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Non-Analytical Naturalism

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents Non-Analytical Naturalism. According to Non-Analytical Naturalists, we use some words to express concepts and make claims that are irreducibly normative, in the sense that these ... More


Epistemology

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter looks at epistemology, the Causal Objection, the Validity Argument, and epistemic beliefs. According to the Causal Objection, since non-natural normative properties or truths could not ... More


Metaphysics

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter relates metaphysics and ontology with Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism. If some things matter, then there are some irreducibly normative truths. This notion is denied by Allan Gibbard and ... More


Agreement

Samuel Scheffler

in On What Matters: Volume Two

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572816
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0022
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of agreement. It is often argued that we cannot rationally believe that there are moral truths, given the facts of deep and widespread moral ... More


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