Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of ...
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Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.Less
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
Robin Markwica
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198794349
- eISBN:
- 9780191835858
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198794349.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 4 examines Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis. It posits that the logic of affect offers a more comprehensive explanation of the Soviet prime minister’s choice ...
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Chapter 4 examines Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis. It posits that the logic of affect offers a more comprehensive explanation of the Soviet prime minister’s choice behavior. Specifically, the model shows that his defiance of John F. Kennedy’s demand to remove the missiles from Cuba during the first two days of the crisis was shaped by his sense of humiliation and anger at what he saw as the American president’s refusal to recognize him as the leader of a co-equal power. In the last four days of the crisis, however, the decline of Khrushchev’s anger and humiliation and a growing fear of nuclear war shaped his preference for accepting Kennedy’s terms. That Khrushchev interpreted a message from Washington at the height of the crisis to mean that Kennedy was finally validating his equal status helped him to protect his self-esteem as he decided to withdraw the missiles.Less
Chapter 4 examines Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis. It posits that the logic of affect offers a more comprehensive explanation of the Soviet prime minister’s choice behavior. Specifically, the model shows that his defiance of John F. Kennedy’s demand to remove the missiles from Cuba during the first two days of the crisis was shaped by his sense of humiliation and anger at what he saw as the American president’s refusal to recognize him as the leader of a co-equal power. In the last four days of the crisis, however, the decline of Khrushchev’s anger and humiliation and a growing fear of nuclear war shaped his preference for accepting Kennedy’s terms. That Khrushchev interpreted a message from Washington at the height of the crisis to mean that Kennedy was finally validating his equal status helped him to protect his self-esteem as he decided to withdraw the missiles.
Iurii Shapoval
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his ...
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This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his initial ties with his mentor, Lazar Kaganovich; and early evidence of both Khrushchev's Stalinism and his budding anti-Stalinism. Most significantly, it shows how Khrushchev's Ukrainian experience influenced his later behavior as Soviet leader.Less
This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his initial ties with his mentor, Lazar Kaganovich; and early evidence of both Khrushchev's Stalinism and his budding anti-Stalinism. Most significantly, it shows how Khrushchev's Ukrainian experience influenced his later behavior as Soviet leader.
Sergei Khrushchev
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter describes how Khrushchev employed both nuclear bluster and bluff to pressure the West. The problem Khrushchev faced was how to deter any Western attack and advance his strategic ...
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This chapter describes how Khrushchev employed both nuclear bluster and bluff to pressure the West. The problem Khrushchev faced was how to deter any Western attack and advance his strategic objectives, while at the same time easing the defense burden on the Soviet economy. Khrushchev's answer was to cut back on conventional weapons and rely on nuclear rockets, even before Soviet intercontinental missiles were deployed in substantial numbers. The horrors he encountered firsthand during World War II convinced Khrushchev that nuclear conflict must be avoided at all costs, even as he manipulated the threat of it to intimidate the West.Less
This chapter describes how Khrushchev employed both nuclear bluster and bluff to pressure the West. The problem Khrushchev faced was how to deter any Western attack and advance his strategic objectives, while at the same time easing the defense burden on the Soviet economy. Khrushchev's answer was to cut back on conventional weapons and rely on nuclear rockets, even before Soviet intercontinental missiles were deployed in substantial numbers. The horrors he encountered firsthand during World War II convinced Khrushchev that nuclear conflict must be avoided at all costs, even as he manipulated the threat of it to intimidate the West.
William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
What was known about Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev during his career was strictly limited by the secretive Soviet government. Little more information was available after he was ousted and became a ...
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What was known about Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev during his career was strictly limited by the secretive Soviet government. Little more information was available after he was ousted and became a “non-person” in the USSR in 1964. This book draws for the first time on a wealth of newly released materials—documents from secret former Soviet archives, memoirs of long-silent witnesses, the full memoirs of the premier himself—to assemble the best-informed analysis of the Khrushchev years ever completed. The contributors to this volume include Russian, Ukrainian, American, and British scholars; a former key foreign policy aide to Khrushchev; the executive secretary of a Russian commission investigating Soviet-era repressions and rehabilitations; and Khrushchev's own son Sergei. The book presents and interprets new information on Khrushchev's struggle for power, public attitudes toward him, his role in agricultural reform and cultural politics, and such foreign policy issues as East-West relations, nuclear strategy, and relations with Germany. It also chronicles Khrushchev's years in Ukraine where he grew up and began his political career, serving as Communist party boss from 1938 to 1949, and his role in the mass repressions of the 1930s and in destalinization in the 1950s and 1960s. Two concluding chapters compare the regimes of Khrushchev and Gorbachev as they struggled to reform Communism, to humanize and modernize the Soviet system, and to answer the haunting question that persists today: Is Russia itself reformable?Less
What was known about Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev during his career was strictly limited by the secretive Soviet government. Little more information was available after he was ousted and became a “non-person” in the USSR in 1964. This book draws for the first time on a wealth of newly released materials—documents from secret former Soviet archives, memoirs of long-silent witnesses, the full memoirs of the premier himself—to assemble the best-informed analysis of the Khrushchev years ever completed. The contributors to this volume include Russian, Ukrainian, American, and British scholars; a former key foreign policy aide to Khrushchev; the executive secretary of a Russian commission investigating Soviet-era repressions and rehabilitations; and Khrushchev's own son Sergei. The book presents and interprets new information on Khrushchev's struggle for power, public attitudes toward him, his role in agricultural reform and cultural politics, and such foreign policy issues as East-West relations, nuclear strategy, and relations with Germany. It also chronicles Khrushchev's years in Ukraine where he grew up and began his political career, serving as Communist party boss from 1938 to 1949, and his role in the mass repressions of the 1930s and in destalinization in the 1950s and 1960s. Two concluding chapters compare the regimes of Khrushchev and Gorbachev as they struggled to reform Communism, to humanize and modernize the Soviet system, and to answer the haunting question that persists today: Is Russia itself reformable?
William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of Nikita Khrushchev's rise and fall from power. It then considers the sources of information about Khrushchev and the questions that have been ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of Nikita Khrushchev's rise and fall from power. It then considers the sources of information about Khrushchev and the questions that have been asked about him. This is followed by an overview of the subsequent chapters.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of Nikita Khrushchev's rise and fall from power. It then considers the sources of information about Khrushchev and the questions that have been asked about him. This is followed by an overview of the subsequent chapters.
Thomas J. Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142609
- eISBN:
- 9781400838813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the ...
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This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.Less
This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.
Shane Hamilton
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780300232691
- eISBN:
- 9780300240849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300232691.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter focuses on Eastern Europe, highlighting the ways in which the communist contestants in the Farms Race pursued noncapitalist goals in the economic battles of the Cold War. Supermarket ...
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This chapter focuses on Eastern Europe, highlighting the ways in which the communist contestants in the Farms Race pursued noncapitalist goals in the economic battles of the Cold War. Supermarket USA—a project jointly pursued by the U.S. Department of Commerce and a private supermarket trade group in 1957—was the first full-scale American-style supermarket to be erected in a communist country. U.S. propagandists touted the Supermarket USA exhibit at Zagreb’s 1957 trade fair as proof of the power of capitalist agriculture and efficient food distribution. Yugoslavian communist leaders, however, recognized the potential for deploying supermarkets in their campaign to convince restive rural peasants to accept socialist approaches to food production. The Yugoslavian adaptation of American supermarkets contrasts with the Soviet Union’s efforts, under the leadership of the rhetorically gifted Nikita Khrushchev, to defy American proclamations of capitalism’s superiority as a mode for spurring agricultural productivity and consumer abundance. In particular, the chapter highlights the ways in which the famous 1959 Kitchen Debate between Khrushchev and U.S. vice president Richard Nixon should be understood as a debate not just about kitchens or consumerism but about the structure of the agricultural systems that fed into both capitalist and communist kitchens.Less
This chapter focuses on Eastern Europe, highlighting the ways in which the communist contestants in the Farms Race pursued noncapitalist goals in the economic battles of the Cold War. Supermarket USA—a project jointly pursued by the U.S. Department of Commerce and a private supermarket trade group in 1957—was the first full-scale American-style supermarket to be erected in a communist country. U.S. propagandists touted the Supermarket USA exhibit at Zagreb’s 1957 trade fair as proof of the power of capitalist agriculture and efficient food distribution. Yugoslavian communist leaders, however, recognized the potential for deploying supermarkets in their campaign to convince restive rural peasants to accept socialist approaches to food production. The Yugoslavian adaptation of American supermarkets contrasts with the Soviet Union’s efforts, under the leadership of the rhetorically gifted Nikita Khrushchev, to defy American proclamations of capitalism’s superiority as a mode for spurring agricultural productivity and consumer abundance. In particular, the chapter highlights the ways in which the famous 1959 Kitchen Debate between Khrushchev and U.S. vice president Richard Nixon should be understood as a debate not just about kitchens or consumerism but about the structure of the agricultural systems that fed into both capitalist and communist kitchens.
Oleg Troyanovsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's foreign policy. It addresses the much-debated question of why Khrushchev declared a Berlin ultimatum in November 1958, thus transforming his hitherto measured ...
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This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's foreign policy. It addresses the much-debated question of why Khrushchev declared a Berlin ultimatum in November 1958, thus transforming his hitherto measured efforts to ease East–West tensions in the Berlin crisis, which lasted until 1961 and beyond. The reason is that after the West had snubbed Soviet peace overtures for five years, Khrushchev resolved to force Western powers to accept them.Less
This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's foreign policy. It addresses the much-debated question of why Khrushchev declared a Berlin ultimatum in November 1958, thus transforming his hitherto measured efforts to ease East–West tensions in the Berlin crisis, which lasted until 1961 and beyond. The reason is that after the West had snubbed Soviet peace overtures for five years, Khrushchev resolved to force Western powers to accept them.
Vladislav Zubok
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter examines Khrushchev's handling of Germany and Berlin. It argues that divided Germany was a grave international problem for Khrushchev. The realities of the German question severely ...
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This chapter examines Khrushchev's handling of Germany and Berlin. It argues that divided Germany was a grave international problem for Khrushchev. The realities of the German question severely limited his freedom of choice, just as the realities of the party command system crippled his attempts at domestic reforms. An understanding of Khrushchev's diplomacy on the German question makes it easier to answer a larger question: why the Soviet reformer was unable to transcend the legacy of the Cold War that he inherited from Stalin.Less
This chapter examines Khrushchev's handling of Germany and Berlin. It argues that divided Germany was a grave international problem for Khrushchev. The realities of the German question severely limited his freedom of choice, just as the realities of the party command system crippled his attempts at domestic reforms. An understanding of Khrushchev's diplomacy on the German question makes it easier to answer a larger question: why the Soviet reformer was unable to transcend the legacy of the Cold War that he inherited from Stalin.
Gareth Porter
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520239487
- eISBN:
- 9780520940406
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520239487.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight ...
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This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong. The new imbalance of power altered the incoming Eisenhower administration's definition of its diplomatic objectives. It was only in 1966 that the USSR acquired a credible minimum deterrent force in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles that were reasonably well protected from a U.S. first strike. Khrushchev apparently had very accurate intelligence on the Kennedy administration's strategic force deployments and future plans. Mao wanted the USSR to act as though it represented a strong military counterweight, regardless of the truth. There are two distinct formative periods in which U.S. perceptions were undergoing major changes: first, from 1953 through mid-1955; and second, from 1961 through 1964.Less
This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong. The new imbalance of power altered the incoming Eisenhower administration's definition of its diplomatic objectives. It was only in 1966 that the USSR acquired a credible minimum deterrent force in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles that were reasonably well protected from a U.S. first strike. Khrushchev apparently had very accurate intelligence on the Kennedy administration's strategic force deployments and future plans. Mao wanted the USSR to act as though it represented a strong military counterweight, regardless of the truth. There are two distinct formative periods in which U.S. perceptions were undergoing major changes: first, from 1953 through mid-1955; and second, from 1961 through 1964.
Nikolai Barsukov
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter focuses on events after 1953: Beria's fall; Khrushchev's defeat of Malenkov and Molotov; the origins and consequences of his 1956 speech unmasking Stalin, and of the coup attempted ...
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This chapter focuses on events after 1953: Beria's fall; Khrushchev's defeat of Malenkov and Molotov; the origins and consequences of his 1956 speech unmasking Stalin, and of the coup attempted against him in 1957; the paradox of the 1961 party program, which promised abundance even as economic conditions worsened; and Khrushchev's decline and fall.Less
This chapter focuses on events after 1953: Beria's fall; Khrushchev's defeat of Malenkov and Molotov; the origins and consequences of his 1956 speech unmasking Stalin, and of the coup attempted against him in 1957; the paradox of the 1961 party program, which promised abundance even as economic conditions worsened; and Khrushchev's decline and fall.
Anatolii Strelianyi
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter focuses on agriculture, tracing Khrushchev's far-reaching reforms of September 1953, his Virgin Lands and corn-growing campaigns, his early success in boosting the Soviet harvest, and ...
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This chapter focuses on agriculture, tracing Khrushchev's far-reaching reforms of September 1953, his Virgin Lands and corn-growing campaigns, his early success in boosting the Soviet harvest, and the agricultural disasters that befell him in the early 1960s. It also dissects Khrushchev's true belief in communism, and his ironical reliance on the hidebound party bureaucracy (the apparat) to implement his utopian dream.Less
This chapter focuses on agriculture, tracing Khrushchev's far-reaching reforms of September 1953, his Virgin Lands and corn-growing campaigns, his early success in boosting the Soviet harvest, and the agricultural disasters that befell him in the early 1960s. It also dissects Khrushchev's true belief in communism, and his ironical reliance on the hidebound party bureaucracy (the apparat) to implement his utopian dream.
William J. Tompson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter examines Khrushchev's economic reforms—or rather, the lack of them—in the light of post-Communist experience. The fact that Khrushchev was no economic reformer used to be held against ...
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This chapter examines Khrushchev's economic reforms—or rather, the lack of them—in the light of post-Communist experience. The fact that Khrushchev was no economic reformer used to be held against him. Nowadays, knowing that Gorbachev's half-measures only made things worse, Khrushchev's nonmeasures do not seem so bad.Less
This chapter examines Khrushchev's economic reforms—or rather, the lack of them—in the light of post-Communist experience. The fact that Khrushchev was no economic reformer used to be held against him. Nowadays, knowing that Gorbachev's half-measures only made things worse, Khrushchev's nonmeasures do not seem so bad.
Nancy Condee
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter examines the Khrushchev Thaw from the perspective of modern (and postmodern) cultural studies. It identifies three major episodes of the cultural Thaw. In the first episode, set in ...
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This chapter examines the Khrushchev Thaw from the perspective of modern (and postmodern) cultural studies. It identifies three major episodes of the cultural Thaw. In the first episode, set in motion by Stalin's death, the key figures are the writers Olga Berggolts, Vladimir Pomerantsev, Leonid Zorin, and Ehrenburg himself. Their thematic concerns—lyricism, sincerity, generational differences, corrupt bureaucrats—form a cluster of issues that remain at the very center of Thaw culture. The second episode is signaled by the events of the 20th Party Congress and marked by the ceremony of Nikita Khrushchev's “secret speech” of February 25, 1956. The third episode is marked by the 22nd Party Congress and consecrated by the removal of Joseph Stalin's body from the mausoleum on Red Square.Less
This chapter examines the Khrushchev Thaw from the perspective of modern (and postmodern) cultural studies. It identifies three major episodes of the cultural Thaw. In the first episode, set in motion by Stalin's death, the key figures are the writers Olga Berggolts, Vladimir Pomerantsev, Leonid Zorin, and Ehrenburg himself. Their thematic concerns—lyricism, sincerity, generational differences, corrupt bureaucrats—form a cluster of issues that remain at the very center of Thaw culture. The second episode is signaled by the events of the 20th Party Congress and marked by the ceremony of Nikita Khrushchev's “secret speech” of February 25, 1956. The third episode is marked by the 22nd Party Congress and consecrated by the removal of Joseph Stalin's body from the mausoleum on Red Square.
Iurii Aksiutin
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter draws upon long-secret party and police reports, as well as unpublished letters to Soviet newspaper editors, to gauge public opinion about key issues between 1953 and 1964. These include ...
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This chapter draws upon long-secret party and police reports, as well as unpublished letters to Soviet newspaper editors, to gauge public opinion about key issues between 1953 and 1964. These include Stalin's death, Khrushchev's secret speech, the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, the attempted coup of the “anti-party group” in 1957, and the economic troubles of Khrushchev's last years. Opinions differed on all these episodes and issues, but the Soviet people were less supportive of Khrushchev than one might have supposed.Less
This chapter draws upon long-secret party and police reports, as well as unpublished letters to Soviet newspaper editors, to gauge public opinion about key issues between 1953 and 1964. These include Stalin's death, Khrushchev's secret speech, the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, the attempted coup of the “anti-party group” in 1957, and the economic troubles of Khrushchev's last years. Opinions differed on all these episodes and issues, but the Soviet people were less supportive of Khrushchev than one might have supposed.
Vladimir Naumov
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's role in both the repression and the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, and in the further repression of those who wanted a wholesale transformation of the Soviet ...
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This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's role in both the repression and the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, and in the further repression of those who wanted a wholesale transformation of the Soviet system. Although incriminating documentation from the 1930s remains hard to come by, enough is available to substantiate Khrushchev's complicity in both Moscow and Ukraine. His role in releasing and rehabilitating prisoners in the 1950s is far clearer, of course, but so is the number of arrests he authorized when his 1956 attack on Stalin produced more unrest than he bargained for.Less
This chapter focuses on Khrushchev's role in both the repression and the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, and in the further repression of those who wanted a wholesale transformation of the Soviet system. Although incriminating documentation from the 1930s remains hard to come by, enough is available to substantiate Khrushchev's complicity in both Moscow and Ukraine. His role in releasing and rehabilitating prisoners in the 1950s is far clearer, of course, but so is the number of arrests he authorized when his 1956 attack on Stalin produced more unrest than he bargained for.
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning Soviet intentions ...
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This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning Soviet intentions and actions. It then describes how the CIA's internal culture and collective identity shaped the Agency's view of the USSR and Cuba during each stage of the intelligence cycle before the Crisis. It also details Soviet security measures and deception techniques, and the intelligence collection methods used to watch Cuba at the time. It contrasts mainstream Agency analysis of the Cuban situation with those of a Cassandra, DCI John McCone, whose contrary opinions his own analysts discounted. It documents how the CIA's collective identity and internal culture led to a fundamental misunderstanding of Soviet intentions in 1962, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure that led to the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the CIA's analysis of events prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It documents the scale and scope of the intelligence failure concerning Soviet intentions and actions. It then describes how the CIA's internal culture and collective identity shaped the Agency's view of the USSR and Cuba during each stage of the intelligence cycle before the Crisis. It also details Soviet security measures and deception techniques, and the intelligence collection methods used to watch Cuba at the time. It contrasts mainstream Agency analysis of the Cuban situation with those of a Cassandra, DCI John McCone, whose contrary opinions his own analysts discounted. It documents how the CIA's collective identity and internal culture led to a fundamental misunderstanding of Soviet intentions in 1962, and thus created the proximate conditions for an intelligence failure that led to the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War.
Gary James Bergera (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780252042256
- eISBN:
- 9780252051081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5622/illinois/9780252042256.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
In 1966 Ezra Taft Benson, high-ranking official of the LDS church and former U.S. secretary of agriculture, delivered a speech on the campus of LDS-owned Brigham Young University in which he ...
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In 1966 Ezra Taft Benson, high-ranking official of the LDS church and former U.S. secretary of agriculture, delivered a speech on the campus of LDS-owned Brigham Young University in which he summarized his encounter with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in September 1959. Benson told BYU students that Khrushchev had bragged to him, in part, “[W]e’ll keep feeding you small doses of socialism until you'll finally wake up and find you already have Communism. We'll so weaken your economy until you'll fall like overripe fruit into our hands.” This essay examines the accuracy of Benson's recital of Khrushchev’s alleged comments and concludes that Benson misstated the incident and attributed statements to Khrushchev he did not make. It also speculates why Benson misrepresented, or misremembered, the facts of the encounter.Less
In 1966 Ezra Taft Benson, high-ranking official of the LDS church and former U.S. secretary of agriculture, delivered a speech on the campus of LDS-owned Brigham Young University in which he summarized his encounter with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in September 1959. Benson told BYU students that Khrushchev had bragged to him, in part, “[W]e’ll keep feeding you small doses of socialism until you'll finally wake up and find you already have Communism. We'll so weaken your economy until you'll fall like overripe fruit into our hands.” This essay examines the accuracy of Benson's recital of Khrushchev’s alleged comments and concludes that Benson misstated the incident and attributed statements to Khrushchev he did not make. It also speculates why Benson misrepresented, or misremembered, the facts of the encounter.
