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From 8,000-5,500 BP, the African Sahara was a centre for domestication of millets and sorghum. Agriculture in the region was extinguished following a sustained drought after 5,450 BP, but may have contributed to the development of the Nile Valley as one of the greatest agro-urban cultures of the ancient world. In Central Europe, after 8,500 BP, farming was introduced by migrants from the Near East who slowly travelled northwestwards along the fertile river valleys from the Balkans towards the Atlantic coast. Other seaborne migrants brought farming to southern Europe via the Mediterranean. Complex urban cultures did not develop in this region for many millennia. Agro-urban cultures developed separately in Mesoamerica, the Andes, and parts of North America once the indigenous crops could be cultivated under high yield conditions. Social collapse and simplification occurred repeatedly in several parts of the continent, probably due to a combination of climatic and social factors.

While it is commonly assumed that slavery, and especially an external slave trade, were significant features of the history of the earlier kingdoms in the Middle Nile, the evidence for this is less certain than the confident assertions of earlier scholars might suggest. Drawing on a range of archaeological and historical evidence, this chapter reassesses our current understanding of the development of slavery in this region in the medieval and post-medieval periods. Forms of slavery were clearly ever-present within the Middle Nile region during both periods, with slave taking likely a common practice on the margins of its early kingdoms. A significant external trade in slaves, however, is hard to demonstrate before the sixteenth century. Our perceptions of such a trade as a timeless and eternal feature of the history of the Nile Valley deserve closer scrutiny.

This chapter places transport in Roman Egypt into its physical context, discussing the geography and topography of the Nile Valley, Fayum, and desert regions. It studies both the literary and papyrological evidence for this, discussing roads and canals, and the problems for transport created by a hydraulic civilization: canals, irrigation channels, dykes, and embankments. It surveys the difficulties encountered by travellers and transporters, and the concern of the state in the upkeep of roads and routes. It considers the nature of desert travel, desert routes, and their transport infrastructure: these routes connected the oases of the Western Desert to the Nile Valley, and gave access, across the Eastern Desert, to the Red Sea and its ports, facilitating trade with the East.

Chapter one examines the geography, religious milieu, prior history, educational developments, and various cultural bonds of the Nile Valley, essentially those characteristics which Egyptians believed argued for the existence of a single nation. These attributes of the Nile Valley did favor unification, but the British, Sudanese, or others desirous of an independent Sudan could also use these qualities for their case. For instance, the Nile River seemingly binds Sudanese and Egyptian regions, but cataracts have also traditionally divided the valley. Islam provides a modicum of religious uniformity, yet the prevalence of certain Sufi orders in the Sudan provides religious distinctiveness for the south. In the end, this chapter argues that historical and cultural commonalities did not definitively support the unity of the Nile Valley, necessitating that Egyptians strengthen economic bonds in pursuing their nationalist objective.

This chapter provides necessary background by examining the wider world from which the desert fathers and desert monasticism emerged. It concentrates on Roman Egypt, its geography, history, politics, and religious milieu. This survey includes a look at ancient Alexandria as well as at life along the Nile Valley. It also examines three features of early Egyptian Christianity: the Alexandrian theological tradition (best embodied by Origen), the Melitian schism, and the early Alexandrian patriarchate.

This chapter examines the means of transportation between Egyptian and Sudanese regions, ranging from ground and riverine to maritime capabilities. Initial attention to rates, inspections, and customs procedures illustrates that both Egyptian and Condominium administrations were more interested in revenue production from transport facilities than encouraging the movement of men, materials, or manufactures along the Nile Valley. Furthermore, early transport infrastructure development in both regions focused on railroad and port facilities directed toward international markets—not binding the Nile Valley. The most glaring symbol of the division of the valley was the absence of a railroad connection between Upper Egypt and northern Sudan. By the mid-1930s Egyptian nationalists were certainly aware of transportation deficiencies, but this chapter argues they accomplished little that would alleviate these problems.

About one thousand mummy portraits have survived from Roman Egypt. They constitute a unique record in colour of a group of individuals, many resident in the towns and villages of the Fayum, but others living in the settlements of the Nile Valley and even on the Mediterranean littoral. This chapter explores the changes in representation of these persons in mummy portraits of the later 3rd and 4th centuries ad, when the educated elite of Hellenic cultural affiliation were concentrated in settlements in the Nile valley.

This chapter rapidly reviews the roll-out of various schemes to develop Egypt’s desert for agriculture, urban development, tourism and industry/mines from 1952–2014. It shows an increasing emphasis of splashy megaprojects and the need to shift millions of inhabitants out of the Nile Valley.

This book explores the influence of warfare, commerce, and political fictions on the relations between two ancient African states, Nubia and the Ethiopian kingdom of Aksum. Focusing primarily on the fourth century CE, it considers how the contact between Nubia and Ethiopia developed within very different regional spheres of interaction. Based on this interaction, the book argues that ancient Northeast Africa cannot be treated as a unified area politically, economically, or culturally. It also suggests that the seemingly weak ties between Aksum and Nubia can be attributed to the geographical orientation of the Ethiopian Highlands and the middle Nile Valley. The book examines how Aksum and the Nubian kingdom of Kush coexisted in peace for most of their history before Aksum took up arms against the latter. This introductory chapter discusses evidence of Ethiopian–Nubian contact before the first century CE.

This chapter discusses the Small Oasis, a single region constituted by the two modern oases of Farafra and Bahariya. Farafra's ancient history is still somewhat of a mystery. Although archaeologists have yet to discover any artifacts dating from the Pharaonic period in the oasis, several ancient texts record that Farafra's inhabitants maintained at least limited commercial relations with neighboring oases and the Nile Valley as far back as the Fifth dynasty. In addition to the Darb el-Farafra, which joins Farafra with Dakhleh Oasis to the south, other routes connect Farafra with Bahariya, Siwa, Assiut, and Libya. In addition to the caravan route connecting Bahariya with Farafra, three other important routes entered the oasis, from the Nile Valley, the Fayoum, and Siwa Oasis. Although scholars have not surveyed these routes carefully, there is little doubt that all were closely guarded and patrolled, especially during the late Roman period.

This chapter addresses Egypt’s demographics and internal migration. It looks at the government’s long-promoted strategy of moving people out of the crowded Nile Valley and into the desert, analyses population figures, and concludes that the strategy has failed dismally.

This chapter discusses how four major Roman roads crossed the Eastern Desert to link the Red Sea with the Nile Valley, and carried the wealth of India and Africa from Red Sea ports to the great emporium at Coptos. The exact course of the Via Hadriana was unmapped until June 1996, when two American researchers succeeded in tracing its route from the Nile Valley to the Red Sea coast. Long before the arrival of the Romans and for centuries after their departure, the scenic Myos Hormos Road between the Red Sea and the Nile served as a vital artery through the Eastern Desert. Researchers began examining the Marsa Nakkari–Edfu route only recently, and little definitive information is available. Although the existence of the Berenike–Coptos road has been known to modern scholars for many years, it has only recently been thoroughly explored and surveyed.

This chapter explores the question of Aksumite trade with Nubia during the period spanning the first and third centuries CE. It suggests that, despite the expansion of international trade during the Roman period, Aksum and Kush did not grow closer and instead had minimal contact. As far as long-distance trade is concerned, the economies of Kush and Aksum operated not very differently but independently of each other. The economy of Kush was intimately bound to the Nile Valley, the main route linking Nubia to Egypt. Aksum depended on agriculture in the Ethiopian Highlands, but its main outlet to the outside world was the Red Sea. This chapter also considers the extent to which Kush and Aksum maintained peaceful trade relations during the period.

China’s misgivings toward Egypt flow from an awareness of the vulnerability of its military rulers. For Egyptians, the Arab Spring replaced a hated dictator with an even more ruthless tyrant, creating the expectation that another revolt was just a matter of time. Egypt has few assets to recommend it as a Silk Road partner. It is in perpetual debt with declining diplomatic influence—especially as China develops multiple routes to bypass the costly Suez Canal. Geopolitically, Egypt is unstable and marginalized. Economically, it seems like a bottomless pit that no single donor can rescue. Religiously, it has crushed all hopes for a liberal Islamic future, allowing extremists to fill the vacuum. The more Cairo presses Beijing for larger investments, the more the Chinese back away—convinced that the country is ruled by a frightened and greedy clique intent on wringing as much profit as possible from foreigners and Egyptians alike.