Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195086454
- eISBN:
- 9780199833306
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195086457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection ...
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This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.Less
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.
Mary Margaret McCabe
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263235
- eISBN:
- 9780191734328
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263235.003.0015
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
In trying to understand Plato, this chapter suggests that Plato himself may be used as a guide to reading Plato, and that such a guide does indeed lead to a philosophical destination of which the ...
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In trying to understand Plato, this chapter suggests that Plato himself may be used as a guide to reading Plato, and that such a guide does indeed lead to a philosophical destination of which the analytic tradition might approve. A comparison of two short and markedly different passages, one from the Meno and the other from the Euthydemus shows us that the difference may be one between a Socratic view (the Meno), and its Platonic replacement in the Euthydemus. This account, however, seems not to meet the present case: in particular because both the two passages are significantly indeterminate. The indeterminacy of the Meno, this chapter argues, is teased out by the Euthydemus; it is this feature that should encourage one to see the latter as a ‘reading’ of the former.Less
In trying to understand Plato, this chapter suggests that Plato himself may be used as a guide to reading Plato, and that such a guide does indeed lead to a philosophical destination of which the analytic tradition might approve. A comparison of two short and markedly different passages, one from the Meno and the other from the Euthydemus shows us that the difference may be one between a Socratic view (the Meno), and its Platonic replacement in the Euthydemus. This account, however, seems not to meet the present case: in particular because both the two passages are significantly indeterminate. The indeterminacy of the Meno, this chapter argues, is teased out by the Euthydemus; it is this feature that should encourage one to see the latter as a ‘reading’ of the former.
Terryl L. Givens
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195313901
- eISBN:
- 9780199871933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313901.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Preexistence is associated with both Pythagoras and Orpheus, however. Plato is the most important classical source for ideas about pre-existence, writing about it in Phaedo, Meno, Phaedrus, Republic, ...
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Preexistence is associated with both Pythagoras and Orpheus, however. Plato is the most important classical source for ideas about pre-existence, writing about it in Phaedo, Meno, Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus. Symposium also presents a version of soul-mate love as have premortal bases. Preexistence supports Plato's particular epistemology as well as a version of theodicy and his understanding of erotic desire. Plato also links preexistence to theosis, a connection that will contribute to the paradigms eventual demise.Less
Preexistence is associated with both Pythagoras and Orpheus, however. Plato is the most important classical source for ideas about pre-existence, writing about it in Phaedo, Meno, Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus. Symposium also presents a version of soul-mate love as have premortal bases. Preexistence supports Plato's particular epistemology as well as a version of theodicy and his understanding of erotic desire. Plato also links preexistence to theosis, a connection that will contribute to the paradigms eventual demise.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on ...
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This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. The book develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance–theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.Less
This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. The book develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance–theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter takes up how value matters in epistemology, and considers the Meno problem (“In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief?”) as to the content and plausibility of the claim ...
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This chapter takes up how value matters in epistemology, and considers the Meno problem (“In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief?”) as to the content and plausibility of the claim that knowledge is always better than would be the corresponding merely true belief. It first asks whether knowledge is always better—at least in epistemic respects—then explores the relation between knowledge and proper action. The chapter then goes on to show how the value-of-knowledge intuition acquires further interest through its equivalence with the view of knowledge as a norm of assertion. Finally, this chapter steps back to examine what we might mean in saying that to know is always necessarily better than to get it right by luck while remaining in ignorance.Less
This chapter takes up how value matters in epistemology, and considers the Meno problem (“In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief?”) as to the content and plausibility of the claim that knowledge is always better than would be the corresponding merely true belief. It first asks whether knowledge is always better—at least in epistemic respects—then explores the relation between knowledge and proper action. The chapter then goes on to show how the value-of-knowledge intuition acquires further interest through its equivalence with the view of knowledge as a norm of assertion. Finally, this chapter steps back to examine what we might mean in saying that to know is always necessarily better than to get it right by luck while remaining in ignorance.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199916818
- eISBN:
- 9780199980291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
How do philosophers in the Socratic tradition think about doxa, belief? It is argued that belief is, for Plato's Socrates as as well as for the skeptics and Stoics, a deficient cognitive attitude. On ...
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How do philosophers in the Socratic tradition think about doxa, belief? It is argued that belief is, for Plato's Socrates as as well as for the skeptics and Stoics, a deficient cognitive attitude. On this conception of belief, knowledge does not involve belief. The Introduction sketches ways of thinking about belief in the Socratic tradition and compares them to widespread contemporary intuitions about belief. Some ideas that are central to the book are explained through a discussion of doxa in Plato's Meno and illustrated by examples from the Euthyphro. The scope of the book is explained. It offers a reading of Plato in two senses: interpretations of Platonic dialogues (or sections thereof) relevant to the question of what doxa is and how it relates to truth, knowledge, and investigation; and a reconstruction of how Pyrrhonian skeptics and Stoics are likely to have engaged with Plato's views on these matters.Less
How do philosophers in the Socratic tradition think about doxa, belief? It is argued that belief is, for Plato's Socrates as as well as for the skeptics and Stoics, a deficient cognitive attitude. On this conception of belief, knowledge does not involve belief. The Introduction sketches ways of thinking about belief in the Socratic tradition and compares them to widespread contemporary intuitions about belief. Some ideas that are central to the book are explained through a discussion of doxa in Plato's Meno and illustrated by examples from the Euthyphro. The scope of the book is explained. It offers a reading of Plato in two senses: interpretations of Platonic dialogues (or sections thereof) relevant to the question of what doxa is and how it relates to truth, knowledge, and investigation; and a reconstruction of how Pyrrhonian skeptics and Stoics are likely to have engaged with Plato's views on these matters.
Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231188
- eISBN:
- 9780191710827
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether ...
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This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book.Less
This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book.
David Charles
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199564453
- eISBN:
- 9780191721618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter analyses the paradox of enquiry in the Meno as grounded in a failure fully to separate definitional accounts of what terms signify and definitions of the basic natures of kinds or ...
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This chapter analyses the paradox of enquiry in the Meno as grounded in a failure fully to separate definitional accounts of what terms signify and definitions of the basic natures of kinds or properties in the world. It considers several passages in which Aristotle addresses this issue, arguing that important chapters of Posterior Analytics II are set up to investigate and defuse this paradox. It further considers Aristotle's discussion of how we form accounts of what terms signify on the basis of experience.Less
This chapter analyses the paradox of enquiry in the Meno as grounded in a failure fully to separate definitional accounts of what terms signify and definitions of the basic natures of kinds or properties in the world. It considers several passages in which Aristotle addresses this issue, arguing that important chapters of Posterior Analytics II are set up to investigate and defuse this paradox. It further considers Aristotle's discussion of how we form accounts of what terms signify on the basis of experience.
Paolo Crivelli
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199564453
- eISBN:
- 9780191721618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably ...
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Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably Chrysippus) placed it in the methodological subsection of the logical part, others in ethics, yet others in the subsection of dialectic relating to voice. The first of these locations focuses on the epistemological side of the theory of definitions. In particular, it is connected with two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure that makes them suitable for instruction. The Stoics do not think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. As for the link with the Stoic theory of language and meaning, definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a special kind (distinct from statables).Less
Definitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably Chrysippus) placed it in the methodological subsection of the logical part, others in ethics, yet others in the subsection of dialectic relating to voice. The first of these locations focuses on the epistemological side of the theory of definitions. In particular, it is connected with two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure that makes them suitable for instruction. The Stoics do not think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. As for the link with the Stoic theory of language and meaning, definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a special kind (distinct from statables).
Gail Fine
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199564453
- eISBN:
- 9780191721618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
In PH 2.1-10, Sextus considers a paradox of sceptical inquiry, according to which sceptics can't inquire. He explains how sceptics can inquire, and argues that it's the dogmatists who can't inquire. ...
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In PH 2.1-10, Sextus considers a paradox of sceptical inquiry, according to which sceptics can't inquire. He explains how sceptics can inquire, and argues that it's the dogmatists who can't inquire. This chapter explores the paradox of sceptical inquiry, along with Sextus' defense of the sceptic's ability to inquiry. It also considers Sextus' challenge to the possibility of dogmatic — especially Stoic — inquiry.Less
In PH 2.1-10, Sextus considers a paradox of sceptical inquiry, according to which sceptics can't inquire. He explains how sceptics can inquire, and argues that it's the dogmatists who can't inquire. This chapter explores the paradox of sceptical inquiry, along with Sextus' defense of the sceptic's ability to inquiry. It also considers Sextus' challenge to the possibility of dogmatic — especially Stoic — inquiry.
Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock, and Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231188
- eISBN:
- 9780191710827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed ...
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The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.Less
The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.
Roslyn Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140767
- eISBN:
- 9780199833849
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140761.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Offers an interpretation of Plato's Meno that seeks to illuminate the particularly “therapeutic” philosophy that Socrates practices. It argues that the Meno, rather than constituting a bridge between ...
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Offers an interpretation of Plato's Meno that seeks to illuminate the particularly “therapeutic” philosophy that Socrates practices. It argues that the Meno, rather than constituting a bridge between “Socratic” and “Platonic” dialogues by way of the introduction of distinctively “Platonic” doctrines such as metempsychosis and learning as recollection, the dialogue employs these ideas to urge Meno to take up the life of moral inquiry. Confronting a young man eager for virtue (success), Socrates attempts to focus Meno's attention on the importance of inquiring into the nature of virtue, the nature of the truly excellent human life. Struggling against both Meno's youthful impatience and his overarching desire for power and wealth, Socrates argues for a life in which the virtues – justice, temperance, and piety, in particular – constitute the core of genuine success. To counter Meno's resistance to elenctic investigation, to disarm Meno's challenge to an inquiry conducted by someone who himself lacks knowledge, Socrates fashions the myth of recollection, followed by the demonstration with the slave boy, in order to convince Meno that even such inquiry is of value. Socrates is no believer in the idea that all knowledge is recollected: most knowledge, he thinks, is learned from those who know and from those who can prove that they know. And the demonstration with the slave boy is no demonstration of recollection: what it is is a lesson in geometry, but one artfully disguised as an elenchus through which the slave‐boy presumably “recollects” the solution. When Meno, despite Socrates’ valiant efforts to coax him back to the inquiry into the all‐important question of what virtue is, wishes still to consider only how one gets virtue, Socrates tries his best to benefit Meno by protecting him from harmful beliefs and influences, arguing that virtue comes neither by nature (so Meno may not arrogantly assume he already has it), nor by teaching (so Meno need not seek out further sophistic training), nor spontaneously (so Meno has no reason to associate with such men as Anytus). If virtue comes at all, Socrates contends, it comes by divine dispensation – or at least that is how political success is acquired: whether or not one makes a name for oneself is ultimately a matter of luck. How is real virtue, as opposed to political success, attained? By the hard work of moral inquiry, by examination, and investigation that leads to true and right opinions.Less
Offers an interpretation of Plato's Meno that seeks to illuminate the particularly “therapeutic” philosophy that Socrates practices. It argues that the Meno, rather than constituting a bridge between “Socratic” and “Platonic” dialogues by way of the introduction of distinctively “Platonic” doctrines such as metempsychosis and learning as recollection, the dialogue employs these ideas to urge Meno to take up the life of moral inquiry. Confronting a young man eager for virtue (success), Socrates attempts to focus Meno's attention on the importance of inquiring into the nature of virtue, the nature of the truly excellent human life. Struggling against both Meno's youthful impatience and his overarching desire for power and wealth, Socrates argues for a life in which the virtues – justice, temperance, and piety, in particular – constitute the core of genuine success. To counter Meno's resistance to elenctic investigation, to disarm Meno's challenge to an inquiry conducted by someone who himself lacks knowledge, Socrates fashions the myth of recollection, followed by the demonstration with the slave boy, in order to convince Meno that even such inquiry is of value. Socrates is no believer in the idea that all knowledge is recollected: most knowledge, he thinks, is learned from those who know and from those who can prove that they know. And the demonstration with the slave boy is no demonstration of recollection: what it is is a lesson in geometry, but one artfully disguised as an elenchus through which the slave‐boy presumably “recollects” the solution. When Meno, despite Socrates’ valiant efforts to coax him back to the inquiry into the all‐important question of what virtue is, wishes still to consider only how one gets virtue, Socrates tries his best to benefit Meno by protecting him from harmful beliefs and influences, arguing that virtue comes neither by nature (so Meno may not arrogantly assume he already has it), nor by teaching (so Meno need not seek out further sophistic training), nor spontaneously (so Meno has no reason to associate with such men as Anytus). If virtue comes at all, Socrates contends, it comes by divine dispensation – or at least that is how political success is acquired: whether or not one makes a name for oneself is ultimately a matter of luck. How is real virtue, as opposed to political success, attained? By the hard work of moral inquiry, by examination, and investigation that leads to true and right opinions.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239307
- eISBN:
- 9780191679889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239307.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the chronology of Plato' dialogues. It then goes on to compare the Theaetetus and the Sophist, followed by an analysis of the Meno. Finally, the ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the chronology of Plato' dialogues. It then goes on to compare the Theaetetus and the Sophist, followed by an analysis of the Meno. Finally, the chapter ponders on the question ‘What is Knowledge?’ which introduces the theme of Theaetetus.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the chronology of Plato' dialogues. It then goes on to compare the Theaetetus and the Sophist, followed by an analysis of the Meno. Finally, the chapter ponders on the question ‘What is Knowledge?’ which introduces the theme of Theaetetus.
Fred Dallmayr
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124575
- eISBN:
- 9780813134994
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124575.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses a clue found in Plato's Meno which indicates that people can learn only what they implicitly already know and that teaching is a kind of mutual disclosure. It asks whether it ...
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This chapter discusses a clue found in Plato's Meno which indicates that people can learn only what they implicitly already know and that teaching is a kind of mutual disclosure. It asks whether it is possible to learn across cultures and comments on the meaning of canons of learning and on the quality of teaching as a mode of learning. The chapter finally draws lessons from these explorations for the enterprise of mobilizing democracy today.Less
This chapter discusses a clue found in Plato's Meno which indicates that people can learn only what they implicitly already know and that teaching is a kind of mutual disclosure. It asks whether it is possible to learn across cultures and comments on the meaning of canons of learning and on the quality of teaching as a mode of learning. The chapter finally draws lessons from these explorations for the enterprise of mobilizing democracy today.
Nicholas White
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250593
- eISBN:
- 9780191598661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250592.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Before Plato there are ample cases in which Greek poets, philosophers, and politicians recognize the possibility that individual and social good can conflict. Nor does Plato think that a full ...
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Before Plato there are ample cases in which Greek poets, philosophers, and politicians recognize the possibility that individual and social good can conflict. Nor does Plato think that a full understanding of the notion of one's good must demonstrate that it cannot conflict with standards of justice. On the contrary, Plato holds that such conflicts can occur even in the case of the rulers of his ideal city‐state. This idea is not contradicted by evidence of other works, such as the Meno, the Symposium, and the Philebus. Nevertheless, although Plato's view admits what is normally thought to be a characteristically Kantian conflict of ethical standards with one's good, it still possesses some distinctly eudaimonistic elements that are at variance with the Kantian view.Less
Before Plato there are ample cases in which Greek poets, philosophers, and politicians recognize the possibility that individual and social good can conflict. Nor does Plato think that a full understanding of the notion of one's good must demonstrate that it cannot conflict with standards of justice. On the contrary, Plato holds that such conflicts can occur even in the case of the rulers of his ideal city‐state. This idea is not contradicted by evidence of other works, such as the Meno, the Symposium, and the Philebus. Nevertheless, although Plato's view admits what is normally thought to be a characteristically Kantian conflict of ethical standards with one's good, it still possesses some distinctly eudaimonistic elements that are at variance with the Kantian view.
David Charles
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256730
- eISBN:
- 9780191597183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925673X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics B.3–7, prepares for the three‐stage view by arguing that no one account can tell us both the essence of a kind and the signification of the term that names that ...
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Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics B.3–7, prepares for the three‐stage view by arguing that no one account can tell us both the essence of a kind and the signification of the term that names that kind. Here, he lays the foundation for the separation of two questions, which we would represent as follows: ‘What does “triangle” signify?’ and ‘What is the triangle?’ This distinction provides him with a way to address and resolve Meno's paradox of enquiry.Less
Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics B.3–7, prepares for the three‐stage view by arguing that no one account can tell us both the essence of a kind and the signification of the term that names that kind. Here, he lays the foundation for the separation of two questions, which we would represent as follows: ‘What does “triangle” signify?’ and ‘What is the triangle?’ This distinction provides him with a way to address and resolve Meno's paradox of enquiry.
Roslyn Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140767
- eISBN:
- 9780199833849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140761.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Socrates insists on the “priority of definition,” shifting the focus of the discussion away from Meno's preoccupation with how virtue is acquired to the question of what virtue is. In the ensuing ...
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Socrates insists on the “priority of definition,” shifting the focus of the discussion away from Meno's preoccupation with how virtue is acquired to the question of what virtue is. In the ensuing struggle over the definition of virtue, Meno contends that virtue is an activity or job that varies with age, gender, and station, and Socrates counters that virtue is a matter of how any activity or job is done: is it done with justice, temperance, and piety – or not? Socrates offers Meno a model definition that he might apply in defining virtue, a definition that Meno rejects for no reason other than his snobbishness. Meno again reveals his snobbishness in his preference for things that are “fine” – though these fine things turn out to be political office and political honor, and gold and silver. Progress is made toward defining virtue, though the definition remains incomplete because virtue as a whole is defined in terms of the parts of virtue.Less
Socrates insists on the “priority of definition,” shifting the focus of the discussion away from Meno's preoccupation with how virtue is acquired to the question of what virtue is. In the ensuing struggle over the definition of virtue, Meno contends that virtue is an activity or job that varies with age, gender, and station, and Socrates counters that virtue is a matter of how any activity or job is done: is it done with justice, temperance, and piety – or not? Socrates offers Meno a model definition that he might apply in defining virtue, a definition that Meno rejects for no reason other than his snobbishness. Meno again reveals his snobbishness in his preference for things that are “fine” – though these fine things turn out to be political office and political honor, and gold and silver. Progress is made toward defining virtue, though the definition remains incomplete because virtue as a whole is defined in terms of the parts of virtue.
Roslyn Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140767
- eISBN:
- 9780199833849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140761.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Having failed to produce a satisfactory definition of virtue, Meno suddenly recalls having heard that Socrates is a perplexed man himself who causes perplexity in others. He likens Socrates to a ...
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Having failed to produce a satisfactory definition of virtue, Meno suddenly recalls having heard that Socrates is a perplexed man himself who causes perplexity in others. He likens Socrates to a sting ray, an ugly fish that numbs those with whom it comes into contact, and seeks to obstruct the continuation of Socrates’ elenctic examination of him by introducing a paradox that would make both inquiry and verification impossible unless the investigator knows the answer in advance of the investigation. Socrates rejects only the “paradox of inquiry” as eristic, saying nothing about the “paradox of knowing,” recognizing perhaps that in the matter of virtue, answers can indeed not be known because they cannot be definitively verified. In order to encourage Meno to persevere in the inquiry, Socrates has recourse to the myth of learning as recollection – a myth he devises not because he believes it to be true but because he believes it to be salutary.Less
Having failed to produce a satisfactory definition of virtue, Meno suddenly recalls having heard that Socrates is a perplexed man himself who causes perplexity in others. He likens Socrates to a sting ray, an ugly fish that numbs those with whom it comes into contact, and seeks to obstruct the continuation of Socrates’ elenctic examination of him by introducing a paradox that would make both inquiry and verification impossible unless the investigator knows the answer in advance of the investigation. Socrates rejects only the “paradox of inquiry” as eristic, saying nothing about the “paradox of knowing,” recognizing perhaps that in the matter of virtue, answers can indeed not be known because they cannot be definitively verified. In order to encourage Meno to persevere in the inquiry, Socrates has recourse to the myth of learning as recollection – a myth he devises not because he believes it to be true but because he believes it to be salutary.
Roslyn Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140767
- eISBN:
- 9780199833849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140761.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In the slave‐boy demonstration, Socrates teaches the slave boy which line it is in an original square upon which a new square, double the size of the first, is constructed. The instruction is ...
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In the slave‐boy demonstration, Socrates teaches the slave boy which line it is in an original square upon which a new square, double the size of the first, is constructed. The instruction is disguised as an elenchus in order to encourage Meno to continue with the elenctic examination into virtue with which he and Socrates had been occupied up to this point. The diagonal, which constitutes the answer to the geometrical question, is present in the diagram from the start but stimulates no “recollection” on the part of the slave‐boy. The solution to the geometry problem is incontestable (it is confirmed by counting) and so amounts to knowledge; in virtue the most one can hope for is to know “no less accurately than anyone.” Socrates is committed only to the moral value of the “doctrines” ‐recollection and the immortality of the soul – he has espoused; he has fought in word (myth) and deed (the slave‐boy demonstration) for the worth of moral inquiry.Less
In the slave‐boy demonstration, Socrates teaches the slave boy which line it is in an original square upon which a new square, double the size of the first, is constructed. The instruction is disguised as an elenchus in order to encourage Meno to continue with the elenctic examination into virtue with which he and Socrates had been occupied up to this point. The diagonal, which constitutes the answer to the geometrical question, is present in the diagram from the start but stimulates no “recollection” on the part of the slave‐boy. The solution to the geometry problem is incontestable (it is confirmed by counting) and so amounts to knowledge; in virtue the most one can hope for is to know “no less accurately than anyone.” Socrates is committed only to the moral value of the “doctrines” ‐recollection and the immortality of the soul – he has espoused; he has fought in word (myth) and deed (the slave‐boy demonstration) for the worth of moral inquiry.
Roslyn Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195140767
- eISBN:
- 9780199833849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140761.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Socrates reluctantly turns from his preferred question of what virtue is to Meno's preferred question of the teachability of virtue – a question that Socrates would surely never have permitted to ...
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Socrates reluctantly turns from his preferred question of what virtue is to Meno's preferred question of the teachability of virtue – a question that Socrates would surely never have permitted to arise if he intended the claim that “all learning is recollection” to be taken seriously. Socrates tests for the teachability of virtue by asking if virtue is knowledge on the hypothesis that anything teachable must be knowledge. Although virtue, as something good, turns out indeed to be knowledge, Socrates discounts virtue's teachability and ultimately, its status as knowledge, on the grounds that there are not teachers of it. Anytus, a democrat and politician, who is the son of Anthemion, a wealthy and good man, fails to establish that there are teachers of virtue. If virtue is not natural and is not knowledge, it can only be true opinion – unless the virtue being considered is the success that politicians enjoy by dint of the divine gift of eudoxia, good repute.Less
Socrates reluctantly turns from his preferred question of what virtue is to Meno's preferred question of the teachability of virtue – a question that Socrates would surely never have permitted to arise if he intended the claim that “all learning is recollection” to be taken seriously. Socrates tests for the teachability of virtue by asking if virtue is knowledge on the hypothesis that anything teachable must be knowledge. Although virtue, as something good, turns out indeed to be knowledge, Socrates discounts virtue's teachability and ultimately, its status as knowledge, on the grounds that there are not teachers of it. Anytus, a democrat and politician, who is the son of Anthemion, a wealthy and good man, fails to establish that there are teachers of virtue. If virtue is not natural and is not knowledge, it can only be true opinion – unless the virtue being considered is the success that politicians enjoy by dint of the divine gift of eudoxia, good repute.
