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One of the benefits for the Allies of Swedish neutrality and independence was the ability of agents based in Sweden to gather intelligence from, and support resistance in, occupied Europe while all the belligerents gathered intelligence in Sweden. The Swedish authorities were initially extremely nervous about Danish and Norwegian nationals operating as agents on Swedish territory. Sweden rightly anticipated proxy conflicts on Swedish territory or being used as a base for unauthorised armed operations against German forces in occupied Denmark and Norway. There seems to have been a certain amount of clandestine warfare between German agents and Norwegian agents in Stockholm leading to death as well as injury. During 1939–44, almost 2,000 people were arrested for activity against the state with espionage and intelligence activity accounting for 60 per cent, sabotage forming just over 11 per cent and the remaining 29 per cent detained on miscellaneous associated charges.

This chapter analyses two series which aimed to present a more authentic portrayal of intelligence activity, embracing a new ‘realism’ grounded in documentary detail and procedure. Special Branch (ITV, 1969-74) focused on the Metropolitan Police unit of the name whose remit centred on issues of national security, the series incorporating the thematic interests of the spy genre into the less heightened generic trains of the police procedural. This chapter explores how this focus converged with a concurrent trend in single plays towards increased location filming on ‘gritty’ 16mm film, with Special Branch’s adoption of this style from its 1973 revamp by Euston Films enhancing to a new narrative interest in international terrorism. This is contrasted with The Sandbaggers (ITV, 1978-80), a series focused on the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) which made an alternative claim to ‘realism’ through mounting an unprecedented examination of the bureaucracies underpinning intelligence activity.

Chapter Two looks at Ministerial use of, and attitude towards, intelligence after Labour’s 1945 Election victory, drawing on the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). While it has been argued that Attlee, a committed internationalist, was opposed to any hostility towards the Soviet Union, the chapter shows that he was kept fully aware of Soviet interests and intentions despite his commitment to renewed Anglo-Soviet relations. In addition to highlighting the role of intelligence in early Cold War crises, particularly the Berlin Blockade, it also looks at Ministerial doubts about the intelligence community, particularly those of Attlee himself. By 1949, he had grown increasingly critical of the intelligence services and, a year later, ordered a review of the intelligence community by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, which is explored here for the first time.

This chapter examines the context, strength, and development of intelligence accountability in the U.K., focusing on surveillance, and it concludes that intelligence accountability in the U.K. has been limited in scope and bureaucratic in function. It first discusses the historical and legal contexts of surveillance and assesses the development and impact of surveillance law. It draws attention to the number and range of oversight bodies, but also identifies their inefficiencies and flaws, including their fragmented coverage and their emphasis on legal compliance rather than broader notions of accountability. The chapter notes that, in the absence of broader approaches to accountability, civil society campaigns against surveillance have filled the gap. Yet, although civil society interventions are important, they cannot take the role of rigorous official governmental review bodies. The chapter reflects on potential legal and institutional reforms to implement stronger independent oversight in the U.K.

This chapter continues description of the disinformation campaign mounted by Egypt and the USSR to implant the deceptive impression that all Soviet advisers were expelled by President Anwar Sadat in July 1972 as part of a rift with Moscow and a shift to the US camp in the Cold War. The advisers were recalled en masse to Cairo, which had to be noticed by foreign observers, but soon were unobtrusively reposted to Egyptian formations where they continued preparations for an anti-Israeli offensive and induction of offensive weapons such as long-range bombers which supposedly had been refused by the Soviets. Among other components of this deception, supposed Israeli spy Ashraf Marwan is documented as falsely advising an MI6 agent that all Soviets were gone and Egypt would revert to procurement of British weapons – which reinforces evidence that he was actually an Egyptian double agent. US statesman Henry Kissinger assisted the ruse by feigning surprise at Sadat’s move, which had actually been coordinated with him at the Moscow Summit, and concealing this from others in the administration as well as from Israel.

This chapter analyzes the components of the intelligence communities of the Five Eyes countries and describes the ways in which their forms and functions have converged over time. It argues specifically that the allied countries have structured and organized their intelligence services in similar ways, and regulated them with similar oversight mechanisms, outlining a theory of institutional convergence that explains this phenomenon. Four main processes gave rise to this phenomenon: competition, coercion, normative persuasion, and acculturation. The chapter examines the consequences of institutional convergence for rights protection and intelligence cooperation and recommends areas for further investigation before suggesting how the Five Eyes model of the oversight and structure of intelligence agencies might become the international norm.