Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-5 of 5 items

  • Keywords: Lycan x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

HOP over FOR, HOT Theory

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order ... More


Explanation and Epistemology

William G. Lycan

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195130058
eISBN:
9780199833481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195130057.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In ”Explanation and Epistemology,” William Lycan proposes that explanation and epistemology are related in at least three ways. First, “to explain something is an epistemic act, and to have something ... More


‘Even if . . . ’

Jonathan Bennett

in A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199258871
eISBN:
9780191597046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199258872.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Discussion of the semantics of ‘Even if . . .’ conditionals against the background of a more general account of the meaning of ‘even’. Merits and demerits of Lycan's account of this.


Assessing Three Close Rivals

Rocco J. Gennaro

in The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262016605
eISBN:
9780262298582
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of ... More


Literalism and Mechanistic Explanation

Carrie Figdor

in Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198809524
eISBN:
9780191846861
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809524.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Chapters 8 and 9 present objections to Literalism inspired by its implications. Chapter 8 presents the homuncular functionalist view of psychological explanation, which holds that in order to ... More


View: