Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a ...
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According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.Less
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘constitutive generalism’. This chapter defends a form of generalism and it argues against constitutive generalism by deploying a version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The ...
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This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.Less
This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.
Jonathan Dancy
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more ...
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Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more recent anti-naturalist arguments by Derek Parfit are outlined. It is necessary to get a clearer view of what normativity is before one can decide whether naturalism abolishes normativity, as Parfit claims. An initial account of normativity is therefore given, and the prospects of a blockbuster argument are reconsidered.Less
Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more recent anti-naturalist arguments by Derek Parfit are outlined. It is necessary to get a clearer view of what normativity is before one can decide whether naturalism abolishes normativity, as Parfit claims. An initial account of normativity is therefore given, and the prospects of a blockbuster argument are reconsidered.
Justin Clarke-Doane
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198823667
- eISBN:
- 9780191862274
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Moral Philosophy
This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that ...
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This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.Less
This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.
Colin Marshall
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198809685
- eISBN:
- 9780191846953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198809685.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses ...
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This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses on the claim that pain is objectively bad, arguing that it is literally true and corresponds to a stance-independent moral fact. After clarifying the meaning of that claim, a partial analysis for “objectively bad” is defended, according to which something is objectively bad if any subject in touch with it would be averse to it. After showing how this partial analysis connects to other philosophers’ analyses of value-related notions and follows from several defensible full analyses, a potential objection based on Moore’s Open Question Argument is considered and answered. It is then shown that “pain is objectively bad” is therefore literally true on this analysis, and that the corresponding fact is stance-independent in the relevant ways.Less
This chapter articulates several core claims of Compassionate Moral Realism, and argues that the view thereby satisfies the semantic and metaphysical criteria for moral realism. The chapter focuses on the claim that pain is objectively bad, arguing that it is literally true and corresponds to a stance-independent moral fact. After clarifying the meaning of that claim, a partial analysis for “objectively bad” is defended, according to which something is objectively bad if any subject in touch with it would be averse to it. After showing how this partial analysis connects to other philosophers’ analyses of value-related notions and follows from several defensible full analyses, a potential objection based on Moore’s Open Question Argument is considered and answered. It is then shown that “pain is objectively bad” is therefore literally true on this analysis, and that the corresponding fact is stance-independent in the relevant ways.