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This chapter examines the use of morality in cases of violence justified as humanitarian intervention. It argues that rather than this being reflective of normative shifts in world politics brought about by global civil society, it can be explained by referring to the role of power and interests. After an examination of how supporters of global civil society have argued for changing norms of sovereignty tied to greater acceptance of human rights, the chapter takes a critical view of the notion of the just use of force. Specifically I argue that where instances of humanitarian intervention have occurred, there have certain national interests motivating elite decisions to use force. Thus, the chapter finds that normative perspectives misrepresent the moral considerations that justify the use of force. In doing so, I argue that an analysis which focuses on interests relative to morality offers a more accurate understanding of what factors motivate a states’ commitment to resort to violence in order to achieve ‘humanitarian’ objectives.

Divisions among the non-communist Lao politicians, a disciplined slate of Pathet Lao and leftist candidates, and the failure of Booster Shot to achieve its objectives lead to a May 1958 election debacle for conservatives in the kingdom. Eisenhower administration officials, convinced of the need for a new generation of anti-communist leaders in the RLG, provided covert support for the Committtee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI). Comprising younger, better-educated civilian elites and backed by elements of the Lao army, the CDNI became a powerful political force that helped depose Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his successor, Phoui Sananikone. The leading CDNI figure is Phoumi Nosavan, a CIA protégé and ardent anti-communist. This chapter includes biographic sketches of American Ambassador Horace Smith and Henry Hecksher, the CIA chief of station in Vientiane.

World War I was not inevitable, but the balance of power allowed war to occur. Local conflicts were allowed to escalate into more general conflict, globalization did not prevent conflict, and there were no general or local institutions which contained the crisis. Today, however, globalization is stronger, but Chinese disputes with its neighbors are chronic and Beijing does not accept the restraints of the Western international system. New regional and international institutions bringing China and the United States together are sorely needed.

The emergence of conservative public-interest law provoked controversy within the American right, where many leading legal intellectuals worried that conservative legal activism threatened conservative legal principles by asking courts to resolve political disputes. Conservatives, including Kit Bond of Great Plains Legal Foundation and Daniel Popeo of Washington Legal Foundation, began to debate the virtues and vices of public-interest law, shifts in US legal culture, and methods of thinking about the “rights revolution” that was initially sparked by the African American struggle for equality but eventually spread more broadly. At Washington Legal Foundation, Popeo articulated a variety of conservative counter-rights on social, cultural, and foreign policy issues. At Capital Legal Foundation, lawyer Dan Burt argued that conservative legal groups needed to challenge the rules and culture that had allowed public-interest law to flourish in the first place.

This chapter analyzes the role of think tanks in DC that are well known for their work in the field of international politics and their experts. The profiles of experts are very similar. They also study the same issues and anticipate the social demand on the part of international politics practitioners as well as the media. As in the case of scholars of comparative politics (chapter 3), their future claims are mostly linear. Experts are well aware of the limitations of their claims about the future. However, they also know that the very approximate knowledge that they produce is not something that practitioners complain about. Indeed, vague future claims give policy makers ample room to manoeuver. The lack of expectation about the quality of future claims on part of policy makers does not encourage think tanks to find innovative solutions in the face of the enigma of the future.