E. J. Coffman and Donald Smith
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014731
- eISBN:
- 9780262289276
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter offers a new criticism of the Mind argument that is both decisive and instructive. It introduces a plausible principle (γ) that places a requirement on one’s having a choice about an ...
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This chapter offers a new criticism of the Mind argument that is both decisive and instructive. It introduces a plausible principle (γ) that places a requirement on one’s having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. Depending on γ’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails in such a way that one or the other of the two main species of libertarianism is the best approach to the metaphysics of freedom. Libertarians argue the compatibility of freedom and indeterminism, and their biggest obstacle is the Mind argument that argues an incompatibility between the two. The chapter aims to build a case for the truth of γ, and so for nonreductive libertarianism. This is achieved by defending it from the best objections that have been brought to light, thereby emphasizing γ’s prima facie plausibility.Less
This chapter offers a new criticism of the Mind argument that is both decisive and instructive. It introduces a plausible principle (γ) that places a requirement on one’s having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. Depending on γ’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails in such a way that one or the other of the two main species of libertarianism is the best approach to the metaphysics of freedom. Libertarians argue the compatibility of freedom and indeterminism, and their biggest obstacle is the Mind argument that argues an incompatibility between the two. The chapter aims to build a case for the truth of γ, and so for nonreductive libertarianism. This is achieved by defending it from the best objections that have been brought to light, thereby emphasizing γ’s prima facie plausibility.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Identifies the main problems facing libertarians – incompatibilists who believe that there are free, autonomous, morally responsible agents. The main problems revolve around luck and control. ...
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Identifies the main problems facing libertarians – incompatibilists who believe that there are free, autonomous, morally responsible agents. The main problems revolve around luck and control. Libertarians need to explain how the same actions can be both free and explicable and how indeterminism contributes to freedom, autonomy, and moral responsibility. It is shown that although the so‐called “Mind argument” is not a problem for libertarians, a variant of it is, and Robert Kane's libertarianism is criticized.Less
Identifies the main problems facing libertarians – incompatibilists who believe that there are free, autonomous, morally responsible agents. The main problems revolve around luck and control. Libertarians need to explain how the same actions can be both free and explicable and how indeterminism contributes to freedom, autonomy, and moral responsibility. It is shown that although the so‐called “Mind argument” is not a problem for libertarians, a variant of it is, and Robert Kane's libertarianism is criticized.
Alicia Finch
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198715702
- eISBN:
- 9780191783401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
In An Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen argued that the consequence argument is valid if and only if the Mind argument is. After McKay and Johnson (1996) demonstrated the invalidity of the consequence ...
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In An Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen argued that the consequence argument is valid if and only if the Mind argument is. After McKay and Johnson (1996) demonstrated the invalidity of the consequence argument as formulated in The Essay, Finch and Warfield argued that this demonstration strengthened the libertarian’s position: while it was possible to reformulate the consequence argument so as to avoid McKay and Johnson’s objection, it was not possible to reformulate the Mind argument in a similar way. This paper argues that Finch and Warfield were wrong: there is a formulation of the Mind argument that is valid if and only if the consequence argument is. The conclusion is reached that libertarians must jettison the consequence argument, find a flaw in the premises of the Mind argument, or join van Inwagen in holding that although each of those premises seems true, at least one is false.Less
In An Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen argued that the consequence argument is valid if and only if the Mind argument is. After McKay and Johnson (1996) demonstrated the invalidity of the consequence argument as formulated in The Essay, Finch and Warfield argued that this demonstration strengthened the libertarian’s position: while it was possible to reformulate the consequence argument so as to avoid McKay and Johnson’s objection, it was not possible to reformulate the Mind argument in a similar way. This paper argues that Finch and Warfield were wrong: there is a formulation of the Mind argument that is valid if and only if the consequence argument is. The conclusion is reached that libertarians must jettison the consequence argument, find a flaw in the premises of the Mind argument, or join van Inwagen in holding that although each of those premises seems true, at least one is false.
