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This chapter discusses the role of the skull in forming the face and in identifying individuality, particularly in reconstructing ancient faces that bear semblance to the dead. Skulls serve as the armature of the face, where tissue, muscles and the skin are attached to form a distinct face. Whereas a surgeon removes layers of skin and tissue to reveal the skull, a medical artist builds each muscle in the skull by using well-established statistics for the flesh thickness and adds layers of clay for the skin. In general, the reconstruction of the face involves the use of a plaster cast replica of the skull. In such replicas, pegs are inserted to the cast to mark the thickness of the skull. In the whole process of face reconstruction, the skull, the medical and the pathological evidence provided by the skull and the post cranial skeleton dictate the formation of the face. In instances when the skull is absent or inaccessible, portraits found on the coffins are vital for reconstruction. While face reconstruction may seem simple, the process of reconstructing faces is a difficult task. Reconstruction of the face requires painstaking work, and knowledge of pathology, anatomy, dentistry and much more to build a case for history. Nevertheless, the painstaking work of face reconstruction is important in the field of forensics and in medical applications. Some of the cases of face reconstruction described in this chapter include the face reconstruction of Phillip II of Macedon, the face reconstruction of the Great Harwood case, the recreation of the faces of the Grave Gamma and the Seianti.

This chapter examines the question of Athenian dependency on grain imports in the ‘classical’ 4th century. It establishes the complexities, finances, and different interests that characterized commerce. Topics covered include dependency cultures, models of dependency, quantifying dependency on imported grain, the economic realities of moving grain, ateleia> — the honour given by the Athenians to significant benefactors, overseas territories, financing commerce, and Athenian economics before 322.

One of the more intriguing documents in the extant corpus of ancient literature on Alexander the Great of Macedon and his death is Liber de Morte, a fictitious account of his last days and will, which was originally appended to a late Latin history known as the Metz Epitome. References to such a document are found in two major historical sources. Quintus Curtius, the Roman historian, claims that an alleged testament of the king had purported to distribute his empire amongst his generals, but he emphatically rejects the validity of its existence and the tradition. According to Diodorus Siculus, Alexander admired the Rhodians so much that he deposited his will with them. Historically, this seems unlikely in view of Alexander's treatment of the island; he had installed a garrison on it and at his death the Rhodians removed their Macedonian overlords.

In the first trial between Demosthenes and Aeschines, the former depicts his rival as a traitor who by accepting Philip of Macedon's bribes and acting against the interest of the Aeschines has effectively left the community of Athenians. Demosthenes uses references to cults, festivals, or ceremonies to support this political point: Aeschines has poured libations and sung the paean with the enemy, and he has caused disruption to an Athenian festival through his detrimental policies. Hardly ever does Demosthenes accuse Aeschines directly of being flawed in a religious way. The clearest instances of argumentation based on religion are the admonitions to the judges to heed the heliastic oath and therefore not to acquit Aeschines.

After Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire in 334–323 B.C., Greek civilization broadened out to encompass all the eastern Mediterranean. This new era has been given in modern times the term “Hellenistic,” Greek-like but not exactly the same as classical Hellenism. Now poets, artists, even philosophers were subsidized, not by aristocrats, but by the kings of Egypt, Syria, and other states and often obsequiously celebrated the virtues of their royal patrons. Although aristocrats lost political power first to Macedon and then eventually to Rome, they remained locally potent. Greek aristocracy had a vital role in many aspects of the amazing development of Hellenic civilization. Its influence did not end when ancient civilization flickered out but was reborn in the Renaissance; thereafter it has had powerful effects in the course of modern Western history.

Few, if any, persons in the ancient Graeco-Roman world have inspired as much writing, by both ancient and modern authors, as Alexander the Great of Macedon. A prominent feature of modern Alexander scholarship is analysis of and/or commentary on the ancient writers about Alexander. Modern scholars concerned with Alexander source criticism have concentrated their efforts on the so-called ‘Alexander historians’, the biographers, memoirists, and pamphleteers who centred their works on the person of Alexander himself. Largely overlooked, as a result, are the works of broader-ranging historians, memoirists, and pamphleteers who, while not focusing their works around the career and personality of Alexander, nevertheless certainly had a good deal to say about that redoubtable individual. This chapter reviews what Polybius of Megalopolis, the only surviving primary Hellenistic historian, had to say about Alexander, and what can be learned from Polybius about the views of such contemporaries of Alexander as Demetrius of Phalerum and Hieronymus of Cardia.

This chapter contextualises the major accounts of Alexander the Great's reign that were produced in the early empire and considers the writers' aspirations, their treatment of fashionable motifs and current issues, and the limits of their originality. The focal figure in the story of Rome's emergence as the dominant ‘world’ power was Pompey, but the Caearian coups made it difficult for historians to avoid demonstrating or betraying their attitude to Pompey and his rivals. These preoccupations of the period are shown to have aroused fresh interest in the Alexander period. In this context one must see the pretensions, enthusiasms, and partisanship of Diodorus, Timagenes, and Trogus, hut in writing history on a grand scale Diodorus and Timagenes seem to have found little of great originality to say about Alexander.

This book analyses and explains some of the huge body of romance that has adhered to the historical Alexander the Great of Macedon and addresses the perennial problems of kingship and imperialism. It argues that the historical tradition of the conquest of Mexico in the early 16th century can shed light on the actions of Alexander in the far east (and vice versa), and also introduces some basic issues of imperial ideology — attitudes towards the subject peoples and justification of conquest. The dark side of monarchy is also explored by looking at conspiracies in the Macedonian and Persian courts, along with the political impact of panhellenism, Alexander's concept of kingship, the basic authenticity of Diodorus's description of Hephaestion's pyre, Alexander's death, and the exchanges between Alexander and his senior general Parmenio.

There are similarities between the conquests of Alexander the Great and those of the Spaniards in Central America. In both cases, the spectacular campaigns of a handful of years changed the political map of the world. Alexander invaded Asia Minor in the spring of 334 BC, and a mere four years later he had overrun the greater part of the Near East, occupied the central capitals of the Persian Empire, and annexed the accumulated treasure of the imperial people he defeated. As a direct result of the campaigns, the world from Macedon in the north to Egypt in the south and to Afghanistan in the east came under the control of a Graeco-Roman elite. Similarly between 1519 and 1522 a group of Spaniards under Hernan Cortés extended the rule of the Spanish crown from the east coast of Mexico over almost all Central America. This chapter looks at the empires built by Alexander of Macedon and Cortés of Castile.

Alexander the Great, in one known case, believed in a conspiracy that did not exist, on the part of supporters of Cleitus. Anyone accused of suspecting conspiracies on the part of Alexander, where some do not see them, can only reply that, like the Emperor Domitian, Alexander has only himself to blame if we approach his claims, as transmitted by court historiography, with some suspicion. The war between Alexander of Macedon and Darius III of Persia and the continuation of Alexander's campaign is marked by a series of conspiracies, allegations of conspiracy, and attempts to anticipate conspiracy. Alexander was involved in the conspiracy that led to the death of Philip II. This chapter also discusses the conspiracy against Philotas and whether Dimnus was involved in the plot to kill him, as well as conspiracies by Macedonians against Alexander.

In 335 BC Alexander of Macedon laid siege to the city of Thebes, which was in revolt, and razed it to the ground. Contrast the treatment of Thebes with that of Plataea. After his victory at Gaugamela in 331, Alexander ordered the rebuilding of Plataea, which had been destroyed by Thebes in 373, because of her services to Greece in 479 BC. Thus, Alexander destroyed one famous Greek city and rebuilt another. Alexander's motive in destroying Thebes was to deter future revolts. The razing of Thebes and the restoration of Plataea were part and parcel of the same policy, and that policy was panhellenic. This chapter discusses panhellenism as an ideology during the time of Alexander the Great, some of his actions that relate to a panhellenist programme, and panhellenism after the burning of Persepolis.

This chapter argues that Alexander the Great's kingship of Asia, as proclaimed in 331 BC, did not mean, as is often thought, the Persian kingship, but was a unique creation of Alexander himself. In addition, Alexander's Persian innovations after the death of Darius in 330 were not primarily designed, as is widely believed, to establish Alexander as Great King, but rather were meant to reform Alexander's kingship by addition of the Persian component, and to establish Alexander, ultimately, as an absolute monarch. According to Plutarch, by Alexander's conquest of Darius at Gaugamela in October 331, the empire of Persia was thought to be completely destroyed, and a few days later, at the nearby village of Arbela, Alexander was proclaimed ‘King of Asia’. Although Plutarch is the only source to provide this information, it is accepted by virtually all historians as historical. Only Franz Altheim and Paul Goukowsky are known to have rejected it.

This book's sources for the reign of Alexander the Great of Macedon are full of set pieces, occasions in which the usually transparent ropes moving people and scenery about in ordinary narrative become evident. This chapter looks at two themes in Alexander history in which it is not so easy to draw the line between what happened and what did not, between the real and the significantly augmented event. It focuses on the series of anecdotes about the advice that Parmenio gave Alexander as well as the series of occasions on which Alexander isolated himself and the rest of the army, usually, then sought to persuade him to return. When one looks carefully at its constituent elements, the theme of Parmenio's advice proves more nuanced than has often been recognised. Parmenio is generally portrayed as rational, cautious, and fearful of risk-taking while Alexander is viewed as an impulsive, daring, and even fond of risks.

Politics in the ancient Mediterranean can be described as a long multi-polar anarchy. The fearsome king of Macedon, Alexander III the Great, could have established a permanent political entity encompassing the entire Mediterranean. But the conqueror of Asia died prematurely in Babylon at the age of 32, and the empire he had build almost immediately fell apart. However, one thought has come to dominate modern scholarship on this dilemma: that Rome was exceptionally successful within its world because Roman society and culture, and Rome's stance toward other states, were particularly warlike, particularly aggressive, and particularly violent—and not merely in modern terms but in ancient terms as well.

This chapter focuses on allegations of foreign and domestic plotting in ancient Athens. It explains that the accusation of being an agent of a foreign power seems to have been commonplace among Athenian politicians. The chapter analyzes allegations of plots that are most revealing of speakers' use of the rhetoric of conspiracy, particularly in relation to Philip of Macedon's design to control Greece, and to men who colluded with him. It also describes, and provides commentaries on, the relevant works of Demosthenes.

This chapter focuses on the rhetoric of international conspiracies in ancient Athens. It highlights Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip of Macedon as constantly interfering in Greek affairs and another speechwriter's charge that Cleomenes of Naucratis in Egypt was attempting to control the international grain trade. The chapter compares Philip and Cleomenes's alleged machinations with modern global conspiracy theories, and suggests that both ancient and modern conspirators were active practically everywhere, unfettered by geographical and national boundaries or by loyalties other than to themselves.

Having survived the Persian invasions and the Peloponnesian War, few Athenians seem to have worried that Athens might actually come under a foreign power's sway. In terms of leadership, fourth-century Athens seems to have found itself at something of a disadvantage when compared with the fifth-century polis. The Athenians' willingness to prosecute and condemn their own commanders had begun to take a toll on Athens' military efficiency at least as early as the 420s. The great crisis Athens faced around midcentury is discussed. The chapter specifically addresses the rise of Macedon and the end of Athenian democracy. To those who see Macedon's triumph as inevitable, the Athenian demos and Athens' leaders bear little responsibility for the loss of their independent government. Athenian democratic politics deserves to be analyzed carefully as one of the reasons for Macedon's success.

This chapter examines the nature of the Roman settlement of Greece in 167 BC which abolished the kingdom of Macedonia by focusing on the defeat of Antiochus and the Peace of Apamea (188). It first looks at the alliance between Rome and Philip of Macedon in the war against Antiochus before turning to Perseus and his concerted effort to re-establish relations with the Achaean League. It then considers the fall of Macedon and the sack of Corinth, along with their impact on Greece.