Tomaso Poggio
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262514620
- eISBN:
- 9780262289610
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262514620.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Vision
This chapter discusses a vision of computational neuroscience, and also addresses what has happened since the publication of David Marr’s Vision. It argues that it is now time to reemphasize the ...
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This chapter discusses a vision of computational neuroscience, and also addresses what has happened since the publication of David Marr’s Vision. It argues that it is now time to reemphasize the links between levels of understanding, if progress in computational neuroscience is wanted. It is believed that computational neuroscience over the past thirty years can be described as mostly exploring each level of understanding independent of the others. Some of the past research trends in computational neuroscience are explained. This brief look at computational neuroscience in the last decades indicates that significant progress has been made at each of the levels of understanding—in a sense following Marr’s prescription—though the problem is far from being solved. It argues that neuroscience can help computational theory and even computer science.Less
This chapter discusses a vision of computational neuroscience, and also addresses what has happened since the publication of David Marr’s Vision. It argues that it is now time to reemphasize the links between levels of understanding, if progress in computational neuroscience is wanted. It is believed that computational neuroscience over the past thirty years can be described as mostly exploring each level of understanding independent of the others. Some of the past research trends in computational neuroscience are explained. This brief look at computational neuroscience in the last decades indicates that significant progress has been made at each of the levels of understanding—in a sense following Marr’s prescription—though the problem is far from being solved. It argues that neuroscience can help computational theory and even computer science.
Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147667
- eISBN:
- 9780199785865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147669.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense ...
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This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense thought. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by outlining what deduction is, in abstract terms, and then considers various ways in which it can be related to human reasoning, using the framework of D. Marr's levels of explanation. Three sophisticated lines of arguments are developed from epistemology, AI, and the psychology of reasoning. Each argument supports the conclusion that deduction has no significant role in commonsense reasoning. The implications of rejecting deduction for the cognitive science of human reasoning are considered.Less
This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense thought. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by outlining what deduction is, in abstract terms, and then considers various ways in which it can be related to human reasoning, using the framework of D. Marr's levels of explanation. Three sophisticated lines of arguments are developed from epistemology, AI, and the psychology of reasoning. Each argument supports the conclusion that deduction has no significant role in commonsense reasoning. The implications of rejecting deduction for the cognitive science of human reasoning are considered.
Lucia M. Vaina
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198749783
- eISBN:
- 9780191831638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749783.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Neuropsychology
In the first section of this chapter, I follow David’s early intellectual and scientific trajectory. I then describe his passions other than science: music and flying. The coherent thread running ...
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In the first section of this chapter, I follow David’s early intellectual and scientific trajectory. I then describe his passions other than science: music and flying. The coherent thread running through these two sections and the later section, “The last challenge,” is of David Marr as a young man who never gave up in the face of any challenge, no matter how big, how hard. He was so determined, so intense and full of passion that he rose victorious above every challenge and this made him really happy. One could see it in his unique smile, a mixture of softness, warmth, and pride in victory, and in the indescribable, also unique, twinkle in his eyes.Less
In the first section of this chapter, I follow David’s early intellectual and scientific trajectory. I then describe his passions other than science: music and flying. The coherent thread running through these two sections and the later section, “The last challenge,” is of David Marr as a young man who never gave up in the face of any challenge, no matter how big, how hard. He was so determined, so intense and full of passion that he rose victorious above every challenge and this made him really happy. One could see it in his unique smile, a mixture of softness, warmth, and pride in victory, and in the indescribable, also unique, twinkle in his eyes.
Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198524496
- eISBN:
- 9780191584923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The idea that a deductive competence theory is central to human cognition both has a long pedigree and is widely held by many leading figures in the psychology of reasoning. This chapter argues ...
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The idea that a deductive competence theory is central to human cognition both has a long pedigree and is widely held by many leading figures in the psychology of reasoning. This chapter argues against this tradition in the psychology of reasoning. It claims that almost no everyday human reasoning can be characterized deductively, or has any significant deductive component. Although many theorists have argued that deduction is at the core of cognition, it is argued that it is at the periphery. The chapter begins by clarifying the meaning of the claim that human reasoning involves deduction by introducing Marr’s levels of description of a computational process.Less
The idea that a deductive competence theory is central to human cognition both has a long pedigree and is widely held by many leading figures in the psychology of reasoning. This chapter argues against this tradition in the psychology of reasoning. It claims that almost no everyday human reasoning can be characterized deductively, or has any significant deductive component. Although many theorists have argued that deduction is at the core of cognition, it is argued that it is at the periphery. The chapter begins by clarifying the meaning of the claim that human reasoning involves deduction by introducing Marr’s levels of description of a computational process.
Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199233298
- eISBN:
- 9780191696602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233298.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Interpretation processes are necessary, whether one then applies probability theory or some other logic in reasoning from the resulting interpretations. In the case of suppression, understood in ...
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Interpretation processes are necessary, whether one then applies probability theory or some other logic in reasoning from the resulting interpretations. In the case of suppression, understood in probabilistic terms, interpretation shows up as the necessity to change one's probabilities in ways not sanctioned by Bayesianism. This chapter argues that a computational level analysis, in the sense of Marr, must also incorporate the interpretation process, not only the reasoning, once the interpretation is chosen. This is not to deny the role of Bayesian probability in a characterization of the computational level. If a subject construes the task as involving uncertain conditionals, in the sense of positive probability of exceptions, principles like Bayesian conditionalization may well form part of the computational level. In this case competence theory is needed of how judgements of probabilities can change in non-Bayesian ways. This is one of the most interesting technical challenges issuing from the present analysis.Less
Interpretation processes are necessary, whether one then applies probability theory or some other logic in reasoning from the resulting interpretations. In the case of suppression, understood in probabilistic terms, interpretation shows up as the necessity to change one's probabilities in ways not sanctioned by Bayesianism. This chapter argues that a computational level analysis, in the sense of Marr, must also incorporate the interpretation process, not only the reasoning, once the interpretation is chosen. This is not to deny the role of Bayesian probability in a characterization of the computational level. If a subject construes the task as involving uncertain conditionals, in the sense of positive probability of exceptions, principles like Bayesian conditionalization may well form part of the computational level. In this case competence theory is needed of how judgements of probabilities can change in non-Bayesian ways. This is one of the most interesting technical challenges issuing from the present analysis.
Frances Egan
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195084627
- eISBN:
- 9780199847167
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195084627.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The chapter discusses David Marr's theory of vision, which likens the visual system to an information-processing system with three levels: the topmost “theory of computation,” the algorithmic level, ...
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The chapter discusses David Marr's theory of vision, which likens the visual system to an information-processing system with three levels: the topmost “theory of computation,” the algorithmic level, and the implementation level. Marr's work, which is based on computational theory, has been assumed by many acolytes of this field of study to be “intentional.” This chapter aims to refute this assumption utilizing the broad tenets of computational methodology. It argues that, in utilizing the formal, mathematical paradigms of computational theory, Marr's theory is rendered essentially neutral, with no accompanying interpretations. Of course, interpretations based on underlying, external factors can also be valid, but are not essential, even if assigning intentional content can have practical uses for the researcher. The chapter ends the discourse by countering the proposed argument of “narrow content,” which posits that the primitives of Marr's vision theory are intentional, while their content is independent of external, causal factors.Less
The chapter discusses David Marr's theory of vision, which likens the visual system to an information-processing system with three levels: the topmost “theory of computation,” the algorithmic level, and the implementation level. Marr's work, which is based on computational theory, has been assumed by many acolytes of this field of study to be “intentional.” This chapter aims to refute this assumption utilizing the broad tenets of computational methodology. It argues that, in utilizing the formal, mathematical paradigms of computational theory, Marr's theory is rendered essentially neutral, with no accompanying interpretations. Of course, interpretations based on underlying, external factors can also be valid, but are not essential, even if assigning intentional content can have practical uses for the researcher. The chapter ends the discourse by countering the proposed argument of “narrow content,” which posits that the primitives of Marr's vision theory are intentional, while their content is independent of external, causal factors.
Sarah Patterson
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195084627
- eISBN:
- 9780199847167
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195084627.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The chapter revolves around Tyler Burge's interpretation of David Marr's theory of vision, and the chapter's arguments against such construal. Burge asserts that through evolution, our sensory ...
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The chapter revolves around Tyler Burge's interpretation of David Marr's theory of vision, and the chapter's arguments against such construal. Burge asserts that through evolution, our sensory systems have become adapted to our current environment, and can be assumed to be “successful” in that we are able to generate veridical perceptions of the same. According to Burge, this ascribes a “success-orientation” to Marr's theory. This chapter argues that Marr's own assumption of success in his work is merely a methodological dictate necessary to solve or understand the initial query and purpose of the study. In the same way that artificial intelligence is developed, one has to make intelligent choices on which types of human cognitive abilities should the project be patterned after. Thus, Marr's employment of this practice does not automatically warrant the assumption of veridical perception in his work.Less
The chapter revolves around Tyler Burge's interpretation of David Marr's theory of vision, and the chapter's arguments against such construal. Burge asserts that through evolution, our sensory systems have become adapted to our current environment, and can be assumed to be “successful” in that we are able to generate veridical perceptions of the same. According to Burge, this ascribes a “success-orientation” to Marr's theory. This chapter argues that Marr's own assumption of success in his work is merely a methodological dictate necessary to solve or understand the initial query and purpose of the study. In the same way that artificial intelligence is developed, one has to make intelligent choices on which types of human cognitive abilities should the project be patterned after. Thus, Marr's employment of this practice does not automatically warrant the assumption of veridical perception in his work.
Glyn W. Humphreys
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199228768
- eISBN:
- 9780191696336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228768.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter looks at changes and developments in the study of object recognition during the past thirty years. It discusses the Marrian revolution attributed to David Marr, who took ideas and ...
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This chapter looks at changes and developments in the study of object recognition during the past thirty years. It discusses the Marrian revolution attributed to David Marr, who took ideas and concepts from psychophysics with the aim of translating them into working computer models. Another major development during this period was the recognition and serious research on the neural basis of visual perception and object recognition.Less
This chapter looks at changes and developments in the study of object recognition during the past thirty years. It discusses the Marrian revolution attributed to David Marr, who took ideas and concepts from psychophysics with the aim of translating them into working computer models. Another major development during this period was the recognition and serious research on the neural basis of visual perception and object recognition.
D. J. WILLSHAW and J. T. BUCKINGHAM
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198521983
- eISBN:
- 9780191688492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198521983.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In the study of neural networks, there have been very few attempts to examine in detail how a particular part of the brain might compute a particular function. This chapter examines one theory of ...
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In the study of neural networks, there have been very few attempts to examine in detail how a particular part of the brain might compute a particular function. This chapter examines one theory of learning and memory that does consider seriously the constraints imposed by the available computing machinery of the brain. This is the proposal, due to the late David Marr (1971), that the mammalian hippocampus acts as a temporary content-addressable memory store. This study remains a potential source of inspiration for those interested in the theory of the nervous system.Less
In the study of neural networks, there have been very few attempts to examine in detail how a particular part of the brain might compute a particular function. This chapter examines one theory of learning and memory that does consider seriously the constraints imposed by the available computing machinery of the brain. This is the proposal, due to the late David Marr (1971), that the mammalian hippocampus acts as a temporary content-addressable memory store. This study remains a potential source of inspiration for those interested in the theory of the nervous system.
Michael Madary
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035453
- eISBN:
- 9780262341783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035453.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This first chapter introduces the main argument of the book and locates my position relative to existing approaches in the philosophy of psychology. The chapter includes a discussion of mental ...
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This first chapter introduces the main argument of the book and locates my position relative to existing approaches in the philosophy of psychology. The chapter includes a discussion of mental architecture and a discussion of earlier attempts to link visual experience with models from cognitive neuroscience. The conclusion of the main argument is that visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfilment.Less
This first chapter introduces the main argument of the book and locates my position relative to existing approaches in the philosophy of psychology. The chapter includes a discussion of mental architecture and a discussion of earlier attempts to link visual experience with models from cognitive neuroscience. The conclusion of the main argument is that visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfilment.
David Marr
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262514620
- eISBN:
- 9780262289610
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262514620.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Vision
This book has tried to lay out in some detail an approach that treats visual perception primarily as an information-processing problem. This chapter presents a conversation between an imaginary ...
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This book has tried to lay out in some detail an approach that treats visual perception primarily as an information-processing problem. This chapter presents a conversation between an imaginary skeptic and an imaginary defender of the information-processing point of view in order to answer the objections most commonly raised in this field. The dialogue is based on lunchtime conversations at the Salk Institute between Francis Crick, Tomaso Poggio, and David Marr. However, it does not follow those conversations very closely, and the imaginary objector is a combination of many real-life people.Less
This book has tried to lay out in some detail an approach that treats visual perception primarily as an information-processing problem. This chapter presents a conversation between an imaginary skeptic and an imaginary defender of the information-processing point of view in order to answer the objections most commonly raised in this field. The dialogue is based on lunchtime conversations at the Salk Institute between Francis Crick, Tomaso Poggio, and David Marr. However, it does not follow those conversations very closely, and the imaginary objector is a combination of many real-life people.
Darieck Scott
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814740941
- eISBN:
- 9780814786543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814740941.003.0007
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
This chapter attempts to traverse the difficulties that narrative machinery encounters in blackness-in/as-abjection by visiting a kind of text that generically aims to work with (and to work) ...
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This chapter attempts to traverse the difficulties that narrative machinery encounters in blackness-in/as-abjection by visiting a kind of text that generically aims to work with (and to work) psychic/body responses: pornographic writing. In Samuel Delany's The Mad Man (1994), a literary pornographic work, the protagonist John Marr is a black gay male character who feverishly seeks out the pleasure of sexual acts that involve some form of apparent humiliation or degradation. It is argued that what is represented in The Mad Man is something in the nature of a rough model of working with the legacies of a history of conquest and enslavement (which is to say, with blackness, with having-been-blackened) through the transformation provided by erotic/sexual fantasies. Delany imagines a position that takes on board race without having at the same time to take up its fellow traveler, so often mistaken for the thing itself, ego. Is it possible to have race without ego, without defensive postures, without boundaries to police and ramparts on which to stand watch? The character of John Marr tries to model for us this position. Delany imagines him living his black body in its collective, sociogenic dimension, in which the demand to self-protection of that seductive individual I is refused in favor of one's becoming immersed in, lost in what it is to be the race, precisely as to be black means to have-been-blackened, to have been rendered abject.Less
This chapter attempts to traverse the difficulties that narrative machinery encounters in blackness-in/as-abjection by visiting a kind of text that generically aims to work with (and to work) psychic/body responses: pornographic writing. In Samuel Delany's The Mad Man (1994), a literary pornographic work, the protagonist John Marr is a black gay male character who feverishly seeks out the pleasure of sexual acts that involve some form of apparent humiliation or degradation. It is argued that what is represented in The Mad Man is something in the nature of a rough model of working with the legacies of a history of conquest and enslavement (which is to say, with blackness, with having-been-blackened) through the transformation provided by erotic/sexual fantasies. Delany imagines a position that takes on board race without having at the same time to take up its fellow traveler, so often mistaken for the thing itself, ego. Is it possible to have race without ego, without defensive postures, without boundaries to police and ramparts on which to stand watch? The character of John Marr tries to model for us this position. Delany imagines him living his black body in its collective, sociogenic dimension, in which the demand to self-protection of that seductive individual I is refused in favor of one's becoming immersed in, lost in what it is to be the race, precisely as to be black means to have-been-blackened, to have been rendered abject.
Michael Tarr
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199328741
- eISBN:
- 9780199369355
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328741.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
How do people recognize an object in different orientations? One theory is that the visual system describes the object relative to a reference frame centered on the object, resulting in a ...
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How do people recognize an object in different orientations? One theory is that the visual system describes the object relative to a reference frame centered on the object, resulting in a representation that is invariant across orientations. Chronometric data show that this is true only when an object can be identified uniquely by the arrangement of its parts along a single dimension. When an object can only be distinguished by an arrangement of its parts along more than one dimension, people mentally rotate it to a familiar orientation. This finding suggests that the human visual reference frame is tied to egocentric coordinates.Less
How do people recognize an object in different orientations? One theory is that the visual system describes the object relative to a reference frame centered on the object, resulting in a representation that is invariant across orientations. Chronometric data show that this is true only when an object can be identified uniquely by the arrangement of its parts along a single dimension. When an object can only be distinguished by an arrangement of its parts along more than one dimension, people mentally rotate it to a familiar orientation. This finding suggests that the human visual reference frame is tied to egocentric coordinates.
Egidio D’Angelo
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198749783
- eISBN:
- 9780191831638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749783.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Neuropsychology
Marr’s Motor Learning Theory (MLT) theory (Marr, 1969) represents a seminal example of how the structure/function relationship in a neural circuit can be conceptualized. It has laid the basis for ...
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Marr’s Motor Learning Theory (MLT) theory (Marr, 1969) represents a seminal example of how the structure/function relationship in a neural circuit can be conceptualized. It has laid the basis for cerebellar investigations for almost half a century. The foundations of MLT are that (1) the cerebellum granular layer generates a sparse representation of mossy fiber inputs that is then conveyed to Purkinje cells through the parallel fibers; and that (2) the connections between parallel fibers and Purkinje cells adjust their weights depending on teaching signals coming from the inferior olive through the climbing fibers. The MLT elegantly solved the problem of how the cerebellum might act as an adaptable controller and operate in several forms of behavior. Nonetheless, the MLT was based on connection statistics and lacked biological details about spatiotemporal dynamics and circuit geometry, so that it has been subsequently challenged by experimental findings related to neuronal and synaptic time-dependent properties, mechanisms and forms of long-term plasticity, and local connectivity rules. Interestingly, the fundamental intuition about the relationship between structure and function was supported by experimental findings on granular layer processing, Purkinje cell integration and parallel fiber plasticity. At present, the need to account for critical experimental observations has promoted the development of new biophysically-grounded models, which may lack the elegance of the initial MLT intuition but provide insight on how the neuronal circuit could operate dynamically during signal processing in the spatio-temporal domain.Less
Marr’s Motor Learning Theory (MLT) theory (Marr, 1969) represents a seminal example of how the structure/function relationship in a neural circuit can be conceptualized. It has laid the basis for cerebellar investigations for almost half a century. The foundations of MLT are that (1) the cerebellum granular layer generates a sparse representation of mossy fiber inputs that is then conveyed to Purkinje cells through the parallel fibers; and that (2) the connections between parallel fibers and Purkinje cells adjust their weights depending on teaching signals coming from the inferior olive through the climbing fibers. The MLT elegantly solved the problem of how the cerebellum might act as an adaptable controller and operate in several forms of behavior. Nonetheless, the MLT was based on connection statistics and lacked biological details about spatiotemporal dynamics and circuit geometry, so that it has been subsequently challenged by experimental findings related to neuronal and synaptic time-dependent properties, mechanisms and forms of long-term plasticity, and local connectivity rules. Interestingly, the fundamental intuition about the relationship between structure and function was supported by experimental findings on granular layer processing, Purkinje cell integration and parallel fiber plasticity. At present, the need to account for critical experimental observations has promoted the development of new biophysically-grounded models, which may lack the elegance of the initial MLT intuition but provide insight on how the neuronal circuit could operate dynamically during signal processing in the spatio-temporal domain.
Rodney J. Douglas and Kevan A. C. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198749783
- eISBN:
- 9780191831638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749783.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Neuropsychology
In this chapter we outline and discuss the key aspects of Marr’s seminal work on a theory of neocortex, published 45 years ago in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, B. Compared to his later work ...
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In this chapter we outline and discuss the key aspects of Marr’s seminal work on a theory of neocortex, published 45 years ago in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, B. Compared to his later work on computational models of vision, where he was principally concerned with developing algorithms, it is interesting to see how carefully Marr maps his early computational approach onto a neural implementation. Inevitably Marr had to make many guesses about the specifics of the cortical circuits, because so many key principles of organization were still missing. Here we review how the concepts introduced by Marr have evolved, driven by a richer understanding the structure, function and development of cortical circuits and their computational functions.Less
In this chapter we outline and discuss the key aspects of Marr’s seminal work on a theory of neocortex, published 45 years ago in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, B. Compared to his later work on computational models of vision, where he was principally concerned with developing algorithms, it is interesting to see how carefully Marr maps his early computational approach onto a neural implementation. Inevitably Marr had to make many guesses about the specifics of the cortical circuits, because so many key principles of organization were still missing. Here we review how the concepts introduced by Marr have evolved, driven by a richer understanding the structure, function and development of cortical circuits and their computational functions.
Martin V. Butz and Esther F. Kutter
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198739692
- eISBN:
- 9780191834462
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739692.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures, Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical ...
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Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical development of cognitive science. The fundamental homunculus and qualia problems are introduced, and tentative answers from embodied cognitive science are sketched-out. A look at biology emphasizes that our bodies and brains are evolutionarily shaped, making us ready to develop our minds. Psychologically, minds develop and adapt given environmental feedback, striving to optimize behavior. Only by means of constructive, generative processes, however, can a behavior-oriented “understanding” of the environment develop. These “understanding”-oriented structures also make our mind language ready. Finally, in order to comprehend how the human mind actually comes into being, based on the considered principles, it is necessary to pursue functional, computational, and where possible, algorithmic and hardware perspectives in the sense of David Marr’s three levels of understanding.Less
Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical development of cognitive science. The fundamental homunculus and qualia problems are introduced, and tentative answers from embodied cognitive science are sketched-out. A look at biology emphasizes that our bodies and brains are evolutionarily shaped, making us ready to develop our minds. Psychologically, minds develop and adapt given environmental feedback, striving to optimize behavior. Only by means of constructive, generative processes, however, can a behavior-oriented “understanding” of the environment develop. These “understanding”-oriented structures also make our mind language ready. Finally, in order to comprehend how the human mind actually comes into being, based on the considered principles, it is necessary to pursue functional, computational, and where possible, algorithmic and hardware perspectives in the sense of David Marr’s three levels of understanding.
Elizabeth Renker
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198808787
- eISBN:
- 9780191863660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198808787.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 19th Century Literature
During the eighties and through his death in 1891—that is, the height of high realism and the Realism War—Melville actively wrote, revised, and published his last two volumes, composed Billy Budd, ...
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During the eighties and through his death in 1891—that is, the height of high realism and the Realism War—Melville actively wrote, revised, and published his last two volumes, composed Billy Budd, and wrote and revised an extensive body of unpublished poems. Yet scholarship has rarely situated Melville the poet in the debates about realism and idealism common in the print culture of the age. This chapter demonstrates that he carved out a realist poetics. This poetics simultaneously countered both Howellsian models of realism and the genteel poetics of romantic idealism. Melville predicates his realist poetic practice on a vision of “the Real”—his term in “The Aeolian Harp” (1888)—as epistemologically opaque.Less
During the eighties and through his death in 1891—that is, the height of high realism and the Realism War—Melville actively wrote, revised, and published his last two volumes, composed Billy Budd, and wrote and revised an extensive body of unpublished poems. Yet scholarship has rarely situated Melville the poet in the debates about realism and idealism common in the print culture of the age. This chapter demonstrates that he carved out a realist poetics. This poetics simultaneously countered both Howellsian models of realism and the genteel poetics of romantic idealism. Melville predicates his realist poetic practice on a vision of “the Real”—his term in “The Aeolian Harp” (1888)—as epistemologically opaque.
Lawrence A. Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190662813
- eISBN:
- 9780190662844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Andy Clark has defended a view of the body’s relationship to the mind that he calls the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS). At the same time, he has criticized an alternative account, the Special ...
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Andy Clark has defended a view of the body’s relationship to the mind that he calls the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS). At the same time, he has criticized an alternative account, the Special Contribution Story (SC). After first clarifying the commitments of these two stories, I argue that Clark’s favored LMS is of less psychological interest than SC, and that SC offers an interesting and viable research program.Less
Andy Clark has defended a view of the body’s relationship to the mind that he calls the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS). At the same time, he has criticized an alternative account, the Special Contribution Story (SC). After first clarifying the commitments of these two stories, I argue that Clark’s favored LMS is of less psychological interest than SC, and that SC offers an interesting and viable research program.
Tim Shallice and Richard P. Cooper
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199579242
- eISBN:
- 9780191804489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199579242.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter begins with a discussion of the arguments and concepts of mathematician turned theoretical neurophysiologist, David Marr. It then covers the rejection of the Marrian approach; modules, ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the arguments and concepts of mathematician turned theoretical neurophysiologist, David Marr. It then covers the rejection of the Marrian approach; modules, isolable subsystems, and functional specialisation; the anatomical bases of modularity; information-processing models; the COGENT formalism; connectionist models; and more advanced symbolic architectures.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the arguments and concepts of mathematician turned theoretical neurophysiologist, David Marr. It then covers the rejection of the Marrian approach; modules, isolable subsystems, and functional specialisation; the anatomical bases of modularity; information-processing models; the COGENT formalism; connectionist models; and more advanced symbolic architectures.
John Zeimbekis
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198738916
- eISBN:
- 9780191802102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for ...
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Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of vision to ground perceptual justification, and the cognitive/perceptual phenomenology distinction. This chapter explores those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as flat after it has caused visual experiences with volumetric contents, and the ability to use a surface initially perceived as flat to visualize 3D scenes. In both cases, the visual processes which extract viewer-centered volumetric shapes (equivalent to Marr’s 2½D sketch) can be penetrated by cognitively driven acts of visualizing. It then make a proposal about why this form of cognitive penetration does not weaken vision’s ability to provide perceptual justification for beliefs.Less
Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of vision to ground perceptual justification, and the cognitive/perceptual phenomenology distinction. This chapter explores those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as flat after it has caused visual experiences with volumetric contents, and the ability to use a surface initially perceived as flat to visualize 3D scenes. In both cases, the visual processes which extract viewer-centered volumetric shapes (equivalent to Marr’s 2½D sketch) can be penetrated by cognitively driven acts of visualizing. It then make a proposal about why this form of cognitive penetration does not weaken vision’s ability to provide perceptual justification for beliefs.
