Jeffrie G. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195178555
- eISBN:
- 9780199850129
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178555.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter provides an exploration on the manners by which a Christian perspective can affect one's thinking and own judgment on forgiveness positively or negatively. First, it examines a number of ...
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This chapter provides an exploration on the manners by which a Christian perspective can affect one's thinking and own judgment on forgiveness positively or negatively. First, it examines a number of central Christian teachings about vengeance and forgiveness that can be accepted in secular terms. Afterwards, the chapter looks into various Christian teachings that can be accepted only in the context of Christian commitment. Two scriptural passages from Romans are cited on this section that shows God's approval of vengeance. However, human limitations inhibit God to entrust his creatures with such task. The chapter ends by drawing some insights from the theologian Marilyn Adams about Christian teachings that has bearing on forgiveness. Four teachings are presented in detail.Less
This chapter provides an exploration on the manners by which a Christian perspective can affect one's thinking and own judgment on forgiveness positively or negatively. First, it examines a number of central Christian teachings about vengeance and forgiveness that can be accepted in secular terms. Afterwards, the chapter looks into various Christian teachings that can be accepted only in the context of Christian commitment. Two scriptural passages from Romans are cited on this section that shows God's approval of vengeance. However, human limitations inhibit God to entrust his creatures with such task. The chapter ends by drawing some insights from the theologian Marilyn Adams about Christian teachings that has bearing on forgiveness. Four teachings are presented in detail.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible ...
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This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.Less
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.
Dustin Crummett
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Both Marilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump have endorsed requirements on theodicy which, if true, imply that we can never suffer all-things-considered harms. William Hasker has offered a series of ...
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Both Marilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump have endorsed requirements on theodicy which, if true, imply that we can never suffer all-things-considered harms. William Hasker has offered a series of arguments intended to show that this implication is unacceptable. This chapter evaluates Hasker’s arguments and finds them lacking. However, it also argues that Hasker’s arguments can be modified or expanded in ways that make them very powerful. The chapter closes by considering why God might not meet the requirements endorsed by Stump and Adams and shows how they can modify their requirements to avoid the untenable implications about harm while still respecting the concerns that motivated their requirements in the first place.Less
Both Marilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump have endorsed requirements on theodicy which, if true, imply that we can never suffer all-things-considered harms. William Hasker has offered a series of arguments intended to show that this implication is unacceptable. This chapter evaluates Hasker’s arguments and finds them lacking. However, it also argues that Hasker’s arguments can be modified or expanded in ways that make them very powerful. The chapter closes by considering why God might not meet the requirements endorsed by Stump and Adams and shows how they can modify their requirements to avoid the untenable implications about harm while still respecting the concerns that motivated their requirements in the first place.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by ...
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This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.Less
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on ...
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This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.Less
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in ...
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This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in contemporary theodicies. These misemphases include a failure to adequately appreciate the distinctive challenges that horrendous evils pose for the moral justification of harm; an overemphasis on the moral distinction between causing and permitting (especially where God is the agent in question); an overestimation of the moral significance of caretaker rights to cause or permit harm; an overemphasis on the role of free will in theodicy (resulting in a tendency towards anthropocentrism); and a questionable focus on general goods which manifests itself in a prioritizing of worlds over human persons, generic human persons over individual human persons, and all-things-considered benefit over more specific interests such as the aversion of serious harm. It is argued that Non-Identity Theodicy corrects for these various misemphases by conceiving of God first and foremost not as a creator of goods but as a lover of persons. This chapter ends by discussing how Non-Identity Theodicy can be combined with other theodicies in the formulation of a cumulative case theodicy.Less
This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in contemporary theodicies. These misemphases include a failure to adequately appreciate the distinctive challenges that horrendous evils pose for the moral justification of harm; an overemphasis on the moral distinction between causing and permitting (especially where God is the agent in question); an overestimation of the moral significance of caretaker rights to cause or permit harm; an overemphasis on the role of free will in theodicy (resulting in a tendency towards anthropocentrism); and a questionable focus on general goods which manifests itself in a prioritizing of worlds over human persons, generic human persons over individual human persons, and all-things-considered benefit over more specific interests such as the aversion of serious harm. It is argued that Non-Identity Theodicy corrects for these various misemphases by conceiving of God first and foremost not as a creator of goods but as a lover of persons. This chapter ends by discussing how Non-Identity Theodicy can be combined with other theodicies in the formulation of a cumulative case theodicy.
R. Zachary Manis
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190929251
- eISBN:
- 9780190929282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190929251.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter begins with some remarks about what traditionalism, for all its difficulties, gets right, and why orthodox Christians are rightly reticent to abandon it. The author then moves on to ...
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This chapter begins with some remarks about what traditionalism, for all its difficulties, gets right, and why orthodox Christians are rightly reticent to abandon it. The author then moves on to universalism, first identifying what he takes to be its most plausible variety and then presenting select arguments on its behalf that are especially powerful and that pose the greatest challenge to anti-universalists. The most basic and fundamental argument in support of universalism is that the salvation of all persons seems to follow from two theological assumptions that are central to orthodox theism: that God is perfectly loving and that God is perfectly sovereign. Some further arguments from two of the foremost defenders of universalism, Marilyn Adams and Thomas Talbott, are given special consideration.Less
This chapter begins with some remarks about what traditionalism, for all its difficulties, gets right, and why orthodox Christians are rightly reticent to abandon it. The author then moves on to universalism, first identifying what he takes to be its most plausible variety and then presenting select arguments on its behalf that are especially powerful and that pose the greatest challenge to anti-universalists. The most basic and fundamental argument in support of universalism is that the salvation of all persons seems to follow from two theological assumptions that are central to orthodox theism: that God is perfectly loving and that God is perfectly sovereign. Some further arguments from two of the foremost defenders of universalism, Marilyn Adams and Thomas Talbott, are given special consideration.
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190246365
- eISBN:
- 9780190246396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0016
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert ...
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A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.Less
A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.
Michael C. Rea
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198826019
- eISBN:
- 9780191865015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198826019.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter is concerned with the question (central to the hiddenness problem) of how people who lack the theistic concept of God, or who are unable to attend to that concept because of trauma or ...
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This chapter is concerned with the question (central to the hiddenness problem) of how people who lack the theistic concept of God, or who are unable to attend to that concept because of trauma or other psychological obstacles, might be able to participate in a positively meaningful relationship with God just by trying to do so. The chapter begins by identifying sufficient conditions on trying to participate in a relationship with God, and arguing that these conditions can be satisfied even by someone who lacks the Christian concept of God. Next, it explains why simply trying to participate in a relationship with God by itself suffices for participating in a relationship with God. Finally, it shows that these conclusions imply that anyone who can try to participate in a relationship with God can participate in such a relationship just by trying.Less
This chapter is concerned with the question (central to the hiddenness problem) of how people who lack the theistic concept of God, or who are unable to attend to that concept because of trauma or other psychological obstacles, might be able to participate in a positively meaningful relationship with God just by trying to do so. The chapter begins by identifying sufficient conditions on trying to participate in a relationship with God, and arguing that these conditions can be satisfied even by someone who lacks the Christian concept of God. Next, it explains why simply trying to participate in a relationship with God by itself suffices for participating in a relationship with God. Finally, it shows that these conclusions imply that anyone who can try to participate in a relationship with God can participate in such a relationship just by trying.