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This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the EU’s active leverage, defined as the EU’s deliberate efforts to promote reform in candidate states moving towards EU membership. Active leverage is animated by the fact that the benefits of membership create incentives for states to satisfy the entry requirements, setting the stage for the effectiveness of conditionality within the EU’s pre-accession process. Three characteristics of this process make it particularly powerful: asymmetric interdependence, enforcement, and meritocracy. This chapter explores the origins of the EU’s pre-accession process, unpacks the requirements of membership, and details all of the different tools that enable the EU to exercise conditionality within the process. It compares the EU’s active leverage to the efforts of NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to promote democratic standards and economic reform in Eastern Europe's new democracies.

Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

The first chapter sets the scene by placing the analysis within the framework of debates about developments in the transatlantic security community in the post-9/11 world. It explains this book's focus on the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, and discusses the methods and data used in this study. Following an analysis of changes in the field of security since the end of the Cold War — and, as a prelude to the empirical chapters, a brief discussion of the evolving roles of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE — this chapter explains the conceptual framework used in this book. Drawing on analyses of risk-management developed in the disciplines of sociology, criminology, and political science, it argues that contemporary practices aimed at preventing and fighting terrorism can be understood as instantiations of a particular form of management of allegedly exceptional risks to modern liberal order.

This chapter examines some of the key OSCE initiatives adopted in the name of combating international terrorism, showing how the organization has sought to cast itself as a relevant, in some ways, uniquely competent security institution in the context of the fight against international terrorism. In particular, the OSCE has repeatedly invoked and sought to reinforce the inclusive security logic that it embodies. This chapter examines the dynamics — and limits — of some of the main practices enacted by the organization in the name of preventing and combating terrorism. It suggests that, for all its claims to the contrary, one of the key problems currently faced by the OSCE is that its ability to act as a security community-builder via the dissemination of norms of liberal-democratic governance has been significantly weakened in recent years. Simultaneously, the organization seems to have developed a greater capacity to carry out practices aimed at excluding from the OSCE territory individuals/groups suspected of involvement in terrorism. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the normative and political problems generated by this apparent change in the mix of inclusive and exclusionary security practices enacted by the OSCE.

The final chapter explores the ways in which the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have related to each other in their (theoretically joint) effort to prevent and combat international terrorism. Drawing on the work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, it argues that important instances of cooperation among NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have been accompanied by a dynamic of competition, as each institution has sought to secure a privileged position in the changing field of security by invoking and seeking to further enhance its symbolic and material capital. This chapter also reflects on the ways in which the activities carried out by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have further contributed to transformations in the field of security and, more broadly, to changes in norms of governance in the Euro-Atlantic area, for instance by participating in the process of blurring the boundaries between policing/defence activities, public/private spheres, and (re)constituting categories of protector/protected. Through their practices, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have also complicated questions about the acceptable limits of exceptional treatments of exclusion that target individuals and groups deemed as enemies of the community based on liberal-democratic values.

Examines the particular role of Western actors in strengthening the process of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The actors involved in the ‘Western project’ are individual Western states and primarily European multilateral organizations: the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and NATO. The first section of this chapter analyses the Western objectives with respect to Eastern Europe, such as helping with the economic transformation and maintaining stability thus promoting democracy. The second section discusses the instruments that the West has used to promote democratic consolidation—from aid to the conditional offer of membership in European organizations (conditionality). The third and final section evaluates the impact that the West has had on democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe.

Nationalizing impulses in countries with substantial ethnic minorities often provoke counter‐mobilization by those minorities. This chapter looks at the effectiveness of international organizations in providing a counterweight to these impulses, with particular reference to the cases of Latvia and Estonia. It is divided into two main sections. The first shows that the adoption of nationalizing measures in Latvia and Estonia is rooted in concerns about the identity, demography, and social mobility of the core group, and outlines the types of nationalizing strategies that have been adopted to reallocate power, status, and resources in favour of this group. The second section examines interventions in Latvia and Estonia by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co‐operation in Europe) High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe, and the EU. Argues that the combination of these pressures has made an important contribution to the recent relaxation of the nationalizing policies that these two countries adopted in their first years of independence.

Poses the question of whether diplomacy could have helped avoid a war in Kosovo while protecting the Kosovar Albanians. It argues that the narrative of the international response is inherently inconclusive, with not many clear “lessons” beyond the prudential observations in favour of early engagement and greater attentiveness to non‐violent options. The chapter describes the diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group, the UN Security Council, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and individual governments of the US and Russia. Belgrade government's opposition to armed international presence in Kosovo and KLA's refusal to back down from demands for independence are identified as main obstacles to reaching an agreement at Rambouillet.

This chapter outlines and analyses the main human rights and minority rights instruments that have been adopted by a range of international and regional organizations; presents an overview of monitoring procedures and institutions concerned with minority rights; and identifies some never-ending problems such as the definition of the term ‘minority’ and the question of individual and group rights. It argues that current international activities relating to minority rights are characterized by scattered standards and weak institutions, and demonstrates the reluctance of governments in this field. The only notable international institutional trends concern the case-law of two treaty bodies and the dialogue functions of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

This chapter continues to trace the recent history of Kosovo within the context of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Picking up in 1991, it examines the fall-out from the Serbian and Croatian declarations of independence, notably the Serbian military response and the internationally driven Carrington process. Of particular note was the restrictive and discretionary attitude of the Badinter Commission towards Kosovo's future status. The perceived sidelining of Kosovo is revisited in subsequent discussion of the 1992 London conference and follow-on meetings. The chapter also examines international efforts to stabilize the situation on the ground through the newly developed conflict prevention mechanisms of the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (C/OSCE), notably its Mission of Long Duration, which undertook responsibilities relating to monitoring mediation and protection of individuals.

This chapter traces the gradual escalation of the Kosovo crisis in the aftermath of the Dayton accords. Fearing potential engagement of neighbouring Macedonia and/or Albania, the international community sought to engage with the crisis in a number of ways: through a limited EU presence; pressure to restore the Long-term Mission in Kosovo; high-level diplomacy undertaken by the Contact Group; a joint US, Russian, and EU observer mission (KDOM); and, decisively, the adoption of UN Chapter VII resolutions threatening further sanctions and the possible use of force against Yugoslavia. The chapter then turns to international attempts to settle the conflict, initially through the multilateral shuttle diplomacy of the Hill negotiations and then through the parallel bilateral deal reached between Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic. However, Kosovo's exclusion from the latter and subsequent FRY/Serbian rejection of the Hill drafts was seen by the Kosovars as an attempt to undermine the internationalized Hill process, a perspective exacerbate by the FRY/Serbian renewed military offensive over Christmas.

This chapter discusses the lack of true democracy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in order to set the stage for a presentation of the study's findings. In the mid-1980s the leadership in the republics of Central Asia was either quiescent in the face of looming changes within the Soviet Union or loyal to the central Soviet leadership and supportive of the Soviet federation's preservation. Ultimately, however, Central Asian governments backed democratization, and the leaders of these republics openly renounced their communist beliefs and affiliations. Western international organizations then launched development, democracy promotion, and security-related projects in these states. Although there were legitimate concerns about these republics' susceptibility to political instability and economic crises, there was also hope that these countries would undergo quick political reform, marketization, and transformation into liberal democratic states. But none of the Central Asian states has met these expectations. Today, Central Asian regimes sit along a continuum of autocracy rather than democracy, their power and authority firmly concentrated in the presidential office and maintained through a combination of repression, co-option, and political constraints on societal institutions.

This chapter analyzes the unique role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an external intervener in internal identity conflicts. It transcends conventional scholarly work by arguing that the HCNM is a mediator with a very flexible modus operandi who—while maintaining his position of mediator within the relational set—shifts between activities traditionally described as mediation and negotiation. Case studies on the HCNM’s interventions in Estonia, Romania, and Ukraine show that the HCNM’s activities can best be described as mediation when he was faced with (1) an immediate crisis involving (2) two relatively clearly defined and strong parties who were (3) experiencing a mutually hurting stalemate. The HCNM moved much more strongly to negotiation when a partner government perceived a minority to be either too diffuse or too weak to be allowed a genuine seat at the table. In this situation, external leverage—as, for instance, provided by the European Union’s enlargement process—seems to have been vital in persuading governments to accommodate their minorities in accordance with (and sometimes even beyond) international standards.

This chapter analyses the aims, purposes, and work of the organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and examines the legal aspects of institutional action in the area of security law. It evaluates whether the legal and institutional structures of OSCE either undermine its future role as the leading European organisation, or may represent an advantage compared to other, mainly European, organisations. It focuses on the potential role of the OSCE in developing a specific legal framework — a European Security Law — both in partnership with other European organisations and in relationship with the UN.

This chapter focuses on the impact of efficiency on conflict-affected populations and on the effectiveness of interventions. It details the conditions under which speed of response enhances prospects for sustainable peace, and it places the discussion on speed in an international security context. Organizations have thus far failed in their efforts to develop and employ rapid response mechanisms. Instead, control over speed of response remains in the hands of the member states driving consensus-based decisions to react. The chapter provides a means for measuring the efficiency involved in the planning and operationalizing of these decisions. It then introduces an original database on response rate variation across four international organizations. In an analysis of the response rates data, the chapter elucidates core distinctions between the record of the European Union and the record of the African Union, OAS, and OSCE. From membership size to strength of capabilities, potential reasons for the variation in speed are assessed but fail to explain why the EU would be slower to react to crises. State-based theories of international relations prove equally insufficient in explaining the phenomenon. This suggests the need for an entirely different explanation, which is outlined in the subsequent chapter.

This chapter examines the contestation of the OSCE’s legitimacy by Russia on the one hand, and the US and Germany on the other. It highlights that international organisations are not only institutions whose authority needs to be constantly legitimated both towards internal and external audiences, but are also institutional frameworks through which states advance and contest competing conceptions of international order. The competing conceptions of order are examined through debates on the forms and functions of the OSCE, in particular the issue of its legal personality, the unequal involvement of the OSCE into the domestic affairs of its member states, and the autonomy from member-state control of OSCE institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It also highlights the limits that value pluralism, exemplified in the OSCE by the split between Russia and CIS states on the one hand, and North American and Western European states on the other, undermines the efficacy of efforts to legitimate any international organisation.

This chapter examines the parliamentarization of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The establishment of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly took place in the context of the post-Cold War democratization wave in Eastern Europe and the active diffusion efforts of the Council of Europe. Whereas the Western governments had a vested interest in ensuring the democratic transition of Eastern Europe, the young democracies sought international recognition as part of the European political community. Beyond this post-Cold War consensus, several options were under consideration. The chapter describes how the initial proposal of a joint parliamentary assembly of the OSCE with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) was discarded in favour of a separate OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

This chapter examines cases of preventive diplomacy in the postcommunist period. At the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts threatened to break out in Yugoslavia, Moldova, Romania, the Baltic countries, and elsewhere in postcommunist Europe. Thinking to prevent future civil wars like those in Bosnia and Croatia, West European governments established the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor hot spots that threatened bloodshed. Preventive diplomacy has met with variable success across Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s and 2000s, the HCNM and the OSCE intervened to contain escalating conflicts on dozens of occasions—with uneven results. Of the HCNM's many mediations, the high commissioner judged its interventions in Macedonia and the Baltics most successful, whereas others—namely, Kosovo—were viewed as significant failures.