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Constitutive Generalism

Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge

in Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a ... More

According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.Less

Moral Realism

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The ... More

This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.Less

Nonnaturalism

Jonathan Dancy

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more ... More

Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more recent anti-naturalist arguments by Derek Parfit are outlined. It is necessary to get a clearer view of what normativity is before one can decide whether naturalism abolishes normativity, as Parfit claims. An initial account of normativity is therefore given, and the prospects of a blockbuster argument are reconsidered.Less

The Truth that Pain is Bad

Colin Marshall

in Compassionate Moral Realism

This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses ... More

This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses on the claim that pain is objectively bad, arguing that it is literally true and corresponds to a stance-independent moral fact. After clarifying the meaning of that claim, a partial analysis for “objectively bad” is defended, according to which something is objectively bad if any subject in touch with it would be averse to it. After showing how this partial analysis connects to other philosophers’ analyses of value-related notions and follows from several defensible full analyses, a potential objection based on Moore’s Open Question Argument is considered and answered. It is then shown that “pain is objectively bad” is therefore literally true on this analysis, and that the corresponding fact is stance-independent in the relevant ways.Less