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Lineages of the Digital State

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

This chapter addresses two important questions: Which governments are online? What is the relative capacity of their information infrastructure? There are many aspects to the information society, and ... More

This chapter addresses two important questions: Which governments are online? What is the relative capacity of their information infrastructure? There are many aspects to the information society, and the chapter reviews the e-government literature relevant to Muslim countries. It traces the recent history of technology adoption by Muslim governments and presents some unique data—collected by the World Information Access project and the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam—which allows for the comparison of wired states. It is shown that there is a surprising amount of dependency in the global information society, with much of the information infrastructure of Muslim countries actually residing in advanced democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. While information technologies seem to be at the heart of newfound efficiency, transparency, and accountability in emerging democracies, pursuing economic benefits and extending state capacity have forced even the most authoritarian states to make policy trade-offs that create the conditions for transparency and accountability.Less

Political Parties Online

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

This chapter shows that political parties play different roles in Muslim countries. In some, parties participate in competitive elections; in others, a single political party manages the state ... More

This chapter shows that political parties play different roles in Muslim countries. In some, parties participate in competitive elections; in others, a single political party manages the state apparatus; and in yet others, political parties are hollow and ineffectual. The majority of these political parties support a vibrant secular political discourse online. The chapter traces the recent history of technology adoption by political parties and presents two findings. First, whereas in the past political parties could easily own, control, and incapacitate the news media, today it is much more difficult for them to maintain the same control over digital media. Second, contrary to received wisdom, the internet has not been taken up significantly by minor parties and radical challenger groups. Rather, it is the large, long-standing political organizations that have invested in information and communication technologies (ICTs) in a big way.Less

Censorship and the Politics of Cultural Production

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

This chapter explores the more pernicious applications of ICTs, which are used in many Muslim countries not simply for censorship but for actively managing collective identity. The first part of the ... More

This chapter explores the more pernicious applications of ICTs, which are used in many Muslim countries not simply for censorship but for actively managing collective identity. The first part of the chapter explores the ways that political culture is now produced and consumed in Muslim countries. It reviews the most recent findings about techniques for political censorship and the efforts of activists to overcome these constraints. The chapter then demonstrates how political elites have effectively used the new media to construct and manage a transnational Muslim identity for people with significantly different cultural backgrounds. Through digital technologies, social elites attempt more than news censorship and email surveillance. They work to manage particular domains of Islamic political culture and identity formation for youth.Less

New Media and Journalism Online

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

One of the most important changes over the last decade has been in the business and practice of journalism in countries with large Muslim communities. This chapter reviews the ways in which the ... More

One of the most important changes over the last decade has been in the business and practice of journalism in countries with large Muslim communities. This chapter reviews the ways in which the internet has changed the organization of the newsrooms and the resources available to journalists. It documents the rise of an important new political actor—citizen-journalists. Equipped with a cell-phone camera or blog, they have had tangible impacts on the local and global news supply during political and security crises.Less

Civil Society and Systems of Political Communication

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

This chapter develops grounded theory about the role of information and communication technologies in civil society development. Civic groups are important for democratization because they are, by ... More

This chapter develops grounded theory about the role of information and communication technologies in civil society development. Civic groups are important for democratization because they are, by definition, social organizations independent of the state. Across the Muslim world, civic associations are sprouting up as a result of the new, supportive information infrastructure provided by ICTs. Relatively cheap consumer electronics allow such civic groups to find new members and build affiliations with groups in cities and other countries. Such groups are particularly important in Muslim countries where political parties are illegal. The chapter reviews the ways in which the internet has had an impact on the political pacts negotiated between social elites and authoritarian regimes—pacts that determine the pace of political change.Less

Conclusion: Information Technology and Democratic Islam

Philip N. Howard

in The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam

This chapter takes a transnational approach to answering a crucial question: What role does the internet have in the democratic transitions of Muslim countries? The previous four chapters reviewed ... More

This chapter takes a transnational approach to answering a crucial question: What role does the internet have in the democratic transitions of Muslim countries? The previous four chapters reviewed the impact of ICTs on four principal political actors: states, political parties, citizens, and journalists, exploring the causal pathways that particular countries have taken to becoming strong, resilient democracies. This chapter puts it all together using an innovative new statistical approach—fuzzy set logic—to summarize the real-world relationships between technology diffusion and democratic change. Using original data and data from established sources in original ways, it is shown that technology diffusion has had a crucial causal role in improvements in democratic institutions.Less

Islam, Democracy and Nationalism after the Second World War

Martin Pugh

in Britain and Islam: A History from 622 to the Present Day

This chapter studies the common assumption that in Muslim societies, religion plays a negative part in the development of democracy. Indeed, some observers uphold the idea of ‘Islamic exceptionalism’ ... More

This chapter studies the common assumption that in Muslim societies, religion plays a negative part in the development of democracy. Indeed, some observers uphold the idea of ‘Islamic exceptionalism’ — in effect the view that Muslims are uniquely resistant to liberal democracy and secularism. Democratic institutions left by departing Western regimes, so the argument runs, have failed to survive everywhere except in Turkey; they have been superseded by autocracy and one-party states. Islamists in particular are thought to endorse democracy, before subsequently suppressing democratic opposition as subversive and irreligious. Another obvious limitation of the negative view is that it focuses on a few Muslim countries around the Mediterranean, and ignores those in the Far East, such as Indonesia, not to mention those that do not have a Muslim majority, such as India. Neither of those countries is consistent with the conventional assumptions. Moreover, the negative view tends to overlook the fact that Oriental societies have good grounds for regarding the Western model of parliamentary democracy as suspect — not least because the United States and Britain have a record of collaborating with Muslim autocracies and undermining and overthrowing democracies when they choose left-wing or anti-Western governments. This is notoriously the case in countries such as Iran after 1945.Less

The Bloody Borders of Religion

Manlio Graziano

in Holy Wars and Holy Alliance: The Return of Religion to the Global Political Stage

This chapter studies the cases in which it is possible to identify a role of religions in internal and international conflicts.

Corruption and Crime

M. Steven Fish

in Are Muslims Distinctive?: A Look at the Evidence

This chapter examines the relationship between Islam and social disorder, with particular reference to corruption and crime. Using data drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS), it evaluates whether ... More

This chapter examines the relationship between Islam and social disorder, with particular reference to corruption and crime. Using data drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS), it evaluates whether Muslims are more (or less) corrupt and more (or less) prone to violent crime than non-Muslims. In this chapter, corruption is measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Corruption is compared in the largest Muslim (for example, Indonesia, Sudan, and Malaysia) and Christian countries (United States, Philippines, UK etc.). The chapter also looks at homicide rates in Muslim countries versus non-Muslim countries.Less

Not Washington, Beijing nor Mecca: The Limitations of Development Models

Robert Springborg

in Development Models in Muslim Contexts: Chinese, 'Islamic' and Neo-liberal Alternatives

This concluding chapter aims to draw out from the preceding chapters answers to key questions about the transportability to Muslim countries of development models, particularly the Chinese model. ... More

This concluding chapter aims to draw out from the preceding chapters answers to key questions about the transportability to Muslim countries of development models, particularly the Chinese model. These questions turn on perceptions of the model at the sending and receiving ends; the viability and sustainability of the model itself; the economic, political, and cultural bilateral and regional relations that provide the context within which the model is perceived and acted upon; preconditions for the adoption and success of the model; the role of competitive models; and the type of governance assumed by the model and whether viable functional substitutes for governance institutions can be found. Answers to these questions may, in turn, enable an assessment of the relevance of models for development, especially across Muslim majority countries.Less

The Roots of Political Activism in Six Muslim-Majority Nations

Nancy J. Davis, Robert V. Robinson, and Tom VanHeuvelen

in Values, Political Action, and Change in the Middle East and the Arab Spring

Through analyses of World Values Surveys of six predominantly Muslim countries (Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Pakistan), the authors explore the religious, social, and contextual ... More

Through analyses of World Values Surveys of six predominantly Muslim countries (Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Pakistan), the authors explore the religious, social, and contextual bases of nonelectoral activism, ranging from discussing politics; to petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations; to illegal strikes and building or factory occupation. The authors tested social movement theories, positing that political engagement results from differential recruitment, relative deprivation, social dislocation, embeddedness in preexisting networks of activists, and open (vs. closed or repressive) political systems. They found that the most politically engaged citizens were male, young or old (vs. middle-aged), had no or few children, were highly educated (but often with low incomes), were embedded in social networks, had a strong interest in politics, and lived in countries with greater foreign investment and with low or high (vs. middle levels) of repression. Poverty and inequality do not increase political engagement. The implications of these findings for political activism in the Muslim world today were discussed.Less

Different Conceptions of Nationalism

Arskal Salim

in Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia

This chapter presents debates over the idea of nationalism and Islam–state relations in pre-independence Indonesia (from the 1920s to the early 1940s). It identifies a widespread conviction that ... More

This chapter presents debates over the idea of nationalism and Islam–state relations in pre-independence Indonesia (from the 1920s to the early 1940s). It identifies a widespread conviction that nationalism in Muslim countries was a direct result of the foreign, non-Muslim colonialism of Islamic lands. Thus, in the light of colonialism, nationalism was often understood as a shared response of Muslim peoples to the foreign infidel power. This nationalism devoted to resisting Western imperialism was furthermore compatible with Islam in its traditional, in its religious, and its social and every other aspect. For this reason, it is no wonder that as early as the twentieth century some Muslim leaders in Indonesia were prone to perceive Islam automatically as nation.Less

State, Islam, and Gender Politics

Jocelyne Cesari (ed.)

in Islam, Gender, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective

The existing literature on women’s rights and Islam falls short of addressing the relationship between the religious debate on women’s rights and the existing rules of law in Muslim-majority ... More

The existing literature on women’s rights and Islam falls short of addressing the relationship between the religious debate on women’s rights and the existing rules of law in Muslim-majority countries. This chapter will bridge this gap by analyzing the status of women in the legal systems of Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. It will evaluate the influence of Islam on the shaping of these laws, compared to other factors like culture, socioeconomic development, and education. Except in marginal cases like Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan under the Taliban, women’s rights in politics, the economy, and education have advanced in all Muslim countries. But there are some limitations placed upon women’s rights using religious arguments. Everywhere, personal rights about family life, sexuality, and dress code remain discriminatory against women. In this regard, the woman’s body has become the main site of the politicization of Islam, by state and non-state actors alike.Less

Constitutional Dissonance

Arskal Salim

in Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia

This chapter explores what Islamic constitutionalism means and its implications for Muslim countries. It looks at the variety of Islamic constitutionalism available in the Muslim world and ... More

This chapter explores what Islamic constitutionalism means and its implications for Muslim countries. It looks at the variety of Islamic constitutionalism available in the Muslim world and demonstrates a basic dissonance in Islamic constitutionalism across the globe. There are at least four types of Muslim countries with regard to the constitutional recognition of state religion. The first is states that proclaim themselves as “Islamic states”; such as Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brunei, Iran, Maldives, Mauritania, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The second is those states that have declared Islam to be the “state religion,” like Bangladesh, Egypt, and Malaysia. The third is states that have no constitutional declaration about the state religion—Indonesia, Syria, and Uzbekistan, among others. And the fourth is states that acknowledge themselves to be secular states. Examples of this kind of state are Azerbaijan, Senegal, and Turkey.Less

Introduction

John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn, and John O. Voll

in Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring

This introductory chapter begins by considering the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings to produce democracy in the Muslim world. It then turns to modernization theory and its corollary, the ... More

This introductory chapter begins by considering the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings to produce democracy in the Muslim world. It then turns to modernization theory and its corollary, the secularization hypothesis—the main reasons why the Arab Spring caught Western analysts by surprise. This is followed by discussions of the changing relationships between Islam and democracy, and democratization movements in the Muslim world at the beginning of the 21st century. Samuel Huntington’s description of long “wave” cycles of democratization is discussed, and the problems inherent to seeing religion as the relevant variable are outlined. Evidence from the recent history of the Arab Spring is marshaled to demonstrate that opposition to secularism is not equivalent to opposition to democracy.Less

Conclusion

John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn, and John O. Voll

in Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring

This concluding chapter summarizes the case studies in the preceding chapters and presents some final thoughts. It discusses how democratization has been ongoing in Muslim-majority countries for well ... More

This concluding chapter summarizes the case studies in the preceding chapters and presents some final thoughts. It discusses how democratization has been ongoing in Muslim-majority countries for well over a century and has taken a variety of forms. It argues that the basic question is not whether Islam is compatible with democracy—most Muslims have already answered that question affirmatively. The question now is what forms a democratic state can take in a Muslim-majority society. The variety of visions and programs, from North and West Africa to Southeast Asia, shows that Muslims are actively engaged in this task.Less

The End of Fear, the Beginning of Understanding

in Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It

This chapter discusses the failure of the United States to address suicide terrorism. It highlights the facts that American military policies have not stopped the rising wave of extremism in the ... More

This chapter discusses the failure of the United States to address suicide terrorism. It highlights the facts that American military policies have not stopped the rising wave of extremism in the Muslim world and that anti-American suicide terrorism is rapidly rising worldwide. This trend may be attributed to America's occupation of two large Muslim countries and the deployment of special forces in numerous Muslim countries. The chapter argues that by ending the perception that the United States and its allies are occupiers, it will be possible to “cut the fuse” to the suicide terrorism threat.Less

Introduction

Mohammad Hashim Kamali

in Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: A Fresh Interpretation

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book, the level of interest in the subject, and how shariah crimes and penalties feature in the larger discourse of Islamic revivalism/resurgence. ... More

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book, the level of interest in the subject, and how shariah crimes and penalties feature in the larger discourse of Islamic revivalism/resurgence. Then it offers a bird’s-eye view of the major themes and outstanding issues in the book. It also discusses how the Muslim masses experience public sensitivity about scriptural issues. These factors present limitations for researchers generally, with a greater effect perhaps in some Muslim countries more than others.Less