Karel C. Berkhoff
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719097560
- eISBN:
- 9781526104441
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719097560.003.0003
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Anthropology, Global
The chapter will show how both the Soviet authorities and the leaders of independent Ukraine attempted to block real investigation and commemoration at the hamlet of Bykivnia, where the NKVD buried ...
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The chapter will show how both the Soviet authorities and the leaders of independent Ukraine attempted to block real investigation and commemoration at the hamlet of Bykivnia, where the NKVD buried murdered bodies from 1939-1941. The chapter will look into how their attempts failed due to pressure from within—grave robbers and activists—and, especially, without—Germany and Poland. Following this account, details about the little-known Nazi and Soviet exhumations at the site will be examined.Less
The chapter will show how both the Soviet authorities and the leaders of independent Ukraine attempted to block real investigation and commemoration at the hamlet of Bykivnia, where the NKVD buried murdered bodies from 1939-1941. The chapter will look into how their attempts failed due to pressure from within—grave robbers and activists—and, especially, without—Germany and Poland. Following this account, details about the little-known Nazi and Soviet exhumations at the site will be examined.
Viacheslav Bitiutckii
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719097560
- eISBN:
- 9781526104441
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719097560.003.0005
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Anthropology, Global
This paper discusses the search for, exhumation and identification of the remains of victims of mass political repression during the Stalinist Great Terror (1937-1938) in the USSR, concentrating on ...
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This paper discusses the search for, exhumation and identification of the remains of victims of mass political repression during the Stalinist Great Terror (1937-1938) in the USSR, concentrating on those who were subjected to the severest form of repression, that is, those who were shot following sentencing during judicial or extrajudicial processes. Even if historians now agree on the number of victims of Stalin's Great Terror (1937-1938) during which nearly 800,000 people were executed by gunshot, we still know little about the ultimate course these victims took as the full trial procedures, executions and burials were marked with the seal of state secrets. By restoring the history of exhumations undertaken from 1989 - quite exceptionally for Russia - in the Voronezh region 500 kilometres south of Moscow, and in focussing more specifically on the discovery of a site where 62 graves were discovered containing the remains of 2,889 individuals, this text lifts the veil on the Soviet logistics of the production of mass death. It sheds light on the human and material resources mobilized by the NKVD for these executions and illegal burials, utilising the repetitive tasks of dozens of individuals.Less
This paper discusses the search for, exhumation and identification of the remains of victims of mass political repression during the Stalinist Great Terror (1937-1938) in the USSR, concentrating on those who were subjected to the severest form of repression, that is, those who were shot following sentencing during judicial or extrajudicial processes. Even if historians now agree on the number of victims of Stalin's Great Terror (1937-1938) during which nearly 800,000 people were executed by gunshot, we still know little about the ultimate course these victims took as the full trial procedures, executions and burials were marked with the seal of state secrets. By restoring the history of exhumations undertaken from 1989 - quite exceptionally for Russia - in the Voronezh region 500 kilometres south of Moscow, and in focussing more specifically on the discovery of a site where 62 graves were discovered containing the remains of 2,889 individuals, this text lifts the veil on the Soviet logistics of the production of mass death. It sheds light on the human and material resources mobilized by the NKVD for these executions and illegal burials, utilising the repetitive tasks of dozens of individuals.
Michael David-Fox
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794577
- eISBN:
- 9780199932245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794577.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter analyzes how the Soviet approach to foreign visitors crystallized during a particular conjuncture in the early 1920s. As the first significant influx of “bourgeois” foreigners, including ...
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This chapter analyzes how the Soviet approach to foreign visitors crystallized during a particular conjuncture in the early 1920s. As the first significant influx of “bourgeois” foreigners, including the American Relief Association (ARA), arrived to provide aid during the famine of 1920–1922, Soviet missions became focused not only on external contacts and exports but on influencing visitors at home. The chapter explores the origins of Soviet organizations set up to shape the international image of the Soviet experiment. It considers the motivations and activities of the precursors to the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS), Soviet guides and translators, and the secret police (OGPU/NKVD). A new Soviet system emerged to predict visitors' judgments, evaluate and classify foreigners, and identify friends and enemies.Less
This chapter analyzes how the Soviet approach to foreign visitors crystallized during a particular conjuncture in the early 1920s. As the first significant influx of “bourgeois” foreigners, including the American Relief Association (ARA), arrived to provide aid during the famine of 1920–1922, Soviet missions became focused not only on external contacts and exports but on influencing visitors at home. The chapter explores the origins of Soviet organizations set up to shape the international image of the Soviet experiment. It considers the motivations and activities of the precursors to the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS), Soviet guides and translators, and the secret police (OGPU/NKVD). A new Soviet system emerged to predict visitors' judgments, evaluate and classify foreigners, and identify friends and enemies.
Michael David-Fox
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794577
- eISBN:
- 9780199932245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794577.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter establishes how the writer Maxim Gorky's return to the Soviet Union from European exile in 1928 to become a chief architect of Stalinist culture was a watershed in the history of the ...
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This chapter establishes how the writer Maxim Gorky's return to the Soviet Union from European exile in 1928 to become a chief architect of Stalinist culture was a watershed in the history of the Soviet reception of foreign visitors. Making a tour around the USSR modeled on those of foreign visitors, Gorky made a distinct contribution to the rise of Socialist Realism, both in the sense of the dominant aesthetic doctrine and as a key mode of Stalin-era ideology as a whole. With his visit to the Solovetskii Camp of Special Designation (SLON, or Solovki), the model camp of the nascent GULAG, it also established new norms for the depiction of forced labor as humane reeducation. The chapter probes a range of previously unknown links among Gorky's famous visit to Solovki, his patronage of the Stalin era's dominant pedagogue, Anton Makarenko, and his ties to the head of the secret police, Genrikh Iagoda. The chapter examines in detail how these links affected the history of some of the most internationally celebrated Soviet destinations for foreign visitors: the secret police-sponsored communes for creating “new people” out of juvenile delinquents, chief among them the OGPU/NKVD Children's Labor Commune at Bolshevo.Less
This chapter establishes how the writer Maxim Gorky's return to the Soviet Union from European exile in 1928 to become a chief architect of Stalinist culture was a watershed in the history of the Soviet reception of foreign visitors. Making a tour around the USSR modeled on those of foreign visitors, Gorky made a distinct contribution to the rise of Socialist Realism, both in the sense of the dominant aesthetic doctrine and as a key mode of Stalin-era ideology as a whole. With his visit to the Solovetskii Camp of Special Designation (SLON, or Solovki), the model camp of the nascent GULAG, it also established new norms for the depiction of forced labor as humane reeducation. The chapter probes a range of previously unknown links among Gorky's famous visit to Solovki, his patronage of the Stalin era's dominant pedagogue, Anton Makarenko, and his ties to the head of the secret police, Genrikh Iagoda. The chapter examines in detail how these links affected the history of some of the most internationally celebrated Soviet destinations for foreign visitors: the secret police-sponsored communes for creating “new people” out of juvenile delinquents, chief among them the OGPU/NKVD Children's Labor Commune at Bolshevo.
Jon K. Chang
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780824856786
- eISBN:
- 9780824872205
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Hawai'i Press
- DOI:
- 10.21313/hawaii/9780824856786.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This study focuses on two primary arguments. First, it demonstrates how the Koreans of the Russian Far East were continually viewed as a problematic or maligned nationality during the Tsarist and ...
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This study focuses on two primary arguments. First, it demonstrates how the Koreans of the Russian Far East were continually viewed as a problematic or maligned nationality during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Second, this study argues that the Soviet state was not free of Russian nationalist, populist and primordial views and influences in their nationalities (national minorities) policies. The aforementioned were the “Tsarist continuities” which blinded the Stalinist regime from seeing the Koreans as loyal citizens. Instead, these influences cast the Koreans as a colonizing element (labor force) with unknowable political loyalties (and therefore, possible fifth columnists). This study found that the Soviet state exerted a tremendous sociopolitical influence on the Korean community primarily through the careful selection, cultivation, and placement of Soviet Korean cadres, informants, and secret police. Additionally, author Jon K. Chang sought to capture the sense of “agency,” initiative, and entrepreneurship that the Koreans added to Soviet life in the Russian Far East. Chang found very few documents of this type in the Soviet archives. Therefore, he went to Central Asia and interviewed over sixty elderly Soviet Korean deportees which he then paired with archival documents to write Burnt by the Sun.Less
This study focuses on two primary arguments. First, it demonstrates how the Koreans of the Russian Far East were continually viewed as a problematic or maligned nationality during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Second, this study argues that the Soviet state was not free of Russian nationalist, populist and primordial views and influences in their nationalities (national minorities) policies. The aforementioned were the “Tsarist continuities” which blinded the Stalinist regime from seeing the Koreans as loyal citizens. Instead, these influences cast the Koreans as a colonizing element (labor force) with unknowable political loyalties (and therefore, possible fifth columnists). This study found that the Soviet state exerted a tremendous sociopolitical influence on the Korean community primarily through the careful selection, cultivation, and placement of Soviet Korean cadres, informants, and secret police. Additionally, author Jon K. Chang sought to capture the sense of “agency,” initiative, and entrepreneurship that the Koreans added to Soviet life in the Russian Far East. Chang found very few documents of this type in the Soviet archives. Therefore, he went to Central Asia and interviewed over sixty elderly Soviet Korean deportees which he then paired with archival documents to write Burnt by the Sun.
Maya Plisetskaya
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300088571
- eISBN:
- 9780300130713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300088571.003.0009
- Subject:
- Music, Dance
In this chapter, Maya Plisetskaya recalls the time she met and became friends with Miliza Korjus, her childhood idol, at the backstage of the Shriner Auditorium in Los Angeles in 1966. Miliza was not ...
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In this chapter, Maya Plisetskaya recalls the time she met and became friends with Miliza Korjus, her childhood idol, at the backstage of the Shriner Auditorium in Los Angeles in 1966. Miliza was not aware that Joseph Stalin liked The Great Waltz a lot and had it distributed on Soviet screens. Maya attended rehearsals at school for an important concert to be held at the club of the NKVD. She wondered why Russia's secret police had a desire to see the young ballet sprouts, the sixth- and seventh-class students of Elizaveta Pavlovna Gerdt. Maya and her classmates danced to piano accompaniment by their best school pianist, Ekaterina Shlikhting.Less
In this chapter, Maya Plisetskaya recalls the time she met and became friends with Miliza Korjus, her childhood idol, at the backstage of the Shriner Auditorium in Los Angeles in 1966. Miliza was not aware that Joseph Stalin liked The Great Waltz a lot and had it distributed on Soviet screens. Maya attended rehearsals at school for an important concert to be held at the club of the NKVD. She wondered why Russia's secret police had a desire to see the young ballet sprouts, the sixth- and seventh-class students of Elizaveta Pavlovna Gerdt. Maya and her classmates danced to piano accompaniment by their best school pianist, Ekaterina Shlikhting.
Jon K. Chang
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780824856786
- eISBN:
- 9780824872205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Hawai'i Press
- DOI:
- 10.21313/hawaii/9780824856786.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
Chapter 6 covers the period 1931–1937. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. This greatly increased Soviet fears of invasion and espionage being carried out in the Russian Far East. At the same time, ...
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Chapter 6 covers the period 1931–1937. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. This greatly increased Soviet fears of invasion and espionage being carried out in the Russian Far East. At the same time, Soviet Koreans were great in education and higher education. By the early 1930s, there were three institutes of higher education for Koreans and other institutes with Korean “sections” such as in Khabarovsk. In 1937, Raisa Nigai (who was interviewed) withdrew from the Nikolsk Ussuriisk Teacher’s College in anticipation of the deportation of Koreans. Nikolai Nigai, an NKVD officer began his work in the first phase of the deportation which consisted of arresting and sentencing some 2000 of the Soviet Korean elites and intellectuals. Afanasii A. Kim, the leader of the Soviet Koreans had been arrested earlier on January 1936. On 21 August 1937, the first resolution for the deportation of the Koreans was signed by Stalin and Molotov. Their deportation was part of the Great Terror.Less
Chapter 6 covers the period 1931–1937. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. This greatly increased Soviet fears of invasion and espionage being carried out in the Russian Far East. At the same time, Soviet Koreans were great in education and higher education. By the early 1930s, there were three institutes of higher education for Koreans and other institutes with Korean “sections” such as in Khabarovsk. In 1937, Raisa Nigai (who was interviewed) withdrew from the Nikolsk Ussuriisk Teacher’s College in anticipation of the deportation of Koreans. Nikolai Nigai, an NKVD officer began his work in the first phase of the deportation which consisted of arresting and sentencing some 2000 of the Soviet Korean elites and intellectuals. Afanasii A. Kim, the leader of the Soviet Koreans had been arrested earlier on January 1936. On 21 August 1937, the first resolution for the deportation of the Koreans was signed by Stalin and Molotov. Their deportation was part of the Great Terror.
James Harris
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199695768
- eISBN:
- 9780191778971
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695768.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Political History
Between the winter of 1936 and the autumn of 1938, approximately three-quarters of a million Soviet citizens were subject to summary execution. More than a million others were sentenced to lengthy ...
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Between the winter of 1936 and the autumn of 1938, approximately three-quarters of a million Soviet citizens were subject to summary execution. More than a million others were sentenced to lengthy terms in labour camps. Commonly known as ‘Stalin’s Great Terror’, it is also among the most misunderstood moments in the history of the twentieth century. The terror gutted the ranks of factory directors and engineers after three years in which all major plan targets were met. It raged through the armed forces on the eve of the Nazi invasion. The wholesale slaughter of party and state officials was in danger of making the Soviet state ungovernable. The majority of these victims of state repression in this period were accused of participating in counter-revolutionary conspiracies. Almost without exception, there was no substance to the claims and no material evidence to support them. By the time the terror was brought to a close, most of its victims were ordinary Soviet citizens for whom ‘counter-revolution’ was an unfathomable abstraction. In short, the terror was wholly destructive, not merely in terms of the incalculable human cost, but also in terms of the interests of the Soviet leaders, principally Joseph Stalin, who directed and managed it. The book presents a new and original explanation of Stalin’s terror based on intelligence materials in Russian archives. It shows how Soviet leaders developed a grossly exaggerated fear of conspiracy and foreign invasion and lashed out at enemies largely of their own making.Less
Between the winter of 1936 and the autumn of 1938, approximately three-quarters of a million Soviet citizens were subject to summary execution. More than a million others were sentenced to lengthy terms in labour camps. Commonly known as ‘Stalin’s Great Terror’, it is also among the most misunderstood moments in the history of the twentieth century. The terror gutted the ranks of factory directors and engineers after three years in which all major plan targets were met. It raged through the armed forces on the eve of the Nazi invasion. The wholesale slaughter of party and state officials was in danger of making the Soviet state ungovernable. The majority of these victims of state repression in this period were accused of participating in counter-revolutionary conspiracies. Almost without exception, there was no substance to the claims and no material evidence to support them. By the time the terror was brought to a close, most of its victims were ordinary Soviet citizens for whom ‘counter-revolution’ was an unfathomable abstraction. In short, the terror was wholly destructive, not merely in terms of the incalculable human cost, but also in terms of the interests of the Soviet leaders, principally Joseph Stalin, who directed and managed it. The book presents a new and original explanation of Stalin’s terror based on intelligence materials in Russian archives. It shows how Soviet leaders developed a grossly exaggerated fear of conspiracy and foreign invasion and lashed out at enemies largely of their own making.
Paul Hagenloh
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199655663
- eISBN:
- 9780191757518
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655663.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Political History, Social History
This chapter examines the centrality of violence—military, police, interpersonal—in the creation of the Soviet administrative system in its formative years; it then traces the connections between ...
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This chapter examines the centrality of violence—military, police, interpersonal—in the creation of the Soviet administrative system in its formative years; it then traces the connections between these forms of violence and the mass repressions that shook Stalin's USSR in 1937 and 1938 (the ‘Great Terror’). It concentrates in particular on the propensity of state officials (local soviets, state commissars, and representatives of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) to use violence to administer the nascent Soviet political system, but it also surveys existing literature on better-known forms of state violence in the era of revolution and civil war, including the Red Army, the party, and the secret police (Cheka/OGPU). It argues that violence pervaded the early Leninist state at all levels of administration, and that this pervasive administrative culture of violence made the Stalinist outcome in the 1930s likely, if not inevitable.Less
This chapter examines the centrality of violence—military, police, interpersonal—in the creation of the Soviet administrative system in its formative years; it then traces the connections between these forms of violence and the mass repressions that shook Stalin's USSR in 1937 and 1938 (the ‘Great Terror’). It concentrates in particular on the propensity of state officials (local soviets, state commissars, and representatives of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) to use violence to administer the nascent Soviet political system, but it also surveys existing literature on better-known forms of state violence in the era of revolution and civil war, including the Red Army, the party, and the secret police (Cheka/OGPU). It argues that violence pervaded the early Leninist state at all levels of administration, and that this pervasive administrative culture of violence made the Stalinist outcome in the 1930s likely, if not inevitable.
Gábor T. Rittersporn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199655663
- eISBN:
- 9780191757518
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655663.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Political History, Social History
Soviet criminal policy of the mid-1930s shows that the Great Terror of 1937–8 was not a minutely planned operation. It was part of a penal strategy that oscillated between attempts to institute legal ...
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Soviet criminal policy of the mid-1930s shows that the Great Terror of 1937–8 was not a minutely planned operation. It was part of a penal strategy that oscillated between attempts to institute legal formalism and the recourse to mass repression. On the eve of the Terror, proponents of judicial formalism consolidated their positions. Still, they had no difficulty in switching over to the hard line. Soviet-type legalism was not incompatible with arbitrary policies and erratic use of force. After the Terror, legal formalism seemed to get the upper hand. But conflicts between the political police and the judiciary were won by the NKVD even though the purge was hardly a success. The practice of mass purges was nevertheless abandoned. A new understanding of threats to the system's stability gave new importance to the judiciary.Less
Soviet criminal policy of the mid-1930s shows that the Great Terror of 1937–8 was not a minutely planned operation. It was part of a penal strategy that oscillated between attempts to institute legal formalism and the recourse to mass repression. On the eve of the Terror, proponents of judicial formalism consolidated their positions. Still, they had no difficulty in switching over to the hard line. Soviet-type legalism was not incompatible with arbitrary policies and erratic use of force. After the Terror, legal formalism seemed to get the upper hand. But conflicts between the political police and the judiciary were won by the NKVD even though the purge was hardly a success. The practice of mass purges was nevertheless abandoned. A new understanding of threats to the system's stability gave new importance to the judiciary.
Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300123470
- eISBN:
- 9780300156416
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300123470.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This book reveals more clearly than ever the precise nature and extent of the damage done to the much-vaunted British intelligence establishment during World War II by the notorious “Cambridge Five” ...
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This book reveals more clearly than ever the precise nature and extent of the damage done to the much-vaunted British intelligence establishment during World War II by the notorious “Cambridge Five” spy ring: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. The code word “Triplex” refers to an exceptionally sensitive intelligence source, one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war, which appears nowhere in any of the British government's official histories. “Triplex” was material extracted illicitly from the diplomatic pouches of neutral missions in wartime London. MI5, the British Security Service, entrusted the job of overseeing the highly secret assignment to Anthony Blunt, who was already working for the NKVD, Stalin's intelligence service. The rest is history, documented here in detail.Less
This book reveals more clearly than ever the precise nature and extent of the damage done to the much-vaunted British intelligence establishment during World War II by the notorious “Cambridge Five” spy ring: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. The code word “Triplex” refers to an exceptionally sensitive intelligence source, one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war, which appears nowhere in any of the British government's official histories. “Triplex” was material extracted illicitly from the diplomatic pouches of neutral missions in wartime London. MI5, the British Security Service, entrusted the job of overseeing the highly secret assignment to Anthony Blunt, who was already working for the NKVD, Stalin's intelligence service. The rest is history, documented here in detail.
Nige West and Oleg Tsarev
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300123470
- eISBN:
- 9780300156416
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300123470.003.0037
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter focuses on a report regarding the British deception schemes. The report aimed to give a brief description of the structure of the British deception agencies and their work based on the ...
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This chapter focuses on a report regarding the British deception schemes. The report aimed to give a brief description of the structure of the British deception agencies and their work based on the current war-based material obtained by the First Directorate of the NKVD. Accordingly, it was divided into three sections: (1) Organizational structure, staff, and functions of the British deception agencies, (2) Deception during the preparations for the Allies' invasion of Sicily, (3) Deception during the preparations for the opening of a Second Front. The report was based on intelligence material of the First Directorate of the NKVD for 1942–1944. It also discussed that there was good coverage of the work of the TWIST and TORY (deception-planning) Committees, but not very much on that of the XX Committee.Less
This chapter focuses on a report regarding the British deception schemes. The report aimed to give a brief description of the structure of the British deception agencies and their work based on the current war-based material obtained by the First Directorate of the NKVD. Accordingly, it was divided into three sections: (1) Organizational structure, staff, and functions of the British deception agencies, (2) Deception during the preparations for the Allies' invasion of Sicily, (3) Deception during the preparations for the opening of a Second Front. The report was based on intelligence material of the First Directorate of the NKVD for 1942–1944. It also discussed that there was good coverage of the work of the TWIST and TORY (deception-planning) Committees, but not very much on that of the XX Committee.
Paul R. Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300134254
- eISBN:
- 9780300152784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300134254.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter, which examines the characteristics of the ranks of the Soviet Union's People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) under the regime of Joseph Stalin, suggests that state security ...
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This chapter, which examines the characteristics of the ranks of the Soviet Union's People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) under the regime of Joseph Stalin, suggests that state security was a nested dictatorship in which subordinates dealt with their subordinates as their superiors dealt with them. It explains that NKVD heads Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Yezhov, and Lavrentiy Beria selected their own immediate subordinates in the same way that Stalin selected relatively uneducated and incriminated heads of state security. The analysis also reveals that NHVD members were drawn from ethnic minorities and managed using the political maximization model.Less
This chapter, which examines the characteristics of the ranks of the Soviet Union's People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) under the regime of Joseph Stalin, suggests that state security was a nested dictatorship in which subordinates dealt with their subordinates as their superiors dealt with them. It explains that NKVD heads Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Yezhov, and Lavrentiy Beria selected their own immediate subordinates in the same way that Stalin selected relatively uneducated and incriminated heads of state security. The analysis also reveals that NHVD members were drawn from ethnic minorities and managed using the political maximization model.
Paul R. Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300134254
- eISBN:
- 9780300152784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300134254.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter examines the evolution of the structure of state security agencies in the Soviet Union. These include the Emergency Commission, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the People's ...
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This chapter examines the evolution of the structure of state security agencies in the Soviet Union. These include the Emergency Commission, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). It shows that the organizational structure of state security changed as frequently as the dictator sought an arrangement which fit his changing needs. The chapter also discusses how Joseph Stalin micromanaged state security, and highlights the fact that there was an extremely short agency chain between Stalin and the actual executors of repression.Less
This chapter examines the evolution of the structure of state security agencies in the Soviet Union. These include the Emergency Commission, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). It shows that the organizational structure of state security changed as frequently as the dictator sought an arrangement which fit his changing needs. The chapter also discusses how Joseph Stalin micromanaged state security, and highlights the fact that there was an extremely short agency chain between Stalin and the actual executors of repression.
Paul R. Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300134254
- eISBN:
- 9780300152784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300134254.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter examines the succession struggles and the role of state security following the death of Soviet Union dictators Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. It explains that although the Joint State ...
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This chapter examines the succession struggles and the role of state security following the death of Soviet Union dictators Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. It explains that although the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) and the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) played only a supportive role in the Lenin success, they played major roles in the success of Joseph Stalin's dictatorship. The chapter also discusses the reasons behind Lavrentiy Beria's attempt to duplicate Stalin's earlier winning strategy.Less
This chapter examines the succession struggles and the role of state security following the death of Soviet Union dictators Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. It explains that although the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) and the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) played only a supportive role in the Lenin success, they played major roles in the success of Joseph Stalin's dictatorship. The chapter also discusses the reasons behind Lavrentiy Beria's attempt to duplicate Stalin's earlier winning strategy.
Paul R. Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300134254
- eISBN:
- 9780300152784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300134254.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter examines the decision making for the terror campaign in the Soviet Union during the period 1937–38, focusing on the role of the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) head and ...
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This chapter examines the decision making for the terror campaign in the Soviet Union during the period 1937–38, focusing on the role of the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) head and regional leaders of the Communist Party. It explains that while Soviet leader Joseph Stalin oversaw the general campaign, local executors of repression were left with considerable discretion with respect to the number and the actual choice of victims. The chapter also mentions that there was a fine dividing line between repressor and victim, as illustrated by the cases of NKVD heads Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov.Less
This chapter examines the decision making for the terror campaign in the Soviet Union during the period 1937–38, focusing on the role of the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) head and regional leaders of the Communist Party. It explains that while Soviet leader Joseph Stalin oversaw the general campaign, local executors of repression were left with considerable discretion with respect to the number and the actual choice of victims. The chapter also mentions that there was a fine dividing line between repressor and victim, as illustrated by the cases of NKVD heads Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov.
David R. Shearer and Vladimir Khaustov
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780300171891
- eISBN:
- 9780300210712
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300171891.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter discusses the various mechanisms and phases of the social and the nationality operations in Stalinist Russia. The “mass operations” of 1937 and 1938 under order 00447 are described. The ...
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This chapter discusses the various mechanisms and phases of the social and the nationality operations in Stalinist Russia. The “mass operations” of 1937 and 1938 under order 00447 are described. The mass operations were ended by the Politburo when Lavrentii Beria and Iosif Stalin planned to weaken Nikolai Yezhov. With his appointment as head of NKVD, Beria replaced almost all of the heads of administration and their deputies. He had also swept away almost all of the krai-, oblast-, and republic-level leadership.Less
This chapter discusses the various mechanisms and phases of the social and the nationality operations in Stalinist Russia. The “mass operations” of 1937 and 1938 under order 00447 are described. The mass operations were ended by the Politburo when Lavrentii Beria and Iosif Stalin planned to weaken Nikolai Yezhov. With his appointment as head of NKVD, Beria replaced almost all of the heads of administration and their deputies. He had also swept away almost all of the krai-, oblast-, and republic-level leadership.
David R. Shearer and Vladimir Khaustov
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780300171891
- eISBN:
- 9780300210712
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300171891.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter discusses the activities of the security police during the Second World War. It describes the mass deportations of different nationalities and the notorious murder of Polish military ...
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This chapter discusses the activities of the security police during the Second World War. It describes the mass deportations of different nationalities and the notorious murder of Polish military personnel and other prisoners in 1940. It also documents Lavrentii Beria's attempts to master the new tasks given to the Soviet political police by the Politburo and to establish a new cadre of Chekists. In addition, it reveals that the first of a series of ethnic deportations by the NKVD in the late summer of 1941 marked the war years.Less
This chapter discusses the activities of the security police during the Second World War. It describes the mass deportations of different nationalities and the notorious murder of Polish military personnel and other prisoners in 1940. It also documents Lavrentii Beria's attempts to master the new tasks given to the Soviet political police by the Politburo and to establish a new cadre of Chekists. In addition, it reveals that the first of a series of ethnic deportations by the NKVD in the late summer of 1941 marked the war years.
Jonathan Haslam
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804783590
- eISBN:
- 9780804788915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804783590.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
In this chapter, Jonathan Haslam demonstrates that in Stalin’s Russia, the vision of intelligence grew out of very recent revolutionary experience and operations against the counterrevolution. These ...
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In this chapter, Jonathan Haslam demonstrates that in Stalin’s Russia, the vision of intelligence grew out of very recent revolutionary experience and operations against the counterrevolution. These circumstances created an atmosphere in which human intelligence (humint) was nearly always privileged over signals/communication intelligence (sigint/comint)—to the detriment of the Soviet Union’s security. Without an advanced deciphering apparatus in place, Haslam demonstrates how this prejudice for human intelligence emerged despite Stalin’s distrust of secret agents. Stalin’s skepticism of his human intel combined with a crippling deficiency in cryptanalysis at a time when cryptographic traffic was growing exponentially, became the Achilles’ heel of the régime.Less
In this chapter, Jonathan Haslam demonstrates that in Stalin’s Russia, the vision of intelligence grew out of very recent revolutionary experience and operations against the counterrevolution. These circumstances created an atmosphere in which human intelligence (humint) was nearly always privileged over signals/communication intelligence (sigint/comint)—to the detriment of the Soviet Union’s security. Without an advanced deciphering apparatus in place, Haslam demonstrates how this prejudice for human intelligence emerged despite Stalin’s distrust of secret agents. Stalin’s skepticism of his human intel combined with a crippling deficiency in cryptanalysis at a time when cryptographic traffic was growing exponentially, became the Achilles’ heel of the régime.
Sarah Davies and James Harris
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780300182811
- eISBN:
- 9780300184723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300182811.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
The Bolsheviks survived the civil war and secured the revolution, but they never felt secure from their enemies. This chapter traces the development of the systems by which information on enemies was ...
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The Bolsheviks survived the civil war and secured the revolution, but they never felt secure from their enemies. This chapter traces the development of the systems by which information on enemies was collected. In privileging information on “threats,” failing to set a standard by which threats could be judged to have been neutralized, in a reliance on “revolutionary instinct” over material evidence in the investigation of counterrevolutionary crimes, the regime came to grossly exaggerate the threat posed by the forces of counterrevolution.Less
The Bolsheviks survived the civil war and secured the revolution, but they never felt secure from their enemies. This chapter traces the development of the systems by which information on enemies was collected. In privileging information on “threats,” failing to set a standard by which threats could be judged to have been neutralized, in a reliance on “revolutionary instinct” over material evidence in the investigation of counterrevolutionary crimes, the regime came to grossly exaggerate the threat posed by the forces of counterrevolution.
