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This chapter discusses Islam, conflict, and democracy. It focuses on the position of many Muslims in India and aims to see what lessons can be extrapolated from there. While it may be surprising to draw conclusions about Muslims from the case of Indian Muslims, considering that India is a minority Muslim population compared to the Muslim-majority countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Muslim-minority status in India is quite revealing in terms of the general lessons that this chapter aims to extract.

This book examines the apparent tension between the inherent logics of the two constructions of the Muslim population, as the two related policies of Community Cohesion and counter-terrorism (Prevent) emerge to address them. Both Community Cohesion and counter-terrorism policies have a generic remit that provides for them to address the majority white population, all minority communities, and Muslim communities. Community Cohesion appears to offer an invitation to greater participation in civil society by Muslim communities at the cost of biting the assimilationist bullet, while the counter-terrorism strategies of Prevent unambiguously assert that they must share a common burden of being targeted as legitimate objects of suspicion through the assertion that terrorist activity is being nurtured within their communities. An overview of the chapters included in this book is provided in this chapter.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of how counterinsurgency practices contribute to producing Thailand as an imperial formation: a modern state formation with roots in the premodern Buddhist empire of Siam that secures its survival by constructing the southern Muslim population as essentially and hierarchically different. Reinforcing notions of the racialized, religious, and gendered Otherness of Patani, counterinsurgency thus fuels the very conflict it has been designed to resolve. From this perspective, it is possible to understand the marginalization of the southern conflict in official discourse, the denials of obvious connections between the insurgency and the August 2016 bombings, and the culturalization of a deeply political conflict as integral parts of imperial policing practices. The counterinsurgency motto “Understanding, Reaching Out, Development” has guided military operations in the southern region under various governments and juntas, and it encapsulates how counterinsurgency discourse is predicated on and produces the essentialized differences of the southern population. Most conspicuously, the motto positions Thai military as the paternal caretaker of the South and relocates the causes of insurgent violence in the differences of the southern population.

This chapter traces the physical movement of Muslims to Britain. Muslims came to Britain mainly—though not only—from South Asia, and they settled in certain cities and neighborhoods. Although Muslims living in Britain today trace their origins to many parts of the world, the majority have roots in former British India, and mainly in today's Pakistan and Bangladesh. Furthermore, within those two countries, a small number of districts have contributed in strikingly disproportionate numbers to the Muslim population of Britain. The concentrations began with historical accident but, once in place, reproduced themselves through practices of “chain migration,” whereby one generation of immigrants pulled another after it. The results are concentrations of closely related people in certain British neighborhoods. Many of these new residents of Britain have sought to maintain their ties to the homeland through marriage and through forms of economic cooperation. These practices reinforce ties of shared ethnic and religious community within certain British neighborhoods.

This chapter considers the period from the onset of major Muslim military advance to Aurangzeb’s death. In general, the population continued to grow slowly and fitfully. We can only speculate about variation in the rate of population growth. The fourteenth-century Black Death perhaps touched parts of the north-west. But there is no evidence of a major demographic collapse. The seventeenth century, the peak period of Mughal rule, was very challenging—for example, in terms of famines and plague. Nevertheless, the population seems to have grown. Analysts have used deficient data, for example on the cultivated land area, to try to estimate the size of India’s population c.1595. Considering previous work, a figure of 125 million seems a reasonable compromise. However, given the inadequate nature of the data, this number is very far from firm. Previous research appears to have overstated the size of Mughal cities and the accompanying level of urbanization.

This chapter recounts how the members of the Arab diaspora attempted legal arbitrage under colonial rule. It analyses the members' expansion and modification of Islamic law, while at other times they policed the boundaries of Islamic law even as mere translators. The chapter tells the story of the surprising involvement of the outsider — the Arab diaspora — in aiding colonialists to accumulate legislative power. The pace of change from the mid-nineteenth century onward was brisk, and the Arab diaspora capitalized on it while attempting to navigate uncertainty and risk. This chapter also investigates how Arab diaspora in Southeast Asia were able to influence the shape of law to a great extent. It takes a look on how concessions to Arabs in the Straits Settlements, in the form of the Mohamedan Marriage Ordinance, and their appointments as members of the Mohamedan Advisory Board after the Sepoy Mutiny subsequently tied them more closely to the British colonial government, along with the rest of the Muslim population in the colony.

This chapter discusses how a manifestation of populism as a force in Indonesian society emerged in the Aksi 212 (212 Action), a politico-religious movement that came to prominence as a reaction to a statement made by the then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok), that many Muslims perceived as blasphemous. As the movement grew, it became increasingly clear that populism, in this context, does not represent an attempt to include the whole Muslim public and is, in fact, exclusionary, reflecting the specific views and interests of one part of the Muslim population against other groups that share the religion but have different theological and ideological views. Its supporters see it as offering material inclusion for Indonesian Muslims through creating pressure for policy that supports their interests. It provides for symbolic inclusion by creating public discourse about the position of Muslims in Indonesian society who should, according to the view of supporters, be prioritised. And it offers political inclusion by positioning Muslim parties and candidates in advantaged positions, including the idea that the office of the president and other high-level positions must only be occupied by Muslims.

This chapter examines the impact of the Iraq War on the war on terror. It suggests that the global perceptions of U.S. operations in Iraq have fueled anti-American and anti-Western sentiment, which intelligence and security services believe has radicalized Muslim populations. The chapter also discusses critics' contention that the war turned Iraq into a potential terrorist haven and that it has starved other fronts, particularly Afghanistan, of the resources required to defeat al Qaeda and its patrons.

This chapter describes Islamic law. Islamic law is not the law of a single state, but rather a religious law of special importance, whose prominence has increased over the last few decades. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between Islamic law and the law in states with predominantly Muslim populations. The defining characteristic of Islamic law is its religious origin and character. In contrast to all state law, it is based on a God-given text, the Koran. Thus, at its core, it is itself divine in nature, not the product of mankind. This explains its special status and claims, but also its special problem. Meanwhile, the latter body of law is geared toward classical Islamic law to widely varying extents. Islamic law is by no means the only example of religious law, but other bodies of religious law—such as Jewish or canon law—are much less significant in the current times.