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Blake's Jews coinhere with British Druids — who spread war throughout the world. Los's Spectre and Emanation appear as refugees, fleeing from Albion to tell their version of his fall (1). Los journeys into Albion's interior, encountering creative ruin and shadowy Vala enthroned (2). Attempting to control lusts, Los sensually constricts Reuben (Albion's son) — while Jesus imaginatively creates states through which humanity can find forgiveness (3). Angelmorphic Eternals (cathedral cities) want to rescue Albion, but they are blighted by spectrous Selfhood (4) and though Los empowers them, Albion rejects their help (5). Vala tramples Jerusalem (6), but wise Erin protectively separates the poem's heroine from Albion's body, which is infected with bellicose Moral Law (7).

This chapter considers Kant's theory of freedom. Kant thinks that our experience of being subject to the Moral Law has the consequence that we cannot help experiencing ourselves as truly, radically free to choose. Various questions arise. For example: (1) Does Kant think that there is a sense in which we really are radically free ‘from a practical point of view’, i.e., as regards action, precisely because we cannot help experiencing ourselves as free? (2) Could a being that had no conception of morality none the less experience itself as radically free? (3) Is is really true that we — human beings — are bound to experience ourselves as radically free? (4) Is believing one is free perhaps a necessary condition of freedom, even if it is not sufficient?

This article takes up the issue of governmental subsidies of the arts, an issue that parallels an examination of governmental restraints on liberty in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In the present article, after considering the limited support offered by considerations like rotational justice, it is argued that supporting the arts in part through government funds derived from mandatory taxation is justified on the grounds that it is good to create, maintain, and preserve things of high intrinsic value even when they do not generate benefits. This position is based upon a rejection of the ancient claim that all worthwhile things produce benefits either directly or indirectly for everyone.

If freedom can manifest itself in the world, it is only insofar as freedom is the excess that constitutes subjectivity. From a practical perspective, that freedom is actual means it motivates the subject to act. Freedom manifests itself as a power to obligate that affects the faculty of desire through the moral law: we find ourselves responding to something without knowing to what. In the Critique of Practical Reason, being free means having freedom act in and through oneself, that is, being animated by a causality one does not understand. This chapter envisions the law as that which in the subject exceeds and addresses the subject as something other. It explores how the subject gives the law its power as cause by making of it the element that initiates and motivates the causality of freedom in oneself. Autonomy, it proposes, consists in offering oneself as origin of what has no origin.

How does the causality of freedom affect the subject? This question concerns the alterity of the law and the subject's relationship with it. Kant refers to the law's impact on subjectivity in terms of respect (Achtung), a singular feeling originating not in sensibility but in practical reason. Respect produces a positive affect that furthers the law, but also a negative one whereby the law appears to consciousness as a threatening command. This chapter analyzes the positive and negative senses of respect in relation with two different conceptions of ethics that coexist in the Critique of Practical Reason, an immanent one defined by unconditionality (Analytic) and a transcendent one that privileges finality (Dialectic). Since, as this chapter shows, the discrepancies between these two conceptions parallel those between the third and the fourth antinomy of pure reason, it proposes to turn to the third antinomy for insight into an immanent ethical subjectivity.