Monique Deveaux
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289790
- eISBN:
- 9780191711022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289790.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter considers how human rights perspectives understand the gender/culture tension and the kinds of normative and practical solutions that they offer. In addition to discussing writing by ...
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This chapter considers how human rights perspectives understand the gender/culture tension and the kinds of normative and practical solutions that they offer. In addition to discussing writing by feminist human rights scholars, it considers the work of philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who focuses on women’s capabilities for well-being, as well as the work of philosopher Onora O’Neill, who argues that we need to attend to the circumstances and capacities that women need if they are to genuinely give their consent to cultural practices and arrangements.Less
This chapter considers how human rights perspectives understand the gender/culture tension and the kinds of normative and practical solutions that they offer. In addition to discussing writing by feminist human rights scholars, it considers the work of philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who focuses on women’s capabilities for well-being, as well as the work of philosopher Onora O’Neill, who argues that we need to attend to the circumstances and capacities that women need if they are to genuinely give their consent to cultural practices and arrangements.
Christian Illies
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238324
- eISBN:
- 9780191679612
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. ...
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Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.Less
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.
Charles Jones
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199242221
- eISBN:
- 9780191697067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242221.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Onora O'Neill made several interesting contributions to the debates on international distributive justice in her 1986 book, ‘Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, and Development’. This ...
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Onora O'Neill made several interesting contributions to the debates on international distributive justice in her 1986 book, ‘Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, and Development’. This chapter outlines O'Neill's Kantian strategy for tackling the moral problems of international poverty and defends a human rights approach against her objections. There are, however, seemingly fatal problems with the Kantian approach that render it less useful than a rights-centered strategy for justifying judgements about global justice. This chapter also discusses the pros and cons of three central cosmopolitan theories of justice: utilitarianism, human rights theories, and O'Neill's maverick Kantianism. The chapter concludes that a theory of basic human rights is a plausible approach for the cosmopolitan to take to the problems of international distributive justice.Less
Onora O'Neill made several interesting contributions to the debates on international distributive justice in her 1986 book, ‘Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, and Development’. This chapter outlines O'Neill's Kantian strategy for tackling the moral problems of international poverty and defends a human rights approach against her objections. There are, however, seemingly fatal problems with the Kantian approach that render it less useful than a rights-centered strategy for justifying judgements about global justice. This chapter also discusses the pros and cons of three central cosmopolitan theories of justice: utilitarianism, human rights theories, and O'Neill's maverick Kantianism. The chapter concludes that a theory of basic human rights is a plausible approach for the cosmopolitan to take to the problems of international distributive justice.
S.K. Das
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780198081661
- eISBN:
- 9780199082421
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198081661.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Indian Politics
This chapter describes the evolution of the human rights discourse covering the time from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 to the present. It ...
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This chapter describes the evolution of the human rights discourse covering the time from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 to the present. It discusses the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Covenants and Conventions, and looks at the expansion in the domain of human rights to cover economic and social rights. It also talks about different conceptions of human rights, particularly of Amartya Sen and Onora O’Neill, and also the critiques such as the feasibility critique and the institutional critique, and allocation of obligations. This chapter points out how a number of considerations—adequacy of the law, robust institutionalization, enabling economic environment, accessible remedies—have to receive attention, for the rights-based approach to succeed,Less
This chapter describes the evolution of the human rights discourse covering the time from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 to the present. It discusses the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Covenants and Conventions, and looks at the expansion in the domain of human rights to cover economic and social rights. It also talks about different conceptions of human rights, particularly of Amartya Sen and Onora O’Neill, and also the critiques such as the feasibility critique and the institutional critique, and allocation of obligations. This chapter points out how a number of considerations—adequacy of the law, robust institutionalization, enabling economic environment, accessible remedies—have to receive attention, for the rights-based approach to succeed,
Elizabeth Ashford
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199604388
- eISBN:
- 9780191803567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199604388.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human ...
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This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human rights. The first argument is that the enjoyment of the right to subsistence is essential to the enjoyment of any other rights, and so has to be acknowledged as a basic human right. The second argument addresses the duties imposed by welfare rights. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses Shue’s account of the interdependence between the right to subsistence and other rights. Section 2 argues for a substantive interdependence between them. Section 3 analyses the Kantian rationale for the claim that duties of justice must be perfect in nature, and that positive duties, unlike negative duties, cannot be general duties of justice. Section 4 discusses Onora O’Neill’s account of coercion, and argues that child labour plausibly constitutes coercion on this account. Section 5 argues that, because of the interdependence of the right against child labour and the right to subsistence, then unless the right to subsistence has been secured, the right against child labour is more plausibly seen as imposing imperfect duties. It concludes that the standard dichotomies between positive and negative duties are overly rigid.Less
This chapter reinforces two of Shue’s principal arguments against the existence of a fundamental distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, such that only the former are genuine human rights. The first argument is that the enjoyment of the right to subsistence is essential to the enjoyment of any other rights, and so has to be acknowledged as a basic human right. The second argument addresses the duties imposed by welfare rights. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses Shue’s account of the interdependence between the right to subsistence and other rights. Section 2 argues for a substantive interdependence between them. Section 3 analyses the Kantian rationale for the claim that duties of justice must be perfect in nature, and that positive duties, unlike negative duties, cannot be general duties of justice. Section 4 discusses Onora O’Neill’s account of coercion, and argues that child labour plausibly constitutes coercion on this account. Section 5 argues that, because of the interdependence of the right against child labour and the right to subsistence, then unless the right to subsistence has been secured, the right against child labour is more plausibly seen as imposing imperfect duties. It concludes that the standard dichotomies between positive and negative duties are overly rigid.
Kristen Hessler
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199688999
- eISBN:
- 9780191768118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688999.003.0017
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
Drawing on Onora O’Neill’s theories on human rights, this chapter examines how elements of her framing of the problem of human rights have been taken up in the literature on women’s human rights to ...
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Drawing on Onora O’Neill’s theories on human rights, this chapter examines how elements of her framing of the problem of human rights have been taken up in the literature on women’s human rights to health. It then argues that a major defect of O’Neill’s account is that it ignores the role that women’s human rights play in establishing women’s equal moral standing with men in their social and political communities, which is best captured by Pogge’s institutional account of human rights. It further argues that establishing women’s equal standing provides an institutional structure that fosters positive change in women’s health. This view of human rights can be grounded in Kant’s political philosophy, in particular the demand that we establish institutions that respect the equal freedom of individuals and avoid subordinationLess
Drawing on Onora O’Neill’s theories on human rights, this chapter examines how elements of her framing of the problem of human rights have been taken up in the literature on women’s human rights to health. It then argues that a major defect of O’Neill’s account is that it ignores the role that women’s human rights play in establishing women’s equal moral standing with men in their social and political communities, which is best captured by Pogge’s institutional account of human rights. It further argues that establishing women’s equal standing provides an institutional structure that fosters positive change in women’s health. This view of human rights can be grounded in Kant’s political philosophy, in particular the demand that we establish institutions that respect the equal freedom of individuals and avoid subordination
Pamela Sue Anderson
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199659289
- eISBN:
- 9780191764752
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659289.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that the compulsory norms of self-sacrificial ‘love’ in patriarchal forms of religious practice have undermined an appropriate confidence for both women and men; under patriarchy ...
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This chapter argues that the compulsory norms of self-sacrificial ‘love’ in patriarchal forms of religious practice have undermined an appropriate confidence for both women and men; under patriarchy persons (in love) tend to exhibit either over- or under-confidence in their capacity to reason for themselves. Yet it is possible to cultivate ethical confidence on the basis of non-destructive identities; this cultivation of human identities in personal and social relations, in turn, restores ‘the capacity to adopt principles that could be adopted by all’ (O’Neill). The latter, ‘principled autonomy’, matters, if we are to overcome sex-gender oppression in our most intimate relations.Less
This chapter argues that the compulsory norms of self-sacrificial ‘love’ in patriarchal forms of religious practice have undermined an appropriate confidence for both women and men; under patriarchy persons (in love) tend to exhibit either over- or under-confidence in their capacity to reason for themselves. Yet it is possible to cultivate ethical confidence on the basis of non-destructive identities; this cultivation of human identities in personal and social relations, in turn, restores ‘the capacity to adopt principles that could be adopted by all’ (O’Neill). The latter, ‘principled autonomy’, matters, if we are to overcome sex-gender oppression in our most intimate relations.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199572809
- eISBN:
- 9780191809866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of Immanuel Kant's Formula of Universal Law as an alternative to consequentialist reasoning. It first considers one version of Kant's Formula of ...
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This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of Immanuel Kant's Formula of Universal Law as an alternative to consequentialist reasoning. It first considers one version of Kant's Formula of Universal Law, known as the Impossibility Formula, which says it is wrong to act on maxims that could not be universal laws. It then examines Onora O'Neill's revised version of Kant's formula, that is: it is wrong to act on any maxim whose being successfully acted on by some people would prevent some other people from successfully acting on it. According to O'Neill, this formula condemns deception and coercion, since those who deceive or coerce others thereby ‘guarantee that their victims cannot act on the maxims they act on’. The chapter also explores Kant's Law of Nature Formula, Permissibility Formula, and Moral Belief Formula before concluding with an analysis of the notion that the agent's maxim determine whether some act is wrong.Less
This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of Immanuel Kant's Formula of Universal Law as an alternative to consequentialist reasoning. It first considers one version of Kant's Formula of Universal Law, known as the Impossibility Formula, which says it is wrong to act on maxims that could not be universal laws. It then examines Onora O'Neill's revised version of Kant's formula, that is: it is wrong to act on any maxim whose being successfully acted on by some people would prevent some other people from successfully acting on it. According to O'Neill, this formula condemns deception and coercion, since those who deceive or coerce others thereby ‘guarantee that their victims cannot act on the maxims they act on’. The chapter also explores Kant's Law of Nature Formula, Permissibility Formula, and Moral Belief Formula before concluding with an analysis of the notion that the agent's maxim determine whether some act is wrong.
Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Humean pluralism does a better job than its monistic rivals at explaining the morally significant phenomena of “agonizing decisions,” situations in which a person feels remorse about doing what she ...
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Humean pluralism does a better job than its monistic rivals at explaining the morally significant phenomena of “agonizing decisions,” situations in which a person feels remorse about doing what she thinks is right and that feeling of remorse is an entirely appropriate response. For while monism implies that when a person facing an agonizing decision comes to think that a certain decision really is right she will no longer experience the situation as involving opposing moral forces, Humean pluralism implies that even if someone comes to think that one particular course of action is right she may continue to experience the situation as one that involves conflicting moral forces. This chapter also addresses a number of monistic objections to this argument for pluralism, such as those pressed by Ruth Barcan Marcus and Thomas Hurka.Less
Humean pluralism does a better job than its monistic rivals at explaining the morally significant phenomena of “agonizing decisions,” situations in which a person feels remorse about doing what she thinks is right and that feeling of remorse is an entirely appropriate response. For while monism implies that when a person facing an agonizing decision comes to think that a certain decision really is right she will no longer experience the situation as involving opposing moral forces, Humean pluralism implies that even if someone comes to think that one particular course of action is right she may continue to experience the situation as one that involves conflicting moral forces. This chapter also addresses a number of monistic objections to this argument for pluralism, such as those pressed by Ruth Barcan Marcus and Thomas Hurka.
Kenneth R. Westphal
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198747055
- eISBN:
- 9780191809200
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747055.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kant’s universalization test is illustrated and defended by reconstructing Kant’s argument to justify rights to usufruct (acquisition, possession and use of things), based on human autonomy and human ...
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Kant’s universalization test is illustrated and defended by reconstructing Kant’s argument to justify rights to usufruct (acquisition, possession and use of things), based on human autonomy and human finitude. The modal interpretation of Kant’s universalization test (advocated by O’Neill) is developed and defended in detail. Only rights to usufruct can be defended by appeal to natural law; rights to property require public legislation (positive law).Less
Kant’s universalization test is illustrated and defended by reconstructing Kant’s argument to justify rights to usufruct (acquisition, possession and use of things), based on human autonomy and human finitude. The modal interpretation of Kant’s universalization test (advocated by O’Neill) is developed and defended in detail. Only rights to usufruct can be defended by appeal to natural law; rights to property require public legislation (positive law).
