Search Results

The Power of Ideas and the Power of Appointment

Archie Brown

in The Gorbachev Factor

A back‐handed tribute to the power of ideas had been paid by the Soviet leadership prior to Gorbachev's coming to power through the lengths to which they went not only to promote official ... More

A back‐handed tribute to the power of ideas had been paid by the Soviet leadership prior to Gorbachev's coming to power through the lengths to which they went not only to promote official Marxism‐Leninism but also to keep out of circulation any heterodox political ideas. Gorbachev embraced new concepts more boldly than any previous General Secretary and engaged in a sharp struggle with conservative opponents of change within the Soviet establishment to have thinking that was radically new in the Soviet context accepted and acted upon. To some extent, the fresh ideas were codified into another orthodoxy known as ‘New Thinking’ or ‘New Political Thinking’, but the new openness meant that this was a fast‐changing body of doctrine, in which, for example, an endorsement by Gorbachev of ‘socialist pluralism’ quite rapidly was broadened into advocacy of ‘political pluralism’. Gorbachev's power of appointment went hand in hand with his support of new ideas. He was able to change the balance of influence before he could alter the balance of power, for he had a much freer hand in choosing aides and advisers than he had in elevating an ally to the Politburo. His changes to that body were also important, however, especially his rapid promotion of Alexander Yakovlev. Gorbachev's own ideas evolved in his discussions both with domestic advisers and with foreign politicians, especially such West European social democrats as Felipe Gonzalez. Conceptual change is an important species of political innovation in any society, especially in a system, such as the Soviet one, in which all political actions were required to adhere to an officially sanctioned ideology. Support for perestroika (reconstruction), democratization, pluralism, and glasnost (openness, transparency) and other heterodox ideas amounted to a conceptual revolution that had profound implications for Soviet politics and society.Less

Soviet New Thinking and the Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Beth A. Fischer

in The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy

Triumphalists make no effort to understand why the Soviets disarmed, reformed, and collapsed. They simply assume the Reagan administration caused these policy changes. Chapters 4 and 5 correct this ... More

Triumphalists make no effort to understand why the Soviets disarmed, reformed, and collapsed. They simply assume the Reagan administration caused these policy changes. Chapters 4 and 5 correct this misperception. Drawing upon Soviet sources, these chapters examine decision making within the Kremlin and the causes of Soviet behavior. Chapter 4 discredits the claim that the Soviet Union became more cooperative with the West and withdrew from its war in Afghanistan because the Reagan administration compelled it to do so. It demonstrates that a reform movement had been growing in the USSR since the 1950s. Soviet reformers sought to modernize the economy, end the arms race, and improve relations with the West. Moreover, within weeks of launching the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders concluded that it was a mistake and began looking for a face-saving way out. Thus, these policies were rooted in domestic needs and debates and were not examples of Moscow acquiescing to American demands, as triumphalists claim. In short, the Reagan administration did not compel Moscow to adopt democratic reforms and withdraw from Afghanistan.Less

The Social Creativity of Deng and Gorbachev

Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko

in Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy

This chapter interprets the reforms by Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev in the context of their efforts to find alternative means to great power status—through social creativity. Deng launched the ... More

This chapter interprets the reforms by Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev in the context of their efforts to find alternative means to great power status—through social creativity. Deng launched the “reform and opening” policy, developing the economic foundation for China to play a great power role while exercising unparalleled diplomatic flexibility in dealing with some of China's most difficult territorial and sovereignty disputes. Gorbachev abandoned Russia's usual military methods for achieving great power status in favor of promoting a new, idealistic philosophy for a more peaceful and harmonious world—the “New Thinking.” While Gorbachev's ideas enjoyed remarkable success internationally, the failure of his domestic reforms, along with the rise of nationalism, contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union and an end to the Soviet Union's status as an innovator of new principles for world order.Less

The Soviet Union and Cold War Interventions

Allison Roy

in Russia, the West, and Military Intervention

This chapter explains how the bipolar Cold War environment shaped self-interested interventions by both superpowers. Ideology acted as a cognitive and discursive framework for Soviet leaders. It was ... More

This chapter explains how the bipolar Cold War environment shaped self-interested interventions by both superpowers. Ideology acted as a cognitive and discursive framework for Soviet leaders. It was expressed in unconvincing rationales for Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan. Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking, however, offered a new type of universalism, reaffirming the norm of non-intervention and emphasizing human values. This created the promise of normative convergence with Western states and a revival of the role of the United Nations. The chapter provides a case study of the Gulf War, assessing Soviet and Western legal claims for the use of force and Soviet political responses in the crisis. Ultimately, cooperation over this war failed to result in a lasting normative consensus. Gorbachev’s universalism failed to develop deep domestic roots.Less

Paradigm Breaking: Surfacing and Challenging Key Assumptions

MITROFF IAN I. and LINSTONE HAROLD A.

in The Unbounded Mind: Breaking the Chains of Traditional Business Thinking

Challenging key assumptions is one of the most critical central aspects of New Thinking. To be able to illustrate the process of surfacing and challenging key assumptions, this chapter provides an ... More

Challenging key assumptions is one of the most critical central aspects of New Thinking. To be able to illustrate the process of surfacing and challenging key assumptions, this chapter provides an actual case, in particular, the case of a drug company to illustrate the process. The concept of stakeholders with assumptions as its properties is introduced in this chapter. Stakeholders are any individual, group, organization, or institution that can affect as well as be affected by an individual's, groups', organization's, or institution's policy or policies. The bigger, the more complex the problem, the more it is likely to involve a wider array of stakeholders and as a result, the more assumptions needed. Further, this chapter also argues the need for new methods for systematically uncovering important stakeholders and their associated properties (assumptions) on which every organization's plans and actions depend.Less

Facing the Nuclear Debates in the 1980s

CHRISTOPH BLUTH

in Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy

This chapter focuses on the development of nuclear weapons policy in the 1980s. This was the era when the Alliance was facing major controversies over nuclear weapons policy such as Intermediate ... More

This chapter focuses on the development of nuclear weapons policy in the 1980s. This was the era when the Alliance was facing major controversies over nuclear weapons policy such as Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and strategic nuclear forces (Trident II in Britain, the MX ‘Peacekeeper’ and the Midgetman Programmes in the United States). During this period, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and he began to restructure Soviet foreign relations. The new priorities of Soviet foreign policies were imbedded in a semi-idealogical framework called ‘New Political Thinking’. This created a change in East-West relations and created a gap in the Alliance, particularly between Britain and West Germany.Less

Moscow Calls Off the Arms Race

Beth A. Fischer

in The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy

Told from the Kremlin’s perspective, this chapter debunks the myth that Reagan’s military buildup—and SDI in particular—compelled the Soviets to agree to arms reductions and then to collapse. In ... More

Told from the Kremlin’s perspective, this chapter debunks the myth that Reagan’s military buildup—and SDI in particular—compelled the Soviets to agree to arms reductions and then to collapse. In reality, the US buildup had a negligible effect on the USSR. By the 1980s Soviet reformers believed nuclear arsenals were of little value: they were costly, could not be used, and incited fear in the West, which prompted the United States to increase its arsenal. The USSR would be more secure, they reasoned, if arsenals were greatly reduced, if not eliminated. Moreover, although some Soviet scientists were initially worried about SDI, this concern dissipated as scientists determined Reagan’s plan was not feasible. In short, for a variety of strategic, financial, and ethical reasons Moscow sought to end the arms race. It therefore did not build its own SDI-style system, nor did it match increases in US defense expenditures, as triumphalistsassume. The Reagan administration’s policies did not compel the Soviet Union to disarm and then collapse.Less

Time and History in Rosenzweig from Temp oral Existence to Eternity

in Exemplarity and Chosenness: Rosenzweig and Derrida on the Nation of Philosophy

This chapter examines the development of Franz Rosenzweig's thought as a philosophy of history. It considers his early rejection of historical relativism, the messianic epistemology he proposed in ... More

This chapter examines the development of Franz Rosenzweig's thought as a philosophy of history. It considers his early rejection of historical relativism, the messianic epistemology he proposed in his essay “The New Thinking,” and the messianic history he laid out in The Star of Redemption. The chapter also discusses Rosenzweig's interpretation of messianism as the drive toward the realization of universal justice in history, and suggests that his theory of individuality also took shape in conjunction with a radical rethinking of time and history.Less