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This chapter examines the political evolution of Malaysia in relation to minority communities, and compares the Malaysian experience to Western liberal theories of multiculturalism. The first three sections of the chapter focus on the important eras in the political history of the Malaysian model: colonization and migration, political independence, and the 1969 ethnic riots and resulting policy initiatives. The final section explores the constitutional and structural opportunities and constraints facing minority groups, and their relation to Western liberal theories. It is argued that Malaysia practices minority rights within the framework of Western liberalism, which is both a boon and a bane for minority communities.

Although there is now a general recognition that capital market liberalization failed to help developing countries achieve economic growth and stability, there are still a number of unresolved controversies, including the fundamental issue of what types of capital market interventions governments should undertake, and more centrally, whether there exist any interventions for which the benefits exceed the costs. Given the importance that capital account interventions can play in macroeconomic policy-making, this chapter analyzes alternative modes of regulations, including case studies of Chile, Colombia, and Malaysia. Though economists have a strong proclivity for price-based interventions (taxes and subsidies) over quantity-based interventions (administrative restrictions and controls), theoretical work in economics has shown that sometimes quantity-based restrictions can reduce risk more effectively than price interventions. In addition to direct forms of interventions, such as taxes and restrictions on inflows and outflows, interventions in capital markets can also take on a variety of indirect forms such as limiting banks’ short-term foreign borrowing or applying adverse tax or bankruptcy treatment to foreign-denominated borrowing. Though the regulations vary in their methods, they generally serve to segment (or separate) the domestic and foreign exchange markets. The chapter concludes with a number of arguments for and against the various modes of capital market intervention.

This introductory chapter discusses the primary objectives of this book, which is to contribute to the understanding of minority rights in Asia. It aims to study the domestic legal systems of four states, with a view to extrapolating the legal regimes and institutions that exist for the protection of minority rights within their jurisdictions. The four states are India, China, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Includes all relevant information on national elections held in Malaysia since its independence in 1957. Part I gives a comprehensive overview of Malaysia's political history, outlines the evolution of electoral provisions, and presents the current electoral legislation in a standardized manner (suffrage, elected institutions, nomination of candidates, electoral system, organizational context of elections). Part II includes exhaustive electoral statistics in systematic tables (numbers of registered voters, votes cast, the votes for parties in parliamentary elections at both the national and regional level, the electoral participation of political parties, the national and regional distribution of parliamentary seats, etc.).

Most studies of Islamism have focused on the role of oppositional forces. Increasingly, states are also important Islamist actors. States pursue Islamization not only in reaction to Islamist challenges but also because in Islamism they see the opportunity to address the inherent weaknesses of the postcolonial state structure, and to significantly increase the power and capacity of the state. This trend is most evident in Pakistan and Malaysia where both the weakness of the postcolonial state and the opportunity inherent in Islamization have been greatest. These cases deviate from other models of state formation in the Muslim world, and provide new insights not only into state formation in the Muslim world but also into the study of the role of religion in state expansion in comparative politics.

Malaysia and Pakistan were created from the rump of British colonialism in India and Southeast Asia. Both states lacked national identity or a unified polity that preceded independence. Both confronted social divisions that were the legacy of the colonial era. In fact, in both countries the struggle for independence was not directed against the British, but was a competition of racial, religious, and ethnic rivals. As weak states, they were unable to proceed with effective state formation. Economic Disparities in Malaysia led to racial and ethnic tensions. Weak state institutions and constitutional crises led to ethnic tensions in Pakistan.

Malaysia and Pakistan sought to address their problems through economic growth and the management of ethnic tensions. Malaysia pursued the New Economic Policy (NEP) to favor Malay bumiputras (sons of the soil), and Pakistan, under a military government, pursued aggressive economic growth. However, these strategies did not resolve ethnic tensions as in Malaysia it did not alleviate the economic problems facing Malays, and in Pakistan it favored Punjab at the cost of other provinces, especially East Pakistan. Both states continued to experience serious challenges to their authorities in the form of racial tensions in Malaysia and the Bangladesh movement in Pakistan.

The 1970s was a period of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and Pakistan. In Malaysia, ABIM and dakwah movements, and in Pakistan, the Jama`at‐i Islami spearheaded Islamist challenge to the secular state. These movements grew in popularity, and became the voice of the disgruntled political elements. They also floated new and powerful political concepts and ideas that quickly gained in popularity and framed public debates and influenced political culture.

In the 1980s, Malaysia adopted the policy of state‐led Islamization. The ruling UMNO party co‐opted ABIM, fashioned itself as an Islamically oriented party, and adopted many Islamist ideas. The state created Islamic institutions, and supported Islamic cultural, political, and economic activities. It used Islamization to expand its power and to penetrate the Malay society. The state also embarked on rapid economic growth to address racial tensions. It used its control of Islam to manage Islamic politics and define Islamic values with a view of economic growth and accommodating globalization.

Why did only Malaysia and Pakistan adopt state‐led Islamization as a strategy for expansion of state power? How did this strategy serve their interests? What was the impact of this strategy on these countries and their societies? In the end, Islamization did serve state interests, but at the cost of laws and procedures that were neither viable in the long run nor were they socially beneficial. Furthermore, Islamization strategy ultimately proved untenable as interests of the state and those of Islamist actors began to diverge, especially with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis, and implementation of IMF reforms.

This chapter explores the three phases of political development in Malaysia, and the changing features of women’s movements as they interface with the politics of ethnicity and democratisation. Gender politics evolved by taking three main facets: political sponsorship, political division, and political inclusion. It is argued that under Malaysia’s current phase of political reconstruction, conflicting gender interests are at risk for being coalesced as ethnic identities and interests are being de-emphasized. However, this process can only be sustained if autonomous feminist movements can withstand pressures to succumb to the agendas of opposition and ruling political parties that exploit the gender discourse for their legitimacy.

Chapter 6 examines the period following April 1967, during which the fundamental issue shifted from whether or not Britain should withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore—which had now been decided—to how Britain should withdraw. On the one side, Britain's international allies, Malaysia and Singapore as well as the ANZUS powers, and the defence and foreign policy departments hoped that the public extent of the change in policy would be minimised and the symbolic remnants of Britain's role maximised. On the other side, Labour Party and Cabinet critics of the previous defence policy hoped for as full and public a reversal as possible. These debates produced the strained outcome evidenced in the Wilson Government's 1967 Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy: an announcement of a staged withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, coupled to a declaration that Britain intended to retain a capability for use in the region to meet its remaining commitments, all wrapped up in the rhetoric of a continuing world role.

Chapter 7 documents the abandonment of the last symbolic remnants of Britain's world role in the aftermath of devaluation. The devaluation of Sterling itself, in November 1967, had little direct effect on defence and foreign policy. But when Roy Jenkins became the new Chancellor of the Exchequer in December 1967, he set about the task of preparing further economic measures to shore up the Pound at its new, reduced level. The bulk of his proposed cuts came from domestic expenditure: but his strategy for getting the cuts through Cabinet involved the initial symbolic sacrifice of the remnants of Britain's ‘East of Suez’ role, and an accelerated withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. Within the Cabinet itself, the old structure of authority that had maintained the Wilson Government's former policies had broken down, enabling Jenkins to guide it to abandon the last echo of Britain's former Empire.

The Conclusion summarises the argument of the book about how the Wilson Government came to decide to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore and the Britain's ‘East of Suez’ role. It notes that there was a conflict between Britain's fundamental interests: between its limited economic means and the need to maintain relations with its major allies, all of whom wanted Britain to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia. Once this issue was decided, a second issue arose about how to balance the political pressure for a fast, public and complete withdrawal, against demands that the symbolic remnants of Britain's world role be retained as long as possible. The Conclusion notes that the roles and significance of the key actors through this process changed over time, from the Whitehall departments and their leading ministers, to the Parliamentary Labour Party, to Cabinet.

This chapter on Malaysian business groups demonstrates how much Malaysia was influenced by East Asian corporate models, specifically the chaebol and the keiretsu, in the way the national economy developed. In addition, affirmative action policies favoring indigenous Malays, known as Bumiputeras, contributed to the rise of several major business groups. Businesses run by the ethnic Chinese had to accommodate the state in order to survive and expand, which led to these entrepreneurs building connections with politicians. The Asian Crisis had a profound impact on domestic capitalists, especially well-connected ones. Some leading Bumiputeras capitalists lost control of their corporate assets since they were burdened with enormous debts and depended too much on state leaders. Their corporate activities were often influenced by politicians and affected by political crises. As a consequence, business groups with better political connections thrived. Others, with the wrong connections, lost their businesses.