Nathaniel Jason Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780190215385
- eISBN:
- 9780190215408
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215385.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter Six defends Subjective Principlism against its most important challenges. It does so by considering the history of and arguments against Subjective Principlism, and then demonstrating that ...
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Chapter Six defends Subjective Principlism against its most important challenges. It does so by considering the history of and arguments against Subjective Principlism, and then demonstrating that there is a version of Subjective Principlism that those arguments fail to impugn. The chapter starts by considering Immanuel Kant’s Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are synthetic a priori. It then considers classic arguments against synthetic apriority, culminating in those of the logical empiricists, including Rudolf Carnap. Next the chapter considers Carnap’s Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are analytic. Afterward it considers the most famous arguments against analyticity, viz., Willard van Orman Quine’s. After that it considers Michael Friedman’s contemporary version of Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are relativized a priori. Finally the chapter shows that Friedman’s Subjective Principlism remains unimpugned by classic arguments against Kant’s and Quine’s arguments against Carnap’s version of it.Less
Chapter Six defends Subjective Principlism against its most important challenges. It does so by considering the history of and arguments against Subjective Principlism, and then demonstrating that there is a version of Subjective Principlism that those arguments fail to impugn. The chapter starts by considering Immanuel Kant’s Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are synthetic a priori. It then considers classic arguments against synthetic apriority, culminating in those of the logical empiricists, including Rudolf Carnap. Next the chapter considers Carnap’s Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are analytic. Afterward it considers the most famous arguments against analyticity, viz., Willard van Orman Quine’s. After that it considers Michael Friedman’s contemporary version of Subjective Principlism, according to which subjective principles are relativized a priori. Finally the chapter shows that Friedman’s Subjective Principlism remains unimpugned by classic arguments against Kant’s and Quine’s arguments against Carnap’s version of it.
Michael Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241279
- eISBN:
- 9780191597107
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241279.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be ...
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It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Michael Friedman investigates the existence of empirically defeasible a priori warrants, focussing on the principles that are constitutive of the spatio‐temporal framework within which a particular scientific theory is formulated.Less
It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Michael Friedman investigates the existence of empirically defeasible a priori warrants, focussing on the principles that are constitutive of the spatio‐temporal framework within which a particular scientific theory is formulated.
Henk W. de Regt
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190652913
- eISBN:
- 9780190652944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190652913.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The contextual theory of scientific understanding developed and defended in this book serves as a basis for specific philosophical theories of explanation that start from the assumption that ...
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The contextual theory of scientific understanding developed and defended in this book serves as a basis for specific philosophical theories of explanation that start from the assumption that explanations should give us understanding, and as a general description and explanation of the historical variation of criteria for understanding employed by scientists in actual practice. This concluding chapter reflects on the results of the investigation by addressing three questions. First, what is the scope of the contextual theory of scientific understanding? Is it restricted to the natural sciences, or does it apply more broadly? In this context, the theory’s relation to the debate about explanation versus understanding in the humanities is discussed briefly. Second, does the theory imply a relativist philosophy of science? Third, can it serve as a basis for normative appraisal of scientific achievements?Less
The contextual theory of scientific understanding developed and defended in this book serves as a basis for specific philosophical theories of explanation that start from the assumption that explanations should give us understanding, and as a general description and explanation of the historical variation of criteria for understanding employed by scientists in actual practice. This concluding chapter reflects on the results of the investigation by addressing three questions. First, what is the scope of the contextual theory of scientific understanding? Is it restricted to the natural sciences, or does it apply more broadly? In this context, the theory’s relation to the debate about explanation versus understanding in the humanities is discussed briefly. Second, does the theory imply a relativist philosophy of science? Third, can it serve as a basis for normative appraisal of scientific achievements?
Menachem Fisch
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226514482
- eISBN:
- 9780226514659
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226514659.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The interlude recaptures the philosophical argument of the last four chapters and explains the nature of the case study in the three to come. First the difference between the view of rationality ...
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The interlude recaptures the philosophical argument of the last four chapters and explains the nature of the case study in the three to come. First the difference between the view of rationality here employed and that of the game theoretic variety is argued for. The latter it is claimed is not about acting rationally, but about deeming an act beneficial in retrospect. It is therefore not about human agency or judgment at all. A brief summary follows of how the philosophical chapters proposed to contend with the problem of accounting for the rationality of framework transitions in science while remaining faithful to critical rationalism even when it is applied reflectively to the framework it presupposes in criticism, yet without diluting that framework or the seriousness of the commitment it commands, as in Friedman’s account.Less
The interlude recaptures the philosophical argument of the last four chapters and explains the nature of the case study in the three to come. First the difference between the view of rationality here employed and that of the game theoretic variety is argued for. The latter it is claimed is not about acting rationally, but about deeming an act beneficial in retrospect. It is therefore not about human agency or judgment at all. A brief summary follows of how the philosophical chapters proposed to contend with the problem of accounting for the rationality of framework transitions in science while remaining faithful to critical rationalism even when it is applied reflectively to the framework it presupposes in criticism, yet without diluting that framework or the seriousness of the commitment it commands, as in Friedman’s account.
