of Fatah and of the Palestinian people more generally. The chapter also considers the “Six Day War” of 1967 that saw the Israeli army defeat the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, along with Israel's control of Gaza and in particular the West Bank; the battle at Karameh pitting Israel against Palestinian fedayeen and Jordanian forces; the rise of airline hijackings as a new form of Palestinian terrorism; and the PLO's creation of the Black September Organization in 1971. Finally, it discusses Israel's Operation Thunderbolt, also known as the Entebbe Raid, as an example of its counterterrorist strategies.Less

The United Nations, Palestine, Liberation, and Development

Raja Khalidi

in Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World

This chapter examines the United Nations's involvement in the economic development of the Palestinian Authority. It begins with an overview of the key stages of the UN involvement in Palestinian ... More

This chapter examines the United Nations's involvement in the economic development of the Palestinian Authority. It begins with an overview of the key stages of the UN involvement in Palestinian development, focusing on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and various UN development agencies. It then considers cracks in the UN's development mission, architecture, and resources amid the rising swell of globalization and liberalization. It also explains how and why the Palestine Liberation Organization bought into neoliberalism and concludes with an assessment of why the UN still matters to Palestine. The chapter offers suggestions for ensuring a better future for the Palestinian people as compared to the past twenty years, as well as for realizing Palestinian efforts at achieving statehood.Less

The UN Statehood Bid: Palestine’s Flirtation with Multilateralism

Noura Erakat

in Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World

This chapter focuses on the United Nations's Palestinian “statehood” bid starting in 2011. In May 2011, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority (PA) announced that it would ... More

This chapter focuses on the United Nations's Palestinian “statehood” bid starting in 2011. In May 2011, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority (PA) announced that it would seek membership as a state within the UN. The UN statehood bid would alter the PLO's status as a nonmember observer entity, conferred upon it by the UN General Assembly in 1974. While the benefits of UN membership, or in the alternative, a UN upgrade, are manifold, none of them guarantee Palestinian self-determination or freedom from Israeli control. The chapter suggests that this statehood bid could have been a pivot away from complete reliance on the United States to deliver independence and a return to multilateralism that positioned the world superpower as part of the problem rather than the solution. However, the promise of multilateralism, signaled by Palestinians in 2011, has not been realized. The Palestinian leadership has responded to the ever-diminishing potential of the US-brokered peace process with incremental steps into international forums.Less

Debacle in Lebanon (1970s–1993)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter focuses on Israel's disastrous campaign in Lebanon against groups like the Hizballah, Fatah, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine between the 1970s and 1993. It first ... More

This chapter focuses on Israel's disastrous campaign in Lebanon against groups like the Hizballah, Fatah, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine between the 1970s and 1993. It first explains how Lebanon became a battleground between Israelis and Palestinians, and how Palestinian groups have used Lebanon to attack Israel with cross-border raids, rockets, and terrorist strikes. It then considers how Palestinians became enmeshed in Lebanese politics, citing corruption as a primary source of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) involvement in Lebanon. It also examines Israel's anti-Palestine operations in Lebanon, including the Spring of Youth in 1973 and Operation Litani in 1978; the tactics employed by Israel to undermine the enemy, such as providing financial support to the Maronites and their thuggish militias; and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon after seeing its counterterrorism policy fail in that country. The chapter concludes by analyzing Israel's failure to transform Lebanon, the criticism it received both at home and abroad, and its peace talks with the PLO by the end of the decade.Less

A Legal Perspective on Oslo

John V. Whitbeck

in The Oslo Accords: A Critical Assessment

On August 13, 1993, it was announced that secret Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, facilitated by the government of Norway, had produced the agreement which, exactly one month later, was signed ... More

On August 13, 1993, it was announced that secret Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, facilitated by the government of Norway, had produced the agreement which, exactly one month later, was signed between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (DOP). This chapter presents the author's account of his role in post-DOP negotiations, which involved serving as a legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during the final week of the negotiations in Cairo, which produced the first post-DOP implementing agreement, the Gaza/Jericho Withdrawal Agreement, signed on May 4, 1994.Less

Seeking Integration: Arab American Political Organizing in the 1980s

Pamela E. Pennock

in Rise of the Arab American Left: Activists, Allies, and Their Fight against Imperialism and Racism, 1960s-1980s

The chapter explains how Arab American activism became more connected to mainstream progressive political organizing. The Palestine Human Rights Campaign, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee ... More

The chapter explains how Arab American activism became more connected to mainstream progressive political organizing. The Palestine Human Rights Campaign, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), and Arab American Institute (AAI) tried to collaborate with liberal religious and political organizations, especially moderate African Americans. The work of the ADC and AAI with Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition and his campaign for the Democratic Party presidential nomination signalled the inclusion of Arab Americans in mainstream civil rights coalitions.Less

Hamas’s Rise and Seeming Fall (1993–2000)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter focuses on the rise and apparent fall of the Palestinian organization Hamas between 1993 and 2000. It begins with the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a leader of Hamas's military wing ... More

This chapter focuses on the rise and apparent fall of the Palestinian organization Hamas between 1993 and 2000. It begins with the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a leader of Hamas's military wing known for his expertise as a bomb maker, in January 1996 by Israel's domestic security service Shin Bet. It then looks at the attacks launched by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad in retaliation against Israel, including suicide bombings. It also discusses the origins of Hamas and Israel's complicity in its rise, along with Hamas's agenda that primarily involves violence driven by hatred of the Jews. In addition, the chapter examines the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and how its promise of peace was undermined by Hamas. An overview of the Palestine Islamic Jihad is provided as well. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the improved security cooperation between Israel and Palestine and the decline of Hamas after Benjamin Netanyahu assumed power as Israeli Prime Minister.Less

Out of the Ashes of Oslo: The Rise of Islamism and the Fall of Favoritism

Ahmed Yousef

in The Oslo Accords: A Critical Assessment

This chapter discusses the failure of the Oslo Accords and the rise of Islamism. The implementation of the Oslo Accords, or lack thereof, provided the greatest platform for the strengthening of ... More

This chapter discusses the failure of the Oslo Accords and the rise of Islamism. The implementation of the Oslo Accords, or lack thereof, provided the greatest platform for the strengthening of Palestinian opposition groups in the Occupied Territories, at the same time weakening the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Islamism in particular grew rapidly in the years that followed the 1993 signing. Organized political and militant Islamist groups first emerged in the early days of the first Intifada, which began in 1987. It was not until six years later, however, that they overshadowed the PLO in Palestinians' minds as the carriers of the torch of resistance. Thirteen years later that shift in allegiance was evident when Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, won national legislative elections in 2006.Less

Peacebuilding in Palestine: Western Strategies in the Context of Colonization

Mandy Turner

in Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World

This chapter examines how peacebuilding as a policy discourse and practice has been developed and applied in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). It first traces the emergence of peacebuilding ... More

This chapter examines how peacebuilding as a policy discourse and practice has been developed and applied in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). It first traces the emergence of peacebuilding as a Western policy discourse in the context of colonization, its evolution into a hegemonic project in the post-Cold War period, and the key assumptions and policies that underpin it. It then considers the situation in which Western peacebuilding and and statebuilding practices and policies were applied in the OPT—inserted as they were into the framework created by the Oslo Accords and subsequent peace agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It also explores how these policies and practices were shaped by global structures of power as they manifest themselves in the region, along with the particular application of these peacebuilding policies and their impacts. The chapter concludes by arguing that peacebuilding strategies in the OPT have contributed toward creating what it calls a “zombie peace”.Less

Champions of Peace? Tools in Whose Hands? Norwegians and Peace Brokering in the Middle East

Hilde Henriksen Waage

in The Oslo Accords: A Critical Assessment

Norway played a key role in the secret talks between representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, which led to the declaration of principles that paved the way for the establishment of ... More

Norway played a key role in the secret talks between representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, which led to the declaration of principles that paved the way for the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority and mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This chapter considers the very special relationship that existed between Norway and Israel long before the exciting days of the secret Norwegian back channel. Is this political past insignificant or decisive when it comes to understanding and explaining Norway's role in the Oslo back channel? Even more important, why did Israelis as well as Palestinians find Norway, of all countries, acceptable as a mediating partner? The Oslo peace process reflected the fundamentally asymmetrical power situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, with Israel as the stronger party and the PLO as the weaker party. What room for maneuver did such a basic asymmetry of power provide for the Norwegians?Less

Faith and Freedom: The Institute on Religion and Democracy

in Public Pulpits: Methodists and Mainline Churches in the Moral Argument of Public Life

The Institute on Religion and Democracy began with a bang. It issued from a report fired across the bow of the United Methodist Church in 1980, aimed at challenging the “peace-and-justice” course set ... More

The Institute on Religion and Democracy began with a bang. It issued from a report fired across the bow of the United Methodist Church in 1980, aimed at challenging the “peace-and-justice” course set by leaders of the Methodist General Board of Church and Society and the General Board of Global Ministries. “Most Methodist church-goers would react with disbelief, even anger,” the report began, “to be told that a significant portion of their weekly offerings were being siphoned off to groups supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, the governments of Cuba and Vietnam, and the pro-Soviet totalitarian movements of Latin America, Asia and Africa, and several violence-prone fringe groups in this country,” so charged the report's author, David Jessup, a new member of the United Methodist Church in a large suburban congregation outside Washington, D.C.Less

The 9/11 Ceasefire that wasn’t (2001–Early 2002)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter focuses on the temporary ceasefire between Israel and Palestine in the wake of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It begins by ... More

This chapter focuses on the temporary ceasefire between Israel and Palestine in the wake of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It begins by considering the Bush administration's renewed attention to the peace process and its support for a Palestinian state before turning to the Palestinian leaders' condemnation of 9/11 and the terrorist groups' decision to lie low in its fight with the Israelis. It then looks at Yasir Arafat's public call for a complete cessation of the Palestine Liberation Organization's military activities, especially suicide bombings. It also discusses the resumption of violence after the temporary ceasefire, with Israel reoccupying the West Bank and orchestrating the assassination of Tulkaram leader Raed Karmi in 2002.Less

The False Promise of Oslo (1993–1996)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter examines how the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) failed to deliver on its promise of peace. The Oslo Accords, signed by PLO chairman ... More

This chapter examines how the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) failed to deliver on its promise of peace. The Oslo Accords, signed by PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in the White House, led to Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and parts of the West Bank beginning in 1994. The chapter considers the impact of the Oslo Accords on politics and counterterrorism in Israel, how Hamas tried to undermine the peace process between Israelis and Palestines, and the continued fighting between Palestinian terrorist groups and Israeli security forces after the Oslo Accords. It also looks into the counterterrorism challenge posed by the Arafat-led Palestinian Authority to Israel.Less

“There Will Be Not a Single Katyusha”

Avi Shilon

in Menachem Begin

In the 1980s, Israel's Lebanese population was made up of Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, Christian Maronites and Catholics, and more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees with no civil rights. Taking into ... More

In the 1980s, Israel's Lebanese population was made up of Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, Christian Maronites and Catholics, and more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees with no civil rights. Taking into consideration the composition of the Lebanese population, David Ben Gurion saw an opportunity to form an alliance with the country's Christians. The histories of the Christians in Lebanon and the Jews have many similarities, yet the historical analogy had no effect on the relations between Lebanon and Israel. When Menachem Begin rose to power, he expanded Israel's relations with the Christians that had begun to develop at the time. Ariel Sharon insisted that invading Lebanon would accelerate the desired political changes in the country. Between 1977 and 1981, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists increasingly penetrated Israel's northern border, prompting the Israel Defense Forces to launch shellings, raids, and aerial bombings throughout Lebanon.Less

Epilogue

Avi Shilon

in Menachem Begin

Menachem Begin was a pragmatic politician as well as an ideologue with a clear vision and unyielding principles. In terms of impact on the character of Israel, he is second in importance only to ... More

Menachem Begin was a pragmatic politician as well as an ideologue with a clear vision and unyielding principles. In terms of impact on the character of Israel, he is second in importance only to David Ben Gurion. His style of leadership would not be appropriate for the Israel of today. In June 1992, three months after Begin's death, the Second Reversal took place when Haavoda, led by Yitzhak Rabin, returned to power and ended fifteen consecutive years of Likud rule. The following year, Israel signed a peace treaty with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Begin would have opposed the Oslo Accords, but these were similar to the agreement that he himself had conceived and signed along with the peace treaty with Egypt. The peace agreement with Egypt was Begin's greatest political achievement, but he will be ultimately remembered for putting his stamp on the Jewish character of the Israeli state.Less

Into the Abyss: The Second Intifada (2000)

Daniel Byman

in A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism

This chapter focuses on the outbreak of the Second, or al-Aqsa, Intifada shortly after Ehud Barak took office as prime minister of Israel. It first considers Barak's promise of peace with Yasir ... More

This chapter focuses on the outbreak of the Second, or al-Aqsa, Intifada shortly after Ehud Barak took office as prime minister of Israel. It first considers Barak's promise of peace with Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians before turning to the eruption of violence sparked by Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000 to reiterate Jewish claims to the site. It then examines the economic impact of the Second Intifada on both Israel and Palestine, as well as the lessons learned by both parties from the Camp David failure that shaped the Second Intifada. The chapter concludes by analyzing the enigmatic character of Arafat as leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).Less

Reluctant Interveners: The Red Line Agreement and Brown’s Mediation

James R. Stocker

in Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-1976

This chapter examines the so-called Red Line Agreement, an unwritten, informal understanding that Syria and Israel allegedly reached to define the scope of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Red ... More

This chapter examines the so-called Red Line Agreement, an unwritten, informal understanding that Syria and Israel allegedly reached to define the scope of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Red Line Agreement was believed to be the result of a series of secret negotiations conducted via third parties between March and June 1976. This chapter begins with a discussion of the so-called Constitutional Document, which proposed a set of seventeen changes to the Lebanese Constitution. It then considers the “negotiations” between Syrian and U.S. officials in Damascus that allegedly led to the Red Line Agreement authorizing a limited Syrian intervention in Lebanon. It also looks at L. Dean Brown's mission to Lebanon and the issue of possible cooperation between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Finally, it analyzes the Lebanese presidential election, won by Elias Sarkis, and the overt Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.Less