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The rule called “Morgan’s Canon,” introduced by the ethologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan at the end of the nineteenth century, states, “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.” It has since been subjected to repeated criticism and is now considered more or less discredited as a scientific rule. This chapter returns to the Canon to ask whether there is anything to be said for Morgan’s proposal, correcting certain misapprehensions about the original intent of the Canon and arguing that it may point toward a salutary “cautious agnosticism” with respect to animal minds.

Argues that pretence is one clear indication of rationality. Makes a suggestion about the kind of evidence of pretence in animals we should be looking for. This suggestion makes claims about pretence hard to justify by comparison with, say, claims about imitation; Appeals to Morgan's canon in defence of this stance. Suggests that we can learn something about pretence by connecting it with the phenomenon of seeing‐in. Finally, offers a speculation on the evolutionary history of the capacity that underlies pretence.

This chapter discusses the consciousness of most animals as posited by the Animals Thesis. The reconciliation of this thesis with the HOT and Conceptualism Theses is the main focus, especially considering that the Animals Thesis, like the Infants Thesis, is a widely held view. Some argue, however, that animals do not possess the faculties that allow them to have concepts—or, in the case of the HOT theory, sophisticated concepts which are required by the HOT theory. An exchange with Peter Carruthers, who accepts the conclusion that HOT theory entails that most animals are not conscious, is also illustrated and criticized. Many animals, in fact, have the capacity to possess mental concepts and self-concepts as demonstrated by “Lloyd Morgan’s Canon,” which posits that attributing conscious mental states to animals is ultimately the more prudent hypothesis.

A distinction between Cartesian knowers (who are capable of all forms of metacognition) and ground-floor cognizers are drawn. B.B., a virtual ground-floor cognizer, is extensively described: what it knows, what it doesn’t know, and what concepts can be attributed to it. The fragmented nature of iterated cognitions is described. That deduction need not require metacognitions of any sort is described: in successfully deducing q from p, an agent need not recognize or appreciate that she is using propositions, that she is using a rule (modus ponens), or that she is justified. A psychological study of deduction is described, and how it fails to illustrate metacognition is illustrated. The apparent ineffability of metacognition in nonhuman animals is discussed. A single anecdotal case of metacognition in chimpanzees is given, and an implicit knowledge generalization is attributed to the animals on the basis of this case. The use of Morgan’s canon is rejected.