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Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons

in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199267989
eISBN:
9780191708268
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ ... More


Disagreement, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics

Billy Dunaway

in Reality and Morality

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198858256
eISBN:
9780191890628
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198858256.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Moral Twin Earth thought experiments appear to show that practical language is highly stable, and that many possible users of practical language are capable of having genuine disagreements with each ... More


Failures of Stability

Billy Dunaway

in Reality and Morality

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198858256
eISBN:
9780191890628
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198858256.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues against the Universal Disagreement thesis. Some possible communities use moral language, but do not have substantive disagreements with others who use their moral language ... More


Moral Language: The “Good” Rules

Paul Bloomfield

in Moral Reality

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195137132
eISBN:
9780199833092
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195137132.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The semantics of “health” are discussed by way of Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication: “health” and “good” have the tripartite semantic structure in terms of a base use, causes, and signs. This ... More


The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth

J. L. Dowell

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: 11

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780198784647
eISBN:
9780191828775
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent ... More


Alternative Normative Concepts

Matti Eklund

in Choosing Normative Concepts

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198717829
eISBN:
9780191787331
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter is centered on the question of whether it is possible for there to be normative concepts with the same normative roles as ours but not coextensive with them. If this is possible, an ... More


Presentationalism

Matti Eklund

in Choosing Normative Concepts

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198717829
eISBN:
9780191787331
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no normative properties ... More


Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics, and Metasemantics

Mark van Roojen

in The Many Moral Rationalisms

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198797074
eISBN:
9780191858291
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198797074.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Rationalism offers an account of moral properties as a subset of the properties which serve to rationalize right actions, and these properties are fit to be the referents of our moral terms. That ... More


Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism: From Negative to Positive

Jon Tresan

in Motivational Internalism

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199367955
eISBN:
9780199367979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Motivational internalists say there are necessary attitudinal conditions on moral judgment. Internalists typically explain these necessities by citing moral semantics, properties, or beliefs. But ... More


Radical Interpretation and the Referential Stability of Wrongness

J. Robert G. Williams

in The Metaphysics of Representation

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
February 2020
ISBN:
9780198850205
eISBN:
9780191884672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter is one of three that draws out the consequences of Radical Interpretation for how concepts represent the world. This chapter introduces a famous ‘moral twin earth’ puzzle about the ... More


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