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Four main arguments have suggested that highways will or should play a smaller role in coming decades. Millennials are claimed to be abandoning car ownership. Autonomous vehicles are seen as leading to ownership by fleets rather than individuals (and hence less driving). The need to reduce carbon emissions is seen by some as contrary to highway expansion, as is the idea that Smart Growth should become the model for metro areas, to minimize driving. This chapter reviews the implications for highways of these concerns.

This chapter lays out the myths of the so-called ‘generation wars’ waged between the Millennials and Baby Boomers and the damaging effects of this generational conflict. The current generation war is presented as a clear conflict between two opposing sides. On one side are the Baby Boomers, born in the twenty years or so following the Second World War; on the other are the Millennials, born in the final two decades of the twentieth century. The chapter shows how the feverish debates about generational conflict reflect very little about the lives of people in any generation. It argues that Boomer-blaming is a narrative that has been constructed by political elites of Western societies to suit their policy agendas.

Despite the vast increase in automobility everywhere, the American obsession with cars still stands out. Yet, despite the multicar household, with vehicles aplenty for teens, the lure of the automobile as a transition to adulthood seems to be in decline. By 2005, reports of delay in teen applications for driver’s licenses were common. The Recession of 2008, increased youth unemployment, and education costs, along with higher car prices provide an economic explanation. And, public pressure, backed up by new legislation, made getting the once coveted license at 16 far more difficult. The acquisition of mechanical skills, long the hallmark of the transition from boy to man--especially in the working class—has declined with the computerization of vehicles. Teens today also have substituted digital or “virtual” liberation from the constraints of family for the old mechanical/physical freedom with the car. And liberation from elders has come earlier with the smartphone. Yet not all agree that growing up with cars is over. Millennials especially note the persistence of auto enthusiasm in their generation and insist that their car culture is simply being ignored by self-absorbed elders, unable to look beyond their own youth of Deuce Coups and GTOs.

This chapter discusses how headhunting has evolved as an occupation. Headhunting is an accidental rather than aspirational occupation—it is one that people enter as the result of an event that triggers a reappraisal of their careers or lives. It is also an occupation that is continuing to evolve as the labor market and recruiting environment change. The chapter examines (1) the various routes into this accidental occupation, (2) the technological and social changes that are changing headhunting, and (3) the different strategies that headhunters have developed for dealing with these changes, including specialization, separating the sourcing of prospects from their recruiting, and forming strategic partnerships with clients.

This chapter explores current activism amongst evangelical millennials who are showing greater interest in socially conscious endeavors ranging from international social justice to local anti-poverty campaigns– groups often associated with left-leaning interests and not older evangelical activists’ political activism. These shifts are particularly evident in young evangelical women’s activism. In this chapter, I consider what sources these young women draw on to legitimize activist pursuits and the ways in which they resolve potential intergenerational tensions resulting from these new activist identities and causes. Preliminary findings suggest a new phenomenon in which young evangelical women resolve these issues by rejecting the “evangelical label.” Also, I find that these young women strive to carve out a niche within US evangelicalism – specifically engaging its views on female empowerment. Central to this engagement is the creation of a “servant-activist” identity - highlighting a meaningful way in which these women negotiate potential tensions that arise between traditional evangelical gender roles and new activist interests. My chapter draws on interview data gathered from evangelical women activists in New York City from 2010 to 2012.

Are there generational differences in religion? Do Millennial youth have perceptions of religion and God that are distinctive from Generation Xers or Baby Boomers? This study found generational differences in views of God and in expressions of spirituality and trends across time that were gradual, starting in one age cohort and slowly developing through time. One trend involved an increasing internalization, or de-objectifying, of God with each successive cohort. The oldest—the WWI and the Depression Era generation respondents—described an all-powerful Heavenly Father evident in nature and “out there.” But Millennials portrayed a more personal, accessible God residing within the human spirit. Another generational trend reflected an increasing separation of religious practice from traditional church worship and religion. The growing emphasis on spirituality, first described by Early Boomers, increasingly separated devotional practices from religious institutions for a growing number of Gen Xers and Millennials who said they were “spiritual but not religious.”

Political scientists debate whether the Millennial generation is disengaging from politics in contemporary democracies. The ISSP surveys show that the generational decline in participation is largely limited to voting and other forms of partisan activity. At the same time, younger citizens are often more engaged in non-electoral activities, such as direct action, protest, and online participation. Time-series data for the United States disentangles the effects of life-cycle changes and generations. More recent generations display a clear decline in voting across the 1967–2014 period. In contrast, life-cycle increases in participation are more common for non-electoral activity. Both factors influence participation but in contrasting ways for different modes of action.

The interviewees are categorized according to age cohorts and types. Although there were few “nones” who volunteered to be interviewed from “The Greatest Generation” (1901?1924), there were many women and men who came forward from “The Silent Generation” (1925?1945), “The Baby Boomers” (1946?1964), “Gen X” (1965?1981), and “Millennials” (born after 1981). The most enthusiastic interviewees were Baby Boomers and women. Cutting across the generations were five distinct types: Dissenters (those who object to specific doctrines or practices in religion and have either left or drifted away), Casuals (those who take spirituality and religion on an “as-needed” basis), Explorers (those who have a spiritual “wanderlust,” like spiritual tourists), Seekers (those who are looking for a more or less permanent spiritual home), and Immigrants (those who are trying out a new religion or spirituality but, like immigrants, may be having difficulty adjusting). Examples and many illustrative quotes from each generation and type are given.

The financial services industry is changing rapidly with the arrival of new economies of scale and networking effects attributable to FinTech, particularly via online or ‘robo’ advice. This chapter reviews the ‘robo-experience:’ how does it differ, if at all, from more traditional advice, and what is likely to happen next? After reviewing the goals and objectives of robo-advice, evolving advice models, who uses robo-advice, and investor behavior, we conclude that first adopters tend to be more affluent Millennial investors, as well as others seeking fast, mobile, and easy access to their finances. Nevertheless, though robo-advice has promised much, evidence is thin on the actual effects of using advice, such as changes in asset allocation and long-term effects on financial security.

Over 30 years since the first studies of Whites’ post-Civil Rights racial attitudes, we question whether Kinder and Sears’ (1981) original assertion that “symbolic racism may be, politically, the most potent vehicle for racial prejudice today” still holds. Some scholars might argue that we are premature in looking for different ways of asking White Americans how and what they think about race and racism in contemporary American politics. If any of our readers fear that we might be attempting to “reinvent the wheel,” we would say that we are in good company. As Millennials ourselves, we recognize that there is a disconnect between some of the measures of racial prejudice most frequently used in political science scholarship and how our families, our colleagues, and especially our students talk (or don’t talk) about race these days. So how can we best conceptualize and more accurately capture contemporary expressions of racial attitudes in the 21st Century with quantitative measures? We begin to answer that question in this chapter.

We began this book by suggesting that America is in a state of racial stagnation. While attitudes towards member of LGBT+ communities and women as well as the preferences concerning policies that affect and protect members of these groups seem to be chugging along in a positive direction, the same cannot be said for Whites’ attitudes towards racial equity and about Blacks, in particular. Although previous research shows that young people have historically worked to move the U.S. towards more progressive attitudes concerning marginalized and underrepresented minority groups, our research reveals that the same cannot be said for White Millennials-or at least not to the same degree. We developed a theory of countervailing forces to help us better understand this phenomenon. This theory asserts that even though there are factors that help White Millennials shift society’s racial attitudes in a progressive direction, there are just as many factors that are actively working against such a shift, thus producing what we call “racial stasis."

This is the first data chapter. In this chapter, respondents who are described as true believers in the gender structure, and essentialist gender differences are introduced and their interviews analyzed. They are true believers because, at the macro level, they believe in a gender ideology where women and men should be different and accept rules and requirements that enforce gender differentiation and even sex segregation in social life. In addition, at the interactional level, these Millennials report having been shaped by their parent’s traditional expectations and they similarly feel justified to impose gendered expectations on those in their own social networks. At the individual level, they have internalized masculinity or femininity, and embody it in how they present themselves to the world. They try hard to “do gender” traditionally.

This chapter considers the ways in which the landscape for shopper engagement with retail enterprises is being changed fundamentally and the opportunities and challenges which this represents for retailers. A framework is presented that defines four different types of shoppers. How shoppers now wish to engage with retail enterprises is discussed. The importance of social media in shopper decision-making is discussed. Particular attention is given to the characteristics of the Millennial shopper. The notion of new engagement options and opportunities for retail enterprises is discussed. Differences between the so-called Mature and Emerging markets are reviewed. A case study is presented of the Millennial shopper in China.

Characterizing historical cohorts as endowed with distinctive features arising from broad historical forces is useful for some analytic purposes but obscures important differences among individuals in a cohort as well as the openness to change. Today’s young people—the millennials—are stereotyped as uninterested in work and traditional political activity. We review research that illuminates the responsiveness of youth to occupational and civic opportunity and conclude that millennials can become the citizens needed to improve American civic life.

The anti-Trump Resistance involves activists from an unusually wide range of political and chronological generations: movement veterans from the 1960s and 1970s, Generation X activists politicized in the 1980s and 1990s, Millennials who entered activism in the 2000s, and newcomers of all ages. Political generations differ in worldview based on both age and time of entry into activism. Generational spillover—the mutual influence, difference, and conflict among political generations—includes explicit attempts to teach organizing, and indirect influences on frames, organizational structures, tactics, ideologies, and goals. This chapter discusses generational spillover in the Resistance, including transmission and conflict.