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To Be and/or Not to Be: The Objects of Meinong and Husserl

Peter Simons and David Bell

in Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic

Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their ... More

Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their variety, Husserl emphasized contents and their variety. Their theories agree on many salient issues both of phenomenology and ontology. Meinong, like Twardowski, upheld the objectuality of all intentional acts, and was therefore constrained to seek objects for acts lacking standard objects. Husserl by contrast rejects non-existents and explains the same phenomena by saying such lack objects but are phenomenologically indistinguishable from acts that have objects. This is modified by Husserl’s later theory of noemata on the one hand and Meinong’s recognition of the semantic role of incomplete auxiliary objects on the other. As a result, their theories materially converged. This chapter charts their principal convergences and disagreements and portrays them both as independent continuers of Brentano’s messianic drive to establish a scientific philosophy.Less

On Denoting

David Bostock

in Russell's Logical Atomism

The chapter outlines Russell’s early theory of denoting in 1903, and the reasons why it should be abandoned. The new theory of 1905 contains objections to the rival views of definite descriptions due ... More

The chapter outlines Russell’s early theory of denoting in 1903, and the reasons why it should be abandoned. The new theory of 1905 contains objections to the rival views of definite descriptions due to Meinong and to Frege, and these are endorsed. (But there is no full discussion of what Russell saw as his main argument, using the example of ‘Gray’s Elegy’.) Russell’s new theory does solve the puzzles that he mentions, at least for definite descriptions, but since the puzzles seem to apply also to names the solution is only partial at this stage. In this article Russell was concerned with our ordinary language, which leaves him open to the kind of objections raised by Strawson (1950). But in later developments he moves from language to thought, and then to a supposedly ‘perfect’ language.Less

On What There Isn't

Graham Priest

in Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the ... More

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the fat man in the doorway is discussed and rejected.Less

Existence (1987)

Nathan Salmon

in Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophical Papers, Volume I

Quine’s dictum that to be is to be a value of a variable is rejected on the grounds that variables range over nonexistents. Many things do not exist. This observation is consistent with actualism, ... More

Quine’s dictum that to be is to be a value of a variable is rejected on the grounds that variables range over nonexistents. Many things do not exist. This observation is consistent with actualism, the doctrine that everything there is exists. All things inevitably have properties. Existence and actuality are properties, Kant notwithstanding.Less

Intentionality and Intensionality

Mark Sainsbury

in Thinking about Things

Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when ... More

Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when one referring expression is replaced by another with the same reference. Attributions of intentional states are intensional. This first chapter sets out the basic distinctions, describes some puzzles about intensionality (for example, how it is possible to think about unicorns when there are none to think about), and sketches the path to be taken in the rest of the book.Less

The Pigtail of the Nineteenth Century: Determinism in the 1880s

in Vienna in the Age of Uncertainty: Science, Liberalism, and Private Life

This chapter reports the age of scientific determinism. The most widely cited response to the education ministry came from the eminent Graz psychologist Alexius Meinong. Meinong had been a student of ... More

This chapter reports the age of scientific determinism. The most widely cited response to the education ministry came from the eminent Graz psychologist Alexius Meinong. Meinong had been a student of Franz Brentano. Brentano was a sympathetic figure to Austria's newly powerful liberals. Franz Exner's concept of the “humanistic” value of science study reemerged at the center of a new Austrian pedagogical movement. Karl Exner addressed the ministry's “Instructions” as an authority on the Gymnasium physics curriculum. Meinong and Höfler's program for teaching students to distinguish “evident” knowledge from mere possibility was one answer to the liberals' problem of steering between dogmatism and skepticism. Adolf Exner was arguing that probabilistic science was a model of reasoning fit for training the future leaders of a liberal state. Adolf's probabilistic model of rationality evoked the liberal culture of the Sommerfrische, with its celebration of the peasant's experiential knowledge of nature.Less

November 13, 1973

Saul A. Kripke

in Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures

Ordinary language allows for quantification over fictional and mythical entities. We can say that Hamlet exists without commitment either to a moody Danish prince or to a shadowy Meinongian entity, ... More

Ordinary language allows for quantification over fictional and mythical entities. We can say that Hamlet exists without commitment either to a moody Danish prince or to a shadowy Meinongian entity, dwelling in some realm between being and non-being. The fictional character Hamlet is an abstract entity, existing in virtue of the fact that Shakespeare engaged in a certain sort of pretense—in particular, writing a work containing a character with that name. Although Hamlet does exist, he does not exist in the way that a concrete entity exists. His existence is similar to the existence of a nation. Both entities exist in virtue of the activities of, or relations between, concrete individuals.Less

Intentionality Primitivism

Mark Textor

in Brentano's Mind

Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that ... More

Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that intentionality is a conceptually primitive property of every mental act are discussed. On the one hand, it makes clear why we need to distinguish between the immanent object (intentional correlate) and the external object. But, on the other hand, propositional attitudes turn out to be a major problem for intentionality primitivism. Meinong accepted Brentano’s Thesis as well as the existence of ‘propositional attitudes’ but one cannot defend Brentano’s Thesis by saying that propositional attitudes are directed on objectives or the like. A plausible mark of the mental needs to disentangle being a mental act (process) from having an object.Less

The Nature of Existence and Non-Existence

Tim Crane

in The Objects of Thought

The problem of non-existence arises because there are true claims about non-existent intentional objects; but what is the nature of such claims and when are such claims true? Two extreme answers are ... More

The problem of non-existence arises because there are true claims about non-existent intentional objects; but what is the nature of such claims and when are such claims true? Two extreme answers are considered and rejected: negative free logic (which does not permit enough truths) and Meinong’s ‘noneism’ (which permits too many). A middle path is defended, which holds that non-existent intentional objects have only representation-dependent properties. These are properties in what is sometimes called the ‘pleonastic’ sense. This chapter also argues that fictional characters do not exist.Less

Nonexistence and Death

Palle Yourgrau

in Death and Nonexistence

Since, as most philosophers of death agree, death implies nonexistence (the corpse is not the dead person, who is essentially a living being), it follows that the mystery of death is due in no small ... More

Since, as most philosophers of death agree, death implies nonexistence (the corpse is not the dead person, who is essentially a living being), it follows that the mystery of death is due in no small part to the paradox of nonexistence. Failing to recognize this, philosophers of death have failed to engage with the literature on the logic of nonexistence, and thus have failed to appreciate Russell’s 1902 distinction between existence and being in relation to the ontology of death. By contrast, it is maintained here that the dead are nonexistent objects that have forfeited their existence, but not their being. More generally, one of the principal goals of this study is to draw attention to the fact that the left hand of philosophy has ignored what the right hand is doing. The mysteries of death and nonexistence, which should have been approached together, have been kept apart.Less

Flashbacks

Mark Sainsbury

in Thinking about Things

‘Flashbacks’ connects themes of the book to discussions by some famous historical figures. Some of the passages quoted puzzled the author greatly when he first encountered them, but viewing them in ... More

‘Flashbacks’ connects themes of the book to discussions by some famous historical figures. Some of the passages quoted puzzled the author greatly when he first encountered them, but viewing them in the light of display theory he finds it easier to detect the seemingly conflicting pressures driving their authors.Less

The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be”: A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire

Federico Lauria

in The Nature of Desire

How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of ... More

How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the “death of desire” principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain motivations and be explained by evaluations. Following these criticisms, three positive arguments in favor of the deontic conception are sketched.Less

Desires, Values and Norms

Olivier Massin

in The Nature of Desire

The thesis defended in this essay, the “guise of the ought,” is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts-to-be or oughts-to-do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has ... More

The thesis defended in this essay, the “guise of the ought,” is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts-to-be or oughts-to-do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and negative norms (obligation and interdiction) are interdefinable through negation; positive and negative values aren’t. This contrast between norms and values, it is argued, is mirrored within the psychological realm by the contrast between desires and emotions. Positive and negative desires are interdefinable through negation, but positive and negative emotions aren’t. The overall, Meinongian picture suggested is that norms are to desires what values are to emotions.Less

Quantification

Thomas Hofweber

in Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics

This chapter argues that quantifiers in natural language are semantically underspecified. They are polysemous, with two distinct readings: a domain conditions reading and an inferential reading. On ... More

This chapter argues that quantifiers in natural language are semantically underspecified. They are polysemous, with two distinct readings: a domain conditions reading and an inferential reading. On the inferential reading quantifier inferences are generally trivial, exploiting just the inferential role of the quantifier. However, on the domain conditions reading they are generally not trivial. Two readings of quantifiers lead to two kinds of questions about what there is. The proposal is contrasted with Carnap’s, Meinong’s, substitutional quantification, and with light vs. heavy-weight quantifiers. At the end of the chapter a solution to the first puzzle about ontology is offered and the trivial arguments for numbers, properties, and propositions are analyzed. An appendix extends the proposal to generalized quantifiers.Less

On What There Isn’t

Graham Priest

in Towards Non-Being

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the ... More

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the fat man in the doorway is discussed and rejected.Less

Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian?

Lynne Rudder Baker

in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen

Peter van Inwagen recently published an essay entitled “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” (Van Inwagen 2012). The three versions he labeled “The Meinongian Version,” “The Conceptual ... More

Peter van Inwagen recently published an essay entitled “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” (Van Inwagen 2012). The three versions he labeled “The Meinongian Version,” “The Conceptual Version,” and “The Modal Version,” respectively. This paper proposes a fourth version, which, for want of a better label, is called ‘The Cognitive-Ability Version’. Van Inwagen says that “Anselm’s argument presupposes, and essentially presupposes, an ontology that is … Meinongian” (Van Inwagen 2012: 8). The paper argues otherwise. If it is right, Anselm’s argument in Proslogion II is of the Cognitive-Ability variety, and not captured by any of van Inwagen’s versions of the ontological argument.Less

Modality and Degrees of Truth: An Austro-Polish Sideline in Twentieth-Century Modal Thought

Peter Simons

in The Actual and the Possible: Modality and Metaphysics in Modern Philosophy

This chapter explores a third way in construing modality—rejecting both linguistic accounts and the polycosmism of possible world theory—in the work of Alexis Meinong and Jan Łukasiewicz. Some of ... More

This chapter explores a third way in construing modality—rejecting both linguistic accounts and the polycosmism of possible world theory—in the work of Alexis Meinong and Jan Łukasiewicz. Some of Meinong’s non-existent objects are incomplete, so in 1915 he accounts for objective probability (he says possibility) with an idea of degrees of truth: the proposition ‘My draw of a card from the pack tomorrow will be a king’ is neither simply wholly true nor wholly false, regardless of the draw I will actually make tomorrow, but has a degree of truth corresponding to the proportion of kings in a pack, between 0 and 1. Łukasiewicz, inventor of fuzzy logic, visited Meinong in Graz, and in 1913 published his own work on probability, suggesting some propositions are indefinite and have truth values between and 0 and 1; then in 1917 he began to extend this to definite propositions about future contingencies.Less