Richard Cross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199244362
- eISBN:
- 9780191697357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244362.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter examines some thinkers who explicitly adopt a view of the hypostatic union that closely resembles the substance-accident relation. These include Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter ...
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This chapter examines some thinkers who explicitly adopt a view of the hypostatic union that closely resembles the substance-accident relation. These include Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter John Olivi, and William of Ware. It becomes evident through the period considered that theologians become — for better or worse — more confident in the power of reason to fathom the Christological mystery.Less
This chapter examines some thinkers who explicitly adopt a view of the hypostatic union that closely resembles the substance-accident relation. These include Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter John Olivi, and William of Ware. It becomes evident through the period considered that theologians become — for better or worse — more confident in the power of reason to fathom the Christological mystery.
Juhana Toivanen
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198743798
- eISBN:
- 9780191821011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743798.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of ...
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This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’Less
This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’
Dominik Perler
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190226411
- eISBN:
- 9780190226442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190226411.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
All medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition agreed that the human intellect is not only able to know other things, but also itself. But how should that be possible? Which cognitive ...
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All medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition agreed that the human intellect is not only able to know other things, but also itself. But how should that be possible? Which cognitive mechanisms are required for self-knowledge? This chapter examines three models that attempted to answer that fundamental question: (1) Thomas Aquinas referred to higher-order acts that make first-order acts and eventually also the intellect itself cognitively present, (2) Matthew of Aquasparta appealed to introspection, (3) Dietrich of Freiberg claimed that no special cognitive process is necessary because the intellect is by nature always fully present to itself. An analysis of these three models shows that scholastic philosophers intended to provide an epistemological foundation for the explanation of Socratic self-knowledge.Less
All medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition agreed that the human intellect is not only able to know other things, but also itself. But how should that be possible? Which cognitive mechanisms are required for self-knowledge? This chapter examines three models that attempted to answer that fundamental question: (1) Thomas Aquinas referred to higher-order acts that make first-order acts and eventually also the intellect itself cognitively present, (2) Matthew of Aquasparta appealed to introspection, (3) Dietrich of Freiberg claimed that no special cognitive process is necessary because the intellect is by nature always fully present to itself. An analysis of these three models shows that scholastic philosophers intended to provide an epistemological foundation for the explanation of Socratic self-knowledge.
