Andrew L. Johns
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125725
- eISBN:
- 9780813135427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125725.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In the story of Theseus, the hero volunteers to slay the Minotaur in the labyrinth created by the master craftsman Daedalus. Ariadne, Daedalus's daughter, who had fallen in love with Theseus, taught ...
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In the story of Theseus, the hero volunteers to slay the Minotaur in the labyrinth created by the master craftsman Daedalus. Ariadne, Daedalus's daughter, who had fallen in love with Theseus, taught him the way to reach the center of the maze, where the half-man, half-bull lived. She also gave him a ball of string that would help him escape after completing his task. Theseus would have been doomed to wander the labyrinth forever—or until he randomly stumbled on the right sequence of decisions that would lead him to the exit. This chapter analyzes how the Nixon administration did just that, taking multiple steps and missteps in an effort to end the war, all while facing keen domestic pressure from all sides and a new international system largely of Nixon's own making.Less
In the story of Theseus, the hero volunteers to slay the Minotaur in the labyrinth created by the master craftsman Daedalus. Ariadne, Daedalus's daughter, who had fallen in love with Theseus, taught him the way to reach the center of the maze, where the half-man, half-bull lived. She also gave him a ball of string that would help him escape after completing his task. Theseus would have been doomed to wander the labyrinth forever—or until he randomly stumbled on the right sequence of decisions that would lead him to the exit. This chapter analyzes how the Nixon administration did just that, taking multiple steps and missteps in an effort to end the war, all while facing keen domestic pressure from all sides and a new international system largely of Nixon's own making.
Jussi Hanhimäki
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195172218
- eISBN:
- 9780199849994
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172218.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In the long series of negotiations with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger informed Nixon that he had hammered out an acceptable agreement that could end America's longest war by the end of the year, a crowning ...
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In the long series of negotiations with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger informed Nixon that he had hammered out an acceptable agreement that could end America's longest war by the end of the year, a crowning achievement in the first Nixon administration's foreign policy. Nixon saw this as an opportunity to maximize his political gain and a useful tool for the upcoming November 1972 election. However, the October agreement fell victim to many problems embedded in Kissinger and Nixon's Vietnam policy. The South Vietnamese president rejected Kissinger's offer. Also, throughout the fall of 1972, the rift between Kissinger and Nixon grew wider with Nixon contemplating letting go of Kissinger as part of his reorganization of his foreign policy team. These events are presented in detail in this chapter.Less
In the long series of negotiations with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger informed Nixon that he had hammered out an acceptable agreement that could end America's longest war by the end of the year, a crowning achievement in the first Nixon administration's foreign policy. Nixon saw this as an opportunity to maximize his political gain and a useful tool for the upcoming November 1972 election. However, the October agreement fell victim to many problems embedded in Kissinger and Nixon's Vietnam policy. The South Vietnamese president rejected Kissinger's offer. Also, throughout the fall of 1972, the rift between Kissinger and Nixon grew wider with Nixon contemplating letting go of Kissinger as part of his reorganization of his foreign policy team. These events are presented in detail in this chapter.
David Hamilton Golland
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813129976
- eISBN:
- 9780813135472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813129976.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
A Puerto Rican and two African American trained steamfitters were rejected when they applied for “A Branch” journeyman membership. Since the union did not want to refer them to work, the Mechanical ...
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A Puerto Rican and two African American trained steamfitters were rejected when they applied for “A Branch” journeyman membership. Since the union did not want to refer them to work, the Mechanical Contractors' Association's (MCA) members all denied them jobs. The steamfitters of Local #629 had two grades — “A Branch” that encompassed specialized construction jobs and the “B Grade” that accounted for maintenance work. After an investigation pursued by the New York City Human Rights Commission, the A Branch hired its first black worker in 1967. While the Nixon administration only furthered the Philadelphia Plan for political purposes, this chapter reveals how Nixon neglected this support after gaining more power. The plan, however, survived and was able to integrate skilled construction unions successfully. Ultimately, employment discrimination persisted in skilled trades because of industry changes.Less
A Puerto Rican and two African American trained steamfitters were rejected when they applied for “A Branch” journeyman membership. Since the union did not want to refer them to work, the Mechanical Contractors' Association's (MCA) members all denied them jobs. The steamfitters of Local #629 had two grades — “A Branch” that encompassed specialized construction jobs and the “B Grade” that accounted for maintenance work. After an investigation pursued by the New York City Human Rights Commission, the A Branch hired its first black worker in 1967. While the Nixon administration only furthered the Philadelphia Plan for political purposes, this chapter reveals how Nixon neglected this support after gaining more power. The plan, however, survived and was able to integrate skilled construction unions successfully. Ultimately, employment discrimination persisted in skilled trades because of industry changes.
William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469626604
- eISBN:
- 9781469626628
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469626604.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Latin American History
This chapter discusses the most serious effort to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba since Washington broke ties with Havana in January 1961. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry ...
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This chapter discusses the most serious effort to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba since Washington broke ties with Havana in January 1961. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opened communications with Fidel Castro, anxious to discuss bilateral issues and to do so discreetly, through intermediaries. Kissinger’s message set in motion a protracted effort to achieve an “opening” to Cuba comparable to the opening to China—an effort to extend the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente with the Soviet Union to its Communist ally in the Caribbean. Over the next eighteen months, emissaries traveled back and forth between Washington and Havana, and Kissinger’s deputies quietly met with Cuban officials in airport lounges, New York hotels, and private homes to discuss the issues that divided the United States and Cuba.Less
This chapter discusses the most serious effort to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba since Washington broke ties with Havana in January 1961. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opened communications with Fidel Castro, anxious to discuss bilateral issues and to do so discreetly, through intermediaries. Kissinger’s message set in motion a protracted effort to achieve an “opening” to Cuba comparable to the opening to China—an effort to extend the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente with the Soviet Union to its Communist ally in the Caribbean. Over the next eighteen months, emissaries traveled back and forth between Washington and Havana, and Kissinger’s deputies quietly met with Cuban officials in airport lounges, New York hotels, and private homes to discuss the issues that divided the United States and Cuba.
Tanya Harmer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807834954
- eISBN:
- 9781469602721
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807869246_harmer
- Subject:
- History, Latin American History
Fidel Castro described Salvador Allende's democratic election as president of Chile in 1970 as the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Yet celebrations ...
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Fidel Castro described Salvador Allende's democratic election as president of Chile in 1970 as the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Yet celebrations were short lived. In Washington, the Nixon administration vowed to destroy Allende's left-wing government while Chilean opposition forces mobilized against him. The result was a battle for Chile that ended in 1973 with a right-wing military coup and a brutal dictatorship lasting nearly twenty years. This book argues that this battle was part of a dynamic inter-American Cold War struggle to determine Latin America's future, shaped more by the contest between Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil than by a conflict between Moscow and Washington. Drawing on firsthand interviews and recently declassified documents from archives in North America, Europe, and South America—including Chile's Foreign Ministry Archive—the author provides a comprehensive account of Cuban involvement in Latin America in the early 1970s, Chilean foreign relations during Allende's presidency, Brazil's support for counterrevolution in the Southern Cone, and the Nixon administration's Latin American policies. The Cold War in the Americas, she reveals, is best understood as a multidimensional struggle, involving peoples and ideas from across the hemisphere.Less
Fidel Castro described Salvador Allende's democratic election as president of Chile in 1970 as the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Yet celebrations were short lived. In Washington, the Nixon administration vowed to destroy Allende's left-wing government while Chilean opposition forces mobilized against him. The result was a battle for Chile that ended in 1973 with a right-wing military coup and a brutal dictatorship lasting nearly twenty years. This book argues that this battle was part of a dynamic inter-American Cold War struggle to determine Latin America's future, shaped more by the contest between Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil than by a conflict between Moscow and Washington. Drawing on firsthand interviews and recently declassified documents from archives in North America, Europe, and South America—including Chile's Foreign Ministry Archive—the author provides a comprehensive account of Cuban involvement in Latin America in the early 1970s, Chilean foreign relations during Allende's presidency, Brazil's support for counterrevolution in the Southern Cone, and the Nixon administration's Latin American policies. The Cold War in the Americas, she reveals, is best understood as a multidimensional struggle, involving peoples and ideas from across the hemisphere.
Jon Wiener
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520216464
- eISBN:
- 9780520924543
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520216464.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This book tells the story of the author's remarkable fourteen-year court battle to win release of the FBI's surveillance files on John Lennon under the Freedom of Information Act. The files had been ...
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This book tells the story of the author's remarkable fourteen-year court battle to win release of the FBI's surveillance files on John Lennon under the Freedom of Information Act. The files had been withheld on the grounds that releasing them would endanger national security. Lennon's file was compiled in 1972, when the war in Vietnam was at its peak, when Nixon was facing re-election, and when the “clever Beatle” was living in New York and joining up with the New Left and the anti-war movement. The Nixon administration's efforts to “neutralize” Lennon are the subject of Lennon's file. The documents are reproduced in facsimile so that readers can see all the classification stamps, marginal notes, blacked out passages and—in some cases—the initials of FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover. The file includes lengthy reports by confidential informants detailing the daily lives of anti-war activists, memos to the White House, transcripts of TV shows on which Lennon appeared, and a proposal that Lennon be arrested by local police on drug charges. The book documents an era when rock music seemed to have real political force and when youth culture challenged the status quo in Washington. It also delineates the ways the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations fought to preserve government secrecy, and highlights the legal strategies adopted by those who have challenged it.Less
This book tells the story of the author's remarkable fourteen-year court battle to win release of the FBI's surveillance files on John Lennon under the Freedom of Information Act. The files had been withheld on the grounds that releasing them would endanger national security. Lennon's file was compiled in 1972, when the war in Vietnam was at its peak, when Nixon was facing re-election, and when the “clever Beatle” was living in New York and joining up with the New Left and the anti-war movement. The Nixon administration's efforts to “neutralize” Lennon are the subject of Lennon's file. The documents are reproduced in facsimile so that readers can see all the classification stamps, marginal notes, blacked out passages and—in some cases—the initials of FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover. The file includes lengthy reports by confidential informants detailing the daily lives of anti-war activists, memos to the White House, transcripts of TV shows on which Lennon appeared, and a proposal that Lennon be arrested by local police on drug charges. The book documents an era when rock music seemed to have real political force and when youth culture challenged the status quo in Washington. It also delineates the ways the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations fought to preserve government secrecy, and highlights the legal strategies adopted by those who have challenged it.
Eric Grynaviski
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452062
- eISBN:
- 9780801454653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452062.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their ...
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This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their understanding of a relationship is shared—cooperation may be much more likely to happen, especially if there are principled differences or conflicts of interest. The case of détente—the most robust period of cooperation between the superpowers—was only possible because of FIBs. Détente to the Soviets meant that they could safely support national liberation movements without US meddling. On the other hand, the Nixon administration thought that Soviet strategic parity meant that military competition had been replaced by political competition.Less
This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their understanding of a relationship is shared—cooperation may be much more likely to happen, especially if there are principled differences or conflicts of interest. The case of détente—the most robust period of cooperation between the superpowers—was only possible because of FIBs. Détente to the Soviets meant that they could safely support national liberation movements without US meddling. On the other hand, the Nixon administration thought that Soviet strategic parity meant that military competition had been replaced by political competition.
Tanya Harmer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807834954
- eISBN:
- 9781469602721
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807869246_harmer.12
- Subject:
- History, Latin American History
This chapter argues that achieving unity and guaranteeing the success of a coup in Chile still remained a big “if” in mid-1973. In the months between May and September 1973, U.S. officials monitoring ...
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This chapter argues that achieving unity and guaranteeing the success of a coup in Chile still remained a big “if” in mid-1973. In the months between May and September 1973, U.S. officials monitoring plotting in the country had been relatively unimpressed with the progress toward this goal. Although the Nixon administration was highly sympathetic to the prospect of a coup, its reading of the situation within Chile and its concern for its own image also meant that this did not translate into a precise policy to accelerate military intervention against Allende. Instead, as Kissinger himself admitted days after 11 September, the United States “created the conditions as great as possible.”Less
This chapter argues that achieving unity and guaranteeing the success of a coup in Chile still remained a big “if” in mid-1973. In the months between May and September 1973, U.S. officials monitoring plotting in the country had been relatively unimpressed with the progress toward this goal. Although the Nixon administration was highly sympathetic to the prospect of a coup, its reading of the situation within Chile and its concern for its own image also meant that this did not translate into a precise policy to accelerate military intervention against Allende. Instead, as Kissinger himself admitted days after 11 September, the United States “created the conditions as great as possible.”
James Edward Miller
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807832479
- eISBN:
- 9781469606002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807887943_miller.15
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter focuses on an event on August 5, 1974, in which Henry Kissinger addressed a meeting of disgruntled State Department officials and defended his handling of the Cyprus crisis. The crisis ...
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This chapter focuses on an event on August 5, 1974, in which Henry Kissinger addressed a meeting of disgruntled State Department officials and defended his handling of the Cyprus crisis. The crisis left Kissinger's diplomacy in tatters but not his self-confidence. Failure to preserve peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, the secretary of state was soon explaining, was the responsibility of everyone except himself. He rewarded those junior State Department officials who had warned him of the dangers that his actions were creating with a systematic effort to destroy their careers. The secretary refused to provide Congress with a complete account of his actions and pointed the finger of blame for the Cyprus mess at the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, which, after years of supinely accepting Nixon administration policies, finally nerved themselves to take back part of their constitutional role in the management of foreign affairs.Less
This chapter focuses on an event on August 5, 1974, in which Henry Kissinger addressed a meeting of disgruntled State Department officials and defended his handling of the Cyprus crisis. The crisis left Kissinger's diplomacy in tatters but not his self-confidence. Failure to preserve peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, the secretary of state was soon explaining, was the responsibility of everyone except himself. He rewarded those junior State Department officials who had warned him of the dangers that his actions were creating with a systematic effort to destroy their careers. The secretary refused to provide Congress with a complete account of his actions and pointed the finger of blame for the Cyprus mess at the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, which, after years of supinely accepting Nixon administration policies, finally nerved themselves to take back part of their constitutional role in the management of foreign affairs.
Peter Maguire and Mike Ritter
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231161343
- eISBN:
- 9780231535564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231161343.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter gives an overview of the drug trade surrounding the seedless cannabis sativa—the marijuana plant used for the potent, high-grade Thai sticks. Such wares fetched a premium price on ...
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This chapter gives an overview of the drug trade surrounding the seedless cannabis sativa—the marijuana plant used for the potent, high-grade Thai sticks. Such wares fetched a premium price on American soil, and their trade continued to addle the Nixon administration even in the face of a much larger threat—heroin trafficking. Given how limited a commodity this prime quality, perfectly dried and packaged Thai and Laotian pot was, in the 1970s it was a seller's market with no end in sight. Unlike other drugs whose distribution was tightly controlled at the upper levels by syndicates, the Thai marijuana trade was controlled only by the laws of supply and demand.Less
This chapter gives an overview of the drug trade surrounding the seedless cannabis sativa—the marijuana plant used for the potent, high-grade Thai sticks. Such wares fetched a premium price on American soil, and their trade continued to addle the Nixon administration even in the face of a much larger threat—heroin trafficking. Given how limited a commodity this prime quality, perfectly dried and packaged Thai and Laotian pot was, in the 1970s it was a seller's market with no end in sight. Unlike other drugs whose distribution was tightly controlled at the upper levels by syndicates, the Thai marijuana trade was controlled only by the laws of supply and demand.
Mark Rifkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780816677825
- eISBN:
- 9781452948041
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Minnesota Press
- DOI:
- 10.5749/minnesota/9780816677825.001.0001
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Native American Studies
In 1970 the Nixon administration inaugurated a new era in federal Indian policy. No more would the U.S. government seek to deny and displace Native peoples or dismantle Native governments; from now ...
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In 1970 the Nixon administration inaugurated a new era in federal Indian policy. No more would the U.S. government seek to deny and displace Native peoples or dismantle Native governments; from now on federal policy would promote “the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.” This book offers a telling perspective on what such a policy of self-determination has meant and looks at how contemporary queer Native writers use representations of sensation to challenge official U.S. accounts of Native identity. The book focuses on four Native writers—Qwo-Li Driskill (Cherokee), Deborah Miranda (Esselen), Greg Sarris (Graton Rachería), and Chrystos (Menominee)—approaching their fiction and poetry as forms of political theory. The book shows how the work of these queer or two-spirit Native writers affirms the significance of the erotic as an exercise of individual and community sovereignty. In this way, we come to see how their work contests the homophobic, sexist, and exclusivist policies and attitudes of tribal communities as well as those of the nation-state.Less
In 1970 the Nixon administration inaugurated a new era in federal Indian policy. No more would the U.S. government seek to deny and displace Native peoples or dismantle Native governments; from now on federal policy would promote “the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.” This book offers a telling perspective on what such a policy of self-determination has meant and looks at how contemporary queer Native writers use representations of sensation to challenge official U.S. accounts of Native identity. The book focuses on four Native writers—Qwo-Li Driskill (Cherokee), Deborah Miranda (Esselen), Greg Sarris (Graton Rachería), and Chrystos (Menominee)—approaching their fiction and poetry as forms of political theory. The book shows how the work of these queer or two-spirit Native writers affirms the significance of the erotic as an exercise of individual and community sovereignty. In this way, we come to see how their work contests the homophobic, sexist, and exclusivist policies and attitudes of tribal communities as well as those of the nation-state.
Jocelyn Olcott
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780195327687
- eISBN:
- 9780199344833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195327687.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter focuses on a protest at the US embassy in which women of color, particularly Wynta Boynes of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and Esther Urista of La Raza Unida, protested that the ...
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This chapter focuses on a protest at the US embassy in which women of color, particularly Wynta Boynes of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and Esther Urista of La Raza Unida, protested that the US delegation to the intergovernmental conference was insufficiently representative of US women. The episode signals the ways in which, in the wake of the US civil rights movement, race had emerged as the principal gauge of representation and identification. US delegation leaders claimed the confrontation as a victory, indicating that it demonstrated a “free and uninhibited exchange” and offered “an impressive and persuasive example of U.S. participatory democracy at work.Less
This chapter focuses on a protest at the US embassy in which women of color, particularly Wynta Boynes of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and Esther Urista of La Raza Unida, protested that the US delegation to the intergovernmental conference was insufficiently representative of US women. The episode signals the ways in which, in the wake of the US civil rights movement, race had emerged as the principal gauge of representation and identification. US delegation leaders claimed the confrontation as a victory, indicating that it demonstrated a “free and uninhibited exchange” and offered “an impressive and persuasive example of U.S. participatory democracy at work.
