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This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's discussions about the usefulness of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as part of the U.S. national security policy. The chapter first looks at the appointment of John Mark Deutch as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with his agenda for the agency. It then considers Deutch's friendship with Aspin that goes back to their student days at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It also discusses the functions of NIEs as well as the subjects they cover and the frequency of their production; the question of how to represent dissenting views in an NIE; and the importance for national intelligence officers to maintain good liaison relationships with consumers and among themselves. The chapter concludes by comparing “current intelligence” with “research intelligence” such as the NIE.

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. intelligence organizations to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union. Drawing on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced on the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1980, the chapter considers the degree to which history confirms the predictions of the selective attention thesis's organizational expertise hypothesis. It also tests the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. After providing a brief overview of the U.S. intelligence community's estimates of Soviet intentions earlier in the 1970s, the chapter discusses the intelligence organizations' views about Soviet intentions during Jimmy Carter's presidency. It shows that an effort to understand the adversary's political intentions did not play a significant role in the U.S. intelligence community's intentions assessments, and particularly in the NIEs' judgments of the threat posed by the USSR. Instead, most of the NIEs were dedicated to estimating current and projected Soviet strategic forces as well as military intentions.

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. intelligence organizations to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union. Drawing on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced on the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1980, the chapter considers the degree to which history confirms the predictions of the selective attention thesis’s organizational expertise hypothesis. It also tests the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses. After providing a brief overview of the U.S. intelligence community’s estimates of Soviet intentions earlier in the 1970s, the chapter discusses the intelligence organizations’ views about Soviet intentions during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. It shows that an effort to understand the adversary’s political intentions did not play a significant role in the U.S. intelligence community’s intentions assessments, and particularly in the NIEs’ judgments of the threat posed by the USSR. Instead, most of the NIEs were dedicated to estimating current and projected Soviet strategic forces as well as military intentions.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's retreat in Leesburg, its second after a similar retreat at Camp Peary near Williamsburg; both venues are in Virginia. The chapter first considers the commission's preparation of its options papers, including “The Consumer-Producer Relationship,” before turning to a discussion of its sessions with expert witnesses. It then looks at the topics tackled by the commission during the retreat, from economic intelligence to covert action and National Intelligence Estimates. It also discusses the reform agenda of Central Intelligence Agency director John Mark Deutch before concluding with an assessment of the approaches proposed by lawmakers with regards to intelligence oversight.