Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book ...
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Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.Less
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.
Williams Martin
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195083491
- eISBN:
- 9780199853205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195083491.003.0015
- Subject:
- Music, Popular
Pharoah Sanders was a Grammy Award winner American jazz saxophonist. He was tagged as the “best tenor player in the world” by the great Ornette Coleman. He was famous for his harmonic and multiphonic ...
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Pharoah Sanders was a Grammy Award winner American jazz saxophonist. He was tagged as the “best tenor player in the world” by the great Ornette Coleman. He was famous for his harmonic and multiphonic techniques on the saxophone. He was born in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1940. Ornette Coleman, Eric Dolphy, and John Coltrane were his earliest musical influences. Sanders first performance was on Coltrane's Ascension, then on their dual-tenor collaboration Meditations recorded in November 1965.Less
Pharoah Sanders was a Grammy Award winner American jazz saxophonist. He was tagged as the “best tenor player in the world” by the great Ornette Coleman. He was famous for his harmonic and multiphonic techniques on the saxophone. He was born in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1940. Ornette Coleman, Eric Dolphy, and John Coltrane were his earliest musical influences. Sanders first performance was on Coltrane's Ascension, then on their dual-tenor collaboration Meditations recorded in November 1965.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the proposition I think. The book seeks to determine what thinking is and what it is for a human being to be thinking. This chapter also describes the instruction of students about Descartes' thinking-man project.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the proposition I think. The book seeks to determine what thinking is and what it is for a human being to be thinking. This chapter also describes the instruction of students about Descartes' thinking-man project.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter examines Descartes' view of another single thinking fact: thinking of God. Central to Descartes' account in Meditation III of thinking of God is an attempt to prove from (i) this ...
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This chapter examines Descartes' view of another single thinking fact: thinking of God. Central to Descartes' account in Meditation III of thinking of God is an attempt to prove from (i) this thinking fact (ii) a thought-free fact about the cosmos, God's existence, or in the more telling gerund form, the fact of God's existing. In Meditations there are at least three separate proofs of this (purported) basic fact. In Meditation V, there is an attempted proof of God's existing from God's essence (from his true and immutable “nature”), referred to as the from His essence proof. In Meditation III, there are (at least) two other proofs. There is a proof God's existing from my (JA's) existing, referred to as the from my existence proof. Finally, there is an attempted proof of God's existing from this thinking-fact, I think about God, referred to as the from my thinking proof. The chapter focuses on one proof only: from my thinking of Him to His existence.Less
This chapter examines Descartes' view of another single thinking fact: thinking of God. Central to Descartes' account in Meditation III of thinking of God is an attempt to prove from (i) this thinking fact (ii) a thought-free fact about the cosmos, God's existence, or in the more telling gerund form, the fact of God's existing. In Meditations there are at least three separate proofs of this (purported) basic fact. In Meditation V, there is an attempted proof of God's existing from God's essence (from his true and immutable “nature”), referred to as the from His essence proof. In Meditation III, there are (at least) two other proofs. There is a proof God's existing from my (JA's) existing, referred to as the from my existence proof. Finally, there is an attempted proof of God's existing from this thinking-fact, I think about God, referred to as the from my thinking proof. The chapter focuses on one proof only: from my thinking of Him to His existence.
Katalin Farkas
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230327
- eISBN:
- 9780191710629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Our conception of the mind is essentially shaped by the Cartesian theory, and this book suggests this should be embraced, rather than overthrown. The chapter argues that we can abstract a method for ...
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Our conception of the mind is essentially shaped by the Cartesian theory, and this book suggests this should be embraced, rather than overthrown. The chapter argues that we can abstract a method for distinguishing mental and non-mental features from Descartes's Second Meditation, which bears the title: ‘The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body’. Different cognitive faculties are distinguished. Only one of them has the following feature: it enables the subject to know its subject matter in a way that no-one else who is endowed with the same cognitive faculty, can. Everything that is known through the use of this faculty belongs to the mind. Privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental.Less
Our conception of the mind is essentially shaped by the Cartesian theory, and this book suggests this should be embraced, rather than overthrown. The chapter argues that we can abstract a method for distinguishing mental and non-mental features from Descartes's Second Meditation, which bears the title: ‘The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body’. Different cognitive faculties are distinguished. Only one of them has the following feature: it enables the subject to know its subject matter in a way that no-one else who is endowed with the same cognitive faculty, can. Everything that is known through the use of this faculty belongs to the mind. Privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental.
Ronald Rubin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804758161
- eISBN:
- 9780804779661
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804758161.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the ...
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This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the method of doubt”). The author argues that many problems of interpretation—including notorious problems of circularity—arise from a failure to recognize that Descartes' strategy for attaining certainty is not to add support for his beliefs, but to subtract grounds for doubt. To explain this strategy, he views Descartes as playing the role of a fictional character—The Demon's Advocate—whose beliefs are, in some respects, mirror images of Descartes' own. The purpose of The Meditations, the author contends, is to silence The Demon's Advocate.Less
This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the method of doubt”). The author argues that many problems of interpretation—including notorious problems of circularity—arise from a failure to recognize that Descartes' strategy for attaining certainty is not to add support for his beliefs, but to subtract grounds for doubt. To explain this strategy, he views Descartes as playing the role of a fictional character—The Demon's Advocate—whose beliefs are, in some respects, mirror images of Descartes' own. The purpose of The Meditations, the author contends, is to silence The Demon's Advocate.
Kyoo Lee
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823244843
- eISBN:
- 9780823250738
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823244843.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Focusing on the first four images of the Other mobilized in René Descartes’ Meditations—namely, the blind, the mad, the dreamy, and the bad—Reading Descartes Otherwise casts light on what have ...
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Focusing on the first four images of the Other mobilized in René Descartes’ Meditations—namely, the blind, the mad, the dreamy, and the bad—Reading Descartes Otherwise casts light on what have heretofore been the phenomenological shadows of “Cartesian rationality.” In doing so, it discovers dynamic signs of spectral alterity lodged both at the core and on the edges of modern Cartesian subjectivity. Calling for a Copernican reorientation of the very notion “Cartesianism,” the book's series of close, creatively critical readings of Descartes’ signature images brings the dramatic forces, moments, and scenes of the cogito into our own contemporary moment. While unravelling the knotted skeins of ambiguity that have been spun within philosophical modernity out of such clichés as “Descartes, the abstract modern subject” and “Descartes, the father of modern philosophy,” the analysis highlights a figure who is at once everywhere and nowhere, a living Cartesian ghost. This effort at revitalizing and reframing the legacy of Cartesian modernity, in a way mindful of its proto-phenomenological traces, also involves reflecting on some of the trends in contemporary Cartesian scholarship while putting Descartes in dialogue with a host of twentieth century and contemporary Continental philosophers ranging from Edmund Husserl, Gaston Bachelard and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-Luc Marion, and Alain Badiou among others.Less
Focusing on the first four images of the Other mobilized in René Descartes’ Meditations—namely, the blind, the mad, the dreamy, and the bad—Reading Descartes Otherwise casts light on what have heretofore been the phenomenological shadows of “Cartesian rationality.” In doing so, it discovers dynamic signs of spectral alterity lodged both at the core and on the edges of modern Cartesian subjectivity. Calling for a Copernican reorientation of the very notion “Cartesianism,” the book's series of close, creatively critical readings of Descartes’ signature images brings the dramatic forces, moments, and scenes of the cogito into our own contemporary moment. While unravelling the knotted skeins of ambiguity that have been spun within philosophical modernity out of such clichés as “Descartes, the abstract modern subject” and “Descartes, the father of modern philosophy,” the analysis highlights a figure who is at once everywhere and nowhere, a living Cartesian ghost. This effort at revitalizing and reframing the legacy of Cartesian modernity, in a way mindful of its proto-phenomenological traces, also involves reflecting on some of the trends in contemporary Cartesian scholarship while putting Descartes in dialogue with a host of twentieth century and contemporary Continental philosophers ranging from Edmund Husserl, Gaston Bachelard and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-Luc Marion, and Alain Badiou among others.
Jean-Luc Nancy
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823270613
- eISBN:
- 9780823270651
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823270613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the ...
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Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the edifice of knowledge on the absolute self-certainty of a Subject fully transparent to itself. While other theoretical discourses, such as psychoanalysis, have also attempted to subvert this Subject, Nancy shows how they always inadvertently reconstituted the Subject they were trying to leave behind. Nancy’s wager is that it is by returning to the moment of the foundation of modern subjectivity, a foundation which always already included all the possibilities of its own exhaustion, that another thought of “the subject” is possible. By paying attention the mode of presentation of Descartes’s subject, to the masks, portraits, feints, and fables that populate his writings, Jean-Luc Nancy shows how Descartes’s ego is not the Subject of metaphysics, but a mouth that spaces itself out and distinguishes itself. This “subject” speaks but he is not the speaking subject or the subject of the utterance; he is not even the neuter, impersonal ça of ça parle; it is a mouth that opens and says, in turn: dum scribo, larvatus pro Deo, mundus est fabula, unum quid.Less
Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the edifice of knowledge on the absolute self-certainty of a Subject fully transparent to itself. While other theoretical discourses, such as psychoanalysis, have also attempted to subvert this Subject, Nancy shows how they always inadvertently reconstituted the Subject they were trying to leave behind. Nancy’s wager is that it is by returning to the moment of the foundation of modern subjectivity, a foundation which always already included all the possibilities of its own exhaustion, that another thought of “the subject” is possible. By paying attention the mode of presentation of Descartes’s subject, to the masks, portraits, feints, and fables that populate his writings, Jean-Luc Nancy shows how Descartes’s ego is not the Subject of metaphysics, but a mouth that spaces itself out and distinguishes itself. This “subject” speaks but he is not the speaking subject or the subject of the utterance; he is not even the neuter, impersonal ça of ça parle; it is a mouth that opens and says, in turn: dum scribo, larvatus pro Deo, mundus est fabula, unum quid.
Michelle Beyssade
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of ...
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This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of anything, that is to say, to recognize truth, the rule which is often called the criterion of truth. The chapter presents truth as indubitable and therefore resisting any form of doubt. It affirms truth by reason of its existence and therefore it can be considered as exception or privileged truth. This chapter also explains that the basis of all truths is the existence of God and that the existence of God is the thing that secures the criterion of truth. The chapter also delves on the nature of the cogito, as something born directly out of metaphysical doubt, its fragile character, its exemplary and exceptional character.Less
This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of anything, that is to say, to recognize truth, the rule which is often called the criterion of truth. The chapter presents truth as indubitable and therefore resisting any form of doubt. It affirms truth by reason of its existence and therefore it can be considered as exception or privileged truth. This chapter also explains that the basis of all truths is the existence of God and that the existence of God is the thing that secures the criterion of truth. The chapter also delves on the nature of the cogito, as something born directly out of metaphysical doubt, its fragile character, its exemplary and exceptional character.
Emily R. Grosholz
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242505
- eISBN:
- 9780191680502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242505.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Descartes was not only a philosopher, but a mathematician and physicist as well. Over the centuries and with currently renewed intensity, his ...
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Descartes was not only a philosopher, but a mathematician and physicist as well. Over the centuries and with currently renewed intensity, his Meditations inspired serious discussions among philosophers. This book aims to define Descartes's method in broader terms, in order to trace its impact on the domains of mathematics and physics as well as metaphysics. Its impact in all three domains proved to be both helpful and restrictive, and underlies some of the important difficulties in the great thought experiment of the Meditations. Meanwhile, the central importance of Descartes's reductionist canon of construction has been missed by many scholars who have rejected method as the key to understanding Descartes's texts.Less
Descartes was not only a philosopher, but a mathematician and physicist as well. Over the centuries and with currently renewed intensity, his Meditations inspired serious discussions among philosophers. This book aims to define Descartes's method in broader terms, in order to trace its impact on the domains of mathematics and physics as well as metaphysics. Its impact in all three domains proved to be both helpful and restrictive, and underlies some of the important difficulties in the great thought experiment of the Meditations. Meanwhile, the central importance of Descartes's reductionist canon of construction has been missed by many scholars who have rejected method as the key to understanding Descartes's texts.
Emily R. Grosholz
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242505
- eISBN:
- 9780191680502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242505.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter re-examines the argument of the Meditations, attempting to do justice to its coherence within its historical situation and revealing ...
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This chapter re-examines the argument of the Meditations, attempting to do justice to its coherence within its historical situation and revealing difficulties in its unfolding by diagnosing them as the effects of the Cartesian method. It argues that in the Meditations, Descartes employed his method to reconstruct the human self as knower, beginning from the ‘simple’ condition of pure self-consciousness where the only content of thought is the self's activity of thinking, and ending with a complex self, confidently prepared to take up the investigation of natural science and human happiness. The first section briefly reviews the argument of the Meditations, following Gueroult's assertion that it unfolds according to the order of reasons. The second section examines the difficulties in maintaining the unity of the human self. The last section critiques Descartes's account called extension.Less
This chapter re-examines the argument of the Meditations, attempting to do justice to its coherence within its historical situation and revealing difficulties in its unfolding by diagnosing them as the effects of the Cartesian method. It argues that in the Meditations, Descartes employed his method to reconstruct the human self as knower, beginning from the ‘simple’ condition of pure self-consciousness where the only content of thought is the self's activity of thinking, and ending with a complex self, confidently prepared to take up the investigation of natural science and human happiness. The first section briefly reviews the argument of the Meditations, following Gueroult's assertion that it unfolds according to the order of reasons. The second section examines the difficulties in maintaining the unity of the human self. The last section critiques Descartes's account called extension.
Stephen Gaukroger
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237242
- eISBN:
- 9780191597480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237243.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Discusses the Meditationes, its reception, and Descartes's response. In this work, Descartes avoided theological questions (except for the doctrine of transubstantiation). Describes the structure of ...
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Discusses the Meditationes, its reception, and Descartes's response. In this work, Descartes avoided theological questions (except for the doctrine of transubstantiation). Describes the structure of the Principia, the culmination of his metaphysics dealing with the cogito, freedom of the will, divine predestination, inertial principles, the conservation of motion, dynamic relativism, and his theory of vortices, which he used to account for planetary orbits, weight or gravity, tides, and magnetism. Chronicles Descartes's religious controversy with Voetius and his dispute with Regius, whom he accused of plagiarizing his work.Less
Discusses the Meditationes, its reception, and Descartes's response. In this work, Descartes avoided theological questions (except for the doctrine of transubstantiation). Describes the structure of the Principia, the culmination of his metaphysics dealing with the cogito, freedom of the will, divine predestination, inertial principles, the conservation of motion, dynamic relativism, and his theory of vortices, which he used to account for planetary orbits, weight or gravity, tides, and magnetism. Chronicles Descartes's religious controversy with Voetius and his dispute with Regius, whom he accused of plagiarizing his work.
Ayesha Ramachandran
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226288796
- eISBN:
- 9780226288826
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226288826.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Ideas
By the seventeenth century, the terms “world” and “cosmos” would become almost interchangeable: chapter four explores this further expansion in scale in René Descartes’s Le monde (The World) whose ...
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By the seventeenth century, the terms “world” and “cosmos” would become almost interchangeable: chapter four explores this further expansion in scale in René Descartes’s Le monde (The World) whose title refers, in fact, to the universe. Though celebrated for his invention of the cogito, this chapter argues for Descartes’s significance as a revolutionary worldmaker: Le monde imagines the creation of a hypothetical world (a “new world”) in order to establish a new physics. Descartes’s suppression of the text after Galileo’s condemnation in 1632 is thus motivated by the recognition of the dangerous consequences of worldmaking itself. Confronting the necessity of human making, he seeks, in the Meditations, to defend its foundations by realigning the metaphysical relation between God and world. Descartes’s work thus marks the transition from Mercator’s bodily and artisanal metaphors of worldmaking to an internalization of the world as a product of the “intellectual imagination.”Less
By the seventeenth century, the terms “world” and “cosmos” would become almost interchangeable: chapter four explores this further expansion in scale in René Descartes’s Le monde (The World) whose title refers, in fact, to the universe. Though celebrated for his invention of the cogito, this chapter argues for Descartes’s significance as a revolutionary worldmaker: Le monde imagines the creation of a hypothetical world (a “new world”) in order to establish a new physics. Descartes’s suppression of the text after Galileo’s condemnation in 1632 is thus motivated by the recognition of the dangerous consequences of worldmaking itself. Confronting the necessity of human making, he seeks, in the Meditations, to defend its foundations by realigning the metaphysical relation between God and world. Descartes’s work thus marks the transition from Mercator’s bodily and artisanal metaphors of worldmaking to an internalization of the world as a product of the “intellectual imagination.”
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show ...
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Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and (2) to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to (1) is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas.Less
Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and (2) to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to (1) is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content ...
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There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content (”objective reality”) of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated (the ”levels formulation”), the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain ( formally or eminently) the same property (”reality”) as is represented by the idea (the ”same‐property” formulation). This central chapter defends four main contentions. (1) The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. (2) The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. (3) When point (2) is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, (4) in light of (3), there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence (the cogito), the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1.Less
There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content (”objective reality”) of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated (the ”levels formulation”), the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain ( formally or eminently) the same property (”reality”) as is represented by the idea (the ”same‐property” formulation). This central chapter defends four main contentions. (1) The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. (2) The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. (3) When point (2) is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, (4) in light of (3), there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence (the cogito), the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It seems undeniable that we have both sense experience of primary qualities and sense experience of secondary qualities, and yet, based on a text in the Sixth Replies among others, many commentators ...
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It seems undeniable that we have both sense experience of primary qualities and sense experience of secondary qualities, and yet, based on a text in the Sixth Replies among others, many commentators have thought that Descartes denied precisely this for primary qualities. One of the main burdens of this chapter is to show that Descartes does have an account of the sense experience of primary qualities and that it is to be found in Descartes's account of the faculty of imagination. The chapter argues that a version of the proof of the external world depends on a special class of ideas of this faculty. There are two sides to Descartes's account: (1) the philosophical theory of ideas, including the taxonomy of perceptual responses developed in the Sixth Replies of the Meditations, and (2) the empirical theory in the Optics and the Treatise on Man, and they are both treated in depth here. Finally, the chapter argues that Descartes has an empirical and philosophical account of the phenomenological fusion of primary and secondary qualities, the former accomplished by means of images in the corporeal imagination and the mechanism of referred sensations in The Passions of the Soul. Less
It seems undeniable that we have both sense experience of primary qualities and sense experience of secondary qualities, and yet, based on a text in the Sixth Replies among others, many commentators have thought that Descartes denied precisely this for primary qualities. One of the main burdens of this chapter is to show that Descartes does have an account of the sense experience of primary qualities and that it is to be found in Descartes's account of the faculty of imagination. The chapter argues that a version of the proof of the external world depends on a special class of ideas of this faculty. There are two sides to Descartes's account: (1) the philosophical theory of ideas, including the taxonomy of perceptual responses developed in the Sixth Replies of the Meditations, and (2) the empirical theory in the Optics and the Treatise on Man, and they are both treated in depth here. Finally, the chapter argues that Descartes has an empirical and philosophical account of the phenomenological fusion of primary and secondary qualities, the former accomplished by means of images in the corporeal imagination and the mechanism of referred sensations in The Passions of the Soul.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense ...
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Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.Less
Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are ...
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The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are actually (formally) exemplified; sensations (ideas of secondary qualities) make it obvious whether the properties they disclose to the mind are exemplified but not what their metaphysical category is. This idea is worked out through a discussion of three stages in the development of Descartes's doctrine of the material falsity of sensory ideas, the core concept of his error explanation of the senses. Material falsity is a set of three defects that sensations have in comparison with intellectual ideas, ideas that fully discharge the role, which Descartes assigns to ideas in his philosophical system. The first stage, reflected in Meditation III, identifies material falsity with two defects: nonrepresentation (a failure on the part of sensations to represent any real thing to the mind) and misrepresentation (a capacity of sensations to mislead us into thinking that they represent something real); the second stage, reflected in the Reply to Arnauld (Fourth Replies), identifies material falsity with obscure ideas (a kind of representational indeterminacy regarding metaphysical category); the third stage, reflected in the Principles of Philosophy I, sees the terminology of material falsity disappear and the terminology of clear but not distinct ideas appear. Other topics discussed include a special application of the rule of truth and skepticism.Less
The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are actually (formally) exemplified; sensations (ideas of secondary qualities) make it obvious whether the properties they disclose to the mind are exemplified but not what their metaphysical category is. This idea is worked out through a discussion of three stages in the development of Descartes's doctrine of the material falsity of sensory ideas, the core concept of his error explanation of the senses. Material falsity is a set of three defects that sensations have in comparison with intellectual ideas, ideas that fully discharge the role, which Descartes assigns to ideas in his philosophical system. The first stage, reflected in Meditation III, identifies material falsity with two defects: nonrepresentation (a failure on the part of sensations to represent any real thing to the mind) and misrepresentation (a capacity of sensations to mislead us into thinking that they represent something real); the second stage, reflected in the Reply to Arnauld (Fourth Replies), identifies material falsity with obscure ideas (a kind of representational indeterminacy regarding metaphysical category); the third stage, reflected in the Principles of Philosophy I, sees the terminology of material falsity disappear and the terminology of clear but not distinct ideas appear. Other topics discussed include a special application of the rule of truth and skepticism.
Stephen Gaukroger
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237242
- eISBN:
- 9780191597480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237243.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Discusses various works of Descartes's and their reception, including objections to them and his response to those objections. Météors deals with meteorology, which includes a corpuscular model of ...
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Discusses various works of Descartes's and their reception, including objections to them and his response to those objections. Météors deals with meteorology, which includes a corpuscular model of light, an account of refraction, and vision, and its links with optical instruments; the Dioptrique is a practical treatise on the construction of these optical instruments; and Géométrie compares arithmetic with geometry and extends Descartes's treatment of the Pappus problem and the classification of curves. The organization of material in the Discours appears arbitrary unless interpreted autobiographically. The Meditationes contains a fuller treatment of scepticism, in comparison with Pyrrhonism, and hyperbolic doubt, a defence of mechanism (which Descartes also saw as a defence of Copernicanism), discussions of the cogito and the transcendence of God, the classification of ideas, a new version of the doctrine of clarity and distinctness, and the nature of the thinking self, the identification of the self with the mind and mind/body dualism.Less
Discusses various works of Descartes's and their reception, including objections to them and his response to those objections. Météors deals with meteorology, which includes a corpuscular model of light, an account of refraction, and vision, and its links with optical instruments; the Dioptrique is a practical treatise on the construction of these optical instruments; and Géométrie compares arithmetic with geometry and extends Descartes's treatment of the Pappus problem and the classification of curves. The organization of material in the Discours appears arbitrary unless interpreted autobiographically. The Meditationes contains a fuller treatment of scepticism, in comparison with Pyrrhonism, and hyperbolic doubt, a defence of mechanism (which Descartes also saw as a defence of Copernicanism), discussions of the cogito and the transcendence of God, the classification of ideas, a new version of the doctrine of clarity and distinctness, and the nature of the thinking self, the identification of the self with the mind and mind/body dualism.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238195
- eISBN:
- 9780191597824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238193.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and ...
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It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.Less
It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.
