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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first shows what consociationalists can learn from Northern Ireland. The second shows what critics of consociational theory can learn from Northern Ireland. The authors argue that a revised consociational theory provides the most sensible basis for understanding and prescribing for Northern Ireland and similar conflict zones. The third section suggests a number of ways in which Northern Ireland's Agreement may be best stabilised following the uncertainty of the first phase in efforts to implement it (1998-2003)

Examines the impact of globalization and EU integration on the Northern Ireland conflict and its resolution. While they have not diluted the identities of opposing factions, or the intensity of their political agendas, they have greatly increased the opportunities for effective diplomacy on the part of national government. The Anglo‐Irish cooperation that ultimately produced the Good Friday Agreement may have been made easier as a result of sovereignty‐pooling and intergovernmental cooperation within the EU, but it was also due to a slow recognition by the UK government that the conflict could not be managed within the traditional state system. Globalization complemented these factors.

The chapter examines the effect of a number of changes in the international order on the Northern Ireland conflict. Its central argument is that while globalization and European integration have done little to transform Northern Ireland's rival identities in the way that some integrationists hope or claim, the internationalisation of Northern Ireland's conflict has had important and positive effects on conflict management.

The chapter offers a comparative evaluation of Northern Ireland's Agreement and the one reached in South Africa, and underlines the differences between them. It argues that the analogy between Northern Ireland and South Africa should be read in different ways than it is by nationalist and unionist integrationists, and by social transformationists. It explains that the Northern Ireland conflict has important exogenous dimensions that are missing in South Africa, This is illustrated by two central points: (i) while South Africans reached agreement because of endogenous factors, cooperation by the British and Irish governments was essential to the attainment of agreement in Northern Ireland; (ii) while South Africa's settlement required new political institutions internal to the country, a vital part of Northern Ireland's agreement involved the construction of trans-border political institutions linking Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.

Reviews the political processes that led to the multi‐party and intergovernmental agreement reached in Belfast on 10 April 1998 (the ‘Good Friday Agreement’), and to the subsequent British–Irish Agreement of 1999. It then examines the details of the understandings arrived at. The story raises some interesting political science questions for formal theorists and comparative analysts regarding the nature of coalition government, the bargaining processes for allocating ministerial portfolios, and variations in consociational executive practice around the world.

The chapter defends the Northern Ireland Agreement's consociational institutions. It notes that the Agreement also contains federal and confederal institutions covering all of Ireland and linking Ireland with Britain, and argues that both the internal and external dimensions were necessary parts of a durable settlement given the identities and aspirations of nationalists and unionists. The chapter stresses, in contrast to positions taken by Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz, the advantages of the particular proportional electoral system used in Northern Ireland. It also points to the dangers that Britain's tradition of parliamentary sovereignty poses to stable agreements between Britain and Ireland. Northern Ireland, the author argues, could and should have become a federacy as well as having consociational governance.

Smooha argues that Jews have settled in Palestine – Land of Israel in sufficient strength to establish a strong independent state in part of the area (pre‐1967 Israel), although their attempt to incorporate the rest (the West Bank and Gaza) by settlement has failed. As a result, partition has become the most feasible way to resolve the Jewish–Palestinian conflict. In Ireland, by contrast, the position of British settlers (Protestants) is said to be much weaker than their Jewish counterparts. The Protestants are weak demographically, lack international legitimacy, are not supported by Britain, and are faced with a confident Irish nationalism. As a consequence, the historical trend points to Britain's withdrawal and an end to the partition of Ireland as the most likely form of conflict resolution.

The “democratic deficit” and significant British and European financial support for civil society have led to the growth of a large voluntary sector in Northern Ireland, including a diverse collection of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs). P/CROs in Northern Ireland were founded to deal with the symptoms of the conflict, not its real or perceived causes, and member characteristics were largely determined by which symptoms P/CROs focused on; however, most members were broadly left leaning. Some P/CROs targeted specific communities, some sought to influence a broader audience, and others did both. While smaller, less formal P/CROS needed little income, larger groups required more funding, and sometimes had to professionalize in order to secure it, although relationships with funders tended to be relaxed. While P/CROs clearly had no direct impact on the peace process, they did introduce an “inclusivist” philosophy into the political arena, encouraged political debate, and provided an extra tier of progressive leadership.

Despite employing a variety of strategies to maintain white supremacy, the South African government could not prevent the rise of a black resistance movement or of predominantly white nongovernmental organizations that opposed apartheid. Such challenges to apartheid, economic difficulties, international pressure, and behind‐the‐scenes negotiations led to regime change and democratic elections in 1994. In Northern Ireland, Catholic–Protestant antagonism has roots in many centuries of English colonialism, aggravated by mutual distrust and segregation, limited citizen control over government, intermittent economic stagnation, and sectarian prejudices, but only in the late 1960s did violence become a part of everyday life. Although bloodshed continued, progress toward a solution began in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s. When Israel was founded in 1948, Arab–Jewish hostility already existed, and grew in the following decades, which saw five wars between Israel and Arab states, as well as political organizations, sometimes leading to violence, by Palestinian Arabs living. Domestic pressure for reform in the late 1970s and intense Palestinian resistance in the late 1980s forced Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, although prospects for peace remained bleak. All three conflicts shared features: disputes over land; forced settlements; ethnonational divisions; and the intersection of class and race.

Taylor delivers a sustained critique of the consociational institutions in Northern Ireland's Agreement from an integrationist (social transformationist) perspective. He argues that a stable peace requires the rejection of the top‐down approach taken in the Agreement and, instead, the construction from the bottom‐up of a common society through integrated schools, residences, and workplaces, and through the organization of groups in civil society that are dedicated to eroding ethno‐national divisions. He favours a ‘non‐sectarian democratic society in a united ‘New Ireland’.

Compares Northern Ireland with Western Europe's other hot spot, the Basque Country. It links both regions with the process of European integration. Keating's view is that, as this promotes a move away from the traditional notion of single identities and sovereign nation‐states towards more complex multiple identities and forms of shared sovereignty; it offers a potential way out of both conflicts.

Compares Northern Ireland's peace process with the transition to democracy in South Africa. The chapter details the ways in which Northern Ireland's political elites learnt from South Africa's negotiations, and argues that they have more to learn. It squarely rejects the claim of Irish republican militants that their position is analogous to that of South Africa's African National Congress.

This chapter criticizes five popular arguments central to the thinking of liberal integrationists: (i) extremist political and religious elites are responsible for conflicts; (ii) conflicts have fundamental economic and material foundations; (iii) conflicts flow from archaic religious and non-religious political cultures; (iv) segregation is the key social and structural cause of conflict; and (v) individual discrimination is the primary motor of conflict. The authors insist instead on the ethno-national nature of the conflict and the need for appropriate political means to address this.

Devolution to Scotland since 1707. Church patronage 1707–1874. The Disruption 1843. The Jacobite risings. The Scottish Enlightenment. Revival of devolution since the 1960s. The shotgun conversion of Scottish Labour 1974. Failure 1974–9; success 1989–99. The Claim of Right (1689 and) 1989. Devolution to Northern Ireland since 1920. A Protestant Parliament in a Protestant state. The Troubles. The Good Friday Agreement. Constitutional framework. Devolution to Wales since 1964. ‘And to a lesser extent Wales.’ The weakest territorial department: Aberfan. Constitutional issues arising out of devolution. The Barnett Formula. The West Lothian Question, true and false. ‘English votes on English laws.’ Authority of subordinate parliaments. Formal (but empty) Diceyanism of the devolution statues. The Sewel Convention.

This chapter examines the changes in the conception of the United Kingdom as a territorial state. It discusses the two major territorial questions relevant to the United Kingdom: the question concerning Ireland and Northern Ireland; and the relationships between the component parts of the United Kingdom, specifically Great Britain. The chapter explains the key aspects of the evolution of the twentieth-century constitution of the United Kingdom.

Article 6 of the European Convention, which protects the right to a fair hearing, is the most frequently invoked Convention article, not just in the United Kingdom but in Strasbourg too. Not surprisingly, it has featured prominently in some cases arising out of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This chapter discusses the issues that raise the risk that Article 6 was being breached, whether pre-trial or at the trial. It shows that despite alterations to the trial process being at the heart of the government's strategy for dealing with terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, the European Convention on Human Rights played a very small role in regulating those alterations.