Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-5 of 5 items

  • Keywords: Moorean paradoxes x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Epistemic Nihilism

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Epistemic antirealist views are rarely explicitly formulated. This chapter formulates and engages with the epistemic counterpart to so-called error theories in morality, such as that defended by J. ... More


Assertion Norms

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Assertion is a phenomenological category—that is, assertions are experienced as such by speaker-hearers. Speech-act phenomenology is distinguished from semantic perception. We not only experience ... More


Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut ... More


Conclusion

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that ... More


Parentheticalism about “Believe”

Tim Henning

in From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198797036
eISBN:
9780191860850
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S believes that P.” It starts from the so-called phenomenon of transparency of first-person sentences of this form. ... More


View: