Alexander Ebner
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231423
- eISBN:
- 9780191710865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231423.003.0013
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy
This chapter examines the co-evolutionary relationship between markets and states as a path-dependent process that reflects the social construction of institutional change. It reviews the major ...
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This chapter examines the co-evolutionary relationship between markets and states as a path-dependent process that reflects the social construction of institutional change. It reviews the major contributions to the governance approach, as originally provided by the new institutional economics and subsequently extended in the transdisciplinary discourse of the new institutionalism. Oliver E. Williamson's transaction cost approach to governance is examined, offering insights into the notion of private ordering as a governance device. Douglass C. North's theory of the institutional evolution of markets and states and, Mancur Olson's collective action approach to governance are then considered.Less
This chapter examines the co-evolutionary relationship between markets and states as a path-dependent process that reflects the social construction of institutional change. It reviews the major contributions to the governance approach, as originally provided by the new institutional economics and subsequently extended in the transdisciplinary discourse of the new institutionalism. Oliver E. Williamson's transaction cost approach to governance is examined, offering insights into the notion of private ordering as a governance device. Douglass C. North's theory of the institutional evolution of markets and states and, Mancur Olson's collective action approach to governance are then considered.
Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154954
- eISBN:
- 9781400845484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.003.0003
- Subject:
- Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology
This chapter examines Mancur Olson's arguments, which he articulated in The Logic of Collective Action, and compares them with those of his supporters and detractors. It also reviews the social ...
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This chapter examines Mancur Olson's arguments, which he articulated in The Logic of Collective Action, and compares them with those of his supporters and detractors. It also reviews the social science literature on cooperation, focusing primarily on the theoretical and empirical research on collective action that grew out of Olson's challenge. According to Olson, the members of a group have interests in common. His logic was an economic logic, based on the behavior of firms in the marketplace in their quest for profits. Olson extended this logic of the market to human social behavior. The chapter considers Olson's solutions to the problem of free riding and the possibility that no group would ever form, including coercion, small groups, selective benefits, and the by-product theory of public goods provisioning. Finally, it describes some major extensions of and challenges to Olson's path-breaking model.Less
This chapter examines Mancur Olson's arguments, which he articulated in The Logic of Collective Action, and compares them with those of his supporters and detractors. It also reviews the social science literature on cooperation, focusing primarily on the theoretical and empirical research on collective action that grew out of Olson's challenge. According to Olson, the members of a group have interests in common. His logic was an economic logic, based on the behavior of firms in the marketplace in their quest for profits. Olson extended this logic of the market to human social behavior. The chapter considers Olson's solutions to the problem of free riding and the possibility that no group would ever form, including coercion, small groups, selective benefits, and the by-product theory of public goods provisioning. Finally, it describes some major extensions of and challenges to Olson's path-breaking model.
Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154954
- eISBN:
- 9781400845484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.003.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology
This book investigates a wide range of ideas, theories, and existing empirical research relevant to the study of the complex and diverse phenomenon of human cooperation. Issues relating to ...
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This book investigates a wide range of ideas, theories, and existing empirical research relevant to the study of the complex and diverse phenomenon of human cooperation. Issues relating to cooperation are examined from the perspective of evolutionary theory, political science, and related social sciences. The book draws upon two bodies of work: Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) and George C. Williams's Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). Olson, an economist, and Williams, an evolutionary biologist, both argued that a focus on groups would not provide a complete understanding of collective action and other social behaviors. This introductory chapter discusses some important definitions relating to cooperation, with particular emphasis on collective action and collective action dilemmas, along with coordination and coordination problems. It also provides an overview of the chapters that follow.Less
This book investigates a wide range of ideas, theories, and existing empirical research relevant to the study of the complex and diverse phenomenon of human cooperation. Issues relating to cooperation are examined from the perspective of evolutionary theory, political science, and related social sciences. The book draws upon two bodies of work: Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) and George C. Williams's Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). Olson, an economist, and Williams, an evolutionary biologist, both argued that a focus on groups would not provide a complete understanding of collective action and other social behaviors. This introductory chapter discusses some important definitions relating to cooperation, with particular emphasis on collective action and collective action dilemmas, along with coordination and coordination problems. It also provides an overview of the chapters that follow.
Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154954
- eISBN:
- 9781400845484
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology
From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation ...
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From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation can be—snarled traffic, polarized politics, overexploited resources, social problems that go ignored. The benefits to oneself of a free ride on the efforts of others mean that collective goals often are not met. But compared to most other species, people actually cooperate a great deal. Why is this? This book brings together insights from evolutionary biology, political science, economics, anthropology, and other fields to explain how the interactions between our evolved selves and the institutional structures we have created make cooperation possible. The book begins with a look at the ideas of Mancur Olson and George C. Williams, who shifted the question of why cooperation happens from an emphasis on group benefits to individual costs. It then explores how these ideas have influenced our thinking about cooperation, coordination, and collective action. It persuasively argues that cooperation and its failures are best explained by evolutionary and social theories working together. Selection sometimes favors cooperative tendencies, while institutions, norms, and incentives encourage and make possible actual cooperation. This book should inspire researchers from different disciplines and intellectual traditions to share ideas and advance our understanding of cooperative behavior in a world that is more complex than ever before.Less
From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation can be—snarled traffic, polarized politics, overexploited resources, social problems that go ignored. The benefits to oneself of a free ride on the efforts of others mean that collective goals often are not met. But compared to most other species, people actually cooperate a great deal. Why is this? This book brings together insights from evolutionary biology, political science, economics, anthropology, and other fields to explain how the interactions between our evolved selves and the institutional structures we have created make cooperation possible. The book begins with a look at the ideas of Mancur Olson and George C. Williams, who shifted the question of why cooperation happens from an emphasis on group benefits to individual costs. It then explores how these ideas have influenced our thinking about cooperation, coordination, and collective action. It persuasively argues that cooperation and its failures are best explained by evolutionary and social theories working together. Selection sometimes favors cooperative tendencies, while institutions, norms, and incentives encourage and make possible actual cooperation. This book should inspire researchers from different disciplines and intellectual traditions to share ideas and advance our understanding of cooperative behavior in a world that is more complex than ever before.
Darren Halpin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719076527
- eISBN:
- 9781781701690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719076527.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter scrutinizes the argument of Mancur Olson regarding collective action. His thesis has been instrumental in fostering pessimism about the democratic potential of groups. This chapter ...
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This chapter scrutinizes the argument of Mancur Olson regarding collective action. His thesis has been instrumental in fostering pessimism about the democratic potential of groups. This chapter argues that while his predictions are right, for representation groups, his reliance on a dominant and wide-spread self-interested rationality is a weakness in his framework. Instead, this chapter argues that the reason they work is not to do with the rationality of joiners, but the way the group constructs and legitimizes a passive form of group affiliation. Thus, Olson works as much because of a supply-side, as a demand-side, phenomenon.Less
This chapter scrutinizes the argument of Mancur Olson regarding collective action. His thesis has been instrumental in fostering pessimism about the democratic potential of groups. This chapter argues that while his predictions are right, for representation groups, his reliance on a dominant and wide-spread self-interested rationality is a weakness in his framework. Instead, this chapter argues that the reason they work is not to do with the rationality of joiners, but the way the group constructs and legitimizes a passive form of group affiliation. Thus, Olson works as much because of a supply-side, as a demand-side, phenomenon.
Mark Zachary Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190464127
- eISBN:
- 9780190609252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190464127.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
This chapter completes the explanation of creative insecurity theory and presents cross-national statistical data to support it. It describes how military and economic threats from foreign rivals can ...
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This chapter completes the explanation of creative insecurity theory and presents cross-national statistical data to support it. It describes how military and economic threats from foreign rivals can counteract domestic political resistance to innovation. External threats raise the benefits of S&T progress and the costs of technological stagnation. Therefore, higher levels of external threats cause a society to alter its calculus regarding the relative costs and risks of technological change. Indeed, as the threat balance shifts more and more toward the external, even many technological losers may recognize that their interests are better served by accepting the costs of S&T progress and government actions that support it.Less
This chapter completes the explanation of creative insecurity theory and presents cross-national statistical data to support it. It describes how military and economic threats from foreign rivals can counteract domestic political resistance to innovation. External threats raise the benefits of S&T progress and the costs of technological stagnation. Therefore, higher levels of external threats cause a society to alter its calculus regarding the relative costs and risks of technological change. Indeed, as the threat balance shifts more and more toward the external, even many technological losers may recognize that their interests are better served by accepting the costs of S&T progress and government actions that support it.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226502106
- eISBN:
- 9780226502120
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226502120.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter investigates transaction cost economics and includes a review of the restrictions on transacting imposed by requirements for common carriage and third-party access (TPA). It evaluates in ...
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This chapter investigates transaction cost economics and includes a review of the restrictions on transacting imposed by requirements for common carriage and third-party access (TPA). It evaluates in detail the concepts of the new institutional economics. The cost of transacting with pipelines once demanded vertical integration. Common carriage was never used for gas pipelines in the United States. A digression on common carriage and TPA is ineluctable if an economic analysis of the different pipeline transport markets in the world is going to make sense. Mancur Olson attracted a number of implications that seem to be significant in how groups press to shape pipeline regulation and markets. His implications from the logic of collective action appeared to be confirmed often enough. The notion of property rights to point-to-point pipeline transport capacity was central to understanding modern pipeline markets.Less
This chapter investigates transaction cost economics and includes a review of the restrictions on transacting imposed by requirements for common carriage and third-party access (TPA). It evaluates in detail the concepts of the new institutional economics. The cost of transacting with pipelines once demanded vertical integration. Common carriage was never used for gas pipelines in the United States. A digression on common carriage and TPA is ineluctable if an economic analysis of the different pipeline transport markets in the world is going to make sense. Mancur Olson attracted a number of implications that seem to be significant in how groups press to shape pipeline regulation and markets. His implications from the logic of collective action appeared to be confirmed often enough. The notion of property rights to point-to-point pipeline transport capacity was central to understanding modern pipeline markets.
Charlotte Rommerskirchen
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198829010
- eISBN:
- 9780191867446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198829010.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
Fiscal policy coordination is marred by a classic collective action problem; it pays to be egoistical. Member states have an incentive to under- or over-stimulate their economies (what this chapter ...
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Fiscal policy coordination is marred by a classic collective action problem; it pays to be egoistical. Member states have an incentive to under- or over-stimulate their economies (what this chapter terms growth and stability free riding), despite a common interest in coordinated policies. Building on Mancur Olson’s premise on collective action failure, the chapter develops three research questions that guide the empirical investigation. These relate to the group latency of EU membership, the evidence for collective action, and finally the provision of incentives to keep free riding at bay. The theme running through this chapter is that the interdependence of EU economies requires cooperative solutions to common problems.Less
Fiscal policy coordination is marred by a classic collective action problem; it pays to be egoistical. Member states have an incentive to under- or over-stimulate their economies (what this chapter terms growth and stability free riding), despite a common interest in coordinated policies. Building on Mancur Olson’s premise on collective action failure, the chapter develops three research questions that guide the empirical investigation. These relate to the group latency of EU membership, the evidence for collective action, and finally the provision of incentives to keep free riding at bay. The theme running through this chapter is that the interdependence of EU economies requires cooperative solutions to common problems.
Werner Troesken (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226299570
- eISBN:
- 9780226299594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226299594.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter examines the history of public utility regulation in the U.S. focusing on regime change and corruption. It suggests that the move to public ownership in the early twentieth century and ...
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This chapter examines the history of public utility regulation in the U.S. focusing on regime change and corruption. It suggests that the move to public ownership in the early twentieth century and the move away from public ownership seventy-five years later were both associated with gains in service quality. This chapter also discusses Mancur Olson's view that change in any direction reduces corruption because of the ossification that all bureaucracies incur after some time.Less
This chapter examines the history of public utility regulation in the U.S. focusing on regime change and corruption. It suggests that the move to public ownership in the early twentieth century and the move away from public ownership seventy-five years later were both associated with gains in service quality. This chapter also discusses Mancur Olson's view that change in any direction reduces corruption because of the ossification that all bureaucracies incur after some time.
