Archie Brown
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192880529
- eISBN:
- 9780191598876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0192880527.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
A central thesis of the book, elaborated especially in this chapter, is that from the outset of his General Secretaryship, Gorbachev was seriously interested in political change as well as in ...
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A central thesis of the book, elaborated especially in this chapter, is that from the outset of his General Secretaryship, Gorbachev was seriously interested in political change as well as in economic reform, but that in the course of the struggle to introduce it, he came to the realization that reform was not enough and that the political system had to be comprehensively transformed. The chapter discusses six stages of transformation between March 1985 and December 1991 as well as the fourfold nature of the transformation that was required: first, the movement from authoritarianism to political pluralism; second, the need to move from a command economy with virtually 100% state ownership of the means of production to a market economy with a substantial private sector; third, the need to create a genuine federation or a looser confederation in place of the pseudo‐federalism in which the aspirations of the more self‐conscious nations within the Soviet borders had been ruthlessly suppressed; and, fourth, the need to transform foreign policy. The dilemma for Gorbachev was that the fourfold transformation was an interlinked process: any three of these basic changes were likely to be undermined by the absence of a fourth; yet, as each was implemented to a greater or lesser degree, its side effects produced complications in the other spheres. Among the political changes analysed are the breakthrough represented by the Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988, the movement from party to state power, the advent of contested elections for a new legislature, the indirect election by that legislature of Gorbachev as President, and the failure to split the Communist Party.Less
A central thesis of the book, elaborated especially in this chapter, is that from the outset of his General Secretaryship, Gorbachev was seriously interested in political change as well as in economic reform, but that in the course of the struggle to introduce it, he came to the realization that reform was not enough and that the political system had to be comprehensively transformed. The chapter discusses six stages of transformation between March 1985 and December 1991 as well as the fourfold nature of the transformation that was required: first, the movement from authoritarianism to political pluralism; second, the need to move from a command economy with virtually 100% state ownership of the means of production to a market economy with a substantial private sector; third, the need to create a genuine federation or a looser confederation in place of the pseudo‐federalism in which the aspirations of the more self‐conscious nations within the Soviet borders had been ruthlessly suppressed; and, fourth, the need to transform foreign policy. The dilemma for Gorbachev was that the fourfold transformation was an interlinked process: any three of these basic changes were likely to be undermined by the absence of a fourth; yet, as each was implemented to a greater or lesser degree, its side effects produced complications in the other spheres. Among the political changes analysed are the breakthrough represented by the Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988, the movement from party to state power, the advent of contested elections for a new legislature, the indirect election by that legislature of Gorbachev as President, and the failure to split the Communist Party.
Helen Hardman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780719079788
- eISBN:
- 9781781706213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719079788.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyses how Gorbachev stage-managed the Nineteenth party conference to create the illusion that the CPSU was unified in its support of perestroika. Gorbachev's apparent defeat at the ...
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This chapter analyses how Gorbachev stage-managed the Nineteenth party conference to create the illusion that the CPSU was unified in its support of perestroika. Gorbachev's apparent defeat at the conference of left and right factions of the party conveyed the impression that Gorbachev was in control. As this chapter illustrates, those delegates invited to speak at the conference were not representative of the CPSU and textual analysis and interviews brought evidence of scripting of speeches and dialogue. While the constitutional reforms adopted at the conference were adopted almost unanimously, some of these had still not been implemented by 1991. For the purpose of securing the execution of his policies, his own position in the CPSU, and to salvage the increasingly fragile Union Treaty negotiations, Gorbachev attempted to reconvene the conference in 1991. This supports the theory that the conference signalled a particular policy choice, aimed at purging opponents and consolidating the General Secretary's position. Opposition to this proposal indicated Gorbachev's dwindling support, but moreover suggests others’ awareness that, as an institution, the conference favoured the General Secretary's preferred outcome.Less
This chapter analyses how Gorbachev stage-managed the Nineteenth party conference to create the illusion that the CPSU was unified in its support of perestroika. Gorbachev's apparent defeat at the conference of left and right factions of the party conveyed the impression that Gorbachev was in control. As this chapter illustrates, those delegates invited to speak at the conference were not representative of the CPSU and textual analysis and interviews brought evidence of scripting of speeches and dialogue. While the constitutional reforms adopted at the conference were adopted almost unanimously, some of these had still not been implemented by 1991. For the purpose of securing the execution of his policies, his own position in the CPSU, and to salvage the increasingly fragile Union Treaty negotiations, Gorbachev attempted to reconvene the conference in 1991. This supports the theory that the conference signalled a particular policy choice, aimed at purging opponents and consolidating the General Secretary's position. Opposition to this proposal indicated Gorbachev's dwindling support, but moreover suggests others’ awareness that, as an institution, the conference favoured the General Secretary's preferred outcome.
