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Proliferation

Michael Quinlan

in Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects

This chapter considers why the spread of nuclear weapons to new possessors has been generally recognized as dangerous, and then notes the array of instruments, centred upon the 1968 Nuclear ... More

This chapter considers why the spread of nuclear weapons to new possessors has been generally recognized as dangerous, and then notes the array of instruments, centred upon the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that has been built up to prevent this. It discusses problems about the asymmetrical character of the Treaty, and brings out that the Treaty embodies three main bargains of which disarmament by the tolerated nuclear-weapon possessors is only one. It acknowledges nevertheless that such disarmament needs to be taken further if whole-hearted support for the Treaty-centred regime, pressure upon problem states like North Korea and Iran, and acceptance of the burdens and constraints which the regime entails are to be maintained, and if the need is to be acted upon, preferably at the 2010 Treaty review conference, to remedy regime weaknesses concerning verification, the right of withdrawal, and reconciling the prevention of wider weapon-proliferation potential with the likely spread of nuclear energy.Less

Postextension Politics of the NPT

Michal Onderco

in Networked Nonproliferation: Making the NPT Permanent

The final chapter looks at the postextension politics of the NPT. In particular, this chapter looks at the interpretation and reinterpretation of the commitments undertaken in 1995. It provides a ... More

The final chapter looks at the postextension politics of the NPT. In particular, this chapter looks at the interpretation and reinterpretation of the commitments undertaken in 1995. It provides a brief history of the post-1995 policy innovations within the NPT regime, with a focus on the additional commitments adopted in 2000 and 2010. It also looks at how these commitments adopted in 1995 have held up twenty-five years after the passing of the indefinite extension. Chapter 6 closes by looking at the US networked power in 2020, analyzing the degree to which US alliances can (and do) provide support for US nuclear policy today.Less

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

Daniel H. Joyner

in International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the ... More

This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the three depository governments and by more than fifty other states. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. In 2007, the membership of the NPT stands at 187 states, and the treaty continues to serve as the cornerstone legal instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Articles I, II, III, and VI of the NPT are discussed.Less

Introduction

Michal Onderco

in Networked Nonproliferation: Making the NPT Permanent

The indefinite extension of the NPT was unexpected because it was not the preferred course of action for most of the countries. The introduction presents the puzzle of extension in light of the ... More

The indefinite extension of the NPT was unexpected because it was not the preferred course of action for most of the countries. The introduction presents the puzzle of extension in light of the contemporary literature. It surveys the existing explanations for indefinite extension. The realist explanation focuses on raw power of the US to coerce recalcitrant parties, but ignores that the US would never be able to coerce all opponents. The institutionalist explanation can explain why the NPT did not end, but it is unrevealing about the length of the extension. The constructivist explanation can provide an explanation about a minimally just solution but cannot explain why other, arguably more just solutions were not adopted. The introduction also offers the plan for the book.Less

Why Indefinite Extension?

Michal Onderco

in Networked Nonproliferation: Making the NPT Permanent

The first chapter provides a gentle introduction to the history of the NPT’s indefinite extension, by asking “why indefinite extension?” This chapter discusses the origins of the provisions for ... More

The first chapter provides a gentle introduction to the history of the NPT’s indefinite extension, by asking “why indefinite extension?” This chapter discusses the origins of the provisions for limited duration in the NPT – how these provisions made their way into the treaty, and how the parties originally thought about these provisions. It also offers a brief history of the NPT from 1970 till 1995, including the gradual expansion and the successes (and failures) of the review conferences, with particular emphasis on the topics that emerged as key in the NPT discussions between 1970 and 1995. The chapter provides a historical and legal sketch of the possible extension options, including their meanings and justifications. Lastly, chapter 1 provides an overview of the US position, with an emphasis on decision-making within the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and at the State Department, and the involvement of the White House.Less

Networked Power

Michal Onderco

in Networked Nonproliferation: Making the NPT Permanent

The second chapter introduces the reader to the theoretical argument. This chapter discusses in depth the theory based on social network theory, tying it to the diplomatic position of the US in ... More

The second chapter introduces the reader to the theoretical argument. This chapter discusses in depth the theory based on social network theory, tying it to the diplomatic position of the US in global networks. This theory posits that the US was able to push for indefinite extension of the NPT because of its unique connections to other well-connected members of the nonproliferation regime – Europe, South Africa, and Egypt. This theory differs from other explanations for states’ influence in international organizations. Chapter 2 also provides evidence for the argument that the US did indeed possess a unique position in the diplomatic, commercial, and military networks in the mid-1990s, unparalleled by any other country.Less

The 1970s: The Nuclear Relationship under the Shah

Steven Hurst

in The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: A Critical History

The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to accelerate Iran's nuclear programme, creating tensions with the USA. This short period witnessed the ... More

The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to accelerate Iran's nuclear programme, creating tensions with the USA. This short period witnessed the emergence of a number of key features of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship: The divergence of perspectives on proliferation and the fuel cycle quickly became clear. Even in a context in which the two were Cold War allies, Iranian nationalism and ambition and American fear of proliferation produced deadlock in their nuclear negotiations. The American refusal to provide Iran with fuel cycle technology was, moreover, strongly influenced by pressure from Congress, which was able to exploit the need for its ratification of any nuclear agreement to great effect. Finally, the chapter reveals a tension between unilateralism and multilateralism that would recur in US policy, as it tried to persuade the other nuclear powers to join it in not transferring sensitive nuclear technology whilst also pursuing its own national interests and accommodating domestic pressures.Less

Has Iran Violated the NPT?

Daniel H. Joyner

in Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law: From Confrontation to Accord

This chapter considers the question of whether Iran has been in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at any point. There are two reasons for addressing this question. First, the NPT ... More

This chapter considers the question of whether Iran has been in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at any point. There are two reasons for addressing this question. First, the NPT is the most important source of international law involved in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. The NPT is the lex lata cornerstone treaty of the international nuclear energy and nuclear weapons nonproliferation normative regime, and the rest of the legal architecture of this existing regime is built upon it. So the question of whether Iran’s actions with regard to its nuclear program have at any time violated the provisions of the NPT carries with it the highest potential implications. Second, this question is the simplest of the legal questions to answer. Arguments by the West that Iran has violated the NPT through actions related to its nuclear program are the weakest among their legal arguments against Iran.Less

PII, Victimhood and “Nuclear Apartheid”

Manjari Chatterjee Miller

in Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China

This chapter turns to the contemporary period to show that PII and, specifically, victimhood matter today. It analyzes India's decision to declare nuclear weapons state status in 1998. It uses PII to ... More

This chapter turns to the contemporary period to show that PII and, specifically, victimhood matter today. It analyzes India's decision to declare nuclear weapons state status in 1998. It uses PII to explain why India decided to conduct further nuclear tests after the first halting tests in 1974, and why it conducted them in 1998. To do so, it utilizes thousands of articles in the Indian print media in 1974 and in the 1990s to demonstrate that a sense of victimization and entitlement regarding the nuclear issue did not exist in 1974, but had appeared by the 1998 decision.Less

The Paradox of Hegemony

Or Rabinowitz

in Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals

The aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical framing of American willingness to reach bargains on nuclear tests through the ‘Paradox of Hegemony’, to be examined as the background to the case ... More

The aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical framing of American willingness to reach bargains on nuclear tests through the ‘Paradox of Hegemony’, to be examined as the background to the case studies. The main question which drives this pursuit is why were American decision-makers willing to compromise the NPT and its declared non-proliferation agenda by reaching nuclear bargains which undermined the treaty’s principles, tacitly acknowledging and accepting nuclear weapons possession outside the club of the first generation proliferators? According to Bruce Cronin’s ‘Paradox of Hegemony’, an inherent tension exists between a state’s role as a system’s hegemon, obligated to adhere to the system’s institutions and norms, and its role as a great power, in pursuit of national-domestic interests, and thus hegemons are constantly torn between these two conflicting vectors.Less

The NPT, Nuclear Tests, and their Changing Legal Status

Or Rabinowitz

in Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals

The chapter explores several historical themes which relate to nuclear tests, their changing legal status, and its relations to the NPT. It charts how the negotiations and the entry into force of the ... More

The chapter explores several historical themes which relate to nuclear tests, their changing legal status, and its relations to the NPT. It charts how the negotiations and the entry into force of the NPT instigated a process which transformed nuclear tests into international markers of nuclear status in the international system. This is followed by a discussion, based on recently published documents, on Nixon’s scepticism and hostility towards the NPT, a treaty which he had inherited from the outgoing Johnson administration. The third part will explore how the legitimacy of nuclear weapons possession and nuclear tests has gradually eroded over time, giving way to the rise of an international legal norm which prohibits tests.Less

Conclusions

Or Rabinowitz

in Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals

The ninth chapter includes the conclusion of the study and its policy implications. It discusses the emergence of the ‘Israeli model’ and the transformation of nuclear tests into bargaining chips in ... More

The ninth chapter includes the conclusion of the study and its policy implications. It discusses the emergence of the ‘Israeli model’ and the transformation of nuclear tests into bargaining chips in the hands of America’s Cold War associates in the second half of the Cold War. Going back to the Paradox of Hegemony presented in the second chapter, it discusses the vulnerability of international norms and institutions, like the NPT, to subversion by powerful decision-makers who are biased against them, especially when the process enjoys a lack of public accountability. The chapter compares the three deals and their durability, and points to the lessons that Israeli decision-makers could learn from the rise and fall of the other two deals: mainly that understandings do not last forever and that a leadership which prizes a certain understanding with Washington should take certain measures to sustain its longevity.Less

The Resilience of Opacity in a Changing International Legal Environment: How Europe Weighted East-West Negotiations of the NPT

Grégoire Mallard

in Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture

Chapter 7 analyzes how international organizations negotiate the interpretation of legal obligations when changes occur in the international legal environment. It describes how the production of soft ... More

Chapter 7 analyzes how international organizations negotiate the interpretation of legal obligations when changes occur in the international legal environment. It describes how the production of soft law and a truly global treaty – the NPT – affected the negotiation between the two existing international organizations in charge of verifying the legal obligations of their member-states with regard to the use of nuclear technologies and fissile materials: Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. It shows that when opposite legal rules are inherited from a succession of treaties with overlapping jurisdiction, it is not always the newest and more general rules that survive the hard work of harmonization. In this case, European diplomats not only preserved Euratom’s exclusive control of nuclear activities in Europe after the NPT was signed, but they also convinced the IAEA to design a new global NPT safeguards system, which was adapted to the Euratom system. The outcome such a complex and sequential process of harmonization of opaque legal rules thus produced some loopholes in the global nonproliferation regime, as the goal of Euratom had never been to check nuclear proliferation in Europe.Less

The Singular Legacies of Nuclear Opacity: The Difficult Road toward the Universalization of the NPT Regime

Grégoire Mallard

in Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture

Chapter 8 analyzes the evolution of opaque rules in other nuclear trade regimes that overlapped with (and contradicted) the legal obligations that key states (like the U.S.) contracted when they ... More

Chapter 8 analyzes the evolution of opaque rules in other nuclear trade regimes that overlapped with (and contradicted) the legal obligations that key states (like the U.S.) contracted when they signed the NPT. By exploring how the U.S. and Western European governments managed the opacity of their nuclear relations with Israel, India and Pakistan – the three countries that have never signed or adhered to the rules of NPT regime –, this chapter shows that harmonization is not the only possible outcome of the interactions between country-specific regimes and the global nonproliferation regime. In each of these three cases, the articulation between the global regime, and the opaque legal rules that the West followed when it dealt with them, differs. Indeed, the outcome produced either some unacknowledged (Israel) or acknowledged (India) exemption in the nuclear nonproliferation regime; or, more dangerously, some subversion (Pakistan) of the global regime. By describing the mechanisms that produced these different outcomes, this chapter draws some lessons from the harmonization between Europe’s regional and global rules to address the question of the universalization of the NPT. In particular, it shows how such harmonization has a bearing on how Israel, India and Pakistan could be included in the global nonproliferation regime.Less

British Intelligence During the Cold War

Richard J. Aldrich

in Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989

Richard Aldrich highlights how secret intelligence operates out of neither a social nor an economic vacuum. All too often, purist approaches to the subject modeled on postwar American behavior ignore ... More

Richard Aldrich highlights how secret intelligence operates out of neither a social nor an economic vacuum. All too often, purist approaches to the subject modeled on postwar American behavior ignore that fundamental truth, he asserts. Aldrich artfully sheds light on a back door into intelligence by asking about money: “cuts and economies can illuminate what intelligence was provided and at what cost,” he writes. This approach allows him to survey the Anglo-American relationship from the vantage point of Britain’s diminishing resources in the face of the need to come up with a steady flow of results to sustain a crucial strategic alliance.Less

India and the global nuclear order: a quiet assimilation

Harsh V. Pant

in Indian foreign policy: An overview

This chapter examines the evolution in India’s role in the global nuclear order – from being a pariah to one at the centre of its reformulation.

On the Fallacies of Cold War Nostalgia: Capitalism, Colonialism, and South African Nuclear Geographies

Gabrielle Hecht

in Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War

This chapter deals with the superpower arms race and how it affected the technopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries began to aim at becoming nuclear powers and gaining the ... More

This chapter deals with the superpower arms race and how it affected the technopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries began to aim at becoming nuclear powers and gaining the knowledge to produce atomic bombs. During this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the principal instruments of the technopolitics involving the Cold War– were formed;.the use of atomic energy for producing electricity was propounded at this time by President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” speech; India also stepped in to produce atomic power plants. The author maintains that apartheid in South Africa was a critical factor in the negotiations for the IAEA seat. South Africa is rich in uranium ore that is used in harnessing atomic energy and in nuclear technology. The presence of this source material was considered to be vital in gaining the IAEA seat, which was a post-colonial settlement.Less

India’s Negotiation Strategy: The Heroism of Hard Bargaining?

Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar

in Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Mahabharata

This chapter begins with a theoretical overview of negotiation strategies as given by the literature on bargaining and negotiation. It outlines the dominant trends in the negotiation strategies used ... More

This chapter begins with a theoretical overview of negotiation strategies as given by the literature on bargaining and negotiation. It outlines the dominant trends in the negotiation strategies used by India since independence and more recently as a rising power. The greater part of the chapter looks at ten episodes (pre-war, war, post-war and related stories, and exceptions) from the Mahabharata to examine how far classical traditions espouse conciliatory diplomacy. Interestingly, as analysis of the text reveals, both the ‘goodies’ and the ‘baddies’, the winners and the losers, in times of peace and war and indeed after, find it difficult to make concessions. The Mahabharata also specifies the limited conditions under which concessions should be made, which this chapter explores with reference to both the text and also modern-day negotiations.Less