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Security as a Whole-of-Government Project: Risk, Economy, Politics

Andrew W. Neal

in Security as Politics: Beyond the State of Exception

This chapter departs from others by focusing on government as a site of politics. It finds the same trend at work: ‘security’ has been migrating out from a ‘black box’ at the dark heart of the state ... More

This chapter departs from others by focusing on government as a site of politics. It finds the same trend at work: ‘security’ has been migrating out from a ‘black box’ at the dark heart of the state and into the wider reaches of government, encroaching on all policy areas and all government departments. Building on current literatures on risk, the chapter argues that central to this trend is the rise of a risk-based based rationality in government, which supplants the traditional threat-based security logic with one based on possibilities. The chapter argues that this allows ‘security’ to become subordinate to other political goals such as economic growth, relativising its traditional existential claim on political rationality.Less

Rethinking National Strategy

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense ... More

This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense Department as part of the overall effort to reorient the country's national security priorities toward a military posture that would be sustainable over the long haul. Another vital part of this new framework was examining the existing foreign and defense policies, and then redrafting them to reflect the administration's different perspective on the issues at hand.Less

Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ... More

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less

Reforming American Power: Civilian National Security Institutions in the Early Cold War and Beyond

William Inboden

in Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy

To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions ... More

To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions like the National Security Council and institutional reform in the early Cold War. Its primary focus is the inflection point from the Roosevelt to Truman administrations, roughly 1942–1950, during which the United States emerged as a global power and the institutions of the modern American national security system were created. Consideration is also given to more recent periods, such as the end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 era, during which old institutions were reformed and new institutions were created in efforts to address terrorism and the challenges of fragile and failed states. It considers different catalysts for reform, such as expert commissions and congressional and executive initiatives. It concludes with some potential applications for American policymakers today.Less

Implementing Grand Strategy: The Nixon-Kissinger Revolution at the National Security Council

William Inboden

in Rethinking American Grand Strategy

This chapter describes the Richard Nixon administration, particularly in its early months. Nixon and his indispensable partner Henry Kissinger took office with a coherent and well-developed grand ... More

This chapter describes the Richard Nixon administration, particularly in its early months. Nixon and his indispensable partner Henry Kissinger took office with a coherent and well-developed grand strategy, based on ideas they had been developing and articulating for years. Much scholarship has been devoted, and rightfully so, to the strategic principles and policies that Nixon and Kissinger pursued while in office. Yet the way they organized their national security system and attempted to implement their strategy has received much less attention—despite the fact that Nixon and Kissinger themselves devoted considerable time and intellectual energy to these organizational issues. In other words, they were concerned not merely with what policies they wanted to pursue and why they would pursue them, but also how they would advance those policies. In the case of Nixon and Kissinger, this “how” included the remarkable centralization of power in the National Security Council, often at the expense of the State and Defense Departments. The chapter assesses how and why Nixon and Kissinger went about this, particularly focusing on how they connected their organizational decisions to their grand strategy.Less

Reengineering the Intelligence Community (2013–)

Richard J. Samuels

in Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community

This chapter examines the most recent and ambitious reengineering of the Japanese intelligence community. A revised Japanese intelligence reform started with the 2013 passage of a Designated State ... More

This chapter examines the most recent and ambitious reengineering of the Japanese intelligence community. A revised Japanese intelligence reform started with the 2013 passage of a Designated State Secrets Law (DSSL) and creation of the National Security Council (NSC). Intelligence communities everywhere are in constant motion, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council had already drafted even more ambitious plans by late 2015. But the scope and scale of the 2013 reforms suggest that political leaders anticipated new security challenges by addressing many of Japan's most difficult endemic intelligence problems. This chapter also analyzes how Japan might resolve the inherent tension between enhancing alliance management and reducing the dependence on the United States.Less

Introduction: Talk in Time of Crisis

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting ... More

This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting of Kennedy's cabinet, their immediate subordinates, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other top-level advisers. It then turns to Kennedy's secret recordings of many White House meetings and telephone conversations, which capture more than twenty hours of ExComm deliberations. Next, it sets out the book's purpose, namely is to undertake the first sustained analysis of the ExComm recordings. The goal is to mine the details of these discussions from a sociological perspective that views conversation as an achievement unto itself, and anything achieved through conversation as indelibly shaped by its rules, constraints, procedures, and vicissitudes.Less

The Vietnam War, Little Consolation

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North ... More

In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North Vietnam. While the air campaign ran the risk of inducing China's intervention, U.S. strategy avoided that outcome. However, America was unable to defeat its opponent in the ground war because General William Westmoreland incorrectly believed that a conventional military strategy held greater promise than a counterinsurgency strategy. Vietnam was a mixed strategic outcome for the U.S. In the air, strategic intelligence was shared among President Lyndon Johnson, the National Security Council, and the military resulting in rational, timely, and effective strategic adaptation. On the ground, the U.S. Army nearly monopolized information thereby preventing positive strategic change. This chapter argues that America's moderately truncated information institution generated the strategic outcome of diplomatic success, but military failure in the war.Less

Military and Diplomatic Defeat in the Korean War

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Korean War, the U.S. attempted to “roll back” communism on the Korean Peninsula by seeking the destruction of North Korea in the fall of 1950. By widening its war aims from the restoration of ... More

In the Korean War, the U.S. attempted to “roll back” communism on the Korean Peninsula by seeking the destruction of North Korea in the fall of 1950. By widening its war aims from the restoration of the status quo ante to that of unification, the U.S. convinced China that its physical security was under threat, and China intervened in force. America's initial war aims in the Korean War were to defeat North Korea's armed forces and to avoid the forcible intervention of either China or the Soviet Union. Neither of these war aims was achieved. This chapter argues that because of General Douglas MacArthur's near-monopoly over strategic intelligence, top policymakers were unable to alter the strategic direction of the war in any significant fashion. America's truncated information institution prevented the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council from positively influencing the strategy prior to China's intervention.Less

Depth in Appointment

Stephen Skowronek, John A. Dearborn, and Desmond King

in Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and The Unitary Executive

This chapter examines depth in appointment, focusing on the tension between qualifications for administrative office and expectations for presidential control. What Trump’s administration has brought ... More

This chapter examines depth in appointment, focusing on the tension between qualifications for administrative office and expectations for presidential control. What Trump’s administration has brought to the fore are the suspicions harbored by a unitary executive toward qualifications per se and in the broadest sense of the term. Ability, sound judgment, commitment to assigned duties are all presumptive conditions on presidential control, implicit limits on political subordination, anticipated brakes on personal will. Conversely, the demand for executive branch unity elevates loyalty above all other qualifications. Here, we offer snapshots of the drive to dissolve administrative qualifications into loyalty to the president at several sites, considering: a hybrid arrangement at the National Security Council; the use of acting appointments at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the assault on merit-based appointments for administrative law judges; and protections against at-will removal at independence agencies like the Federal Reserve.Less

“No Place to Fight a War”: Washington Backs Away from Laos

Seth Jacobs

in The Universe Unraveling: American Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos

This chapter examines John F. Kennedy’s decision against U.S. military intervention in Laos during his April 27, 1961 meeting with congressional leaders. When the National Security Council (NSC) ... More

This chapter examines John F. Kennedy’s decision against U.S. military intervention in Laos during his April 27, 1961 meeting with congressional leaders. When the National Security Council (NSC) presented its report on Laos, Kennedy summoned prominent legislators to receive the intelligence. He began by reading aloud a recent cable from Winthrop Brown—American ambassador to Vientiane—who requested intervention by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to stop a communist advance on the Lao capital. The president then stressed deployment difficulties, quoting a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimate that “the communists could put into Laos five men to our one,” which made U.S. victory in a limited war unlikely. However, his assent to Lao neutralism did not grow out of a nuanced foreign-policy doctrine or recognition of American limitations; policymaker disgust with the Lao intensified after Kennedy assumed office.Less

The Rise and Fall of the Military as a Political Force

İlter Turan

in Turkey’s Difficult Journey to Democracy: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

This chapter analyzes the changing role of the military in Turkish politics from guardian to accepting civilian supremacy. Street violence and ineffective coalitions brought another military ... More

This chapter analyzes the changing role of the military in Turkish politics from guardian to accepting civilian supremacy. Street violence and ineffective coalitions brought another military intervention in 1980. To remove the need for future interventions, the commanders tried to transform the political system, with restricted space for electoral politics, a depoliticized society, and constitutional arrangements granting the military direct instruments to influence the political process such as the MGK (National Security Council). In 1997–1998, the military forced the coalition led by the Welfare Party (RP) to first adopt new secularist educational measures, and later to resign. The rise of AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2001, its solid electoral victories since, and the political and economic stability the country has enjoyed have enabled the government to challenge successfully the military’s political role, and take to court top officers for having planned anti-government conspiracies.Less

The Response

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to ... More

This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to that very plan was suppressed, namely that it would give the Soviets a chance to complete work on at least some of the missiles, as a result of which the United States might subsequently find itself attacking operational missiles that could be launched (perhaps without authorization) against U.S. cities. This suppression took time, however, time that the ExComm had because it was able to postpone a decision so long as its deliberations were kept secret.Less

“The Next Step”

Daniel F. Harrington

in Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War

The Western powers had to decide their next step; Chapter 6 describes their deliberations. Long-term prospects appeared bleak: sooner or later the Western powers would have to abandon the city to ... More

The Western powers had to decide their next step; Chapter 6 describes their deliberations. Long-term prospects appeared bleak: sooner or later the Western powers would have to abandon the city to save its population from starvation, or (as US military governor Lucius Clay proposed) use force to break the blockade—an action his critics was sure would trigger world war. In the short term, Washington deployed B-29s to the United Kingdom to deter the Soviets and show resolve. Truman and his advisers debated whether to transfer custody of atomic weapons to the Pentagon. The National Security Council on July 22 endorsed diplomatic approaches to Moscow and an expanded airlift, leaving unresolved the long-term dilemma facing the US and its allies.Less

The Blockade

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of ... More

This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of forcing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, storytelling about the consequences of stopping various ships rarely connected those actions to the larger objective. Furthermore, stories about the future were largely supplanted by elaborate justifications for not acting, one peculiarity of which was that the ExComm sometimes seemed to lose sight of whom it primarily had to convince. Moreover, the ExComm did not so much decide not to intercept the Bucharest, a tanker which was Kennedy's best chance to set an early example, as it failed to decide anything at all, but this indecision was transformed into a decision by the course of events.Less

Coping with the New Look

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter continues the discussion of President Eisenhower's efforts to reorganize the country's defense strategy. A major overhaul of how the country prepared for its defense also required that ... More

This chapter continues the discussion of President Eisenhower's efforts to reorganize the country's defense strategy. A major overhaul of how the country prepared for its defense also required that senior members of the national security team approach the issues at hand free of the constraints imposed by past policies. By bringing in new officers to serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower hoped in part to ease the transition from the Truman administration's policy of pointing the U.S. defense buildup toward a “year of maximum danger” to his new policy of attaining a defense posture that would be economically sustainable “over the long haul.”Less

The New Conservative Mainstream and New Security Policies Under Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, 2012 to 2016

Andrew L. Oros

in Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century

This chapter examines the return of Shinzo Abe to Prime Minister of Japan from 2012-2015, paying special attention to new security legislation and military capabilities developed in this period.

The ExComm

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter begins with some historical background, situating the ExComm, as a deliberative body, against the backdrop of the Bay of Pigs, where genuine deliberation was lacking. Then, it describes ... More

This chapter begins with some historical background, situating the ExComm, as a deliberative body, against the backdrop of the Bay of Pigs, where genuine deliberation was lacking. Then, it describes how the ExComm's meetings were organized and conducted. It starts with some remarks about the composition of the group, and then describes, in general terms, how the meetings were structured. Next, it describe Kennedy's singular role in the meetings, as sometimes-chair, sometimes-decider, and addressee of choice. Finally, it looks at the conversational data through an entirely different methodological lens, presenting some simple quantitative findings about who spoke, how they obtained the floor, and who was addressed—patterns that offer further evidence for the qualitative observations about authority and expertise while providing additional insight into the interactional styles of the different ExComm members.Less

Conclusion

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

Reflecting on the decision-making process after the Cuban missile crisis was over, President Kennedy famously observed that “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the ... More

Reflecting on the decision-making process after the Cuban missile crisis was over, President Kennedy famously observed that “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself ... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.” This chapter summarizes theoretical and empirical arguments with an eye toward making sense of this striking claim, wherein Kennedy appears to admit that even he felt baffled by what happened in the White House during his presidency. It then discusses the peculiar fact that, at a conference of former ExComm members and academics held twenty-five years after the crisis, the former were forced to admit that their deliberative process was far from systematic. The academics were baffled, but the findings of this book provide an explanation, involving the strange twists and turns that the deliberative process undergoes when it is conducted aloud, subject to the whims of other people and the demands and sensitivities of the conversational machinery that makes the whole thing work.Less

“Doomed to Failure”

Daniel F. Harrington

in Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War

Past authors argue the Western powers quickly adopted an “airlift strategy” to defeat the blockade. Exploring the airlift’s early limits, Chapter 5 disputes this contention. The airlift began as a ... More

Past authors argue the Western powers quickly adopted an “airlift strategy” to defeat the blockade. Exploring the airlift’s early limits, Chapter 5 disputes this contention. The airlift began as a short-term measure to feed the Western garrisons, then expanded into an effort to buy time and boost Berliners’ morale. In the early days, no one believed it could break the blockade. The US Air Force and the Royal Air Force had few airfields in their zones and only two in Berlin. Bad weather and shortages of crews, mechanics, spare parts, and fuel hampered operations. The Assistant Secretary of the US Air Force summed up the situation for the National Security Council in mid-July, declaring the airlift was “doomed to failure.”Less