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Palliative care education (PCE) has developed a wealth of approaches at the local, national, and regional levels to meet different needs. Previous chapters have identified key challenges and tensions relevant to different continents. This chapter begins with an introduction to the current debate in education around the purpose and nature of learning from a global perspective. This is followed by exploring PCE under four headings: embracing diversity; identity and sustainability; power and authority; and patterns of learning. The chapter concludes with recommendations arising from the discussion.

This chapter examines how the Communists attempted to thwart Prieto and to bolster its position by seeking a temporary accommodation with the CNT. Their efforts were driven by the need to occupy the highest positions available, and in doing so they not only had to balance one rival faction against another, but also to neutralize and efface them one by one. Faced with Prieto's enmity, which reached its peak after he assumed control of the defense ministry, the Communists needed a temporary truce with the CNT in order to maintain their balancing position in the scale of power and to prepare for the approaching showdown with the Socialist leader. This change of policy was also doubly necessary as Largo Caballero soon attempted to restore his own position by concluding an alliance with the CNT.

This chapter discusses the combined efforts of the Communists and the centrists in the Socialist party to exact Largo Caballero's political undoing. To dislodge Largo Caballero from his bastion in the UGT executive, the PCE had simply to exploit the differences between the left and center factions in the Socialist labor federation and to bring into play its own accrued influence, especially upon prominent members of the national committee, which had the statutory power to appoint a new executive. Largo Caballero would attempt to outmaneuver them, but in the end the national committee would hastily convene and elect a new executive, removing him from his position and thereby winning another victory for the Communists. Their next objective would be to establish a pact between the UGT and the CNT, which the chapter also discusses in more detail.

This chapter shows the growing discord within the Republican camp midway through 1938. The libertarian movement continued to struggle between practicing its founding principles or eschewing them in order to retain their political footing. The underlying differences between the CNT and the FAI would soon erupt in a national plenum of the libertarian movement in October, especially on the matter of collaborating with the government. In addition, the political impotence of the Republicans, Socialists, and Anarchosyndicalists increased their frustration and heightened their animosity toward Negrín and the PCE. And as the Communist party grew ever more unpopular, they became compelled to rely more and more on their military and police power.

This chapter considers another angle to the decision to end continued resistance. As the previous chapter noted, Negrín was not unaware of Casado's conspiracy against him, though he allowed it to continue on the grounds of a general sense of disillusionment among the PCE, among other things. For various pragmatic reasons, and given the futility of further resistance, Casado decided that he might as well proceed on his own to tackle the difficulties of negotiating with Franco, and spare the Communists any further trouble. However, his handling of the Casado situation would eventually be used to paint Negrín as a scapegoat, as it could easily be perceived by many as a selfish and cowardly act.

This concluding chapter chronicles the final events leading up to Franco's victory over the Republic and the Revolution. Following the initial stages of Casado's coup, the PCE was in turmoil even as Negrín and the rest of the politburo were already preparing for a departure from Spain. For the next thirty-eight years, the PCE would not be able to function legally in Spain. Meanwhile, after Negrín's departure, Casado attempted to negotiate an “honorable peace” with the Nationalist forces. Franco, however, was adamant against any compromises made with Republican authorities, and he remained steadfast on his terms of unconditional surrender. Nevertheless, Casado would persist in the negotiations until Franco launched his final “Ofensiva de la Victoria,” effectively ending the war whilst thousands of refugees hastily attempted to leave the country.

This chapter shows how the Communists allied themselves with the moderate or the so-called center faction of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and exploited its internal rivalries in order to thwart Largo Caballero. Prior to the Civil War, collaboration between the Partido Comunista Español (PCE) and the center faction of the PSOE had not been feasible, yet it now appeared practicable not only because of their common hostility toward Largo Caballero and their resolve to remove him from the premiership and war ministry but because of the softening of the attitude of a few leading centrists toward an eventual merger of the two parties. The Communists were further encouraged by the genial attitudes Indalecio Prieto extended toward their Russian allies.

This chapter documents the formation of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC). A small party at the outset of the Civil War, the PSUC was the result of the fusion of four miniscule organizations aggregating approximately 2,500 members: the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC), the Federació Catalana del PSOE, the Partit Communista de Catalunya, and the Partit Català Proletaria. By March 1937, only nine months after its formation, the PSUC would claim fifty thousand adherents. From the time of its fusion, the PSUC adhered to the Communist International through the PCE, before being taken over by the leaders of the Catalan Communist party.

This chapter presents the Comintern's new line on the goal of the war—an understanding among Spaniards to end “the foreign invasion.” The Comintern's presentation of this to the PCE central committee coincided with the Munich agreement, demonstrating that the new line had no chance for success whatsoever. At one time, the Soviet military presence may have numbered close to a thousand men, but their number was dwindling; by 4 January 1939, this number dropped to 218. This was a considerable reduction, but far from a liquidation. There is no indication that after the Comintern's new “September strategy” had become a nonstarter, Stalin either had or sought any exit strategy whatsoever. Soviet participation and exposure would be reduced but not ended; from the Soviet point of view, it was important not to give up.

This study investigates the effects of simulating the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with alternately sourced weights on the inflation experience for an average US consumer. The Bureau of Labor Statistics currently uses household spending data from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey to construct expenditure category weights, or “item” weights, in the CPI. The Bureau of Economic Analysis also estimates consumer expenditures, but does so at a national level for publication of Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) in the National Income and Product Accounts. In this chapter, 2005-2010 price indexes that utilize PCE weights instead of CE expenditure weights are compared with the CPI-Urban in order to evaluate current CPI weighting methods. These comparisons show that the annualized growth rate over five years of an adjusted PCE-weighted CPI is slightly lower than that of the CPI-U, while a reweighted index that uses PCE expenditure definitions grows much more quickly than the CPI.

There are two federal data series that refer to U.S. household expenditures. One uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), and the other personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Weights for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are based on CE data, but some suggest that PCE be used instead. Researchers have tried to reconcile differences in scope and definitions in the CE and PCE. We review these differences along with aggregate estimates resulting from accounting for them. However, to compare trends in CE and PCE over time, a concordance of comparable items in both surveys is desirable. Independent exercises by federal agencies have created three different concordances. Here we discuss one such concordance and highlight similarities and differences in the CE and PCE along with trends in ratios of aggregate CE and PCE over 1992 to 2010. Aggregate expenditures and ratios of CE to PCE are produced for durables, non-durables, and services Results suggest that nondurables are most alike for the CE and PCE. Regarding trends over time and focusing on comparable goods and services only, CE to PCE ratios have steadily decreased. The greatest decline in CE to PCE ratios is for durables, and those for comparable services dropped the least.

Chapter 4 asks why, by the early 1980s, the Spanish labor movement emerged so much stronger than in neighboring Portugal in terms of its capacity to protect the wages of low-skilled workers. The relative weakness of the Portuguese labor movement is even more surprising when one considers that the Portuguese communists emerged from the transition period with control over the country’s powerful unitary labor confederation whereas the Spanish labor movement was initially characterized by more extensive fragmentation at the confederal level. The chapter demonstrates how differences in the distribution of power resources within the left shaped party strategies for regulating the role of unions within collective bargaining and, in so doing, shaped the long-term bargaining capacity of unions vis-à-vis employers.

Chapter 7 turns to the evolution of social protection in the rural sector. It highlights the two countries’ very different responses to their “Agrarian Social Question”—that is, to the challenge stemming from declining demand for agrarian labor in their latifundia regions. Once again, it demonstrates how the different outcomes relate to differences in the strength of the far left. In Portugal, the exclusionary strategy adopted by the center-left and center-right led to the demise of the far left’s rural class organizations, and to a “rural exodus” from the southern countryside. In Spain, the context of electoral socialism induced parties on both the right and left to maintain workers’ wages via state transfers. The result was a generous system of social protection, but one which promoted the political demobilization of rural workers’ class organizations.