Sir Adam Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of ...
More
Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of humanitarian intervention also poses a challenge to the UN and its member states, and could even undermine the organization. At the heart of the UN’s difficulty is a delicate balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. For its first 45 years, the body was associated with the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force, yet, since 1990, it has endorsed a series of interventions for humanitarian purposes. After considering the history and causes of this shift, the author discusses nine cases of intervention between 1990 and 2001. These cases reveal a number of issues and controversies, including reliance on the UN Security Council for authorization, the stance of the UN Secretary General, and the impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.Less
Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of humanitarian intervention also poses a challenge to the UN and its member states, and could even undermine the organization. At the heart of the UN’s difficulty is a delicate balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. For its first 45 years, the body was associated with the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force, yet, since 1990, it has endorsed a series of interventions for humanitarian purposes. After considering the history and causes of this shift, the author discusses nine cases of intervention between 1990 and 2001. These cases reveal a number of issues and controversies, including reliance on the UN Security Council for authorization, the stance of the UN Secretary General, and the impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.
Jeffrey G. Barlow
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This book discusses the role of the U.S. Navy within the country's national security structure during the first decade of the Cold War from the perspective of the service's senior uniformed officer, ...
More
This book discusses the role of the U.S. Navy within the country's national security structure during the first decade of the Cold War from the perspective of the service's senior uniformed officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and his staff. It examines a variety of issues of the period, including the Army–Navy fight over unification that led to the creation of the National Security Act of 1947, the early postwar fighting in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, the formation of NATO, the outbreak of the Korean War, the decision of the Eisenhower Administration not to intervene in the Viet Minh troops' siege of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the initiation of the Eisenhower “New Look” defense policy. The author relies upon information obtained from a wide range of primary sources and personal interviews with senior Navy and Army officers. The result is a book that provides the reader with a new way of looking at these pivotal events.Less
This book discusses the role of the U.S. Navy within the country's national security structure during the first decade of the Cold War from the perspective of the service's senior uniformed officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and his staff. It examines a variety of issues of the period, including the Army–Navy fight over unification that led to the creation of the National Security Act of 1947, the early postwar fighting in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, the formation of NATO, the outbreak of the Korean War, the decision of the Eisenhower Administration not to intervene in the Viet Minh troops' siege of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the initiation of the Eisenhower “New Look” defense policy. The author relies upon information obtained from a wide range of primary sources and personal interviews with senior Navy and Army officers. The result is a book that provides the reader with a new way of looking at these pivotal events.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.003.0018
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense ...
More
This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense Department as part of the overall effort to reorient the country's national security priorities toward a military posture that would be sustainable over the long haul. Another vital part of this new framework was examining the existing foreign and defense policies, and then redrafting them to reflect the administration's different perspective on the issues at hand.Less
This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense Department as part of the overall effort to reorient the country's national security priorities toward a military posture that would be sustainable over the long haul. Another vital part of this new framework was examining the existing foreign and defense policies, and then redrafting them to reflect the administration's different perspective on the issues at hand.
David R. Gibson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151311
- eISBN:
- 9781400842438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151311.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting ...
More
This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting of Kennedy's cabinet, their immediate subordinates, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other top-level advisers. It then turns to Kennedy's secret recordings of many White House meetings and telephone conversations, which capture more than twenty hours of ExComm deliberations. Next, it sets out the book's purpose, namely is to undertake the first sustained analysis of the ExComm recordings. The goal is to mine the details of these discussions from a sociological perspective that views conversation as an achievement unto itself, and anything achieved through conversation as indelibly shaped by its rules, constraints, procedures, and vicissitudes.Less
This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting of Kennedy's cabinet, their immediate subordinates, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other top-level advisers. It then turns to Kennedy's secret recordings of many White House meetings and telephone conversations, which capture more than twenty hours of ExComm deliberations. Next, it sets out the book's purpose, namely is to undertake the first sustained analysis of the ExComm recordings. The goal is to mine the details of these discussions from a sociological perspective that views conversation as an achievement unto itself, and anything achieved through conversation as indelibly shaped by its rules, constraints, procedures, and vicissitudes.
Michael Mulqueen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719080272
- eISBN:
- 9781781702734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719080272.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter outlines the profile of the frontline agencies of Irish national security and their government overseers. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate information gathering and ...
More
This chapter outlines the profile of the frontline agencies of Irish national security and their government overseers. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate information gathering and analytical functions that more broadly inform security policy debate and action. There is a parallel in the Swedish and Irish rationales for cooperation with neighbouring military intelligence agencies. Cooperation is a key priority for Irish, Swedish and Danish agencies but there are important differences between Irish arrangements and those operating within the Scandinavian states. Considerable inefficiencies were apparent in how the Defence Forces played out its aid to the civil power role. A key characteristic of the National Security Committee is its civilian members' reliance on their frontline agency colleagues for all operational information and analysis coming before them. Irish commitments to international cooperation do not necessarily imply a flawless or even desirable Irish intelligence apparatus.Less
This chapter outlines the profile of the frontline agencies of Irish national security and their government overseers. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate information gathering and analytical functions that more broadly inform security policy debate and action. There is a parallel in the Swedish and Irish rationales for cooperation with neighbouring military intelligence agencies. Cooperation is a key priority for Irish, Swedish and Danish agencies but there are important differences between Irish arrangements and those operating within the Scandinavian states. Considerable inefficiencies were apparent in how the Defence Forces played out its aid to the civil power role. A key characteristic of the National Security Committee is its civilian members' reliance on their frontline agency colleagues for all operational information and analysis coming before them. Irish commitments to international cooperation do not necessarily imply a flawless or even desirable Irish intelligence apparatus.
Spencer D. Bakich
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226107684
- eISBN:
- 9780226107851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226107851.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ...
More
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.
William Inboden
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190611477
- eISBN:
- 9780190611514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611477.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions ...
More
To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions like the National Security Council and institutional reform in the early Cold War. Its primary focus is the inflection point from the Roosevelt to Truman administrations, roughly 1942–1950, during which the United States emerged as a global power and the institutions of the modern American national security system were created. Consideration is also given to more recent periods, such as the end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 era, during which old institutions were reformed and new institutions were created in efforts to address terrorism and the challenges of fragile and failed states. It considers different catalysts for reform, such as expert commissions and congressional and executive initiatives. It concludes with some potential applications for American policymakers today.Less
To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions like the National Security Council and institutional reform in the early Cold War. Its primary focus is the inflection point from the Roosevelt to Truman administrations, roughly 1942–1950, during which the United States emerged as a global power and the institutions of the modern American national security system were created. Consideration is also given to more recent periods, such as the end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 era, during which old institutions were reformed and new institutions were created in efforts to address terrorism and the challenges of fragile and failed states. It considers different catalysts for reform, such as expert commissions and congressional and executive initiatives. It concludes with some potential applications for American policymakers today.
Beverly Bell
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452123
- eISBN:
- 9780801468322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452123.003.0024
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology
This chapter examines what Haiti's peasant women are doing to guarantee their political and economic rights in the post-earthquake period. It discusses the work of three peasant leaders and their ...
More
This chapter examines what Haiti's peasant women are doing to guarantee their political and economic rights in the post-earthquake period. It discusses the work of three peasant leaders and their organizations: Gerta Louisama, who sits on the Executive Committee and the Women's Commission of Heads Together Haitian Peasants; Iderle Brénus Gerbier, a member of the Haitian National Network for Food Sovereignty and Security and an adviser to the National Coalition of Peasant Women; and Yvette Michaud, cofounder of the National Coalition of Peasant Women. It considers the platform of the Women's Commission, such as petitioning the government to do a thorough agrarian reform. Gerbier works with many peasant organizations to support women's rights and food sovereignty. The National Coalition of Peasant Women, founded in 2008, is the first effort to unite the voices and interests of peasant women at the national level.Less
This chapter examines what Haiti's peasant women are doing to guarantee their political and economic rights in the post-earthquake period. It discusses the work of three peasant leaders and their organizations: Gerta Louisama, who sits on the Executive Committee and the Women's Commission of Heads Together Haitian Peasants; Iderle Brénus Gerbier, a member of the Haitian National Network for Food Sovereignty and Security and an adviser to the National Coalition of Peasant Women; and Yvette Michaud, cofounder of the National Coalition of Peasant Women. It considers the platform of the Women's Commission, such as petitioning the government to do a thorough agrarian reform. Gerbier works with many peasant organizations to support women's rights and food sovereignty. The National Coalition of Peasant Women, founded in 2008, is the first effort to unite the voices and interests of peasant women at the national level.
Eric S. Edelman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449093
- eISBN:
- 9780801460814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449093.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in ...
More
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.Less
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.
David R. Gibson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151311
- eISBN:
- 9781400842438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151311.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to ...
More
This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to that very plan was suppressed, namely that it would give the Soviets a chance to complete work on at least some of the missiles, as a result of which the United States might subsequently find itself attacking operational missiles that could be launched (perhaps without authorization) against U.S. cities. This suppression took time, however, time that the ExComm had because it was able to postpone a decision so long as its deliberations were kept secret.Less
This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to that very plan was suppressed, namely that it would give the Soviets a chance to complete work on at least some of the missiles, as a result of which the United States might subsequently find itself attacking operational missiles that could be launched (perhaps without authorization) against U.S. cities. This suppression took time, however, time that the ExComm had because it was able to postpone a decision so long as its deliberations were kept secret.
Andrew L. Oros
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231172615
- eISBN:
- 9780231542593
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231172615.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and ...
More
For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and global security. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's military capabilities have resurged. In this analysis of Japan's changing military policy, Andrew L. Oros shows how a gradual awakening to new security challenges has culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade. Despite openness to new approaches, however, three historical legacies—contested memories of the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, postwar anti-militarist convictions, and an unequal relationship with the United States—play an outsized role. In Japan's Security Renaissance Oros argues that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by these legacies, which Japanese leaders have struggled to address. He argues that claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernable shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. Bringing together Japanese domestic politics with the broader geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the world, Japan's Security Renaissance provides guidance on this century's emerging international dynamics.Less
For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and global security. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's military capabilities have resurged. In this analysis of Japan's changing military policy, Andrew L. Oros shows how a gradual awakening to new security challenges has culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade. Despite openness to new approaches, however, three historical legacies—contested memories of the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, postwar anti-militarist convictions, and an unequal relationship with the United States—play an outsized role. In Japan's Security Renaissance Oros argues that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by these legacies, which Japanese leaders have struggled to address. He argues that claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernable shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. Bringing together Japanese domestic politics with the broader geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the world, Japan's Security Renaissance provides guidance on this century's emerging international dynamics.
Spencer D. Bakich
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226107684
- eISBN:
- 9780226107851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226107851.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North ...
More
In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North Vietnam. While the air campaign ran the risk of inducing China's intervention, U.S. strategy avoided that outcome. However, America was unable to defeat its opponent in the ground war because General William Westmoreland incorrectly believed that a conventional military strategy held greater promise than a counterinsurgency strategy. Vietnam was a mixed strategic outcome for the U.S. In the air, strategic intelligence was shared among President Lyndon Johnson, the National Security Council, and the military resulting in rational, timely, and effective strategic adaptation. On the ground, the U.S. Army nearly monopolized information thereby preventing positive strategic change. This chapter argues that America's moderately truncated information institution generated the strategic outcome of diplomatic success, but military failure in the war.Less
In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North Vietnam. While the air campaign ran the risk of inducing China's intervention, U.S. strategy avoided that outcome. However, America was unable to defeat its opponent in the ground war because General William Westmoreland incorrectly believed that a conventional military strategy held greater promise than a counterinsurgency strategy. Vietnam was a mixed strategic outcome for the U.S. In the air, strategic intelligence was shared among President Lyndon Johnson, the National Security Council, and the military resulting in rational, timely, and effective strategic adaptation. On the ground, the U.S. Army nearly monopolized information thereby preventing positive strategic change. This chapter argues that America's moderately truncated information institution generated the strategic outcome of diplomatic success, but military failure in the war.
David R. Gibson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151311
- eISBN:
- 9781400842438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151311.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of ...
More
This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of forcing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, storytelling about the consequences of stopping various ships rarely connected those actions to the larger objective. Furthermore, stories about the future were largely supplanted by elaborate justifications for not acting, one peculiarity of which was that the ExComm sometimes seemed to lose sight of whom it primarily had to convince. Moreover, the ExComm did not so much decide not to intercept the Bucharest, a tanker which was Kennedy's best chance to set an early example, as it failed to decide anything at all, but this indecision was transformed into a decision by the course of events.Less
This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of forcing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, storytelling about the consequences of stopping various ships rarely connected those actions to the larger objective. Furthermore, stories about the future were largely supplanted by elaborate justifications for not acting, one peculiarity of which was that the ExComm sometimes seemed to lose sight of whom it primarily had to convince. Moreover, the ExComm did not so much decide not to intercept the Bucharest, a tanker which was Kennedy's best chance to set an early example, as it failed to decide anything at all, but this indecision was transformed into a decision by the course of events.
Hugo Meijer
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190277697
- eISBN:
- 9780190277710
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190277697.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, American Politics
The competition between the two contending coalitions, Control Hawks and the Run Faster coalition, resulted in diverging policy outcomes in the two technology areas of dual-use information and ...
More
The competition between the two contending coalitions, Control Hawks and the Run Faster coalition, resulted in diverging policy outcomes in the two technology areas of dual-use information and communications technology (ICT) and satellites. Chapter 5 demonstrates how, in the area of dual-use information and communications technology, that could be used for both civilian and military applications by the PRC, the Run Faster coalition was able to overcome the resistance and opposition of the Control Hawks and to significantly liberalize export controls during the first decade of the post-Cold War era. To do so, the making of US export controls toward China is examined respectively in the areas of high performance computers (or supercomputers) and telecommunications equipment (section). It will be shown that the same international, bilateral, and domestic factors coalesced in molding American export control policy toward China in these two strategically sensitive areas.Less
The competition between the two contending coalitions, Control Hawks and the Run Faster coalition, resulted in diverging policy outcomes in the two technology areas of dual-use information and communications technology (ICT) and satellites. Chapter 5 demonstrates how, in the area of dual-use information and communications technology, that could be used for both civilian and military applications by the PRC, the Run Faster coalition was able to overcome the resistance and opposition of the Control Hawks and to significantly liberalize export controls during the first decade of the post-Cold War era. To do so, the making of US export controls toward China is examined respectively in the areas of high performance computers (or supercomputers) and telecommunications equipment (section). It will be shown that the same international, bilateral, and domestic factors coalesced in molding American export control policy toward China in these two strategically sensitive areas.
David Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748626014
- eISBN:
- 9780748670673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748626014.003.0004
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Cultural Studies
This chapter makes the case that the events of 11 September 2001 did not represent a major turning point in American diplomatic history. Taking a long historical view, the author, David Ryan, ...
More
This chapter makes the case that the events of 11 September 2001 did not represent a major turning point in American diplomatic history. Taking a long historical view, the author, David Ryan, contends that the reaction of the Bush administration in invading Iraq harkened back to old ideas and ideologies associated with the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War and with Cold War tendencies to think in dualistic terms. Concurrent with the resurgence of such mid-to-late twentieth-century ideological positions is the revivification of the 1990s theses of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, the ‘end of history’ and ‘the clash of civilisations’ respectively. Ryan argues that their ideas and their constructed notion of ‘the West’, founded on nostalgic and triumphal histories of the Cold War, informed the 2002 National Security Strategy and at a meta-level represent a yearning to inject a particular purpose and morality into American foreign policy.Less
This chapter makes the case that the events of 11 September 2001 did not represent a major turning point in American diplomatic history. Taking a long historical view, the author, David Ryan, contends that the reaction of the Bush administration in invading Iraq harkened back to old ideas and ideologies associated with the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War and with Cold War tendencies to think in dualistic terms. Concurrent with the resurgence of such mid-to-late twentieth-century ideological positions is the revivification of the 1990s theses of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, the ‘end of history’ and ‘the clash of civilisations’ respectively. Ryan argues that their ideas and their constructed notion of ‘the West’, founded on nostalgic and triumphal histories of the Cold War, informed the 2002 National Security Strategy and at a meta-level represent a yearning to inject a particular purpose and morality into American foreign policy.
William J. Norris
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801454493
- eISBN:
- 9781501704031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801454493.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Asian Politics
This chapter examines the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) as a potential instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. More specifically, it considers the factors that make the NSSF unlikely to be ...
More
This chapter examines the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) as a potential instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. More specifically, it considers the factors that make the NSSF unlikely to be a source of strategic concern by focusing on its institutional and structural characteristics as well as its investment activities. The chapter begins with a historical overview of the NSSF, followed by a discussion of the NSSF's financing sources and uses. It then reviews the NSSF's mandate and activities before evaluating how the theory applies to the case of the NSSF. It suggests that the NSSF has little potential as an effective tool of China's economic statecraft owing to its institutional structure.Less
This chapter examines the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) as a potential instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. More specifically, it considers the factors that make the NSSF unlikely to be a source of strategic concern by focusing on its institutional and structural characteristics as well as its investment activities. The chapter begins with a historical overview of the NSSF, followed by a discussion of the NSSF's financing sources and uses. It then reviews the NSSF's mandate and activities before evaluating how the theory applies to the case of the NSSF. It suggests that the NSSF has little potential as an effective tool of China's economic statecraft owing to its institutional structure.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for ...
More
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.Less
This chapter discusses the U.S. Navy's efforts to adjust to the increased centralization of defense decision-making dictated by the National Security Act of 1947. It argues that the transition for the Navy went better than it otherwise might have, largely due to the fact that the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had been the Secretary of Navy. Yet, this factor also had its drawbacks, since it tended to magnify the differences between the Navy and the recently created U.S. Air Force, whose ambitious secretary, Stuart Symington, was only too ready to see partiality toward the Navy in any of Forrestal's decisions that went against his own service.
Kazuo Takaragi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780823244560
- eISBN:
- 9780823268948
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823244560.003.0012
- Subject:
- Information Science, Information Science
This chapter introduces the topic of information technology for a safe and secure society in Japan and shows an emerging trend toward a cyber-physical solution. It begins by reviewing major security ...
More
This chapter introduces the topic of information technology for a safe and secure society in Japan and shows an emerging trend toward a cyber-physical solution. It begins by reviewing major security incidents in the United States and Japan, and presenting the Japanese national strategy for information security. It then describes various emerging security technologies in Japan, starting with an overview of the two levels of security technology: the component level, such as finger vein authentication and RFID, and the system and management level, such as a multiple risk communicator. Each of these technologies is discussed in turn. The chapter also covers various issues related to mitigating information leakage.Less
This chapter introduces the topic of information technology for a safe and secure society in Japan and shows an emerging trend toward a cyber-physical solution. It begins by reviewing major security incidents in the United States and Japan, and presenting the Japanese national strategy for information security. It then describes various emerging security technologies in Japan, starting with an overview of the two levels of security technology: the component level, such as finger vein authentication and RFID, and the system and management level, such as a multiple risk communicator. Each of these technologies is discussed in turn. The chapter also covers various issues related to mitigating information leakage.
Seth Jacobs
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801445477
- eISBN:
- 9780801464041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801445477.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines John F. Kennedy’s decision against U.S. military intervention in Laos during his April 27, 1961 meeting with congressional leaders. When the National Security Council (NSC) ...
More
This chapter examines John F. Kennedy’s decision against U.S. military intervention in Laos during his April 27, 1961 meeting with congressional leaders. When the National Security Council (NSC) presented its report on Laos, Kennedy summoned prominent legislators to receive the intelligence. He began by reading aloud a recent cable from Winthrop Brown—American ambassador to Vientiane—who requested intervention by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to stop a communist advance on the Lao capital. The president then stressed deployment difficulties, quoting a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimate that “the communists could put into Laos five men to our one,” which made U.S. victory in a limited war unlikely. However, his assent to Lao neutralism did not grow out of a nuanced foreign-policy doctrine or recognition of American limitations; policymaker disgust with the Lao intensified after Kennedy assumed office.Less
This chapter examines John F. Kennedy’s decision against U.S. military intervention in Laos during his April 27, 1961 meeting with congressional leaders. When the National Security Council (NSC) presented its report on Laos, Kennedy summoned prominent legislators to receive the intelligence. He began by reading aloud a recent cable from Winthrop Brown—American ambassador to Vientiane—who requested intervention by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to stop a communist advance on the Lao capital. The president then stressed deployment difficulties, quoting a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimate that “the communists could put into Laos five men to our one,” which made U.S. victory in a limited war unlikely. However, his assent to Lao neutralism did not grow out of a nuanced foreign-policy doctrine or recognition of American limitations; policymaker disgust with the Lao intensified after Kennedy assumed office.
Fritz Oehlschlaeger
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813130071
- eISBN:
- 9780813135731
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813130071.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter deals with Wendell Berry's political and economic thought, broadly construed. Berry has been particularly perceptive in analyzing the ways of increasingly “total economy” undermines ...
More
This chapter deals with Wendell Berry's political and economic thought, broadly construed. Berry has been particularly perceptive in analyzing the ways of increasingly “total economy” undermines community life, the private–public distinction, and the institution of marriage. To counter this detrimental influence, he reasserts the importance of household and local economies. The chapter also concentrates on Berry's case for community as the indispensable source of virtues necessary to keep the private and public spheres in a proper relationship. It then turns to Berry's constructive account of an alternative to the “total economy”. Moreover, it deals with Berry's writing as a citizen and patriot since September 11, 2001. Berry has sharply criticized American policy since 9/11, arguing especially that the provisions for preemptive strikes contained in the National Security Strategy are inconsistent with democracy.Less
This chapter deals with Wendell Berry's political and economic thought, broadly construed. Berry has been particularly perceptive in analyzing the ways of increasingly “total economy” undermines community life, the private–public distinction, and the institution of marriage. To counter this detrimental influence, he reasserts the importance of household and local economies. The chapter also concentrates on Berry's case for community as the indispensable source of virtues necessary to keep the private and public spheres in a proper relationship. It then turns to Berry's constructive account of an alternative to the “total economy”. Moreover, it deals with Berry's writing as a citizen and patriot since September 11, 2001. Berry has sharply criticized American policy since 9/11, arguing especially that the provisions for preemptive strikes contained in the National Security Strategy are inconsistent with democracy.
