Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order ...
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Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order perception (HOP) theories over each of them. But HOP theories come in two very different varieties. One is the ‘inner sense’ theory of Armstrong and Lycan, according to which we have a set of inner sense-organs charged with scanning the outputs of our first-order senses to produce higher-order perceptions of our own experiential states. The other is the author’s own dispositional form of HOT theory, according to which the availability of our first-order perceptions to a faculty of higher-order thought confers on those perceptual states a dual higher-order content. Argues that this latter form of HOP theory is superior to the inner-sense theory, and also defends it against the charge that it is vulnerable to the very same arguments that sink FOR theories and actualist HOT theory.Less
Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order perception (HOP) theories over each of them. But HOP theories come in two very different varieties. One is the ‘inner sense’ theory of Armstrong and Lycan, according to which we have a set of inner sense-organs charged with scanning the outputs of our first-order senses to produce higher-order perceptions of our own experiential states. The other is the author’s own dispositional form of HOT theory, according to which the availability of our first-order perceptions to a faculty of higher-order thought confers on those perceptual states a dual higher-order content. Argues that this latter form of HOP theory is superior to the inner-sense theory, and also defends it against the charge that it is vulnerable to the very same arguments that sink FOR theories and actualist HOT theory.
William G. Lycan
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In ”Explanation and Epistemology,” William Lycan proposes that explanation and epistemology are related in at least three ways. First, “to explain something is an epistemic act, and to have something ...
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In ”Explanation and Epistemology,” William Lycan proposes that explanation and epistemology are related in at least three ways. First, “to explain something is an epistemic act, and to have something explained to you is to learn.” The second way in which explanation is related to epistemology is by the idea of explanatory inference (the idea of proceeding from a specific explanandum to the best hypothetical explanation for that explanandum). This leads into a discussion of the third relation, Explanationism, which claims that a belief can be justified if it is arrived at by explanatory inference. Lycan distinguishes four degrees of the theory, but focuses on “Weak Explanationism” (the idea that epistemic justification by explanatory inference is possible) and “Ferocious Explanationism” (the notion that explanatory inference is the only basic form of ampliative inference).Less
In ”Explanation and Epistemology,” William Lycan proposes that explanation and epistemology are related in at least three ways. First, “to explain something is an epistemic act, and to have something explained to you is to learn.” The second way in which explanation is related to epistemology is by the idea of explanatory inference (the idea of proceeding from a specific explanandum to the best hypothetical explanation for that explanandum). This leads into a discussion of the third relation, Explanationism, which claims that a belief can be justified if it is arrived at by explanatory inference. Lycan distinguishes four degrees of the theory, but focuses on “Weak Explanationism” (the idea that epistemic justification by explanatory inference is possible) and “Ferocious Explanationism” (the notion that explanatory inference is the only basic form of ampliative inference).
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199258871
- eISBN:
- 9780191597046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258872.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Discussion of the semantics of ‘Even if . . .’ conditionals against the background of a more general account of the meaning of ‘even’. Merits and demerits of Lycan's account of this.
Discussion of the semantics of ‘Even if . . .’ conditionals against the background of a more general account of the meaning of ‘even’. Merits and demerits of Lycan's account of this.
Rocco J. Gennaro
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016605
- eISBN:
- 9780262298582
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of ...
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This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of consciousness existing at the present time, but this chapter presents a criticism of three related theories that share the common goal of offering a reductive theory of consciousness in mentalistic terms. It begins by offering a criticism of first-order representationalism (FOR), specifically Tye’s PANIC theory and Dretske’s own version of FOR, which refers to theories that attempt to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of first-order intentional states. A rejection of Carruthers’s dual-content or dispositional HOT theory as well as a criticism of Lycan’s higher-order perception (HOP) theory follow suit in an effort to make the case for the HOT Thesis.Less
This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of consciousness existing at the present time, but this chapter presents a criticism of three related theories that share the common goal of offering a reductive theory of consciousness in mentalistic terms. It begins by offering a criticism of first-order representationalism (FOR), specifically Tye’s PANIC theory and Dretske’s own version of FOR, which refers to theories that attempt to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of first-order intentional states. A rejection of Carruthers’s dual-content or dispositional HOT theory as well as a criticism of Lycan’s higher-order perception (HOP) theory follow suit in an effort to make the case for the HOT Thesis.
Carrie Figdor
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198809524
- eISBN:
- 9780191846861
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198809524.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Chapters 8 and 9 present objections to Literalism inspired by its implications. Chapter 8 presents the homuncular functionalist view of psychological explanation, which holds that in order to ...
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Chapters 8 and 9 present objections to Literalism inspired by its implications. Chapter 8 presents the homuncular functionalist view of psychological explanation, which holds that in order to naturalize the mind we need to posit “homunculi”, or ever-simpler capacities, to avoid explaining intelligence with intelligence. Otherwise one commits the homuncular fallacy. The Literalist responds that the fallacy is not a fallacy. Many contemporary mechanistic explanations commonly ascribe the same capacities at many levels in the same decomposition, and there is no plausible way to carve out an exception for psychology. It reinterprets the demand for “discharging” the psychological capacities in terms of finding mathematical models to illuminate old concepts rather than inventing new ones. It also argues that decompositional hierarchies of simple and basic capacities and simple and basic objects are not mirror images of each other.Less
Chapters 8 and 9 present objections to Literalism inspired by its implications. Chapter 8 presents the homuncular functionalist view of psychological explanation, which holds that in order to naturalize the mind we need to posit “homunculi”, or ever-simpler capacities, to avoid explaining intelligence with intelligence. Otherwise one commits the homuncular fallacy. The Literalist responds that the fallacy is not a fallacy. Many contemporary mechanistic explanations commonly ascribe the same capacities at many levels in the same decomposition, and there is no plausible way to carve out an exception for psychology. It reinterprets the demand for “discharging” the psychological capacities in terms of finding mathematical models to illuminate old concepts rather than inventing new ones. It also argues that decompositional hierarchies of simple and basic capacities and simple and basic objects are not mirror images of each other.
