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This chapter examines the growth of the Furness Group’s shipping services between 1910 and 1919, as world trade, shipping values, and freight rates escalated after a brief slump. It charts the wave of acquisitions during the period, and considers the expansion of the Furness Group within the context of the industry-wide changes taking place. It offers an overview of the Furness Group’s performance, followed by an overview of their expansion strategy. Next, it focuses on the purchase and reconstruction of five financially weak firms between 1910-1912. It continues with development and expansion of South American trade. Further competitive difficulties arose between the Furness Group, International Mercantile Marine, and Canadian Pacific Railroad, including expansion efforts in New York and Rotterdam and related wartime developments. It concludes that in contrast to Furness’ promotion efforts at the beginning of the century, no new shipping subsidiaries were floated during this period, so capital gains were not realised as shipping values rose.

This chapter analyses the wartime behaviour of maritime merchants, particularly the necessity of seeking new trade ventures. As a case-study, it seeks to determine why Britain sought maritime trade with Denmark-dependent Iceland, during the Napoleonic Wars, and how this trade was conducted. It contextualises the maritime activities of Iceland in 1800; traces the trade voyages of the Clarence, the HMS Rover, the Margaret and Ann, and the Talbot to Iceland. It concludes by affirming the trade began as a result of chance, and failed to thrive due to the pressures of war.

This chapter discusses the economic impact of prize-making by both privateers and the Royal Navy on Atlantic Canada. It considers the following factors: commercial warfare; blockades; compulsory convoys; the risks of insuring trade and the risks of securing trade to confirm that American trade was choked by privateering and prize-making, which led to the complete collapse of the American war effort. The author concludes that the war was a futile military exercise, but a successful war against maritime trade.

This chapter continues the previous chapter’s overview of British shipping conventions, picking up in 1689 at the turning point of industry growth and continuing into the late eighteenth century. It pays particular attention to the Anglo-French wars between 1689-1713 and the effect they had on shipping growth, resulting in both temporary setbacks and long-term economic depression. It examines the Union of England and Scotland, the sharp decline of Anglo-French trade and the compensatory increase in trade with Portugal, and non-war related declines such as trade with Turkey and the decline of the Newfoundland Fishery. It catalogues the shipping tonnage of major English ports, and contrasts Bristol, Liverpool, and Hull in regard to several aspects of shipping such as the growing slave trade. It concludes with the growth of international and transatlantic trade, and the transformation of British shipping in anticipation of modern shipping technology.

This chapter considers the financial impact of war on British shipping during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It attempts to discern the number of merchant ship losses during the Anglo-Spanish War, Anglo-French War, Seven Years’ War, and the Dutch Wars by scrutinising Admiralty records of loss estimates. It examines privateering activity; wartime insurance rates; the rise in seafaring wages; naval impressment; the disruption to trade cycles; the hiring of ships by the government; and a contrast of tonnage rates between periods of peace and war to determine the financial cost of war to the shipping industry. It concludes that though war made many demands of the merchant shipping industry, merchants and shipowners knew that successful campaigns would lead to the expansion of a British shipping monopoly, and so deemed war financially worthwhile in the long run.

This final chapter returns to the original question laid out at the start of the volume: why the tonnage of British ships declined by an enormous amount between 1900 and 1960. It brings together the findings of the volume to provide a definitive conclusion. It reiterates the changes in economic factors; interferences with the competitive process; trade factors; war; taxation; policy-making; growth rates; and growth constraints, concluding that overall, the decline of the industry was primarily due to internal decision-making rather than external factors. Upon publication, this conclusion drew ire and scrutiny, but Sturmey’s arguments have generally stood the test of time.

This chapter is a study of the rise and decline of the British coastal shipping trade between 1870 and 1914. It separates the period into three segments: the prosperous 1870-1914; the immediate impact of the First World War 1914-1918; and the stagnation of 1918-1930. It examines both the short and long-term causes of decline, and concludes that the decline and stagnation of the coastal fleet was due to a combination of factors, both avoidable and inevitable. Crucially, though the coastal shipping continued to innovate during this period it did not do so quickly enough to rescue the industry.

This chapter presents an English-language translation of Antoine Zuchet’s correspondence with the Dutch Republic during the Tripolitanian War between America and Tripoli (The First Barbary War). Zuchet was a Representative of the Dutch Republic, originally from Livorno and living in Tripoli during the war. His detailed account serves as a counter-balance to the records from the American Navy which reflect a certain level of nationalist bias. Zuchet’s account as a neutral party displays sympathy for American hostages; remarks on poor, naive, and incoherent choices made by American naval officers and diplomats; and condemns Tripolitanian leader Yusuf Karamanli as a tyrant.

This chapter is the first of two to explore United States President Thomas Jefferson’s approach to the Tripolitanian War. It argues that Jefferson sought to protect and expand American commerce whilst eroding the trade networks of England and France as means of gaining a stronger position in the international economy. It suggests that Jefferson’s use of commerce as a tool of foreign policy was not related to pacifism and diplomacy, but rather an extra arm of defence on the world stage. It provides a thorough exploration of Jefferson’s political and economic motives for the war, and in doing so compares Jefferson’s speeches to the language of Realpolitik. It also explores the advocacy of economic warfare; and details the feud between Jefferson and Hamilton concerning British rule. It concludes that the Tripolitanian War can be considered a component of a larger geopolitical strategy to defend and advance the political and economic interests of America. It also asserts that historians should treat this war within the nineteenth-century political sphere, and refrain from making comparisons to twenty-first century American foreign policy.

This chapter is the second of two to explore United States President Thomas Jefferson’s approach to the Tripolitanian War. Unlike the previous chapter, this one presents Jefferson as both reluctant to use force and unprepared for the length and toll of the campaign. It examines his fluctuating attitude toward the navy; concern over the financial cost of war; difficulty in securing an end to the war; and the handling of the disastrous loss of the Philadelphia. It concludes that though Jefferson was ambivalent and reluctant to enter war and failed to use sufficient force for the majority of the campaign, he was triumphant in avoiding paying tribute to Tripoli, and the war was an overall success for the United States.

This chapter studies the transition from war to peace between 1939 and 1948 and its impact on British shipping. The section discussing war is broken into two parts: the change in tonnage rates during the war and the financial fallout of war. It pays particular attention to wartime financial dealmaking, and compares British and Norwegian shipowning during the period to determine that British shipping neither suffered nor profited from the Second World War any more so than other nations. The second part of the chapter evaluates the transition to peace, discovering that British shipowners had learnt to be cautious about replenishing tonnage after the First World War, but by 1948 had successfully regained a strong fleet. The conclusion clarifies that uncertainty surrounding the growth of the industry would increase in the coming years.

This chapter presents the effects of the First World War on the future of the British shipping industry. It examines shipping tonnage statistics to demonstrates Britain’s loss of three million tons and in contrast, the worldwide tonnage increase of seven million tons. It is presented in two halves: the first provides overviews of the tonnage profit between 1914 and 1920 in America, Japan, France, and Italy, and the tonnage of neutral countries and British enemies; detailed shipping losses and the financial effects on British shipping; plus tramp and liner statistics, tax rates, freight rates, the lack of equalisation schemes, and the loss of entrepôt trade. The second half examines the British postwar reconstruction effort, and calculates the value of the four major sources of tonnage available: British ships built during the war; ceded German ships; purchases from foreign owners; and new builds. It concludes that Britain sought to return to a prewar perceived sense of normalcy in shipping, despite irrevocable changes in worldwide shipping such as the rise of the American fleet.