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The national movement to abolish child labor, led by reformer Owen Lovejoy, entered its peak political and cultural phase at the height of the Progressive Era. This chapter reveals that the movement’s embrace of federal authority became increasingly religious in nature as it joined forces with the Social Gospel movement. Pointedly, this turn paid particular attention to girls in the age of Mueller v. Oregon and the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire. This approach led to many victories, including the Keating-Owen Act of 1916. During World War I, however, the movement shifted as it joined forces with the American toy industry and modern child welfare campaign, setting the stage for the rise of a consumerist ethos and a secular bureaucratic approach to child welfare.

This chapter examines how Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy traversed an uneven political ground in 1855 to move their respective positions on slavery into almost perfect alignment. It first provides an overview of Lincoln and Lovejoy's political grounding before discussing the political agreement that would allow Lincoln to advance his candidacy for the U.S. Senate and for Lovejoy to find a venue to correct some intentional mischaracterizations of the early Republican Party in Illinois. It also considers the two men's speeches in which they both regarded the repeal of the Missouri Compromise as a big mistake; their contradictory perceptions of the abolitionists; and their disagreement over the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the cautious approach taken by Lovejoy and others in uniting various antislavery groups.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's continued antislavery campaign and how they finally attained political power with Lincoln's election as the sixteenth president of the United States in 1860. In Illinois, Lincoln had learned to harness various political forces and pull them together, but he knew he needed more national exposure if he was to win the presidency as a compromise candidate from a necessary state. Like Lincoln, Lovejoy sought wider national recognition. This chapter first discusses Lincoln's speech at Cooper Union in New York City on February 27, 1860, in which he defended the Republican position with regard to slavery. It then considers Lovejoy's Barbarism of Slavery speech in Congress on April 5, 1860, along with the nomination of Lincoln as the Republican presidential candidate for that year's elections. It also looks at the campaigns in support of Lincoln, with particular emphasis on the roles played by Lovejoy and the Wide Awakes, and concludes with an assessment of Lincoln's victory.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's commitment towards holding together the Union while restoring the Founding Fathers' ideology as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. It first considers the debate in the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War about who had the right to investigate whether Democratic generals were not sufficiently committed to the Union cause to engage the rebels in battle. It then discusses laws enacted in the Thirty-Seventh Congress with the aim of promoting the nation's welfare; Lovejoy's bill “to secure freedom to all persons within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government”; Lincoln's proposal for gradual emancipation in the four border states; and the growing friendship between Lincoln and Lovejoy. The chapter also analyzes the Second Confiscation Act; factions within the Republican Party in the House; Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation; and Lovejoy's reelection in 1862. Finally, it addresses the question of whether Lincoln was a radical.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's antislavery campaign in 1859. Although he lost in the state legislature in the 1858 elections, Lincoln won the support of legislators representing the majority of voters. This, coupled with Lovejoy's victory, put both men in a position to enhance the Republicans' chances of winning in Illinois in 1860. Lincoln also intensified his political efforts in 1859 by continuing to expose Stephen A. Douglas's distortions of both popular sovereignty and the Declaration of Independence. In a speech in Chicago, he implored the Republicans of Illinois “to keep the faith, to remain steadfast to the right, to stand by your banner...” This chapter first assesses the impact of the 1858 elections on Kansas and the fire-eaters before considering Joseph Lovejoy's betrayal of his brother Owen and the incident involving white abolitionist John Brown. It also discusses the first session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress, where a fierce battle for Speaker of the House erupted, and Lincoln and Lovejoy's preparations for the 1860 elections.

This chapter focuses on Owen Lovejoy's election to the U.S. Congress in 1856, attributing his victory to various antislavery factors working together to prevent the expansion of slavery. In response to various accusations by the opposition press against the Republicans, including the charge that they were criminals who were breaking the Fugitive Slave Law, members of the Republican Party's Steering Committee developed a new strategy. Lovejoy dubbed this “our short bob sleds” strategy. This chapter first examines the Republicans' implementation of the twin bobsleds strategy before turning to the anti-Nebraska convention held in Bloomington, Illinois, on May 29, 1856, to nominate candidates for statewide offices. It then considers the national Republican Nominating Convention in Philadelphia on June 17, 1856, along with Lovejoy's nomination as the Republican candidate for the Third Congressional District of Illinois. It also compares the campaign strategies of Lovejoy and Abraham Lincoln for the 1856 contest in Illinois and concludes by highlighting the significance of Lovejoy's triumph in the congressional elections, noting how “nobly the elements had stood together” throughout the campaign.

This chapter suggests that Abraham Lincoln's failed senatorial bid in the 1858 elections allowed him to know who really cared about the results, and that they had come to trust him. In a March 8, 1958, letter to Owen Lovejoy, Lincoln ended with the statement “Let this be strictly confidential...I have some valued friends who would not like me any the better for writing it.” This cautionary tone is proof that Lincoln trusted Lovejoy enough to risk giving him candid information. After discussing Lovejoy's speech accepting his unanimous renomination to the U.S. Congress, this chapter considers Lovejoy and Lincoln's opinions on Negro equality. It also examines Lincoln's debates with Stephen A. Douglas in each of Illinois's seven congressional districts over the issue of slavery. Finally, it describes Lovejoy's victory in the 1858 elections and Lincoln's disagreement with the notion that he had made the wrong choice by keeping his principles and coming too close to Lovejoy.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's unwavering commitment to the antislavery cause during Lincoln's first year in office amid the eruption of hostilities between northern and southern states that culminated in the Civil War. The discussion begins with an analysis of how the concepts of honor and dishonor escalated the tension between North and South over the issue of secession. The chapter then considers Congressman John Crittenden's proposed compromise whereby new states formed below a line extending from Missouri's southern border to the Pacific Ocean would be admitted as slave states, while all new states above that line would prohibit slavery. It also looks at Lincoln's inauguration and his initiatives as president to defend the Union against the Confederacy, as well as the special first session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress. Finally, it assesses Lovejoy's time in Missouri fighting as part of the Union forces under General John C. Frémont, his plan to quell the rebellion, his return to Congress, and his legislative proposals.

This chapter summarizes some of the accomplishments of Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's unusual but remarkable collaboration that continued until the latter's death in 1864. It first considers Lovejoy's support for Francis Carpenter in creating a life-size portrait of Lincoln depicting the moment when he read the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. It then recounts how, in the last ten years of their lives, Lincol and Lovejoy had relied on each other, working together to unite the divergent factions in the Illinois Republican Party, to keep the Republicans united in Congress, and to convince moderate and radical members of Congress to pass emancipation legislation. It argues that Lovejoy and Lincoln had acted from the perspectives of both radicalism and pragmatism in their quest to end slavery, that as radicals, they collaborated pragmatically to make major and lasting contributions to the process of emancipation. Their ability to collaborate was enhanced by a common religious approach, which was also a source of their mutual trust and respect.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's united stand to assure that the nation “can long endure” amidst the war. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation intensified the desperation felt by slaveholders in areas close to the invading armies. While resisting and escaping slaves invigorated the political process for emancipation, the Emancipation Proclamation emboldened more resistance to slave masters and enhanced cooperation in the Union's efforts in the Civil War. This chapter begins with a discussion of the debate among antislavery leaders over reconstruction policy, along with Lincoln and Lovejoy's disagreements about issues such as the role that the federal military should take in policing the states during the transition. It then considers Lovejoy's health problems and the support for the Lincoln administration's war effort, as well as two men 's persistence in pursuing their radical agenda. It also looks at Lincoln's appeal for divine help to guide and heal the nation, highlighted by his Thanksgiving Proclamation designating August 6 “a day for National Thanksgiving, Praise and Prayer.”

Chapter Nine explores the range of opinion among Republicans in the US House in early 1861. Hard-liners led by Thaddeus Stevens and Owen Lovejoy disavowed all intention of attacking slavery in the states where it existed but argued that it would be wrong to offer concessions in the face of secessionist recklessness; the Constitution should be “obeyed rather than amended.” By contrast, conciliatory Republicans denied that the constitutional amendment would appease secessionists. It would instead strengthen those Southerners who had done the most to challenge disunion, and who had thereby kept secession from engulfing the eight slave states of the Upper South.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1857 ruling in the case of Dred Scott. The Dred Scott decision, written by Chief Justice Roger Taney, affirmed that slaves were not citizens and indeed “had no rights which a white man was bound to accept.” Lincoln and Lovejoy denounced the Supreme Court's interpretation that the Constitution provided federal authority to reduce human beings to property without rights, accusing it of political abuse of judicial power. This chapter begins with a discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court's previous rulings in connection with the slave transit law, along with Lincoln and Lovejoy's argument that humans could not legally be reduced to property under the Constitution. It then considers the two men's views on religion and politics as well as their response to the Dred Scott decision. It also looks at Lincoln and Lovejoy's preparations for the 1858 elections.

This chapter examines how Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy were brought together by a common vision to end slavery. Lincoln, a Springfield lawyer, and Lovejoy, a Princeton pastor, met for the first time at the Springfield State Fair in Illinois on October 4, 1854. At that time, both Lincoln and Lovejoy were angered by the Kansas–Nebraska Act championed by Illinois Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas. Lincoln wanted the Whigs and Lovejoy wanted the Republican Party to lead the “fusion” movement uniting all those opposed to Douglas's law and advocating the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. In a speech, Lincoln declared, “This...real zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate.” Lovejoy, one of those in attendance, identified with Lincoln's emotion and conviction, as his brother, Elijah, was murdered by a pro-slavery mob. This chapter first discusses the beginning of the Republican Party in Illinois before turning to his and Lincoln's election to the Illinois House of Representatives on November 7, 1854.

This chapter discusses the abolition of slavery in Illinois after the firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861 marked the beginning of the end of the struggle for emancipation. Many of the settlers of southern Illinois had come from the slave belt. These men brought with them their outlooks and habits of life, and southern Illinois, later known as “Egypt,” became a stronghold of pro-slavery sentiment. With the opening of the Erie Canal, New Englanders, New Yorkers, and immigrants direct from Europe settled in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin. These pioneers, too, “packed their beliefs in their traveling bags.” It has been contended by some that the construction of the Erie Canal was more influential in freeing the Southern slaves than were such abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison. This chapter looks at some of the leading Illinois abolitionists, including Owen Lovejoy, Ichabod Codding, Edward Beecher, Zebina Eastman, Hooper Warren, Benjamin Lundy, and Lyman Trumbull. It also considers the Fugitive Slave Law and the reaction of Chicagoans to it.

This book examines the role played by Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy in America's road to emancipation, with particular emphasis on how their collaboration contributed to the process of ending slavery. It argues that mutual trust and respect enabled Lincoln and Lovejoy to overcome their differences to forge an unlikely friendship and work toward a shared vision that helped mold (practical) public opinion to accept the (radical) objective of freeing the slaves. It analyzes the nature of Lincoln and Lovejoy's collaboration in the context of the ongoing debate over Lincoln and the radicals, and shows that the trusting relationship between the two men was grounded in the clear evidence of their integrity and wisdom; this relationship persisted despite the inconclusive evidence regarding the success of their differing tactics.