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This chapter examines why Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded in concluding the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. It notes that Moscow and Washington had concluded that nonproliferation enhanced both U.S. and Soviet national security, especially with respect to West Germany and non-Western nations. The chapter notes further that they envisioned a two-tier system in which their respective alliance partners would have tightly controlled access to nuclear weapons while the rest of the world pledged nuclear abstinence. It points out, however, that newly decolonized nations objected to this system of “nuclear weapons apartheid,” demanding that Moscow and Washington cut their nuclear arsenals to offset the sacrifice of non-nuclear nations. The chapter notes that the NPT that finally took effect in 1970 marked, in the words of one jaded proponent, a “worthless triumph.”

This chapter examines whether the policies instituted by the international community, led by major powers such as the United States, to separate the peaceful and military uses of the atom have been effective. In particular, it evaluates the degree to which the safeguards established by the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have made a difference in terms of making it more difficult for countries to exploit peaceful nuclear assistance to build nuclear weapons. It also considers whether such safeguards have weakened the relationship between peaceful nuclear assistance and nuclear weapons program initiation by focusing on the cases of Syria and Japan. It shows that in practice, nuclear safeguards have had a relatively modest effect in reducing the dangers of atomic assistance for nuclear weapons proliferation. Atomic assistance increases the likelihood of nuclear weapons pursuit regardless of a state's status in the nonproliferation regime.

This chapter examines whether exchanging oil for nuclear technology is a compelling motivation for peaceful nuclear assistance across a broader set of cases or whether it explains only a handful of outliers. It also considers whether there is a significant relationship between being an oil producer and receiving nonsafety assistance in developing a civil nuclear program by analyzing statistical data on nonsafety nuclear cooperation agreements against oil-producing countries for the period 1950–2000. Finally, it presents some additional qualitative evidence linking oil production and peaceful nuclear cooperation. The chapter notes important differences in patterns of atomic assistance during periods when oil prices rise substantially and suggests that suppliers are more likely to engage in oil-for-nuclear technology swaps when they are concerned about their energy security. Furthermore, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty variable is positively correlated with nuclear assistance.

This chapter looks at how the inauguration of President Kim Young-sam resulted in drastic reforms during his early years of presidency. Kim supported the prosecution of former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. However, despite all the reforms, the advocacy only advanced within Jeju itself—a periphery in South Korean politics. Attempts to push the issue onto the national agenda were foiled by a lack of political will and public interest. To make things worse, President Kim made a change in his policy and he had successfully suppressed civil society by the end of his tenure. Two political issues explain this sudden turn. First, North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provoked the conservative and military facets of society. Second, Kim pushed for a retrogressive revision of the Labor Law, but had to withdraw because of a nationwide strike.