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Tensions increased in Cuba in late March and early April of that year; everybody prepared themselves for a violent showdown. Larger numbers of Latin American, European, and U.S. reporters roamed around the island, witnessing first hand police and rebel violence. Batista prepared his troops for a rebel-developed general strike. His troops chased dissidents of types, killing M-26-7 suspects on the spot. Rebel units also destroyed Oriente Province, battling with Cuban forces, stopping traffic. The U.S. Embassy initiated the early phases of evacuation plan for its citizens.

People knew that President Batista had fled. Looking out of their windows, habaneros could only see SIM and police cars fleeing away to an unknown destination. Cubans seemed “afraid to trust their liberation. They were afraid of the empty streets and the silence.” M-26-7 soldiers who had lived underground now cheered and hugged openly, not hating the many demonstrators surrounding them who had become instant rebels. Cars filled with 26th of July emblems strolled the streets honking horns proclaiming the good news. Others broke shop windows, looting clothes and furnishings meant to be sold to rich Cubans.

Few of the tense men crouched on the Granma on November 25, 1956, could have been thinking about the many characteristics of mid-century Cuban-American relations. They were preoccupied with a crowded old boat trying to go out of a Mexican harbour without being caught by Batista's spies. Stormy seas and heavy rains punished the M-26-7 men. They became seasick, the equipment failed, food and water were limited; this caused seven days of punishment. On December 2 of that year, the boat set foot in a muddy mangrove swamp at the south-eastern part of the island adjacent Niquero.

Chapters 1 illustrates the major steps and missteps in Cuba’s state-sponsored campaign to eliminate racial discrimination that began in March 1959. Using government speeches and articles, editorials, and political cartoons from Cuban newspapers, this chapter finds that the revolution’s choice to speak to the unequal situation facing Cubans of color was somewhat surprising given M 26-7’s silence about race during the 1950s war against Batista. However, the need to respond to pressure from Afro-Cuban leaders and to unify the nation against U.S. opposition led the new government to break their silence on racial discrimination. In March 1959, Castro announced the national anti-discrimination campaign and initiated what would become the revolution’s legacy as an antiracist government. Unfortunately, the revolution fell into the same trap that plagued nineteenth-century patriots—the desire to resolve racial inequalities by moving beyond race to a colorblind society.