Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities ...
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This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One argues that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth — that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two argues that a form of Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms. Part Three argues that non-correspondence accounts of truth-truth as superassertibility or idealized rational acceptability, formal conceptions of truth, and Tarskian truth also fail to meet the criteria for objectivity. Along the way, it also dismisses the claims of the latter-day views of Putnam, and of similar views articulated by John McDowell, to constitute a new, less traditional, form of realism. The Coda bolsters some of the considerations advanced in Part Three in evaluating formal conceptions of truth, by assessing and rejecting the claims of Robert Brandom to have combined such an account of truth with a satisfactory account of semantic structure. The book concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth that preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. So the only question remaining is which form of antirealism to adopt.Less
This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One argues that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth — that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two argues that a form of Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms. Part Three argues that non-correspondence accounts of truth-truth as superassertibility or idealized rational acceptability, formal conceptions of truth, and Tarskian truth also fail to meet the criteria for objectivity. Along the way, it also dismisses the claims of the latter-day views of Putnam, and of similar views articulated by John McDowell, to constitute a new, less traditional, form of realism. The Coda bolsters some of the considerations advanced in Part Three in evaluating formal conceptions of truth, by assessing and rejecting the claims of Robert Brandom to have combined such an account of truth with a satisfactory account of semantic structure. The book concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth that preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. So the only question remaining is which form of antirealism to adopt.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, ...
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This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.Less
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their ...
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This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.Less
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a ...
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This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.Less
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to ...
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Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to this problem that is often associated with epistemological disjunctivism. This chapter explores what these differences are. John McDowell is the obvious case in point in this respect, since while he advances a form of epistemological disjunctivism that is very similar to that defended here, and while he also thinks that this proposal in a sense resolves the problem of radical scepticism, he is quite clear that he does not think of the view as offering a direct response to this problem in the way that we have set out.Less
Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to this problem that is often associated with epistemological disjunctivism. This chapter explores what these differences are. John McDowell is the obvious case in point in this respect, since while he advances a form of epistemological disjunctivism that is very similar to that defended here, and while he also thinks that this proposal in a sense resolves the problem of radical scepticism, he is quite clear that he does not think of the view as offering a direct response to this problem in the way that we have set out.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608591
- eISBN:
- 9780191729621
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own ...
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This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own day. Seven of the chapters focus on David Hume, and examine the sources and implications of his ‘naturalism’ and his ‘scepticism’. Three others deal with the legacy of that ‘naturalism’ in the 20th century. In each case the book moves beyond providing a description of historical contexts and developments, and confronts the philosophical issues as they present themselves to the philosophers in question.Less
This book explores central issues and ideas in the work of individual philosophers, ranging from Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume to Quine, Burge, McDowell, Goldman, Fogelin, and Sosa in our own day. Seven of the chapters focus on David Hume, and examine the sources and implications of his ‘naturalism’ and his ‘scepticism’. Three others deal with the legacy of that ‘naturalism’ in the 20th century. In each case the book moves beyond providing a description of historical contexts and developments, and confronts the philosophical issues as they present themselves to the philosophers in question.
Caroline Jenkins
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231577
- eISBN:
- 9780191716102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses objections to the idea that arithmetical concepts have empirical grounding, other than those covered in the previous chapter. These include some objections derived from ...
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This chapter discusses objections to the idea that arithmetical concepts have empirical grounding, other than those covered in the previous chapter. These include some objections derived from McDowell, and some arguments to the effect that arithmetical concepts are too rich to be grounded in sensory input. One such argument appeals to certain results in empirical psychology which purport to show that arithmetical concepts (or even knowledge) are innate. It argues that the question of innateness is at best tangential to my project, since the origin of a concept and its epistemic status are distinct issues.Less
This chapter discusses objections to the idea that arithmetical concepts have empirical grounding, other than those covered in the previous chapter. These include some objections derived from McDowell, and some arguments to the effect that arithmetical concepts are too rich to be grounded in sensory input. One such argument appeals to certain results in empirical psychology which purport to show that arithmetical concepts (or even knowledge) are innate. It argues that the question of innateness is at best tangential to my project, since the origin of a concept and its epistemic status are distinct issues.
Jennifer Hornsby
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231546
- eISBN:
- 9780191716126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter introduces a disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons by showing that an account of acting for reasons should give a place to knowledge. This disjunctive conception is claimed to ...
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This chapter introduces a disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons by showing that an account of acting for reasons should give a place to knowledge. This disjunctive conception is claimed to have a role analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and it is shown that the two conceptions have work to do in combination when they are treated as counterparts. It is also claimed that the disjunctive conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between what moves us to act (sometimes called ‘motivating reasons’) and what favours our acting (sometimes called ‘normative reasons’).Less
This chapter introduces a disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons by showing that an account of acting for reasons should give a place to knowledge. This disjunctive conception is claimed to have a role analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and it is shown that the two conceptions have work to do in combination when they are treated as counterparts. It is also claimed that the disjunctive conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between what moves us to act (sometimes called ‘motivating reasons’) and what favours our acting (sometimes called ‘normative reasons’).
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231546
- eISBN:
- 9780191716126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
It is claimed that McDowell's treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much-derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical ...
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It is claimed that McDowell's treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much-derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. This chapter evaluates the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and offers further support for the view.Less
It is claimed that McDowell's treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much-derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. This chapter evaluates the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and offers further support for the view.
Ram Neta
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231546
- eISBN:
- 9780191716126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
McDowell has offered a particular epistemological argument in favour of one version of disjunctivism about perception. This argument has been prominently criticized by Crispin Wright, and the ...
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McDowell has offered a particular epistemological argument in favour of one version of disjunctivism about perception. This argument has been prominently criticized by Crispin Wright, and the conclusion of the argument has been prominently criticized by Mark Johnston. This chapter rebuts both of those criticisms.Less
McDowell has offered a particular epistemological argument in favour of one version of disjunctivism about perception. This argument has been prominently criticized by Crispin Wright, and the conclusion of the argument has been prominently criticized by Mark Johnston. This chapter rebuts both of those criticisms.
Crispin Wright
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231546
- eISBN:
- 9780191716126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In his contribution to the present volume, John McDowell proposes a distinctive kind of ‘transcendental’ argument for the disjunctive conception of experience, and renews his claim that the latter ...
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In his contribution to the present volume, John McDowell proposes a distinctive kind of ‘transcendental’ argument for the disjunctive conception of experience, and renews his claim that the latter can be deployed to defuse certain kinds of sceptical doubt, responding obiter to the misgivings advanced in Wright (2002) about its credentials for the latter task. This chapter queries the putative ‘transcendental’ authority of disjunctivism, and reinforces the misgivings. It is argued that the root of sceptical doubt has less to do with a ‘highest common factor’ conception of the commonality between perceptions and illusions than with the possibility of phenomenological matching; and that scepticism can take a direct realist conception of sense experience in its stride once proper heed is given to the gap between direct awareness of a situation and the possession of warrant to believe that it obtains.Less
In his contribution to the present volume, John McDowell proposes a distinctive kind of ‘transcendental’ argument for the disjunctive conception of experience, and renews his claim that the latter can be deployed to defuse certain kinds of sceptical doubt, responding obiter to the misgivings advanced in Wright (2002) about its credentials for the latter task. This chapter queries the putative ‘transcendental’ authority of disjunctivism, and reinforces the misgivings. It is argued that the root of sceptical doubt has less to do with a ‘highest common factor’ conception of the commonality between perceptions and illusions than with the possibility of phenomenological matching; and that scepticism can take a direct realist conception of sense experience in its stride once proper heed is given to the gap between direct awareness of a situation and the possession of warrant to believe that it obtains.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. ...
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This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. The chapter first considers, and reject, McDowell's appeal to the analogy with secondary qualities in his ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (1985). The chapter then considers and defends McDowell's reply to John Mackie's complaint that objective values do not pull their own weight; I try to show the justice of McDowell's reply in a way that detaches it from any reliance on the dispositional conception of value. Finally, the chapter turns to Williams's attempts to show that the objectivity of moral values cannot be sustained within the constraints of McDowell's approach, because of various explanatory failures. The chapters argues that everything that needs to be explained can be explained, and that we should prefer a sort of optimism to a Williams-style pessimism. The chapter ends by considering whether Williams is right to think of McDowell as an intuitionist.Less
This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. The chapter first considers, and reject, McDowell's appeal to the analogy with secondary qualities in his ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (1985). The chapter then considers and defends McDowell's reply to John Mackie's complaint that objective values do not pull their own weight; I try to show the justice of McDowell's reply in a way that detaches it from any reliance on the dispositional conception of value. Finally, the chapter turns to Williams's attempts to show that the objectivity of moral values cannot be sustained within the constraints of McDowell's approach, because of various explanatory failures. The chapters argues that everything that needs to be explained can be explained, and that we should prefer a sort of optimism to a Williams-style pessimism. The chapter ends by considering whether Williams is right to think of McDowell as an intuitionist.
R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695317
- eISBN:
- 9780191738531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter applies originalism to three further problems: the content of hallucinatory experience, the epistemic role of perception, and arguments against physicalism based on conceivability ...
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This chapter applies originalism to three further problems: the content of hallucinatory experience, the epistemic role of perception, and arguments against physicalism based on conceivability (especially zombie-based arguments).Less
This chapter applies originalism to three further problems: the content of hallucinatory experience, the epistemic role of perception, and arguments against physicalism based on conceivability (especially zombie-based arguments).
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230334
- eISBN:
- 9780191710605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one ...
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This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one to have that stance towards something is for that thing to be so (or there). Some of these simply contain their object: taking them is not aiming at their object (which then, happily, is there to hit). John Cook Wilson saw knowledge as a stance of this last sort. John McDowell showed why knowledge needs to be like that. But it was J. L. Austin who made the idea viable. He did it by showing how a sense of occasion is required for proper ascription of epistemic notions.Less
This chapter explores the views of John Cook Wilson, J. L. Austin, and John McDowell. Some stances aim at the world: if all goes well, stance and world match. Some stances contain the world: for one to have that stance towards something is for that thing to be so (or there). Some of these simply contain their object: taking them is not aiming at their object (which then, happily, is there to hit). John Cook Wilson saw knowledge as a stance of this last sort. John McDowell showed why knowledge needs to be like that. But it was J. L. Austin who made the idea viable. He did it by showing how a sense of occasion is required for proper ascription of epistemic notions.
Jason A. Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781496808202
- eISBN:
- 9781496808240
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781496808202.001.0001
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
During the civil rights era, Mississippi was cloaked in the hateful embrace of the Closed Society, historian James Silver’s description of the white caste system that enforced segregation and ...
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During the civil rights era, Mississippi was cloaked in the hateful embrace of the Closed Society, historian James Silver’s description of the white caste system that enforced segregation and promoted the subservient treatment of blacks. Surprisingly, challenges from Mississippi’s college basketball courts brought into question the validity of the Closed Society and its unwritten law, a gentleman’s agreement that prevented college teams in the Magnolia State from playing against integrated foes. Mississippi State University was at the forefront of the battle for equality in the state with the school’s successful college basketball program. From 1959 through 1963, the Maroons won four Southeastern Conference basketball championships and created a championship dynasty in the South’s preeminent college athletic conference. However, in all four title-winning seasons, the press feverishly debated the merits of an NCAA appearance for the Maroons, culminating in Mississippi State University’s participation in the integrated 1963 National Collegiate Athletic Association’s National Championship basketball tournament. Full Court Press examines news articles, editorials, and columns published in Mississippi’s newspapers during the eight-year existence of the gentleman’s agreement, the challenges posed by Mississippi State University, and the subsequent integration of college basketball within the state. While the majority of reporters opposed any effort to integrate athletics, a segment of sports journalists, led by the charismatic Jimmie McDowell of the Jackson State Times, emerged as bold and progressive advocates for equality. Full Court Press highlights an ideological metamorphosis within the press during the Civil Rights Movement, slowly transforming from an organ that minimized the rights of blacks to an industry that weighted the plight of blacks on equal footing with their white brethren.Less
During the civil rights era, Mississippi was cloaked in the hateful embrace of the Closed Society, historian James Silver’s description of the white caste system that enforced segregation and promoted the subservient treatment of blacks. Surprisingly, challenges from Mississippi’s college basketball courts brought into question the validity of the Closed Society and its unwritten law, a gentleman’s agreement that prevented college teams in the Magnolia State from playing against integrated foes. Mississippi State University was at the forefront of the battle for equality in the state with the school’s successful college basketball program. From 1959 through 1963, the Maroons won four Southeastern Conference basketball championships and created a championship dynasty in the South’s preeminent college athletic conference. However, in all four title-winning seasons, the press feverishly debated the merits of an NCAA appearance for the Maroons, culminating in Mississippi State University’s participation in the integrated 1963 National Collegiate Athletic Association’s National Championship basketball tournament. Full Court Press examines news articles, editorials, and columns published in Mississippi’s newspapers during the eight-year existence of the gentleman’s agreement, the challenges posed by Mississippi State University, and the subsequent integration of college basketball within the state. While the majority of reporters opposed any effort to integrate athletics, a segment of sports journalists, led by the charismatic Jimmie McDowell of the Jackson State Times, emerged as bold and progressive advocates for equality. Full Court Press highlights an ideological metamorphosis within the press during the Civil Rights Movement, slowly transforming from an organ that minimized the rights of blacks to an industry that weighted the plight of blacks on equal footing with their white brethren.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596218
- eISBN:
- 9780191595783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Just how do those demands on the objectivity of judgement set out by Frege limit the authority of the parochial in shaping thought? This chapter discusses those demands, and compares John McDowell ...
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Just how do those demands on the objectivity of judgement set out by Frege limit the authority of the parochial in shaping thought? This chapter discusses those demands, and compares John McDowell and Noam Chomsky in their respective ways of assigning the parochial a substantive role in shaping, or identifying, some realm of fact, where, at the least, that realm cannot be brought into view at all without the work of the parochial. It defends McDowell, and, with him, Wittgenstein, from charges of idealism which have been directed against them.Less
Just how do those demands on the objectivity of judgement set out by Frege limit the authority of the parochial in shaping thought? This chapter discusses those demands, and compares John McDowell and Noam Chomsky in their respective ways of assigning the parochial a substantive role in shaping, or identifying, some realm of fact, where, at the least, that realm cannot be brought into view at all without the work of the parochial. It defends McDowell, and, with him, Wittgenstein, from charges of idealism which have been directed against them.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199647033
- eISBN:
- 9780191741166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647033.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's ...
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This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's unavoidable ignorance regarding the outcome of a proposed course of action, which is perfectly compatible with that action being causally determined. Against this, it is argued that Kant's account of rational agency makes a persuasive case for attributing to an agent a genuine spontaneity which eludes the naturalistic framework that is assumed by Dennett to be all‐encompassing. The other is to counter the views of John McDowell, who rejects a “bald naturalism” (such as Dennett's) and insists on the ineliminability of a conception of spontaneity like Kant's, while criticizing Kant for linking this spontaneity with transcendental idealism. In response, it is argued that McDowell misconstrues Kant's idealism and that he is himself committed to a form of idealism.Less
This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's unavoidable ignorance regarding the outcome of a proposed course of action, which is perfectly compatible with that action being causally determined. Against this, it is argued that Kant's account of rational agency makes a persuasive case for attributing to an agent a genuine spontaneity which eludes the naturalistic framework that is assumed by Dennett to be all‐encompassing. The other is to counter the views of John McDowell, who rejects a “bald naturalism” (such as Dennett's) and insists on the ineliminability of a conception of spontaneity like Kant's, while criticizing Kant for linking this spontaneity with transcendental idealism. In response, it is argued that McDowell misconstrues Kant's idealism and that he is himself committed to a form of idealism.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter sketches the main themes of the book. These are as follows: Part I concerns the problems and prospects of Kantian anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. Part II concerns ...
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This introductory chapter sketches the main themes of the book. These are as follows: Part I concerns the problems and prospects of Kantian anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. Part II concerns the problems and prospects of arguments against scepticism that are driven by semantic externalism (Putnam, Davidson, McDowell are the principal players here). Part III concerns the epistemology of anti-individualism: does this very plausible and influential thesis in the philosophy of mind engender sceptical problems about knowledge of the content of one's own intentional mental states? Part IV concerns fundamental epistemic principles (such as closure of knowledge under known implication) that figure in the now-standard versions of sceptical argumentation. Can the principles be argued for, or are they primitives? What is the most plausible formulation of them?Less
This introductory chapter sketches the main themes of the book. These are as follows: Part I concerns the problems and prospects of Kantian anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. Part II concerns the problems and prospects of arguments against scepticism that are driven by semantic externalism (Putnam, Davidson, McDowell are the principal players here). Part III concerns the epistemology of anti-individualism: does this very plausible and influential thesis in the philosophy of mind engender sceptical problems about knowledge of the content of one's own intentional mental states? Part IV concerns fundamental epistemic principles (such as closure of knowledge under known implication) that figure in the now-standard versions of sceptical argumentation. Can the principles be argued for, or are they primitives? What is the most plausible formulation of them?
Simon Blackburn
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199548057
- eISBN:
- 9780191594953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548057.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a response to the view expressed by John McDowell in which the mind relates to the world by absorbing facts, thought of as worldly items, within itself. It argues that the metaphors ...
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This chapter is a response to the view expressed by John McDowell in which the mind relates to the world by absorbing facts, thought of as worldly items, within itself. It argues that the metaphors need unpacking, and when this is done a better view is obtained.Less
This chapter is a response to the view expressed by John McDowell in which the mind relates to the world by absorbing facts, thought of as worldly items, within itself. It argues that the metaphors need unpacking, and when this is done a better view is obtained.
