Search Results

The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention

Sir Adam Roberts

in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations

Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of ... More

Demonstrates that the United Nations has been at the centre of key field operations and policy debates relating to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, the issue of humanitarian intervention also poses a challenge to the UN and its member states, and could even undermine the organization. At the heart of the UN’s difficulty is a delicate balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. For its first 45 years, the body was associated with the principle of non-intervention and the non-use of force, yet, since 1990, it has endorsed a series of interventions for humanitarian purposes. After considering the history and causes of this shift, the author discusses nine cases of intervention between 1990 and 2001. These cases reveal a number of issues and controversies, including reliance on the UN Security Council for authorization, the stance of the UN Secretary General, and the impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.Less

Security as a Whole-of-Government Project: Risk, Economy, Politics

Andrew W. Neal

in Security as Politics: Beyond the State of Exception

This chapter departs from others by focusing on government as a site of politics. It finds the same trend at work: ‘security’ has been migrating out from a ‘black box’ at the dark heart of the state ... More

This chapter departs from others by focusing on government as a site of politics. It finds the same trend at work: ‘security’ has been migrating out from a ‘black box’ at the dark heart of the state and into the wider reaches of government, encroaching on all policy areas and all government departments. Building on current literatures on risk, the chapter argues that central to this trend is the rise of a risk-based based rationality in government, which supplants the traditional threat-based security logic with one based on possibilities. The chapter argues that this allows ‘security’ to become subordinate to other political goals such as economic growth, relativising its traditional existential claim on political rationality.Less

Rethinking National Strategy

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense ... More

This chapter discusses President Eisenhower's reorganization of the U.S. defense strategy. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council and further centralized authority within the Defense Department as part of the overall effort to reorient the country's national security priorities toward a military posture that would be sustainable over the long haul. Another vital part of this new framework was examining the existing foreign and defense policies, and then redrafting them to reflect the administration's different perspective on the issues at hand.Less

Introduction: Talk in Time of Crisis

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting ... More

This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the events that unfolded during the Cuban missile crisis. It describes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or the ExComm, consisting of Kennedy's cabinet, their immediate subordinates, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other top-level advisers. It then turns to Kennedy's secret recordings of many White House meetings and telephone conversations, which capture more than twenty hours of ExComm deliberations. Next, it sets out the book's purpose, namely is to undertake the first sustained analysis of the ExComm recordings. The goal is to mine the details of these discussions from a sociological perspective that views conversation as an achievement unto itself, and anything achieved through conversation as indelibly shaped by its rules, constraints, procedures, and vicissitudes.Less

The Irish national security apparatus

Michael Mulqueen

in Re-evaluating Irish National Security Policy: Affordable Threats?

This chapter outlines the profile of the frontline agencies of Irish national security and their government overseers. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate information gathering and ... More

This chapter outlines the profile of the frontline agencies of Irish national security and their government overseers. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate information gathering and analytical functions that more broadly inform security policy debate and action. There is a parallel in the Swedish and Irish rationales for cooperation with neighbouring military intelligence agencies. Cooperation is a key priority for Irish, Swedish and Danish agencies but there are important differences between Irish arrangements and those operating within the Scandinavian states. Considerable inefficiencies were apparent in how the Defence Forces played out its aid to the civil power role. A key characteristic of the National Security Committee is its civilian members' reliance on their frontline agency colleagues for all operational information and analysis coming before them. Irish commitments to international cooperation do not necessarily imply a flawless or even desirable Irish intelligence apparatus.Less

Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ... More

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less

Reforming American Power: Civilian National Security Institutions in the Early Cold War and Beyond

William Inboden

in Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy

To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions ... More

To address how to reform civilian national security institutions for a new security strategy, this chapter explores the American past, giving particular attention to the creation of new institutions like the National Security Council and institutional reform in the early Cold War. Its primary focus is the inflection point from the Roosevelt to Truman administrations, roughly 1942–1950, during which the United States emerged as a global power and the institutions of the modern American national security system were created. Consideration is also given to more recent periods, such as the end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 era, during which old institutions were reformed and new institutions were created in efforts to address terrorism and the challenges of fragile and failed states. It considers different catalysts for reform, such as expert commissions and congressional and executive initiatives. It concludes with some potential applications for American policymakers today.Less

Reengineering the Intelligence Community (2013–)

Richard J. Samuels

in Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community

This chapter examines the most recent and ambitious reengineering of the Japanese intelligence community. A revised Japanese intelligence reform started with the 2013 passage of a Designated State ... More

This chapter examines the most recent and ambitious reengineering of the Japanese intelligence community. A revised Japanese intelligence reform started with the 2013 passage of a Designated State Secrets Law (DSSL) and creation of the National Security Council (NSC). Intelligence communities everywhere are in constant motion, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council had already drafted even more ambitious plans by late 2015. But the scope and scale of the 2013 reforms suggest that political leaders anticipated new security challenges by addressing many of Japan's most difficult endemic intelligence problems. This chapter also analyzes how Japan might resolve the inherent tension between enhancing alliance management and reducing the dependence on the United States.Less

The Response

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to ... More

This chapter focuses on discussions about the initial U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet missiles. It argues that the choice of the blockade was only possible once a particular objection to that very plan was suppressed, namely that it would give the Soviets a chance to complete work on at least some of the missiles, as a result of which the United States might subsequently find itself attacking operational missiles that could be launched (perhaps without authorization) against U.S. cities. This suppression took time, however, time that the ExComm had because it was able to postpone a decision so long as its deliberations were kept secret.Less

The Central Pillar: Peasant Women

Beverly Bell

in Fault Lines: Views across Haiti's Divide

This chapter examines what Haiti's peasant women are doing to guarantee their political and economic rights in the post-earthquake period. It discusses the work of three peasant leaders and their ... More

This chapter examines what Haiti's peasant women are doing to guarantee their political and economic rights in the post-earthquake period. It discusses the work of three peasant leaders and their organizations: Gerta Louisama, who sits on the Executive Committee and the Women's Commission of Heads Together Haitian Peasants; Iderle Brénus Gerbier, a member of the Haitian National Network for Food Sovereignty and Security and an adviser to the National Coalition of Peasant Women; and Yvette Michaud, cofounder of the National Coalition of Peasant Women. It considers the platform of the Women's Commission, such as petitioning the government to do a thorough agrarian reform. Gerbier works with many peasant organizations to support women's rights and food sovereignty. The National Coalition of Peasant Women, founded in 2008, is the first effort to unite the voices and interests of peasant women at the national level.Less

The Strange Career of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance

Eric S. Edelman

in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11

This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in ... More

This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.Less

9/11 And US Foreign Policy

David Ryan

in American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century

This chapter makes the case that the events of 11 September 2001 did not represent a major turning point in American diplomatic history. Taking a long historical view, the author, David Ryan, ... More

This chapter makes the case that the events of 11 September 2001 did not represent a major turning point in American diplomatic history. Taking a long historical view, the author, David Ryan, contends that the reaction of the Bush administration in invading Iraq harkened back to old ideas and ideologies associated with the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War and with Cold War tendencies to think in dualistic terms. Concurrent with the resurgence of such mid-to-late twentieth-century ideological positions is the revivification of the 1990s theses of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, the ‘end of history’ and ‘the clash of civilisations’ respectively. Ryan argues that their ideas and their constructed notion of ‘the West’, founded on nostalgic and triumphal histories of the Cold War, informed the 2002 National Security Strategy and at a meta-level represent a yearning to inject a particular purpose and morality into American foreign policy.Less

The Blockade

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of ... More

This chapter examines talk about how to enforce the blockade, in terms of which ships to stop and which to allow through. Because the blockade was, from the start, ill suited for the purpose of forcing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, storytelling about the consequences of stopping various ships rarely connected those actions to the larger objective. Furthermore, stories about the future were largely supplanted by elaborate justifications for not acting, one peculiarity of which was that the ExComm sometimes seemed to lose sight of whom it primarily had to convince. Moreover, the ExComm did not so much decide not to intercept the Bucharest, a tanker which was Kennedy's best chance to set an early example, as it failed to decide anything at all, but this indecision was transformed into a decision by the course of events.Less

The Vietnam War, Little Consolation

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North ... More

In the Vietnam War, the U.S. sought to preserve the viability of a noncommunist South Vietnam. America waged a ground campaign in South Vietnam and an air campaign, “Rolling Thunder,” over North Vietnam. While the air campaign ran the risk of inducing China's intervention, U.S. strategy avoided that outcome. However, America was unable to defeat its opponent in the ground war because General William Westmoreland incorrectly believed that a conventional military strategy held greater promise than a counterinsurgency strategy. Vietnam was a mixed strategic outcome for the U.S. In the air, strategic intelligence was shared among President Lyndon Johnson, the National Security Council, and the military resulting in rational, timely, and effective strategic adaptation. On the ground, the U.S. Army nearly monopolized information thereby preventing positive strategic change. This chapter argues that America's moderately truncated information institution generated the strategic outcome of diplomatic success, but military failure in the war.Less

Toward a Peaceable Economy for a Beloved Country: Berry as Agrarian, Citizen, and Patriot

Fritz Oehlschlaeger

in The Achievement of Wendell Berry: The Hard History of Love

This chapter deals with Wendell Berry's political and economic thought, broadly construed. Berry has been particularly perceptive in analyzing the ways of increasingly “total economy” undermines ... More

This chapter deals with Wendell Berry's political and economic thought, broadly construed. Berry has been particularly perceptive in analyzing the ways of increasingly “total economy” undermines community life, the private–public distinction, and the institution of marriage. To counter this detrimental influence, he reasserts the importance of household and local economies. The chapter also concentrates on Berry's case for community as the indispensable source of virtues necessary to keep the private and public spheres in a proper relationship. It then turns to Berry's constructive account of an alternative to the “total economy”. Moreover, it deals with Berry's writing as a citizen and patriot since September 11, 2001. Berry has sharply criticized American policy since 9/11, arguing especially that the provisions for preemptive strikes contained in the National Security Strategy are inconsistent with democracy.Less

The ExComm

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

This chapter begins with some historical background, situating the ExComm, as a deliberative body, against the backdrop of the Bay of Pigs, where genuine deliberation was lacking. Then, it describes ... More

This chapter begins with some historical background, situating the ExComm, as a deliberative body, against the backdrop of the Bay of Pigs, where genuine deliberation was lacking. Then, it describes how the ExComm's meetings were organized and conducted. It starts with some remarks about the composition of the group, and then describes, in general terms, how the meetings were structured. Next, it describe Kennedy's singular role in the meetings, as sometimes-chair, sometimes-decider, and addressee of choice. Finally, it looks at the conversational data through an entirely different methodological lens, presenting some simple quantitative findings about who spoke, how they obtained the floor, and who was addressed—patterns that offer further evidence for the qualitative observations about authority and expertise while providing additional insight into the interactional styles of the different ExComm members.Less

Conclusion

David R. Gibson

in Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis

Reflecting on the decision-making process after the Cuban missile crisis was over, President Kennedy famously observed that “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the ... More

Reflecting on the decision-making process after the Cuban missile crisis was over, President Kennedy famously observed that “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself ... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.” This chapter summarizes theoretical and empirical arguments with an eye toward making sense of this striking claim, wherein Kennedy appears to admit that even he felt baffled by what happened in the White House during his presidency. It then discusses the peculiar fact that, at a conference of former ExComm members and academics held twenty-five years after the crisis, the former were forced to admit that their deliberative process was far from systematic. The academics were baffled, but the findings of this book provide an explanation, involving the strange twists and turns that the deliberative process undergoes when it is conducted aloud, subject to the whims of other people and the demands and sensitivities of the conversational machinery that makes the whole thing work.Less

Implementing Grand Strategy: The Nixon-Kissinger Revolution at the National Security Council

William Inboden

in Rethinking American Grand Strategy

This chapter describes the Richard Nixon administration, particularly in its early months. Nixon and his indispensable partner Henry Kissinger took office with a coherent and well-developed grand ... More

This chapter describes the Richard Nixon administration, particularly in its early months. Nixon and his indispensable partner Henry Kissinger took office with a coherent and well-developed grand strategy, based on ideas they had been developing and articulating for years. Much scholarship has been devoted, and rightfully so, to the strategic principles and policies that Nixon and Kissinger pursued while in office. Yet the way they organized their national security system and attempted to implement their strategy has received much less attention—despite the fact that Nixon and Kissinger themselves devoted considerable time and intellectual energy to these organizational issues. In other words, they were concerned not merely with what policies they wanted to pursue and why they would pursue them, but also how they would advance those policies. In the case of Nixon and Kissinger, this “how” included the remarkable centralization of power in the National Security Council, often at the expense of the State and Defense Departments. The chapter assesses how and why Nixon and Kissinger went about this, particularly focusing on how they connected their organizational decisions to their grand strategy.Less